as interchangeable modules that can plug and play in any situation and in any command arrangement. We have put a lot of effort into interoperability on the tactical level, like the modifications of the P-3 that I just described, but we must also concentrate on the operational level of warfare, where organizational and process improvements are just as important.

The current focus of our efforts and the area with the greatest potential payoff is, I believe, in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). By improving our C4ISR, we can ensure our commanders have the best information available for rapid battlefield decisionmaking. We have made progress in recent years, but stovepipes continue to cause gaps and seams between our combatant commands and the forces that are provided by the services. These gaps and seams must be eliminated. Close cooperation across the services, combatant commands, and with other government departments is key to success in achieving our national security objectives.

Additionally, we are developing a command and control architecture in our unified commands that will lead to an improved ability to accept and employ forces. We call this architecture the Standing Joint Force Headquarters. This headquarters will provide the combatant commanders the ability to employ an agile and lethal force using the integrated C4ISR network that I described earlier and further enhance our joint warfighting capabilities.

The second key to maintaining the quality of our force and preparing for the future challenges is transformation. The Secretary has already laid out for you our transformational goals, but I would like to follow through with a couple of points. For me, transformation is simply fostering changes that result in a dramatic improvement over time in the way a combatant commander wages war. I am convinced that our force structure requires better flexibility and adaptability to achieve our national security objectives in this new international security environment.

Such dramatic improvement requires not only technological change, but most importantly, changes in how we think and how we employ our capabilities to achieve more effective results in less time, with fewer lives lost, and with less cost. True transformation must include training and education, as the Secretary said, and changes in our doctrine and in our organizations.

The second point on transformation is that, while sudden technical, organizational, or doctrinal breakthroughs are possible and should be vigorously pursued, it is important to note that transformation often results from an accumulation of incremental improvements. Let me give you an example. When I was flying F-4s in Vietnam, we lost a lot of airplanes to pilots trying to destroy single targets like bridges and anti-aircraft sites. We had to put a lot of people in harm's way to get the job done because our weapons systems were not very accurate.

So we developed laser-guided bombs and found a way to steer them to the target. Nevertheless, we still had to have relatively good weather because you had to see the target to be able to put the laser-guided bomb on the target. Now, we still needed to put the aircraft in harm's way to keep the bombs on target, but we had achieved, I think, a significant improvement in bombing accuracy.

Now let us think about where we are today. We have bombs that are impervious to the weather conditions, that steer themselves using satellite-generated global positioning system signals. Let me also point out that when the global positioning system was being developed and first deployed, no one was talking about using it for bombing. It was seen as a better navigational tool.

So essentially, we have linked incremental improvements in several different technologies to achieve today our precision strike capability with accuracy that I believe amounts to truly transformational change.

But this transformation is not just about more accurate bombs. The real transformation is in the target set, where we have advanced from needing multiple sorties to strike one target to using one sortie to strike multiple targets. There has also been a transformation in our thinking. Bombs are no longer regarded as solely area weapons. Instead, they can be used like bullets from a rifle, aimed precisely and individually.

The foundation of that breakthrough, laid over 30 years ago in Vietnam, was tactical innovation in the midst of war. On that foundation we have built successive improvements to get where we are today. Of course, we are laying that same foundation of future breakthroughs in the midst of today's war.

For example, the armed unmanned vehicle is a tactical innovation that we are just beginning to explore. We cannot accurately foresee the future for sure, but I am confident we are working on other capabilities that, when you couple them with the improvements of armed unmanned vehicles, have the potential to change significantly the way we fight and perhaps even the nature of warfare itself. That, and similar possibilities, are why I believe that the service recapitalization and modernization programs are so important to transformation.

Members of the committee, I am pleased to say that our forces remain the most powerful and the best trained in the world. Their excellence is due in no small part to your unwavering support of our troops. We have made tremendous strides in recent years providing our people a comprehensive set of quality of life improvements, especially in the areas of pay, housing, and health care. But quality of life also includes adequate training, modern equipment, modern infrastructure, and adequate spare parts.

I ask that we continue to keep faith with both our Active and Reserve component members, as well as our retirees. Sustaining the quality of life of our people is crucial to recruiting and retention, and is especially crucial to our readiness to fight. But more important, it is the right thing to do for our heroes who this very minute are serving in harm's way, defending our freedom. They are the practitioners of joint warfighting and the creators of transformation. They make things happen and should always be our top priority.

The men and women of your Armed Forces are committed to achieving victory no matter how long it takes or where it takes us. They are counting on all of us to provide them the tools they need for success today and tomorrow. They certainly deserve our best effort.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to work with you and the committee as we continue to fight against global terrorism, and I thank you again for the opportunity to be here with you today. I look forward to taking your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Myers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF

It is an honor to report to Congress on the state of the U.S. Armed Forces. The United States is engaged in a multi-front war that includes operations in direct defense of our homeland and a sustained military campaign overseas. All elements of our force-Active, Reserve, and National Guard-are taking part in this struggle to maintain the safety and security of our Nation, and the initial results have been promising. While there are relatively few American troops deployed "on the ground” in Afghanistan, it is important to note that a significant percentage of the force is directly engaged in some aspect of the global war on terrorism. At the same time, other threats to U.S. interests remain a part of the strategic environment. Thus, elements of our force are committed to other missions, such as defense of the Korean peninsula, protection of U.S. interests in Southwest Asia, and peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.

With our friends and allies, we continue to gather intelligence and prepare for action against the al Qaeda network and other terrorist organizations that threaten nations around the world. As President Bush has reminded us on several occasions, the global war on terrorism will require great effort over an extended period of time and it will require all elements of our national power. The U.S. Armed Forces are steeled and ready to engage the enemy for as long as it takes to complete the mission. The threat that we face and the effort that will be required remind me in some ways of the situation faced by the United States after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

While there are significant differences between that global war and this one, there is at least one key lesson to be remembered. During World War II, the services showed a remarkable capacity to learn from experience. At the beginning of the war, they faced conditions they had not prepared for, but managed to adapt themselves in the midst of the fight and within a short time had established an extraordinary degree of teamwork and combat efficiency. We face a similar task today-to defeat multiple enemies who are capable of striking us with asymmetric means from locations around the world. Winning this new global war will require us to exhibit the same flexibility in adapting to changing conditions and considering new technologies and procedures to enhance our combat capabilities. An equally important imperative in the midst of this war is to continue to modernize and transform our force to meet future challenges in this rapidly changing 21st century.

These imperatives dictate my priorities as Chairman-to win the global war on terrorism, to improve the joint warfighting capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces, and to transform those forces so they are ready to face future challenges. I look forward to working with President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, and Congress in the months ahead to achieve these goals and to address other critical issues facing the U.S. military. To keep our forces superior to those of any other nation, we must maintain our quality force today and create the capabilities needed to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Guiding our efforts is the thought of the brave soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen who are defending our way of life and who are counting on us to make the right decisions.

GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

As you well know, we are engaged in only the first phase of the global war on terrorism. In this new kind of war, we face adversaries who refuse to adhere to the norms of international behavior, who have sought access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and who have demonstrated both the capacity and the will to use those weapons. Our objectives in this war are simple: to disrupt and destroy global terrorist organizations, eliminate safe havens for terrorists, and prevent access to WMD by terrorist groups.

In response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, we have been conducting both offensive and defensive operations. The Reserve components have been essential to these actions. As of late January 2002, we had alerted just over 97,000 individuals for activation and completed the call-up of 64,013 people. Additionally, since 11 September, the number of personnel, both Active and Reserve component, deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility increased from approximately 22,000 to about 60,000.

The direct defense of the American homeland is called Operation Noble Eagle. This operation, comprised of actions to protect civil population centers, critical infrastructure, and special events, began with the dramatic shift in operational focus that the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) executed on 11 September. When the day began, NORAD's attention was on a large Russian air exercise in the Arctic. As the magnitude of the terrorist attacks quickly became apparent, the command "shifted gears" completely-to prepare to respond to further attacks, establish combat air patrols over key domestic locations, expand air operations, and accept command and control of Active component forces, including U.S. Navy ships with anti-aircraft systems to enhance the security of U.S. domestic airspace. Noble Eagle also includes Coast Guard inspections of cargo vessels and patrols in defense of major sea ports. Additionally, there is widespread augmentation of civil site security with both Active Duty and Reserve component military personnel. Familiar examples of these actions are the 7,200 National Guard troops augmenting security at 444 airports, which will continue at least through March of this year. We have also enhanced security at military and other government installations and for space launch operations at Cape Canaveral. The North American Treaty Organization (NATO) has provided airborne early warning aircraft and combined aircrews to augment our airspace protection activities under Article 5 of the NATO treaty. This has freed U.S. E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft to prosecute the war in forward areas. We have also established a Homeland Security Joint Task Force (JTF) to coordinate and provide command and control for homeland security operations.

Our offensive operations are labeled Operation Enduring Freedom. These actions include, but are not limited to, ground, air, and naval operations in the Afghan theater and North Arabian Sea; planning and training for follow-on operations; and a host of support activities. In 2001, U.S. forces flew over 16,700 sorties employing over 17,000 precision and freefall munitions in support of operations in Afghanistan. These operations included not only reconnaissance and strike missions, but also simultaneous humanitarian airdrop missions by C-17s flying from Germany.

Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom have both highlighted many lessons that will be of great use in the subsequent campaigns of this war, as well as in our planning, programming, and transformation efforts. Foremost among them is the importance of versatility and flexibility to achieving operational success. Consider the examples of forward air controllers on horseback and special operations troops transporting their high-tech gear on donkeys to isolated mountain tops from which they directed strikes of precision guided munitions-illustrations of the kind of versatility and flexible thinking that we need to foster.

A second lesson is the ever-increasing importance of operations in the information domain. The actions in Afghanistan highlighted two key aspects of this topic. The first is the importance of a "networked" operations capability. We have continued the process of connecting sensors, shooters, and command and control elements with a single network of voice and data links, without regard to platforms or individual services. We do not yet have this capability complete, but we are making steady progress. For example, in Afghanistan special operations forces (SOF) on the ground guided strikes from both U.S. Navy and Air Force aircraft. Additionally, Navy and Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms were able to feed sensor outputs to Marine and SOF ground units, as well as other airborne platforms. We were also able to link real-time inputs from unmanned aerial vehicles to orbiting AC-130 gunships, which then provided responsive and pinpoint fire support to ground operations. These Afghan operations provide a hint of the operational advantages we will gain when this element of the transformation process is more

mature.

The second aspect of information operations highlighted by the Afghan campaign is the importance of a well-integrated information campaign. To that end, the Department of Defense (DOD) activated an information operations task force focused on winning the information campaign against global terrorism. This task force is committed to developing, coordinating, deconflicting, and monitoring the delivery of timely, relevant, and effective messages to targeted international audiences.

Additionally, the more we rely on information resources and systems, the greater must be our efforts to protect them. An important step will be the development of military doctrine for Information Assurance/Computer Network Defense. This doctrine will guide our actions in employing safeguards against attacks upon our critical information networks and in detecting, combating, and recovering from cyber attacks as soon as they are attempted.

Finally, another lesson learned with every operation, but that bears repeating, is that the friction and fog of war remain difficult to overcome. Our adversaries are always thinking and reacting in an attempt to increase our difficulties and defeat

our forces. Although we do our best to prevent errors, because human beings make mistakes and mechanical systems sometimes fail, we will never have perfect success-and sometimes will suffer tragic accidents. History tells us these types of difficulties will never be completely eliminated, but we continue to work hard to change this history.

In addition to providing lessons learned, the campaign has reinforced some existing concerns and validated concepts that we have been working on for quite some time. It has had a significant impact on and exacerbated shortfalls in specialized assets and capabilities. It has also added emphasis to the requirement of maintaining an adequate inventory of precision guided munitions (PGM). These weapons are an increasingly important tool for operational commanders across the entire spectrum of conflict. We need to maintain sufficient capability in the industrial base to manufacture adequate quantities of PGMs. We also need to protect our ability to surge to meet increased demands associated with sustained high-tempo operations. We ask for your continued help in building PGM inventories so we may react to future contingencies with our full capability to deliver this lethal combat power.

Other weapon systems that have further validated their potential in Afghanistan are unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). The increasing importance of these systems in a reconnaissance and surveillance role and their newly demonstrated potential for accomplishing combat missions is unmistakable. We will continue to experiment with additional roles and missions for these vehicles, improve their communications reach-back capabilities, and develop and acquire them at greater rates.

The war has also validated our emphasis on the importance of interagency coordination and cooperation, especially the need for close partnership with both domestic and international law enforcement agencies. On the domestic front, the military will usually act in support of civilian law enforcement and first responders, as has been the case in Operation Noble Eagle. We are working to build strong ties with other government agencies in the areas of training, planning, and operations-and especially in intelligence sharing. We have established a Domestic Threat Working Group with the goal of sharing domestic threat information between the services, Defense Agencies, and Combatant Commanders. This group allows us to properly fuse domestic intelligence related to the antiterrorism effort.

As the war continues, the Armed Forces will remain focused on the fundamental mission of homeland defense. Our enemies have exploited the openness of our society and the very freedoms that we cherish to attack our citizens. To better organize our forces at home and provide support to civil authorities, we are in the midst of modifying the Unified Command Plan to establish a combatant command responsible for homeland security. However, our first line of defense will remain our overseas forces.

On that front, our main effort is the destruction of the al Qaeda network. Continued success toward that goal will require sustained effort as we work with our friends and allies around the world to disrupt, preempt, and prevent terrorist attacks at their source. We have Special Forces troops in the Philippines, training and assisting their forces in antiterrorism efforts-another illustration of the global nature of this war. At the same time we stand ready to plan for and take action against other international terrorist organizations and the Nations that harbor them when ordered to do so. We are working diligently with our friends and allies to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. Our challenge will be to prioritize resources and operations in support of that mission against the other security responsibilities to which we are also committed. We must remain trained and ready to execute the full range of military operations to simultaneously protect the homeland as well as other U.S. interests in the near term, even as we transform our forces to meet future challenges.

IMPROVING JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES

The superb warfighting capabilities of the services have given us the winning edge in Operation Enduring Freedom and form the foundation for success against future adversaries. While our forces operating in and near Afghanistan have achieved enormous success on the battlefield, the same operations have revealed that so much more can be accomplished. I look forward to sharing with you afteraction reports from Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCCENT) and his component and task force commanders for their recommendations regarding improvements to joint warfighting.

Joint warfighting brings the combat capabilities of the services together with a focus on desired effects, resulting in a whole that is greater than the sum of the parts. It is, therefore, imperative that we continue to improve joint warfighting capabilities. We have made great progress in improving those capabilities, especially