the United States in terms of their ability to reach us with a longrange ballistic missile. His response was dated August 24, 1998, and it said that our best intelligence says that we have adequate time, that is 3 years or so, to prepare for the time when they would have a system. Seven days later they fired a multistage rocket from North Korea.

It is disturbing to me when we have evidence that is not even classified suggesting that China, Russia, and North Korea are trading systems and technology with countries like Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, and yet we seem to think we are safe in going back to the old Cold War mentality that has the U.S.S.R. versus us.

My concern is what is out there now, where these threats are, and with a little more accuracy than we can reveal in this meeting, just what we have in our nuclear stockpile and what they have. It is disturbing to me. I remember so well, I am sure you remember at the end of the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein said if we had just waited 10 years to go into Kuwait, we would not have come because Hussein would have had a missile that could reach the United States. Here it is 10 years later. Just keep that in mind as part of your thinking on this subject. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LEVIN. Senator Warner has just joined us.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I had another matter to attend to. I thank my colleague here, Senator Allard, the former Chairman and now ranking member of the Strategic Subcommittee, for reading my statement. I listened very carefully to Mr. Nelson's observation about the difference in time between our ability to reconstitute our inventory in a significant way as compared with Russia. I am sure Admiral Ellis will give you a little clearer insight and another statistic as to the timing of that. I had a very extensive consultation with my old friend and colleague, Admiral Ellis, last night, and that was one of the subjects we covered. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome our witnesses this morning. General Gordon, we continue to get the best reports about your performance. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Secretary Feith.

STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS J. FEITH, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Secretary FEITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Members of the committee, good morning. I would appreciate it if I could put my written statement in the record and start with a few brief remarks. Chairman LEVIN. It will be made part of the record.

Secretary FEITH. The Nuclear Posture Review is an ambitious document. It aims to transform U.S. nuclear forces and our thinking about strategic forces policy. No thorough transformation of that kind has occurred since the end of the Cold War. As was noted, the last Nuclear Posture Review was completed in 1994, when the full significance of the demise of the Soviet Union couldn't be appreciated. In any event, the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review was done for the purpose of analyzing what our nuclear force posture would look like under START II.

When he took office, President George W. Bush wanted to ensure that in planning for the future of U.S. nuclear forces and policy, the Defense Department did a number of things. First, that we rec

ognized the radical changes in the world that resulted from the West's victory in the Cold War-chief among them is the new relationship between the United States and Russia, and the potential for better relations between us in the future.

Second, that we abandon the morally and strategically unappealing theory of mutually-assured destruction, which we all know appropriately as MAD.

Third, that we give the United States missile defense options so that we have more tools in our strategic kit than simply the threat of offensive retaliation. If, for example, a nuclear weapon were launched accidentally against the United States, we would want to have a nonoffensive response option.

Fourth, that we take advantage of the opportunities to make drastic reductions in U.S. offensive nuclear force levels.

Fifth, that we give proper attention to the key strategic reality of our era, and I would say arguably the key reality of any era, which is uncertainty. I think this goes to the point that Senator Inhofe was making about the surprise of the 1998 launch by North Korea of the Taepo Dong missile. In performing the Nuclear Posture Review, the Defense Department operated with due respect for the unpredictability of the future and the role of error in human affairs. Accordingly, we assigned high priority to flexibility and adaptability.

The NPR contains serious new thinking. It was not produced on autopilot. It is a rich mix of creative ideas on how the United States can make the world safer and more secure, shape the strategic environment in Europe, in Asia, and globally, and ensure that the United States has the means to keep ourselves, our allies, our friends, and interests safe from the emerging or altogether new threats that may materialize in many coming decades. I am proud of the work that my colleagues have done on the NPR. I am pleased that the Senate Armed Services Committee is holding this hearing to spotlight this work and the strategic questions related to it.

Now, as all students of strategic policy know, the key image of our force posture in the past was a triad of land-, air-, and seabased nuclear weapons. The organizing mental picture of our Nuclear Posture Review is what we call a new strategic triad. The new strategic triad envisions a nuclear posture that moves beyond mutually-assured destruction and reduces long-term U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons and purposeful vulnerability as the guarantor of our security. The new triad removes roadblocks to developing a cooperative strategic framework with Russia. If there is a headline for the Nuclear Posture Review, it is that the days of MAD are over, and unlamented. Instead, we plan to develop a new suite of capabilities that will first, assure our allies of our commitment to global peace and the steadfastness of that commitment; second, dissuade potential adversaries from contemplating military competition with the civilized world; third, deter aggressors; and fourth, defeat aggression when and where we have to while defending the United States, our friends, and allies. Offensive nuclear weapons remain a component of our new triad but they cannot themselves achieve all four of our national security goals. We have to develop new capabilities, new legs of the new triad.

First, we plan to develop a non-nuclear strategic strike capability to give future presidents more options for responding to aggression than simply pushing the button. The success we have enjoyed with precision guided munitions over the last decade will give us a head start in developing these capabilities.

Second, we plan to develop and deploy missile defenses. Our investment in homeland security and the ability to defeat unconventional attacks is an important element of this. Fortunately, we already possess such defensive capabilities and are improving them every day, but missile defense is another issue. To this date, ballistic missiles remain the only means of attacking the United States, our friends, and our allies against which we have no effective defense. Deploying such defenses is essential to the defensive leg of our new triad and will help reduce a serious vulnerability.

Third, we plan to develop a responsive infrastructure. For too long, the United States has let atrophy its ability to develop new military capabilities that respond to changes in the world. It is difficult to change the Cold War force structure that we inherited, and why is this? Because we lack the physical plant and trained personnel necessary to develop and produce replacements that are more flexible or otherwise better suited to today's world. We want to invest in defense infrastructure, to transform our military for the 21st century.

Finally, we plan to integrate the legs of the triad through improved command and control, what we call exquisite intelligence and adaptive planning. During the Cold War, the United States poured immense resources and much time into planning for war with the Soviet Union. So revisions in the plans could take months, a year, or longer.

Instead of the ponderous and detailed product we prepared during the Cold War, we intend to develop the capability and flexibility to quickly identify the strengths and weaknesses of multiple enemies that might emerge suddenly. Thus, with the exception of nuclear strike, all of the concepts of the new triad are, in fact, new. Strategic defense, responsive infrastructure, non-nuclear strike, global command and control, exquisite intelligence, and adaptive planning are all capabilities to transform our strategic forces. For this reason, the review marks the beginning of a process, not the end.

We will start with forces we currently have on hand and improve them as we develop a range of new capabilities. Because the Cold War is over, we no longer need to size our deployed nuclear forces against the threat posed by Russia and therefore we won't. For the first time in our history, U.S. nuclear forces will not be deployed for the purpose of waging a thermonuclear war against Moscow. The President decided that the United States would take the initiative and begin reducing its operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces over the next decade.

Based on the NPR's analysis, the President announced his decision to begin removing around two-thirds of U.S. nuclear weapons from operational deployment. We will begin making cuts now that some commentators argued we should do only in the future, after extensive formal negotiations with the Russians.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, some have referred to the reductions we are making in the Nuclear Posture Review as an accounting sleight of hand. But, I think there is great importance in the distinction between warheads deployed on delivery vehicles ready for launch within minutes or hours and warheads that are not available for use immediately or in the near term.

Arms control agreements in the past, such as SALT I, SALT II, the IMF Treaty, START I, and START II, all of which were widely praised for reducing nuclear force levels, and all of them dealt not with the destruction of warheads, but rather delivery vehicles. So the notion that the failure to destroy warheads means that one does not have the right to say one is reducing nuclear force levels is a brand-new notion that was never applied over the decades of the Cold War when arms control agreements were praised, notwithstanding their complete failure to address the question of destruction of warheads.

On the issue of irreversibility of force reductions, I think it is important that we recognize that as a practical matter, there is no such thing as irreversibility. I mean, chasing it would be chasing a will of the wisp.

Any reductions, even if they entail the destruction of warheads, are reversible. A state that destroys warheads could manufacture new warheads. There is no such thing as irreversibility. The issue of reversibility is a matter of time and money, and in that regard, it is worth pointing out that the United States and Russia stand on completely different footings with regard to their ability to manufacture new nuclear weapons. Russia has a large infrastructure. They have a warm production base capable of producing large numbers of new nuclear weapons annually.

The United States has not produced a new nuclear weapon in a decade. It will take nearly a decade and a large investment of money before we would be in a position to produce a new nuclear warhead. So the issue of storing our weapons, of whether we choose to build up a large infrastructure that would put us in a position to create new nuclear weapons if circumstances in the world changed and warranted it, versus taking weapons and rendering them unavailable for use in the near term by putting them in storage, is an issue that I believe needs to be examined in light of this important difference between the capability that the United States has in its ability to produce new nuclear weapons and the capabilities of other nations.

In short, it is highly significant for the United States to reduce its offensive nuclear forces by rendering large numbers, two-thirds of our weapons, unavailable for use immediately or in the near term. I trust this committee will see the big picture. We are closing the history books on the Cold War balance of terror. We are reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons and replacing mutually-assured destruction with a strategic triad more suited to the security requirements of this century. We are cutting our deployed nuclear forces by roughly two-thirds and developing a new qualitative approach to arms control based on transparency and confidence building measures.

We are indeed transforming our strategic posture, and the Nuclear Posture Review tells us where we need to go. We hope that

Congress will join us in boldly stepping forward into the post-Cold War strategic environment by fully funding the programs envisioned in the Nuclear Posture Review. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Secretary Feith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. DOUGLAS J. FEITH

INTRODUCTION

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 required the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear forces and to develop a long-range plan for the sustainment and modernization of United States strategic nuclear forces. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) constitutes the Department of Defense's response to this requirement.

We submitted the NPR to Congress on January 8, 2002. It is the first comprehensive review of nuclear forces since 1994, when the first Nuclear Posture Review was completed. The primary purpose of the 1994 review was to determine the strategic nuclear force structure to be deployed under the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II).

The current review of the U.S. nuclear posture differs from the 1994 review. The 1994 review assumed that the central strategic U.S. concern was managing a potentially hostile relationship between the two largest nuclear powers. The current review recognizes that the United States and Russia have a new relationship, and that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles has created new challenges for deterrence. It defines the capabilities required of nuclear forces in the new strategic environment and in relation to other U.S. defense capabilities. Most especially, it recognizes that Russia, unlike the Soviet Union, is not an enemy. There is ground for mutual cooperation, and the United States is seeking to move beyond the outdated Cold War nuclear confrontation to develop a new strategic framework with Russia.

A NEW ERA

The basic features of the Cold War shaped our approach to security, including the role and size of our nuclear forces and deterrence policies. Our current nuclear triad of ICBMs, bombers, and ballistic missile submarines, and the ways we have pursued deterrence and arms control negotiations, reflect the conditions of Cold War. The new features of the international system, particularly the types of threats we face, are dramatically different. Consequently, President Bush charged the Department of Defense with transforming our approach to defense, including nuclear weapons and missile defenses, to meet the new challenges of the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War we faced a single, ideologically hostile nuclear superpower. We prepared for a relatively limited number of very threatening conflicts with the Soviet Union. Much of the world was part of two competing alliances and the stakes involved in this competition amounted to survival for both sides. We must never lose sight of just how dangerous the situation was.

There was, however, considerable continuity and predictability in this competition of two global alliance systems. For decades, U.S. nuclear forces were organized and sized primarily to deter the Soviet Union, and there were few sharp turns in U.S.Soviet relations. Based on the continuities of the international system at the time, the successful functioning of nuclear deterrence came to be viewed as predictable, ensured by a sturdy “balance of terror.” Many argued that defenses which might lessen that terror by offering protection against Soviet nuclear attack would instead undermine the predictable "stability" of the balance of terror.

The Cold War system of two competing blocs has been replaced by a new system, one with a broad spectrum of potential opponents and threatening contingencies. The continuities of the past U.S.-Soviet relationship have been replaced by the unpredictability of potential opponents who are motivated by goals and values we often do not share nor well understand, and who move in directions we may not anticipate. We no longer confront the severe but relatively predictable threats of the Cold War; instead we have entered an era of uncertainty and surprise. As the attacks of September 11th demonstrated, we must now expect the unexpected. What we can predict today is that we will face unanticipated challenges, a range of opponents— some familiar, some not-with varying goals and military capabilities, and a spectrum of potential contingencies involving very different stakes for the United States and its foes. These conditions do not permit confident predictions about the specific threats against which we must prepare or the "stability" of deterrence.