counted in determining the number necessary to obtain a two-thirds majority.

The requirement of two-thirds reflects the view of the overwhelming majority of the American Republics as expressed in the consultations carried out prior to the Conference. As pointed out by the Peruvian delegation in the discussions at the Conference, it represents a "middle ground" between the unanimity rule favored by Argentina and the majority rule proposed by Uruguay. The decision to require twothirds majority was reached, after discussion, on the ground that such a majority is sufficiently high to assure that action taken will reflect the general collective will of the American community and can thus be made effective, yet it avoids the possibility that a small minority might paralyze the operation of the treaty.

The issues which if put to a specific vote in the Organ of Consultation would require the approval of a two-thirds majority include the following: Whether “armed attack” has taken place requiring collective action under article 3, whether there has been other aggression committed, or whether a situation exists endangering the peace of America in order to bring the provisions of article 6 into operation; questions arising in connection with the application of article 7; and the nature, extent and timing of the collective measures enumerated in article 8 which should be taken.

As a procedural matter it is noted that these provisions concerning the qualifications for voting and the majority required for decisions determine the quorum necessary to permit the Organ of Consultation to take decisions. Article 19 provides that

"To constitute a quorum in all the meetings referred to in the previous Articles, it shall be necessary that the number of States represented shall be at least equal to the number of votes necessary for the taking of the decision."

BINDING EFFECT OF DECISIONS

A significant advance over previous inter-American agreements is the obligation accepted by the parties to comply (with one exception) with decisions of two-thirds of them to put into effect the punitive measures enumerated in article 8. This obligation is embodied in the following language:

Article 20. "Decisions which require the application of the measures specified in Article 8 shall be binding upon all the Signatory States which have ratified this Treaty, with the sole exception that no State shall be required to use armed force without its consent."

This article is the result of a United States initiative in amending its original proposals, together with a similar proposal by Mexico,1 and reflects the majority sentiment of the American Republics as expressed in the consultations on the principal points of the treaty held in July 1947. This means that when two-thirds of the voting parties decide that the chiefs of diplomatic missions should be recalled from a country, or diplomatic or consular relations broken, or economic, transport, or communications relations interrupted, each of the parties is bound to carry out the decision although it may have voted against it. The "sole exception" that "no State shall be required to use armed force without its consent" does not affect the validity of a decision to use armed force but leaves each state free to decide whether it will use such force. The exact scope of this exception in relation to the measures set forth in article 8 occasioned some debate in the committee of the Conference; it was agreed that the language clearly means that only those specifically enumerated in that article are binding upon all the parties.

The consequences of this binding effect of a two-thirds decision to employ punitive measures is of particular significance for the United States and such other American states as may be members of the Security Council of the United Nations. The treaty represents a regional arrangement for the maintenance of peace. Under article 53 of the United Nations Charter no "enforcement action" may be taken under regional arrangements without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception set forth in article 51 of the Charter that any action may be taken individually or collectively in the event of an armed attack until the Security Council has taken the necessary measures. Thus when the parties decide under the treaty to take measures which amount to "enforcement action," they must request Council authorization, and the position of those American states, members of the Council, on the question of granting such authorization would be determined by the two-thirds binding vote of American states in the decision under the treaty.

Relations to the United Nations, and Consistency With the United Nations Charter

The purpose of regional security arrangements must be to supplement and buttress world-wide efforts for the maintenance of general peace and security and the consequent general subordinance to the

United Nations of regional arrangements in this field is established by the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

The treaty is based squarely on this concept and a number of its provisions reflect its perfect concordance with the United Nations Charter. The preamble, adopting Charter language, refers to an inter-American system "consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations" and to the conclusion of an agreement "concerning those matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which are appropriate for regional action." The treaty contains an important general saving clause to the effect that none of its provisions "shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the United Nations" (art. 10).

This constitutes additional assurance of complete consistency with the Charter and harmony between regional and world systems.

Language similar to article 10 was contained in the original proposals submitted by Panama and the United States and the revised proposals submitted to the Conference by the Mexican delegation. Although initially it was felt by a number of the delegations to be an unnecessary statement of an obvious fact, it was included as a further concrete indication that the assumption by the American Republics of special regional security obligations within the security zone does not imply any change in attitude toward their basic obligations and rights under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world.

Article 10 thus assures that any "enforcement action" decided upon under the treaty to meet dangers to the peace other than an armed attack shall be taken subject to the authorization of the Security Council as provided in article 53 of the Charter discussed above. The Charter does not expressly define "enforcement action" and it was recognized as not appropriate for the treaty to seek to interpret the phrase.

As to action to meet an armed attack, it is specifically provided in article 3, paragraph 4 of the treaty that the individual or collective ineasures "may be taken until the Security Council of the United Nations has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security," an exact reproduction of the language of the selfdefense article of the Charter.

The general requirement that the Security Council be fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation by regional security arrangements is fully satisfied by article 5 of the treaty, which reads:

"The High Contracting Parties shall immediately send to the Security Council of the United Nations, in conformity with Articles 51

and 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, complete information concerning the activities undertaken or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defense or for the purpose of maintaining inter-American peace and security."

The reports to the Council are thus to be "in conformity with Articles 51 and 54." An examination of these clarifies the scope of the quoted language. All collective measures "undertaken or in contemplation" must be reported; all individual measures actually taken to meet an armed attack are to be reported but individual measures to meet an armed attack merely contemplated but not actually taken need not be reported.

The necessity of close contact between the regional and world security organizations indicated the desirability of designating a liaison organ for this purpose. Article 15 entrusts this function to the Pan American Union Governing Board. It provides that the Board— "shall act in all matters concerning this Treaty as an organ of liaison among the Signatory States which have ratified this Treaty and between these States and the United Nations."

It is thus expected that the Board would be the normal channel of communication between the Organ of Consultation and the United Nations for the transmission of information and for the receipt of authorization or direction for collective regional security action. However, as the drafting committee of the Conference clearly indicated and the use of the indefinite article “an organ of liaison" bears out, the article was not intended to preclude in any way direct contact between the individual States and the United Nations.

Protocolary Articles

In the drafting of the protocolary articles (arts. 22-26) three problems of special significance arose. The first relates to the number of ratifications necessary to bring the treaty into effect. The proposals submitted by Bolivia and Uruguay provided that the treaty should become effective among the ratifying states as they deposited their instruments of ratification. The Chilean proposal would bring it into effect upon ratification by a majority of the signatories. The projects of Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, and the United States required ratification by two-thirds and the other proposals were silent on the point.1

After consideration of the problem it was decided to provide that the treaty should come into effect upon ratification by two-thirds of the signatories on the ground that its effectiveness and significance as an instrument of regional security depended upon ratification by a large majority of states of the region. A supporting reason was that all American states will enjoy the protection of the treaty once it is enforced and it is thus only reasonable that its obligations be likewise shared as widely as possible.

The second problem of special significance relates to the procedure whereby American states not participating in the Conference might become parties to the treaty. This concerns especially the two Republics-Nicaragua and Ecuador-which, because of circumstances set forth above, were not able to become original signatories of the treaty at the conclusion of the Conference. To meet this situation, it was proposed and agreed in the drafting subcommittee that an additional article be inserted to the effect that "This treaty shall be open to the adherence and accession of American states which may not have signed it." Under this concept of adherence, however, the acceding states would not be original parties and it was felt that for such a basic instrument of the inter-American system no such distinction among the parties should be made. It was, therefore, decided as proposed by the United States that the provisions should read simply:

"This Treaty is open for signature by the American States at the city of Rio de Janeiro, and shall be ratified by the Signatory States as soon as possible in accordance with their respective constitutional processes" (art. 23).

Thus all American states who enjoy the protection of the treaty whether or not they are now members of the inter-American system have the right to be original signatories on an equal basis.

The third problem concerned the duration and denunciation of the treaty. No specific provisions limiting its duration appeared in any of the proposals submitted. The project submitted by Bolivia specifically stipulated that the treaty would be undenounceable. The projects of Mexico, Panama, and the United States permitted denunciation by individual states. The other proposals made no reference to the matter. After consideration of the matter, the drafting subcommittee initially proposed an article providing for unlimited duration (but permitting amendment by two-thirds vote of the signatories at a consultative meeting convoked by the Pan American Union on petition of five or more states). In making this proposal, the subcommittee took note of the language in the Act of Chapultepec recommending