advanced sensors and imagery for improved intelligence and assessment and for modernization of communications and targeting capabilities in support of evolving strike concepts.

CONCLUSION

A half a century ago, in the midst of the Cold War, Prime Minister Winston Churchill noted in the House of Commons the "sublime irony" that in the nuclear age, "safety will be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation." The_Cold War is long over and new approaches to defense are overdue. As President Bush has stated, "We are no longer divided into armed camps, locked in a careful balance of terror. Our times call for new thinking." The new triad, outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review, responds to the President's charge.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Secretary Feith.

General Gordon.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN A. GORDON, USAF (RET.), ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION General GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a longer prepared statement that I would offer for the record.

Chairman LEVIN. It will remain part of the record.

General GORDON. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) participated in the Nuclear Posture Review, and while the nuclear requirements are largely within the providence of the Department of Defense and the White House, we were able to participate fully throughout the study to ensure that the choices, plans, and requirements that were developed were well within the realm of the possible from the technical and production standpoints of the NNSA. So I would like to make a few points.

The first key conclusion out of the NPR is the concept of a new triad that focuses on and supports the importance of a robust and responsive R&D and industrial base, of which the nuclear weapon enterprise is a key element. It is not only in-being forces, but the demonstrable capabilities of the defense, science, technical, and manufacturing infrastructure that began the nuclear weapon enterprise that provide us with a means to respond to new and unexpected emerging threats in a timely manner and dissuade a potential future competitor from seeking a nuclear advantage.

A second fundamental conclusion, at least from NNSA's perspective, is that for the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons will remain, if not a critical, but at least a key element of U.S. strategy. A basic point, but it tells us that the NNSA must continue to ensure the safety and reliability of the stockpile, and our Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is designed to do just that and to do it in the absence of nuclear testing. From basic surveillance of weapons to refurbishment of the systems, to studying the chemistry and the metallurgy of long-term materials aging, to understanding weapons physics in a new and very different way, in much more detail, and developing the tools for really long-term stewardship, the NNSA is focused on its mission.

An important point is that the NPR essentially revalidated the basic structure of the warhead refurbishment program that had earlier jointly been developed with DOD and the NNSA under the Nuclear Weapons Council structure. The precise weapons that fall into each category are the W80, W76, and B61, which will be central to the stockpile, and we know they will require life extension and refurbishment. The NNSA's requirements remain, and we need

to press ahead, to restore past production capabilities, modernize others, and be able to begin these refurbishments on schedule.

This, in turn, then raises a key point. The results of the NPR do not in the near term reduce the NNSA's costs. Our near term costs are driven by the need to restore and revitalize the infrastructure, and they are driven not by the number of warheads in the stockpile and by the number to be refurbished.

Cost savings from refurbishing a smaller number of warheads will not be realized until perhaps 2010. So this then puts me in a bit of a difficult position, I think, in trying to explain what or what is not intuitively obvious as to why the weapons' cost is not going down, why costs are not going down, but the point is at the core of the enterprise, and the stockpile needs to be refurbished regardless of the numbers of weapons we deem necessary to retain. Even at that level, the enterprise will be stretched, and we will see something approaching maximum capacity when these systems are all in the process line.

So under current planning scenarios, we will be at or near capacity, limiting our ability to dismantle significant numbers of weapons over the next 10 years or so. Under current plans, weapons identified for dismantlement would use low-level capacity at the plants, but it would be difficult to undertake major scheduled dismantlements without slipping some of the schedules or adding new capacity.

Mr. Chairman, I would point to some of the less obvious but very important results of the NPR, at least to me. The conduct of this review has done much to review the cooperation and coordination among the Department of Energy, NNSA, and the Department of Defense on these issues. The Nuclear Weapons Council is working effectively and efficiently. Policy levels are working together. The DOD has offered strong support for needed programs and from my perspective, that is a most welcome development.

Mr. Chairman, I might take a moment to make a few comments on NNSA as an organization, about how it fits into this. First, we are particularly grateful for the support of the Senate for a budget that actually begins to make our requirements achievable. The fiscal year 2003 budget request also makes another important step, and we look forward to sustained support from the administration and from Congress for our ambitious programs. I am confident that we will be able soon to submit a 5-year plan with meaningful con

sent.

Second, I want to report that I am fundamentally satisfied with the progress we are making on stewardship. With improved surveillance tools, we are finding problems and we know how to fix them, but none of them, none of these problems that we found and other fixes we proposed suggest a need any time soon. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) seems to be on track and the pit program is coming into line. We see the infrastructure and improve

ments.

Third, I see real improvements with the labs and the plants and morale is up, retention is up, recruitment is up. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't go so far as so suggest all is perfect. It is hardly that. We run programs with considerable inherent risk as we push the limits of technology. We struggle with complex and large programs, and

NNSA, a large organization, has a ways to go. With the recent confirmation of Dr. Everett Beckner to the position of Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, we will have a leadership team in place. The vectors are good.

Mr. Chairman, two more points if I may. While movement of our work is focused almost exclusively on maintaining today's stockpile and developing the tools to certify our weapons far into the future, without testing, I have directed and the NPR has endorsed three specific initiatives for our weapons programs.

First, we need to begin thinking seriously about a modern pit production facility (MPF) and I want to begin in earnest the very early work on the alternatives that would be available to us. I do not foresee a need for such a facility for at least 15 years, but I want to accelerate and make more rigorous our planning processes toward that.

Second, while I see no near-term need for nuclear tests, my judg ment is that our current test readiness posture is a bit too relaxed and perhaps 30 to 36 months for a fully diagnosed all up test. I believe we should be on a more ready footing, not because I see the need for the test but out of simple prudence.

Third, we are doing almost nothing now, almost no rigorous thinking about the future nuclear concepts. We are not challenging our designers or adequately training new designers. So I have asked the labs to put together a small group at each location that allows new designers to work with old hands to think about and explore what might be possible. I hasten to say that this work is not done with a specific military requirement in mind, but rather a way to help ensure long-term design competence, and we do this with an appreciation of the restrictions on pursuing new weapons. Finally, Mr. Chairman, you asked in your letter of invitation to this hearing that I address the questions raised in a couple of recent DOE Inspector General reports related to stockpile surveillance. In its report on surveillance testing, the IG noticed a continuing backlog in certain tests that could result in a lack of critical information needed to make valid assessments of weaponry on which we rely. It contributes to the backlog of testing, to delays in completing the studies to minimize hazards and ensure safe operations and difficulties in coordinating tests with the Department of Defense. These reports pointed out a deteriorating structure that had contributed to delays in surveillance and other programs.

The second report called to attention the lengthy period of time required to complete the significant findings investigations (SFIs). The reports were correct in identifying significant backlogs of surveillance testing and a likely process for solving problems. But even before the report, we applied funds in 2000, 2001, and 2002 to address these problems. The inspection backlogs were limited last year and others will be done this year. To address delays in completing SFIs, we are taking the actions to assure that the most critical ones are resolved promptly and with high confidence. We are developing a comprehensive SFI database to track the progress and institute accountability. I'm not satisfied with our past handling of this issue, and I have directed Dr. Beckner, our new Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, to take this on as a top priority.

Mr. Chairman, today our nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, it is secure, it is reliable. We are working hard to assess the implications of the NPR for NNSA and to work closely with Department of Defense partners in its implementation and more importantly the flexibility to sustain our nuclear weapons stockpile to adopt current weapons to new missions, potentially to field new weapons depends on healthy plan for stockpile stewardship, peer review and base certification as well as a robust infrastructure for nuclear weapons. As numbers of nuclear forces are reducing, it becomes even more important to retain high confidence in the reliability of the remaining forces. We must also have the capacity to respond to changes in the strategic environment, if need be.

Achieving these goals will require a strong commitment to the recapitalization of our nuclear weapons infrastructure, now a smaller infrastructure to be sure, but one that is sufficiently modern and capable to fully support the NPR and more broadly, our defense strategy. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Gordon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JOHN A. GORDON, USAF (RET.)

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today on the Nuclear Posture Review and the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) role in working with the Department of Defense to implement it.

The NPR reviews future national security needs, and the nuclear weapons stockpile and infrastructure required to support it. The review was carried out by DOD in close consultation and cooperation with the NNSA. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and I fully endorse Secretary Rumsfeld's December 2001 Report to Congress on the NPR.

The central question that I want to address today is: What are the implications of the NPR for nuclear weapons programs? More broadly, what does NNSA need to do to implement the findings and recommendations of the NPR? Let mo first givo the "short answer," which I will then develop more fully.

First, the NPR reaffirms that nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future, will remain a key element of U.S. national security strategy. As a result, NNSA must continue to assure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Our stockpile stewardship program is designed to do just that, and to do so in the absence of nuclear testing.

Second, the NPR reaffirms the stockpile refurbishment plan agreed previously between DOD and NNSA, which calls for three warhead refurbishment programs-the W80, the W76 and the B61-to begin later this decade. As a result, NNSA must press ahead with its efforts to reverse the deterioration of its nuclear weapons infrastructure, restore lost production capabilities, and modernize others in order to be ready to begin those refurbishments on schedule.

This raises a key point-the NPR will not reduce NNSA's costs or workload anytime soon. Regardless of the eventual size of the future stockpile, we will need to meet the agreed timelines, established with DOD well before the NPR, to begin refurbishments later in this decade on the three warhead types. In this regard, nearterm costs are driven not by the total number of warheads to be refurbished, but by the need to restore production capabilities in time to carry out the first refurbishment of each type. Possible cost savings from having to refurbish fewer warheads for a smaller stockpile would not be realized until well into the next decade. Third, several NNSA initiatives have been endorsed by the NPR including efforts

to:

• Enhance nuclear test readiness;

• Reestablish nuclear warhead advanced concepts teams at the national labs and headquarters; and

• Accelerate preliminary design work on a modern pit facility (MPF).

Given our multi-year plan to reintroduce program stability to the enterprise, we believe we are on track to complete acquisition of the tools and capabilities needed

to assure future stockpile safety and reliability, achieve the needed restoration and modernization of the production complex, and implement the NPR initiatives.

ROLE OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ENTERPRISE IN ACHIEVING DEFENSE POLICY GOALS

Let me elaborate more on these matters starting from first principles. Four key defense policy goals were articulated in the Quadrennial Defense Review and later reaffirmed in the NPR. Briefly, the goals are to:

• assure allies and friends by demonstrating the United States' steadiness of purpose and capability to fulfill its military commitments;

⚫ dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends;

⚫ deter threats and counter coercion against the United States, its forces, and allies; and

• defeat any adversary decisively and defend against attack if deterrence fails.

In seeking to meet these goals, the NPR has established as its centerpiece the "new triad" of flexible response capabilities consisting of the following elements:

• non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities including systems for command and control;

⚫ active and passive defenses including ballistic missile defenses; and

• R&D and industrial infrastructure needed to develop, build, and maintain nuclear offensive forces and defensive systems.

Perhaps more so than in any previous defense review this concept of a new triad reflects a broad recognition of the importance of a robust and responsive defense R&D and industrial base in achieving our overall defense strategy.

The ability of our modern defense industrial base to bring advanced defense technology rapidly into the field is well respected internationally among both friends and foes. The breadth and scope of the U.S. strategic modernization program of the early 1980s, including the potential of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) then in the very early stages of R&D, was key to causing President Gorbachev in the late 1980s to seek an end to strategic competition with the West and an end to the Cold War. The U.S. defense R&D and industrial base, including the nuclear weapons complex of the national laboratories, production plants, and test sites that supported development of sophisticated warheads with build rates exceeding 1,000 weapons per year, permitted that modernization program to take place and was a major factor in reassuring allies (who depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella), in dissuading, that is, convincing the Soviet Union that arms competition with the United States was futile and in deterring aggression.

Many modern military capabilities evolved from the legacy of the Manhattan Project, characterized by the massive application of science and technology to the problem of developing and producing the atomic bomb and leading to later efforts across a range of military systems. It was not only nuclear and conventional forces that provided deterrence during the Cold War, but the latent potential-reflected in our defense scientific, technical, and manufacturing base to design and develop ever more advanced and capable military systems, and the ability to produce them in great quantities if need be.

Now that the Cold War is over, how can the nuclear weapons enterprise act both to reassure allies, and to dissuade or deter future adversaries? An enterprise focused on sustainment and sized to meet the needs of a smaller nuclear deterrent can provide capabilities to respond to future strategic challenges. A future competitor seeking to gain some nuclear advantage would be forced to conclude that its buildup could not occur more quickly than the U.S. could respond. Alternatively, an ability to innovate and produce small builds of special purpose weapons, characteristic of a smaller but still vital nuclear infrastructure, would act to convince an adversary that it could not expect to negate U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities. The development and subsequent modification of the B61-7 bomb-converting a few of them into the B61-11 earth penetrator weapons-is a case in point.

Thus it is not only in-being forces, but the demonstrable capabilities of the defense scientific, technical and manufacturing infrastructure, of which a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure is a key part, including its ability to sustain and adapt, that provides the United States with the means to respond to new, unexpected, or emerging threats in a timely manner. This has served to reassure allies and friends, dissuade adversaries from strategic competition with the United States, and underpin credible deterrence in a changing security environment.