Military service status of male population, ages 181⁄2-271⁄2, as of June 1962 1 Total male population: Includes continental United States, territories and posses- 2 Entered military service: Includes entries into Active Forces and Reserve com- 3 No tour of extended active duty. May have had active duty for Reserve training. 5 Status of men with no military service: Selective Service boards do not normally 6 Unfit for peacetime service: Includes estimated number of men, in each age class, 7 Fathers and dependency deferments: Includes fathers, potentially eligible for classi- 8 Students and other deferrables: Includes full-time high school or college students, 9 Net availables (nonfather manpower pool): Estimated net number of nonfathers in NOTE.-Detail does not necessarily add to totals due to rounding. Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, I notice on page 4, where you state that you have a requirement for about 76,000 inductees during fiscal year 1963. The total number of personnel that we will have in the armed services over that period is about what, about 2.8 million? Mr. PAUL. Yes, sir; approximately 2.7 million. Chairman RUSSELL. Now, suppose we did not extend the law and were denied these 76,000 inductees. That, of itself, would not have a completely disastrous impact on our military structure. We might be able to absorb 76,000, but what effect do you think it would have on the overall manpower requirements of the Armed Forces if the law were not extended? In other words, what further impact would it have than merely denying these 76,000 men to the Army? Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, I think I might say, first, the 76,000 estimated for this fiscal year is lower than the normal would be. Chairman RUSSELL. I understand. Mr. PAUL. Because of certain things that have happened to the Army in the last couple of years, and this is a cyclical year and a lower year for inductions. Chairman. RUSSELL. With the exception of the Berlin crisis, it has not run above 100,000 for several years, has it? Mr. PAUL. No, sir; it has not. Chairman RUSSELL. That gives us some idea of it. Mr. PAUL. But I think the most important element in answering your question is, the absence of the induction authority would drastically affect the recruitment programs that are now being conducted by the services, both in the enlisted and the officer area. If a man is suddenly released from the obligation for military service for his country, his motivation for a military career or military service is drastically reduced. We feel that would be the most important, the most dangerous or difficult aspect of not continuing. Chairman RUSSELL. Do you think that you could maintain or keep as many as 2.5 million men in the armed services over a period of the next 4 years without this law being on the statute books? Mr. PAUL. No, sir; I do not. Chairman RUSSELL. We have a great deal of talk every time this extension is up about the effect that it has in filling the manpower requirements of the Armed Forces through giving young men an opportunity to select the branch of service and the type of training that they desire. But, when the services come before this committee on their general statements, they do not give any great credit to the Selective Service System. They just talk about how they have to fill their requirements by volunteer means. It tends to lead one to believe, just in hearing them, that even if this law were not extended, that they could continue to fill their requirements through volunteers. Your statement, I believe, is that that would not be true; that they could not get the necessary manpower voluntarily. Mr. PAUL. I do not believe they could, Mr. Chairman. Chairman RUSSELL. I would like very much to get some better system. With all of its faults and imperfections, the present system is the only practical way we can get the manpower that we require. It is somewhat like the seniority system in the Congress in selecting committee chairmen. You can always find something wrong with it, but when it comes to getting some alternative, the alternative has more objections than what you have. I wish you would offer for the record, Mr. Secretary, a table that would give us information on the military service requirements imposed by law in all the nations with whom we are associated in the NATO organization, in SEATO, and I believe CENTO is the other one, is it not? Mr. PAUL. Yes, sir; CENTO. Chairman RUSSELL. People ask me from time to time why it is necessary for us to have a Selective Service System which has, undoubtedly, the effect of compelling military service on the part of some Americans who would prefer not to serve in the military forces during the cold-war period, when one of our associates like Great Britain has no selective service at the present time or any compulsory military requirement. Are there many other NATO countries that do not have some form of compulsion? Mr. PAUL. No, sir, I believe that Canada and the United Kingdom are the only ones that do not have conscription at this time. Chairman RUSSELL. England has reduced its Military Establishment very markedly in the last several years. What steps have they taken to secure even the number of people that they have at the present time? Have they increased compensation or done anything else to make military service more attractive? If you do not have that available, you can offer it for the record. I just want something in the record to show why it is that our allies can maintain the military strength, they think they should have, even if we do not think it is comparable to their obligation. Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, England did offer certain inducements to retain people who were already in the service during the Berlin crisis, but their Armed Forces, as you say, have been so drastically reduced, that, to my knowledge, they have not offered any exceptional inducements, but I will find that out and supply it for the record. (The following information was subsequently furnished by the Department of Defense:) EXPERIENCE OF UNITED KINGDOM SINCE TERMINATION OF NATIONAL SERVICE 1 In 1957, as a result of a complete reorientation of her defense posture involving increased reliance on the nuclear deterrent, Britain decided on a smaller, but all-regular, armed force. The plan, as originally announced, called for a reduction of total military strength from 690,000 in 1957 to approximately 390,000 by end-1962. National service callups would stop at end-1960 and all conscriptees would be released by end-1962 unless voluntary recruiting failed to provide the required manpower. It was contended that substantial military manpower savings could be accomplished through reduced training requirements, centralization of functions, and cutbacks of headquarters and administrative overhead staff. Actual military strength developments have been broadly consistent with the original plan. Total active duty military strength was cut back to 485,000 by April 1961 and latest estimates provide for a further reduction to 432,700 by April 1963. By April 1961, the number of national service personnel on active duty had been reduced to 78,000, or 16 percent of total strength, and it was then estimated that all conscriptees would be released by the end of 1962. However, because of the Berlin situation, measures were taken to retain some of the conscripts for an additional 6 months active service beyond this date, if required. Voluntary recruitment capability even in the face of the sharp reductions in force was recognized at the outset as the key uncertainty in the British program to attain an all-regular force. A number of measures were therefore taken after 1957 to increase enlistments and officer procurement. These included increased pay and allowances; improved barracks, military housing, and recreation facilities; 1 This summary is based primarily on published official British sources and on other readily available published materials. additional payments for travel costs and movement of household effects; special officer procurement programs, including scholarship plans, short-term (3-year) contracts for reserve officers, and higher pay scales and other special inducements for medical and dental officers. In addition, recruitment staffs and publicity were expanded, including extensive use of TV, mobile caravans, and other recruitment "sales" efforts. From a numerical standpoint, the voluntary recruitment effort has apparently been reasonably successful to date. If recruitment can continue to meet strength requirements through 1963, the lower replacement needs resulting from longer term (6-year) enlistments should facilitate maintenance of the all-regular force beyond 1963. At the same time, there have been evident difficulties in procurement of junior officers and in meeting requirements for certain categories of specialized personnel for technical and professional units. The most critical problem has apparently been in the medical and dental profession, and resulted in announcement of a comprehensive program, in April 1962, for increased pay and a wide range of special inducements for medical and dental officers. The shift from national service to voluntary recruitment has also required a major realinement of the Reserve Forces. The national service system had required a 32-year period of mandatory Reserve service, following 2 years of active duty. With the termination of national service, a major source of inputs into the Reserves has been eliminated. In order to partially offset this loss, the British Government announced in early 1962 their decision to raise, from within the ranks of the territorial (reserve) army, a new volunteer category to serve with the Regular Army in time of emergency. These personnel, to be known as the Territorial Army Emergency Reserve the "Ever Readies"-will be liable for callup to active service for periods up to 6 months. These personnel will receive an annual bonus equivalent to $420 if they fulfill their Reserve training obligations. While the numerical recruitment goals are now being met, this was done in conjunction with a 45-percent reduction in total military strength. The relaxation of the pressure of conscription produced problems in the areas of officer and technical personnel procurement which have not yet been fully overcome. There are a number of obvious contrasts between the British and the United States military manpower situation: (1) While British military strengths have been cut back by 45 percent since 1957, U.S. military strengths are only slightly below the 1957 level (2.8 million in 1957 versus 2.7 million in 1962). Moreover, the percentage of the military-aged population required for service in this country is nearly twice as great as in Great Britain. (2) The contrast in military manpower requirements is even greater when allowance is made for the Reserve components. Total strengths of all Reserve components in Great Britain are reported at 394,000 in January 1962, as contrasted to nearly 2.9 million Reserves not on active duty in the United States. Chairman RUSSELL. I would like to know the number of people that they have had in the military services over a period of years, also. Mr. PAUL. Yes, sir. I can say right now it went from 690,000 in 1957 to approximately 390,000 by the end of 1962. Chairman RUSSELL. That is even more than I had thought it was. That is all they have in all branches, 390,000? Mr. PAUL. Yes, sir; that is total military strength. Chairman RUSSELL. I knew that "Britannia rules the waves" is now one of the great antique pieces in history, but I did not know it. was that great a fall. That includes the army, navy, and air force? Mr. PAUL. I have that as the total military figure, Mr. Chairman. I beg your pardon. Chairman RUSSELL. That must be the army. Mr. PAUL. That was the originally announced plan, and that was later revised. My figures indicate that total active duty military strength was cut back to 485,000 by April 1961, and recent estimates provide for a further reduction to 432,700 by April 1963. I am sorry, that was the original plan, but they revised it. Chairman RUSSELL. They revised it. They now have 485,000. Have you any information that would indicate the ratio of persons in the military services to the total population of the NATO countries? Mr. PAUL. Yes. We have figures on that, Mr. Chairman. Chairman RUSSELL. I wish you would also offer a table on that for the record. (The following information was subsequently furnished by the Department of Defense:) 1 Conscriptees desiring to serve their entire 12-month tour within Belgium now must "volunteer" to serve an additional; months. (Total, 15.) 2 Also unspecified Reserve liability. 3 Followed by 19 years in Reserves. 4 Actual service now being progressively reduced, as result of Algerian cease-fire, and will reach the legal period of 18 months by July 1, 1963. New legislation on Feb. 22, 1962, increased period from 12 to 18 months, effective July 1, 1962. In addition 9 months Reserve full-time training liability up to age 45. |