EUGENE, OREG., February 26, 1963.

Chairman RICHARD RUSSELL,
Senate Armed Services Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Enclosed with this letter is my statement opposing extension of the Universal Military Training and Service Act which expires in June of this year. Will you please include this statement in the hearings on draft extension to be held in the near future since I am unable to be present in person to present testimony.

Thank you.
Sincerely,

Mrs. Lois BARTON.

STATEMENT OPPOSING DRAFT EXTENSION

I believe the Universal Military Training and Service Act should not be extended. It is an inefficient and wasteful technique for providing manpower. Peacetime conscription for military service is a violation of our democratic way of life, disrupting plans for every youth during the crucial years between education and vocational adaptation. And, at a time when war as a method has become unthinkable, it provides an opportunity for military indoctrination of impressionable young people by those who see in the military approach the only solution to international problems.

The eight children in our family deserve the right to apply their efforts toward a better world in a manner of their choosing, without being obliged to sacrifice many months as conscripts to a system which is not only wasteful and inefficient, but actually, in my opinion, detrimental to our stated goal of a peaceful world, under law. I therefore ask you to reject any resolution calling for an extension of the draft law.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. MEYER OF WEST RUPERT, VT.

As an individual citizen I regret that this legislation is moving so rapidly through Congress. Apparently the general public has not heard much about its progress and the news media have given relatively little attention to the subject. This may result in such a quiet passage of the bill as to make it seem extremely popular and widely accepted. I know, however, that there are millions of Americans who are opposed to this legislation in full or in part. While differing in detail and intensity, they share the reasons many of us expounded in 1959, in opposing an extension of the draft without adequate consideration of other alternatives. In the interest of brevity I recommend a perusal of my testimony as a Member of Congress before this committee in 1959.

It seems to me that the reasoning presented by many of us in 1959 is valid in 1963 and I am sorry that the 86th Congress did not see fit to accept the compromise proposal for a 2-year extension of the draft with a study commission to report on alternatives for the future. Although I am against the present bill in principle as I was in 1959, I do not deny that the compromise would have met with wide acceptance in many quarters and thus politically was a practical measure. I believe S. 846 tends to prolong a system that is

1. Wasteful in its effect on our human resources.

2. Too costly in dollars and wasteful with respect to our national treasury and national resources.

3. Unfair and inequitable.

4. Not in accord with our traditions and Constitution.

5. Harmful to our total national strength in a time of crisis.

6. Morally deficient and destructive to our social standards.

7. Dangerous to a free society that of necessity must guard against the growth of militarism.

I say all of these things as a "hard headed," practical realist.

Continuation of the peacetime draft in the United States, without frequent and thorough public discussion of its implications, is a dangerous development for our country.

The word militarism is not a pleasant word, and we do not ordinarily think of it in connection with the United States. Our history, in contrast to that of many other countries of the world, has happily been free of the ugly phenomenon of militarism. We have preserved a healthy tradition of civilian government.

civilian control over the military. The benefits of this tradition are among our most cherished possessions today. Indeed, this tradition is high among the values which we are anxious to defend in today's troubled world.

We have, of course, throughout our history, given proper and due respect and honor to our military leaders and enlisted men who have served the country and its institutions so well. But we have not, in general, relied on the military for the formulation of policy, in either internal or foreign affairs.

In a sense, this is a practice which is related to one of the basic principles of our system of government, the separation of powers. Just as we regard it as fundamental that the legislative branch not infringe upon the proper functions of the executive, that the judiciary not enter into the legislative province, and so forth, we have viewed it as essential that the military not infringe upon that area of national life which is properly civilian. At the same time, of course, in purely military matters, decision is left to the military. Why do I mention militarism here? Are we not secure in our traditions against the growth of this dangerous element in our national life?

There are, in the words of Mr. Justice Black, "grim reminders all over this world" today that the distance between a democratically elected civilian government and control by the military is small. We must be eternally vigilant to maintain the proper restraints upon the possible development of militarism in this country.

I feel the growth and acceptance of peacetime conscription in this country gives rise to dangerous trends in the wrong direction, in the direction of relaxation of these vital restraints.

I am sure that all of us remember the important warning sounded by President Eisenhower, in his farewell address to the Nation, against the development of power by the Military Establishment. The increasing relationships between the military and business is only one aspect of the problem. As military technology becomes more advanced, as the complexity of weapons systems increases to a point that staggers the imagination, the problems of maintaining necessity civian control become more difficult. The question of the role of democratic decisionmaking with respect to the kind of highly specialized, technical matters which are involved in the issue of peace and war in our modern world is one which has troubled many thinkers in recent years.

It is in this context that I feel we must view the issue of peacetime conscription. There can be no doubt but that universal military training and service in peacetime vastly increases the impact of the military upon our Nation.

Many youths are called from the civilian pursuits which they have freely chosen and compelled to learn and live the military way of life. For 2 years, they are subject to indoctrination by the military.

It is not sufficient that some civilian control may be exercised over that indoctrination. It is not even sufficient, as some may argue, that the best defense against the development of the military way of thinking is to expose unwilling young people to it.

Perhaps, if it could be shown that peacetime conscription were necessary, or even the best means for providing for the common defense, it might be acceptable as such. The startling thing is, however, that such a case has never been made. Indeed, many of the facts seem to indicate that the opposite is true, that not only is the draft in peacetime unnecessary, but that it is much less satisfactory than other means for achieving our Nation's security.

I think that is has been shown that we can have a better defense with a volunteer, professional armed force. In the light of the complexity of modern military technology, to which I have already referred, the need is for highly trained, specialized personnel, for quality rather than quantity. It is wasteful in the extreme to invest in the amount of training necessary to render a draftee useful in the modern army, only to have him leave when his 2-year obligation is completed. Additionally, of course, the resentment of the man who is doing forced labor (for this is what service under the draft really is) cannot but injure the quality of his work.

The substitution of an entirely professional force, with rates of pay adequate to attract the caliber of personnel needed to do the job, for the part-professional part-drafted force we now have, would provide a net gain in this country's defense. I might observe in passing that the use of a properly paid professional armed force is much more consistent with this country's basic philosophy of free enterprise. If we apply the principles of this philosophy to the problem of defense, we should conclude that the way to secure the proper work force to do this job is to pay the wages necessary to attract qualified people.

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When weapons and other material are needed for defense, we buy them on the open market, paying the prices necessary to insure adequate quality. We do not draft people to design and build missiles, and we would probably not rely on missiles built by forced labor.

I submit that we relv on the draft only because we are unwilling to think clearly about the problem of manpower procurement, and to recognize that an adequate force can best be secured by the provision of adequate incentives.

The extent to which the operation of the draft is grossly unfair and inequitable in its effect on the young men of this Nation has been demonstrated over and over again, and should be well known to this committee. Only about 1 of every 10 young men who become 26 in 1963 will have been drafted. Student deferments result in many young men not being reached by the draft. Often, of course, it is those who can afford to pay for advanced schooling who thus obtain exemption, while their less wealthy fellows must serve.

Disruption of family life and, unfortunately, ill-considered and hasty decisions about marriage and children are produced by considerations of the draft.

An argument often relied on in support of the draft is that, while it may not provide large numbers of men itself, it is responsible for many voluntary enlistments by those who prefer enlistment to being drafted. Some figures may be revealing in this regard. Out of approximately 2,700,000 men in service, somewhere around 500,000 must be replaced each year. Of these, the draft now supplies about 100,000. As far as I know, no serious research has been done on the problem of how many of the remaining 400,000 are really motivated by desire to avoid the draft. I would seriously recommend that such a study be undertaken. At the same time, we should attempt to learn what other inducements, by way of pay and other conditions, would be sufficient to maintain the needed level of replacements in the absence of the draft. Certainly such studies would not be difficult, and they would be directed at bringing our armed services back into our free enterprise system.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that I have not argued that we should not have an armed force. I have merely tried to indicate that we could have a more efficient force without the draft in peacetime, with less expense to our vital human resources, to our country's traditions, and to the moral fiber of our Nation today.

STATEMENT OF GERALD J. RINGER OF BOSTON, MASS.

I. ON LIMITED WAR

Certain characteristics of war which have emerged as new realities since World War II pose unprecedented moral problems in the relationship between the serviceman and the civilian population. First let us isolate and clarify the nature of these as yet seldom-recognized moral problems; then we might ask about the propriety of continuing the draft; we would suggest an alternative method of obtaining servicemen; and finally we would suggest that a much greater national effort should be made to realize honorable alternatives to war in the atomic age.

In American wars prior to 1950: (1) the goal of victory gave the troops confidence in their destiny and purpose and (2) the American public supported the troops' faith that the "folks back home" would be willing to share the danger undergone by the troops-if need be. It may very well have been an illusion, but such support and such willingness tended to make it seem that the American public was well worth defending from danger. The old-style war was worth fighting, both in the sense that its aim was victory and in that its aim was protection of the "folks back home."

In the Korean war, for the first time, American cities became the potential targets of a potential enemy's weapons of modern mass destruction. Whatever illusions had existed fell away: the American public wanted maximum security at minimum personal risk. It wanted security from Communist expansion in Korea, and security from Soviet bombs at home; but the latter came first: for 2 years the troops on the front line were shortchanged in order to guarantee that Soviet Russia would not overtly participate. Fatal limitations were imposed from Washington: in numbers of United Nations troops employed; in weapons employed; in authorized targets and in area of maneuver.

The Korean war served to define "limited war" as any war which is "not the right war to win." (1) The sense of destiny and purpose flew out of the frontline experience of our troops. (2) It became crystal clear that the American public was willing to commit young lives to a holocaust ("burnt offering"), but

that it absolutely was not willing to share their danger-and, by hook or by crook, it would see that such a need would never arise.

Our leading strategists tend at present to favor holding big bombs and waging limited wars virtually forever. It is reasonable to assume that the same general kind of limitations will circumscribe all limited wars of the future—that a limited war will always be "not the right war to win."

On three counts, limited war is immoral in ways that American wars have not been immoral in the past:

(1) To wage war only for the sake of stalemate points to a vast and meaningless waste of life and material. Far from being the result of their upbringing or their own moral fiber, the low morale of American servicemen in Korea stemmed largely from the certain knowledge that they were being wasted in a war that was not worth winning- a war in which the American people refused to share the risk; in which this refusal led to niggardly support and cost the lives of countless troops at the front.

Testimony on Capitol Hill after the Korean war followed an interesting pattern. The officers of flag rank who had commanded the troops in the field were practically unanimous in their condemnation of the limitations which had been imposed; the testimony of those analyzing the behavior of our prisoners of war attached blame about equally to the men and to their upbringing; and all too many of our legislators drew the conclusion that the fault lay with our churches, schools, patriotic organizations, and the armed services themselves. The false conclusion was drawn that our men had not been properly indoctrinated with Americanism. But there was at least one man who saw clearly to the heart of the matter. On July 27, 1956, Representative Philip J. Philbin submitted to the Congressional Record an article by an Army psychiatrist who had studied some 1,000 case histories of returned prisoners of war. Maj. William E. Mayer wrote: "The behavior of too many of our soldiers in prison fell far short of the historical American standards of honor, character, loyalty, courage, and personal integrity. The fact that so many yielded to the degree that they did presents a problem of fantastic proportions and should cause searching self-examination by all Americans both in and out of uniform."

But

The authorities in Congress and in the Defense Department responded to this moral challenge by issuing the soldier's code (earlier, in 1955), and by making a show of closer cooperation between the various institutions which instill loyalty and patriotism. Troop indoctrination was beefed up in the armed services. behind a diplomacy that could prevent all-out wars but could not prevent limited wars, some of us thought we detected a cowardice and a crippling self-interest in the spiritual constitution of the American people.

(2) Our people commit young men to die in wars that are not worth winning— when our national heritage condemns such wars as not worth fighting.

(3) The overriding hypocrisy lies in the self-delusion of the public which allows limited wars to be conducted and projected on its behalf. Ostensibly, one of the major aims of limited war is to sustain avoidance of the all-out war. But recisely at that point at which it becomes worth fighting it becomes most likely to flame into all-out war; and so, in becoming "worthwhile" it has failed in one of its major aims: It has failed to "maintain the peace.' Ironically, the resulting all-out war can no longer resolve the crucial issues which have brought it into being; rather, through the mutual annihilation of the two then-contending powers, the issues are simply obliterated from the face of the earth. What Hans J. Morgenthau and other analysts and philosophers now call "suicidal absurdity," our theologians are beginning to recognize as "blasphemous." As time goes by it is becoming increasingly evident and increasingly true that all-out war would reduce our people and our Nation to meaninglessness and absurdity.

It is suggested above that limited wars that become worth winning are likely to become all-out wars-or else they become ignominious stalemates like Korea. To make the cream of our youth the brunt of either sort of fiasco is an unprecedented blight on our national honor. We must never forget or forgive the tarnishing of our national values in the Korean war. Is there not an unacceptable depravity involved in adults sending young men out to die, while yet remaining unwilling to risk allowing them to win?

II. ON CONTINUING THE DRAFT

Strictly on moral grounds, then, we must question whether our people have the right to command young draftees to fight these wars that are not worth winning. Is it not unsupportably hypocritical to command a draftee to die in a war which has been planned limited but which, if it were to become worth

winning, would become all-out war? Is this not potentially a betrayal of both the draftee and the people for whom he dies? Such war lays bare the essential ritual nature of war itself; but the "holocaust" today is illusory, for at the very point where the sacrifice becomes meaningful and worth while, the holocaust becomes international and absurd.

The new weapons render any kind of war increasingly hypocritical and immoral. We have reached a point where war is absurd and, if you are a believer, blasphemous.

In recognition of the new realities, it may be wise and honorable, as well as practical, to consider alternatives to the now "traditional" draft as a method of recruiting troops.

III. A SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE

In spite of the demonstrable absurdity of all forms of war today, the current drift of our Nation through the seas of world change indicates that the United States will likely be involved in limited wars for an indefinite period into the foreseeable future. But there is an alternative to the draft-an alternative that is plausible, viable, and honorable.

We can envision the establishment of a force of American mercenary servicemen. This would be a force of professionals, volunteers who fully understood and accepted their role. They would be willing to fight anyplace, any time--and they would be absolutely satisfied from the day of enlistment about the rules of the job: they would be on tap to fight wars that America does not deem worth winning. In return, they would be adequately recompensed in service pay and allowances. By offering high enough rewards, the Government could recruit any desired number; what constitutes "high enough" could be computed on electronicmachines, using Department of Labor statistics.

The rationale for the individuals in such a force would be twofold: (1) They would be performing a specialized atomic-age function as Government employees. In all honesty, however, the traditional patriotic motives should not be alluded to, for to assert that the waging of war serves the long-range national interest is to return to hypocrisy and self-delusion. (2) They would be well paid for performing their potentially dangerous role. The nature of their recompense would be in harmony with the nature of their mission. A perfect example of (1) and (2) is the occupation of the U-2 pilot as brought to public attention by the mishap of Francis Powers.

Indeed, one is tempted to inquire whether this plan has not already been partially adopted, i.e., in the jungle fighting in southeast Asia. How many of the 50-odd American casualties in Vietnam have been draftees? Under this new plan none would have been draftees; all would have been volunteers, and they would. have been paid a fair price for their service and their "sacrifice."

IV. AN END TO WAR

War-limited as well as general nuclear-all war is today an archaic and absurd way to resolve international issues. That we continue to wage cold war in a warlike mood is tragic, and it might well mean that we are courting the destruction of Western civilization. We ought to ask ourselves whether any single generation has the right to put an end to the long and upward march of European, Russian, and American man. Are we justified in being ready, willing. and able to destroy our world before our children and grandchildren--have had their chance to build a future world unforeseeable by any prophet living today" Certainly, before we have any more Koreas, we owe the Korean dead our maximum national effort in seeking the ways to avoid such a repetition of tragedy. For they could not buy us freedom; they could only buy us a little time. The task of establishing world peace with justice is herculean, and it is equally pressing in point of time. We should ponder whether we do not owe our current crop of 18-year-olds a program of the order of magnitude of the wartime Manhattan project-but focused upon goals of peace instead of destructive potential. In the absence of any such all-out assault on war itself, can there be any moral justification for continuing the draft?

Hence, the suggestion that we use the willing mercenary to replace the unwilling sacrifice. It is the lesser of two evils, designed only as a temporary solution. It would merely alleviate a moral situation that has arisen within the last 17 years; it is no long-range panacea. It might buy us a little peace of mind and a little time, however, which we ought to exploit in a serious public search. for sane answers to the problems of international tensions.