For some reason or other Mr. Eden is not interested in this aspect of the matter. In the "five stages" of his plan, there are no preventative measures in this respect. He is carried away by formal constitutionalism, procedural questions of elections, and the like. He apparently considers that everything else will take care of itself; it is as if it would be enough to adopt a good electoral law and to work out on paper a number of stages relating to the unification of Germany in order to insure that a unified Germany will become democratic and peace-loving.

The Soviet people, however, cannot agree with such an approach to so serious a question-the question of the re-establishment of a unified Germany as a democratic and peace-loving State.

Precisely because of the enormous difficulties which have descended on the German people as the result of 13 years of Hitlerite domination, it can't be expected that everything will take care of itself. It is possible that just as in the time of Hitler the worst elements, that is the antidemocratic elements, may take advantage of the temporary postwar difficulties of the German people and appear on the crest of the wave of political life. Magnates of industry and finance will be found who will again spend many millions of marks and dollars simply to place in power those people who will stop at nothing for the sake of them. There are such reckless people, adventurers of the revenge-seeking type, in Western Germany. Quite recently, for example, British occupation authorities spoke of the revival of Fascist organizations in Western Germany. This is a real threat not only to Germany's neighbors but also to the German people themselves and, above all, to the basic masses of the population, i. e., the workers of Germany.

It is clear from all this why the Soviet Government cannot support Mr. Eden's plan.

The plan of the three Western States is not in conformity with the interests of lasting peace and does not provide for the elementary interests of democracy in Germany. We cannot on this basis insure such a unification of Germany as would contribute to her restoration as a democratic and peace-loving State. Hasty agreement to this plan can lead to new dangerous ventures on the part of German militarism. This is not in the interest of the German people, nor is it in the interest of Germany's neighbors or of European security, and it is not even in the interest of Great Britain and the United States of America.

First of all, we would attain agreement on the fundamental question: Whether we agree that our task is one and the same as the task of the democratic elements of Germany. Are we agreed that this task consists of the need to insure the restoration of unified Germany as a democratic peace-loving State?

Perhaps there are adherents of such a position as the following: That it is sufficient for us to concern ourselves with organizational and technical questions of election procedure and that we are not concerned with the question as to where such elections will lead. Possibly, such an opinion is reflected in the draft set forth by Mr. Eden.

We cannot agree with this position. We consider that the Four Powers cannot escape the responsibility of insuring the development of Germany on a peaceful and democratic basis after German elections. It is on this question that we must first come to an agreement.

There are two basic prerequisites of the insurance of freedom in a unified Germany and, in addition, of her further development along peaceful and democratic lines. These prerequisites are related on the one hand to questions of an internal nature and, on the other, to questions of external character.

Let us begin with the fundamental prerequisites of the reunification of Germany on a peace-loving and democratic basis.

We are all striving for free and democratic German elections. This should lead us to the conclusion that such elections ought to be carried out by the Germans themselves and not by the foreign occupation authorities. As regards Eastern Germany the Soviet Union is not afraid of leaving the preparation and carrying out of elections to the Germans themselves and their democratic organizations. Both in Eastern and Western Germany the aim of democratic elements is that unified Germany should be a democratic and peaceful State. If our four States were to support this aim and act in concert, there is no doubt that unified Germany would firmly embark upon such a path and that all-German elections would correspond to the interests of democracy and peace in Europe.

The three-power plan does not serve these aims. The serious drawback of this plan is that it reflects distrust of the German democratic elements. One cannot agree that the question of the unification of Germany should be placed entirely in the hands of the Occupation Powers. The Germans should not be set aside. It would be insulting to the German people, who have considerable democratic traditions.

It appears that even the electoral law for the all-German elections is not to be worked out by the Germans themselves. At the time of the Weimar Republic the Germans had their own electoral law to which there was no objection in democratic circles. Both the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic have electoral laws, which, by the way, Mr. Eden finds satisfactory. It is possible that the Germans themselves cannot draft a new all-German electoral law which would meet the requirements of present circumstances? It is necessary that such laws for the German people be drafted in the United Kingdom?

Mr. Eden's plan goes in the opposite direction. That plan proposes that the elections should be carried out under the supervision of the four foreign States who have occupation armed forces on German territory. This is a further extension of the rights of the occupation forces to the detriment of the rights of the German people, which is wrong.

This proposal is also full of lack of confidence in the German democratic elements. However, if we could insure that no truly democratic organizations would be pushed aside or deprived of the possibility of active cooperation in the preparation and carrying out of the elections, then no such foreign control over all-German elections would be necessary. It would be far better to let the Germans decide for themselves what they should do, in order to insure a normal, democratic order for the preparation and carrying out of all-German elections. This would conform with the principles of democracy.

In the event that we should agree that the carrying out of the elections is a matter for the Germans themselves, we should then arrive at the corresponding practical conclusions. And in that case we could not further postpone taking practical steps for the creation of a unified Germany.

We should help the Germans to set up forthwith an appropriate all-German authority. The best way to do this would be for the Parliaments of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic to form a provisional all-German government, with the wide participation of democratic organizations. Such a provisional all-German government could be found by agreement between Eastern and Western Germany, either to replace the existing governments in Berlin and Bonn, or, if this should prove difficult at the present time, to exist temporarily together with these governments.

Undoubtedly, the Germans themselves could prepare and carry out free all-German elections in conformity with the interests of the German people, their freedom, and the strengthening of Germany's national independence, not worse but better than the Occupation Authorities. Our four Governments should give every assistance to Eastern and Western Germany in expediting and facilitating the creation of such an all-German center.

If we refuse to assist in the setting up of a provisional all-German government, we shall only hamper and delay the restoration of the unification of the German State. On the other hand, if we recognize the necessity of constituting a provisional all-German government, we not only would help to realize the just rights of the Germans to the creation of a unified, democratic, and peace-loving Germany, but would thus be able to solve a number of practical questions, which would even today ease the life of the German population, insure their

rights, and at the same time contribute to the expansion of economic, trade, and cultural relations between Eastern and Western Germany. In order to insure to the German people the right to decide for themselves their national affairs, we should recommend to the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic that they convene a conference of plenipotentiary representatives of Eastern and Western Germany without delay. Such a conference would come to an agreement on the procedure of setting up a provisional all-German government, on its composition, functions, tasks, and authority.

All this would enable free all-German elections to be carried out in the near future in an atmosphere of freedom. It would also enable Germany to call an all-German constituent assembly, freely elected. Such an all-German parliament could set up, not a provisional government, but a government endowed with full powers, based on a democratic constitution.

The Soviet Government considers that all these measures should be carried out by agreement of our four States. We should be particularly careful, however, not to place the interests of one State in opposition to those of another.

It is understood that the carrying out of all-German elections should be realized under conditions of complete freedom of activity for all democratic organizations. This does not mean that we should not take any measures against the rebirth of activity on the part of Fascist and militaristic organizations. It is also necessary to exclude the possibility of any attempts at pressure by large monopolies on the preparation and carrying out of the elections.

Let us revert to the question of external prerequisites of insuring the peaceful and democratic development of a unified Germany. This is linked with the necessity to insure the national independence of Germany.

In this connection we find ourselves once more up against the agreement on the European Defense Community, i. e. up against the Bonn and Paris agreements signed by the West German authorities.

One cannot overlook the fact that the Paris agreement on the participation by Western Germany in the European army is incompatible with the interests of the national independence of a unified Germany. It is incompatible with the interests of European security insofar as it leads to the restoration of German militarism.

In order to insure, in the external field, the prerequisites of the creation of a free and peace-loving Germany as an independent state, it is necessary to desist from imposing upon Germany the agreement on the European Defense Community, i. e. on the participation of Western Germany in the Western European army. If that agreement, providing for participation by Western Germany in a military

grouping of Western European states for 50 years, remains in force, it would mean that there is an intention to extend that agreement to a unified Germany as well. In other words, it is intended to put the fetters of the European Defense Community not only on Western but also on Eastern Germany, which is, of course, impossible.

According to the Paris agreement, Western Germany can unite with Eastern Germany only on the condition that she remain true to her obligations concerning her participation in the Western European army. Consequently, unification of Germany becomes possible only if the attempt to draw Eastern Germany into the European Defense Community together with Western Germany is successful, and to this the German Democratic Republic strongly objects. Thus, the Paris agreement on the European Defense Community is, in fact, directed against unification of Germany and, therefore, also against the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

From the aforesaid only one conclusion can be drawn: In order to carry out the plan of unification of Germany and to make it possible to conclude a peace treaty with Germany, it is necessary to desist from imposing upon Western Germany participation in the military grouping of Western European states, all the more so since such participation is incompatible not only with the interests of the German people but also with the safeguarding of lasting peace and security in Europe.

In the statement made by M. Bidault today [see under “European Security," No. 51], he expressed a certain discontent with the criticism of the European Defense Community by the Soviet delegation, which the latter considered to be very mild and which consisted of stressing the negative character of the community from the point of view of international relations in Europe. It will not be difficult to prove the inadequacy of all the arguments put forward in favor of that community. It is impossible to defend plans which aim not at the reinforcement of peace but at the preparation of a new war in Europe.

Let us sum up. The proposal of Great Britain put forward by Mr. Eden and supported by the U. S. A. and France is unacceptable for the following reasons:

This proposal is in essence an attempt to entrust the Occupation Authorities with the carrying out of the all-German elections and actually to preclude the Germans from participation in these elections. No good will come of this.

The proposal of the three powers does not insure a real freedom of elections and does not contain any provisions guarding against political pressure by foreign states in the elections. This proposal implies that the elections must take place while the Occupation