transportation assets and associated personnel. That said, NNSA will work with DOD to assure that longer-term warhead transportation needs deriving from the NPR can be met. Enhanced test readiness President Bush supports a continued moratorium on underground nuclear testing; nothing in the NPR changes that. Over time, we believe that the stewardship program will provide the tools to ensure stockpile safety and reliability without nuclear testing. But there are no guarantees. It is only prudent to continue to hedge for the possibility that we may in the future uncover a safety or reliability problem in a warhead critical to the U.S. nuclear deterrent that could not be fixed without nuclear testing. Based on a 1993 Presidential directive, NNSA currently maintains a capability to conduct an underground nuclear test within 24 to 36 months of a Presidential decision to do so. Test readiness is maintained principally by the participation of nuclear test program personnel in an active program of stockpile stewardship experiments, especially the subcritical experiments carried out underground at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). During the NPR, two concerns were raised about our test readiness program. First, a 2- to 3-year readiness posture may not be sustainable as more and more experienced test personnel retire. Not all techniques and processes required to carry out underground nuclear tests are exercised with the work carried out at the NTS. As experienced personnel retire, it will become more difficult to train new people in these techniques, further degrading test readiness. This argued for an approach in which key capabilities required to conduct nuclear tests are identified and exercised regularly on projects making use of a variety of nuclear test-related skills. Second, the current 2- to 3-year posture may be too long. If we believed that a defect uncovered in the stockpile surveillance program, or through new insight gained in R&D efforts, had degraded our confidence in the safety and/or reliability of the W76 warhead-the warhead deployed on Trident submarines and comprising the most substantial part of our strategic deterrent-the ability to conduct a test more quickly might be critically important. To address these concerns, the NPR endorsed the NNSA proposal to enhance test readiness by reducing the lead-time to prepare for and conduct an underground nuclear test. To support this, NNSA has allocated $15 million in fiscal year 2003 to begin the transition to an enhanced test readiness posture. Funds will be used among other things to: • augment key personnel and increase their operational proficiency, ⚫ begin the mentoring of the next generation of testing personnel, • conduct additional subcritical experiments and test-related exercises, • replace key underground-test-unique components, • modernize certain test diagnostic capabilities, and ⚫ decrease the time required to show regulatory and safety compliance. NNSA will work with DOD over coming months to refine test scenarios and evaluate cost/benefit tradeoffs in order to determine, implement, and sustain the optimum test readiness time. Accelerate planning for a Modern Pit Facility (MPF) Our inability to produce and certify plutonium pits is a shortfall in our stockpile stewardship program. Pit production was terminated at Rocky Flats in 1989 and is now being re-established on a limited scale at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Only engineering test units of a single warhead type have been produced to date, however, and no "war reserve" units are expected to enter the stockpile for about 7 years. Current plans envision Los Alamos producing about 20 pits per year with a surge capacity to perhaps 50. The current pit production strategy is first to carry out an assessment of pit lifetime, through our enhanced surveillance campaign, to yield initial results by fiscal year 2003 with completion by fiscal year 2006. Once that is completed, our policy is to reestablish pit production capability in a time frame and with a capacity sufficient to meet national needs. Implementing that policy means fielding a capability that is: • available in time to replace pits that exceed minimum projected lifetime; sized to support the planned workload, with ready reserve to address “surprise” requirements for force augmentation, and potential new warhead production; and • modular (i.e., expandable further) if further needs dictate. One thing is now certain—the Los Alamos production capacity will be insufficient to meet future requirements for pits. As a result of the NPR, we seek to accelerate planning and initial design work to establish an MPF. Relevant activities about to begin include preliminary MPF design, associated technology development, and initiation of the National Environmental Policy Act process. Tritium While the NPR will result in a smaller active stockpile of both operationally deployed and responsive forces, the nuclear stockpile by warhead type, by year, and by readiness state-has not yet been determined. This will be done in detail as part of the NWC process and will enable NNSA to plan for the delivery of sufficient tritium to meet all military requirements. Because stockpile reductions will not be accomplished for several years, we do know that there will be no near-term reduction in the immediate demand for tritium. NNSA plans to begin tritium production in commercial reactors in fall 2003, and to complete construction and begin operations of a new Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) at the Savannah River Site so that tritium can be delivered to the stockpile in advance of need. It will be important for NNSA to assess future tritium needs in light of a number of factors in addition to NPR reductions in the active stockpile. These include potential changes to the tritium loadings of several warhead types and potentially increased "pipe line" needs at the Savannah River tritium facilities (in connection with the new extraction facility). CONCLUSION Mr. Chairman, today, our nuclear stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. We are working hard to assess the inplications of the NPR for NNSA and to work closely with our DOD partners in implementation. Most importantly, the flexibility to sustain our nuclear weapons stockpile, to adapt current weapons to new missions, or to field new weapons, if required, depends on a healthy program for stockpile stewardship and peer-review-based certification as well as a robust infrastructure for nuclear weapons production. As numbers of nuclear forces are reduced, it becomes even more important to maintain high confidence in the safety and reliability of remaining forces. We must also have the capability to respond to changes in the strategic environment, if need be, by being able to reconstitute larger force levels with safe and reliable warheads and develop, produce, and certify new or modified nuclear warheads to meet new military requirements. Achieving these goals will require a strong commitment to the recapitalization of the nuclear weapons infrastructure a smaller infrastructure, to be sure, but one that is sufficiently modern and capable to fully support the NPR and, more broadly, our Nation's defense strategy. Chairman LEVIN. General Gordon, thank you. Admiral Ellis. STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND Admiral ELLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee. I, too, have a brief written statement I would offer for the record and a few comments before we begin the rounds of questioning. It is an honor again to appear before you, particularly as today we address the changes and opportunities represented in the recently completed Nuclear Posture Review. In so doing, as Senator Ben Nelson noted, I represent the men and women of all of our strategic forces, and in the short time that I have had command, I have deepened my already enormous respect for the United States Strategic Command's (STRATCOM) exceptional professionals, both civilian and military, who provide, as they always have, a priceless service to our Nation. While sustaining the rigor and professionalism required to support our nuclear forces, they are fully engaged in reflecting tremendous change and challenges ahead as we work to transform fundamentally the strategic landscape. We welcome the results of the Nuclear Posture Review. More than a much-needed capabilities assessment, it fundamentally addresses more broadly the entire concept of deterrence. It brings increased focus to ensure all our strategic forces, including delivery systems, weapons, infrastructure, communications, and planning receive the resources required to enhance their capabilities and in many cases extend their lives well beyond their original design lives. The attention to infrastructure is particularly welcome as it recognizes the contribution to deterrence of what has been a linchpin of America's military might, and that is our industrial and technological superiority. I appreciate, echo, and acknowledge the yeoman effort John Gordon and his team at NNSA have expended in bringing the nuclear weapons complex back to health. A recurring theme from the past decade, repeated by the Nuclear Posture Review, is the importance of our people. From the civilian and military personnel at our headquarters, to the scientists and engineers in the laboratories, and the sailors and airmen operating our strategic forces, they continue a legacy and culture of which we, as Americans, can all be proud. The rigor and exactness appropriate to their awesome responsibilities, which is exemplified by the culture of the earlier Strategic Air Command, continue to this day in the United States Strategic Command and indeed in all of our nuclear infrastructure. This hallmark of excellence is the standard by which we will measure ourselves as we boldly move into a dynamic future. As a military team, I and the other unified commanders in chief are fully engaged in supporting the disparate elements contributing to the success of the Nation's global war on terrorism. That is a team effort, but I also very clearly understand that there is only one military commander in chief who directly oversees our strategic forces. That task is assigned to me. My shipmates and I at the United States Strategic Command are mindful of this uniquely important responsibility and are committed to continuing that history of service to this great Nation. Thank you. I welcome your questions. [The prepared statement of Admiral Ellis follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to testify on the Nuclear Posture Review. This is my first appearance before this committee since my confirmation hearing last September. I am honored to be invited to participate in this hearing on a major report, the conclusions of which will reshape and revitalize, respectively, our strategic policy and capabilities. As Congress recognized in the Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act, a periodic comprehensive review of our Nation's strategic posture is appropriate as the national security environment changes. The last Nuclear Posture Review was conducted 8 years ago to address how to effectively draw down our strategic forces in the post-Cold War world. For a number of reasons, including a rapidly changing international environment and complex new national security challenges, the time is right to again assess our strategic direction. This Nuclear Posture Review provides that assessment and, indeed, moves beyond assessment to provide the initial details of a new direction, proposing a comprehensive approach that builds on the Quadrennial Defense Review's strategic foundation of assure, dissuade, deter, defend, and defeat. The Nuclear Posture Review was conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. U.S. Strategic Command participated in the review as did the Joint Staff and the Services, particularly the Air Force and the Navy. We were consulted on many issues and provided our expertise as well as our frank opinions on the report's findings as they were developed. I am pleased with the Nuclear Posture Review's balance and focus and look forward to working with Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Services as we work to implement these findings in the months ahead. Many of the details and key issues involving the Nuclear Posture Review are familiar to you and have been addressed by others, but I would, however, like to discuss some of the key findings from my perspective as the combatant commander of our Nation's strategic forces. MODERNIZATION AND SUSTAINMENT The first finding I'd like to highlight is the recognition of a pressing need for investment across the full range of our strategic capabilities. As we work to reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads, this investment is needed to sustain and improve our aging operating forces, to recapitalize our infrastructure which has atrophied over the last 10 years, and to refine and enhance current systems. Reductions of operationally deployed nuclear warheads to the lowest numbers consistent with national security, as the President directed, will require that remaining systems be reliable, sustainable, and, therefore, fully credible. Our current operating forces, our intercontinental ballistic missiles, our bombers, and our strategic ballistic missile submarines, and their weapons, will remain the backbone of our strategic strike forces for at least the next 20 years. These platforms and their weapon systems are projected to remain in service well beyond their original design lives and require significant sustained investment to monitor and, if necessary, to replace aging and obsolete components in addition to more comprehensive overhauls or life extension programs. The NPR fully recognizes this. Our operating forces could not be effective without robust complementary capabilities including command, control, and communications systems as well as effective intelligence and planning support. Increased strategic flexibility and adaptability will require an equally robust but much more capable nuclear command and control system. The Nuclear Posture Review identifies advances in speed and capabilities in these areas as critical to improving the capabilities of our strike forces. General Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has similarly identified improvement in command and control capabilities as a vital component of our military's transformation. I fully support this renewed focus on improving these military capabilities. Investments in these areas are critical enablers to not only strategic forces but our overall military capability. As the Secretary of Defense stated in his testimony last June, our military has been forced to make increasingly difficult choices between equally necessary procurement, readiness, and research and development needs over the last 10 years. Strategic forces have not been excluded from this trend. The Nuclear Posture Review recognizes this and recommends renewed investment in existing and future operating forces, supporting capabilities, and strategic infrastructure. I fully support those recommendations. Thank you for the positive steps you've already taken in this committee to provide much needed funding to improve these capabilities and for your continued support in this vital area. NUCLEAR WARHEAD REDUCTIONS A second key finding of the Nuclear Posture Review is the need for a measured approach to operationally deployed nuclear warhead reductions. This approach meets the President's direction and establishes as a goal the lowest number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads consistent with the Nation's national security needs. I fully support it. The Nuclear Posture Review directs periodic assessments to evaluate the strategic environment and our progress in developing new capabilities for our strategic forces. These assessments allow us to respond appropriately to any emerging threat, dissuade any potential adversary, and provide assurance to our allies of our resolve. BROADER DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC FORCES The third key finding of the Nuclear Posture Review is the recognition that our strategic capabilities should not be limited to nuclear weapons alone. The inclusion of non-nuclear, and, potentially, non-kinetic capabilities into our strategic options provides a number of benefits. First, it helps to raise the nuclear threshold by providing the President with strategic options in a crisis or conflict that do not rely solely on nuclear weapons, yet still convey the Nation's resolve and determination. Second, integrating non-nuclear capabilities into strategic forces strengthens our joint approach to developing and operating military forces. In the past, there have often been unique requirements for nuclear forces beyond those of conventional forces. Now, with technological advances, we have the potential to seamlessly integrate existing or projected enhancements to non-nuclear capabilities such as communications, intelligence flow, and precision strike to improve our strategic capabilities. The integration of what had previously been considered conventional capabilities into national strategic plans allows for the development of responsive, adaptive, and interoperable joint forces that can be employed in a wider range of contingencies. There are certainly challenges associated with incorporating non-nuclear capabilities into our strategic forces, however, the benefits far outweigh the con cerns. OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY The final finding of the Nuclear Posture Review is the need for more flexible and adaptive planning in support of our strategic forces. U.S. Strategic Command is in the process of developing a more flexible and adaptive planning system that retains the rigor and expertise developed over the last 40 years, yet employs modern computing techniques and streamlined processes to significantly improve our planning capability for rapid, flexible crisis response in the face of new national security challenges. This new approach to planning will require significantly more collaboration with the regional combatant commanders as we continue to better integrate our military capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. CONCLUSION There are many positive results that will accrue from the Nuclear Posture Review. A comprehensive and focused assessment of our strategic posture has provided new concepts that can both allow us to reduce our deployed nuclear weapons inventory and strengthen our national security to meet this era's new challenges. This bold change in direction will allow us to begin shifting our focus from the number of launchers and weapon platforms stipulated by previous treaties and based on latent mistrust of former adversaries. Instead, we will move toward significantly lower numbers of operationally deployed nuclear weapons reflecting our new relationship with Russia and technologically transform our strategic posture from a purely nuclear focus to the broader capabilities of the new triad. The new triad, when development is complete, will include improved strategic strike forces, active and passive defenses, and a responsive infrastructure all supported by improved command and control as well as robust intelligence and planning capabilities. Over the next decade two of the legs of the NPR's new triad, defenses and a responsive infrastructure, will be combined with a modernized strategic strike force including nuclear and non-nuclear options. This new triad can broaden the definition of strategic forces, enhance deterrence concepts against a wider range of threats, and offer dramatic improvements in the speed, accuracy, and agility of the full range of our Nation's military response. I look forward to reporting in the future on our progress in implementing the findings of the Nuclear Posture Review as we, together, reshape our strategic capabilities to meet the challenges of this new era. Thank you very much. I welcome your questions. |