and for the solution of the conflict by peaceful means." What these measures are is not specified. However, to the extent that they may be measures of pacific settlement, they will be defined and the procedures for employing them set forth in the separate inter-American treaty to be concluded at the Ninth International Conference of American States. Therefore, if it is feasible or practicable after a conflict has begun to attempt to reinstitute pacific settlement measures, they would more appropriately be taken under that instrument. This conclusion is strengthened by the language of article 8 discussed above.

Mechanism for the Operation of the Treaty

In order to bring the treaty into operation in a given case, two types of mechanism were recognized to be necessary: First, a forum in which the consultation can take place and the decisions can be reached, and second, a mechanism to facilitate joint action under the treaty in implementation of the decisions of the consultation.

THE CONSULTATIVE ORGAN

As to the first problem, of the original proposals for the treaty submitted in 1945, those of Bolivia and Ecuador provided that consultations should be carried out through the Pan American Union Governing Board. The Panamanian Government favored the creation of a special organ which should exercise all political functions. The remaining five drafts left the choice of mechanism or agency to the parties in each instance.1 In the United States proposals this was stated in a general provision as follows:

"The consultations and measures referred to in the preceding articles shall be carried out through such procedures and agencies as are now in existence, or as may hereafter be established by agreement of the High Contracting Parties."

The revised Mexican proposals submitted to the Conference provided that the meetings of consultation of the ministers of foreign affairs would be the normal forum, except that in each case the Governing Board could request authorization so to act. The Guatemalan proposal stated that consultation in the event of a threat of aggression should be undertaken through the Board, as did the revised draft

submitted by Uruguay. The Peruvian proposal for the inclusion of extensive provisions on pacific settlement entrusted to the Governing Board the task of "promoting the meeting of consultation" for this purpose.

After studying all these proposals it was decided that in view of the serious character of the action contemplated under the treaty the meeting of consultation of the ministers of foreign affairs should be the normal organ of consultation.

In order, however, to make a special amendment of the treaty unnecessary in the event that the forthcoming Ninth International Conference of American States should alter the character of the meetings or abolish them, the alternative phrase was added that the consultations would be carried out either by the meetings of foreign ministers "or in the manner or by the organ which in the future may be agreed upon." Decision to do so would, of course, have to be embodied in an instrument having a juridical status equal to that of the treaty.

In recognition of the fact that certain cases might not require the convocation of a meeting of the Foreign Ministers, or permit sufficient time to convoke such a meeting, the initial draft prepared by the subcommittee provided that the Pan American Union Governing Board could act as an interim-consultative organ, "whenever so delegated by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs." This quoted phrase, although supported by three countries, was eliminated as unnecessary since in any event the members of the Board would act only on the authorization of their governments. As finally approved, this provision reads:

Article 12. "The Governing Board of the Pan American Union may act provisionally as an organ of consultation until the meeting of the Organ of Consultation referred to in the preceding Article takes place."

Some opposition was expressed, particularly by the Chilean delegation, to the idea of using the Governing Board as an organ of consultation on the ground that there was no assurance that all the countries on the Board would be parties to the treaty. However, a Paraguayan amendment, to provide that the Governing Board would be "composed for this purpose of representatives of the States who are parties to the Treaty," failed of approval because of a general feeling that to permit two potentially different compositions for such an important body as the Board might have divisive implications for the inter-American system. Nevertheless, after reconsideration of the problem, a drafting subcommittee (composed of Brazil, Mexico, Peru,

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and United States) proposed a similar solution in the following language: "The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the representatives of each State on the Governing Board of the Pan American Union shall be those of the high contracting parties which have ratified the Treaty." It was agreed, however, in the full Commission that the membership of nonratifying states in the Governing Board as an organ of consultation was not of serious consequence so long as participation in the decisions was limited to the parties to the treaty.

This machinery of consultation is set in motion by a request addressed to the Governing Board by any party under article 13:

"The consultations shall be initiated at the request addressed to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union by any of the Signatory States which has ratified the Treaty."

In order to prevent possible unnecessary consultations, the Board nevertheless has discretion to determine as a threshold question whether a sufficiently colorable case exists to justify the consultation and then to decide the time and place and, as indicated above, whether it should act provisionally as the Organ of Consultation.

MECHANISM FOR THE EXECUTION OF MEASURES

With respect to the mechanism for joint action under the treaty to facilitate or implement the decisions of the consultation, the treaty is less precise. Although the proposals originally submitted by the Governments of Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay had included provisions concerning the establishment of an Inter-American military agency, it was agreed by a large majority of the governments in the preconference consultations that the creation of such an agency should be left for consideration by the Ninth International Conference of American States. These proposals likewise contained specific articles regarding the provision of the armed forces, but it was felt that such problems could be worked out subsequently, perhaps with the advice of the military agency. Furthermore, in other than military fields the procedures to be employed in carrying out decisions under the treaty might vary widely depending upon the particular case.

It was, therefore, decided that the Rio treaty should contain only the following generally worded provisions:

Article 21. “The measures agreed upon by the Organ of Consultation shall be executed through the procedures and agencies now existing or those which may in the future be established."

This wording, based on a provision in the original United States proposals, not only provides ample flexibility in the use of the mech

anism and procedures for action in a given case, but also preserves for the Ninth Conference greater freedom of action in the creating of a military agency or any other body or set of procedures through which the treaty might be implemented.

Voting Provisions and Effect of Decisions

The Act of Chapultepec contained no provisions with respect to voting. Only three of the seven original proposals for the treaty submitted by the governments (those of Ecuador, Panama, and the United States)1 contained substantive voting provisions, providing that agreement on collective measures should be reached by a vote of twothirds of the parties. As a rule decisions of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union and of the meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs are normally taken by majority vote, binding only upon concurring States. In practice unanimity is always sought and usually obtained.

It was decided, however, that specific provisions should be included in the treaty on this point (arts. 14, 16, 17, and 20). In brief, these articles provide that decisions concerning the initiation of consultation and concerning liaison with the United Nations shall be by majority vote; all other decisions require two-thirds vote and those to employ the measures specified in article 8 will bind all parties, except that no state shall be required to use armed force without its consent.

QUALIFICATIONS FOR VOTING

The treaty lays down two conditions to be met to entitle a state to participate in voting: (1) The state must have ratified the treaty (art. 14); and (2) in the case of a dispute between American states. exclusively, the state cannot be a directly interested party (art. 18). The first qualification is an obvious necessity. The second requires examination.

In recognition of the principle, embodied in the United Nations Charter, that the parties to a dispute should not judge their own case, it was proposed that these parties be excluded from voting in the Governing Board. In the course of the discussion in the committee, it was pointed out that while such exclusion is appropriate in the case of a dispute among two or more American states, in the event of an attack by a non-American state on an American state, under such a

1 Appendix two, part 1D.

provision the victim would be deprived of the right to vote on matters vitally affecting its own defense. Although initial disagreement to this view was expressed by Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, because of the fear that it would introduce a distinction between an attack by an American state and one by a non-American state contrary to the basic decision previously taken that no such distinction should be made, it was pointed out that this would not contravene the basic principle and related only to a procedural matter. Consequently it was finally agreed that the exclusion of the parties from voting would apply only when all parties to the dispute were American states.

It was made clear in the discussions in the committee of the Conference that the language, "the parties directly interested," is intended to be limited to the immediate and initial parties to the dispute. It is not of course construable as including in addition all those states which, in the event of an armed attack, assist the victim in fulfillment of their obligation under article 3.

In order to determine who are the parties to an inter-American dispute, an initial vote would have to be taken by the Organ of Consultation. In such a vote those who are alleged to be parties must themselves be permitted to vote and, as a procedural matter, it is assumed that the decision will be taken by a simple majority of the contracting states.

MAJORITY REQUIRED FOR DECISIONS

From the beginning there was complete and general agreement that whatever the nature of the majority to be required for substantive decisions under the treaty, the initial procedural and administrative decisions should be taken by a simple majority. Article 16 of the treaty so provides, stating such decisions are to be taken by "an absolute majority of the Members entitled to vote" [emphasis added], thus excluding from the computation both nonratifying states and states who are parties to an inter-American dispute.

The questions to which the majority decision applies would include the determination as to who the parties are, if the dispute is between American states; the decision to hold a consultation; the time; the place; whether the Governing Board will act as a provisional organ of consultation; and incidental questions relating to the transmittal of information to the Security Council.

Once the consultation is initiated all decisions are to be taken by vote of two-thirds of the ratifying states (art. 17). This differs from the decisions requiring majority vote in that ratifying states which are parties to an inter-American dispute, although ineligible to vote, are