vided "quick fix fencing" and other equipment for storage site improvements, inventory control systems, personnel reliability and safety equipment, emergency response equipment, and guard force equipment. We also conduct railcar maintenance, and our assistance has helped reduce MOD's response and recovery times to respond to nuclear accidents or incidents.

7. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Feith, is it in our national security interests to encourage a Russian responsive force, rather than weapon dismantlement?

Secretary FEITH. Russia already possesses a responsive capability inherent in its continued manufacture of new nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Because the United States is not producing new nuclear weapons and lacks the ability to do so, our only means of maintaining a responsive capability is to store existing nuclear weapons. Naturally, we plan to dismantle warheads we no longer need and encourage the Russians to do so as well.

Russia's maintenance of a large inventory of non-deployed nuclear warheads is driven more by the nature of its infrastructure than a desire to match U.S. warhead inventories. Russia's philosophy for maintaining its nuclear forces is significantly different from that of the U.S. Russia's nuclear warheads have a relatively short shelf life, so it maintains a large active complex to produce new warheads to replace warheads whose service life has expired. U.S. nuclear warheads, on the other hand, have a much longer shelf life and, since we have no warhead production capability and are at least several years from developing one, our responsive capability relies on the retention of warheads.

[Deleted.]

THE NPR IN THE CONTEXT OF ARMS CONTROL

8. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Feith, rather than the dire predictions in the 1960s of large increases in the number of nuclear states, the number has actually declined over the past 30 years. Do you feel that our continual reliance on nuclear weapons, as outlined by the Nuclear Posture Review, undermines the global trend away from nuclear weapons?

Secretary FEITH. In 1972, 5 states had nuclear weapons programs; 9 states possessed ballistic missiles; and 10 states possessed chemical weapons. Today, 12 states have nuclear weapons programs; 28 states possess ballistic missiles; and 16 states possess chemical weapons. The United States cannot predict with confidence what nations, combination of nations or non-state actors may pose a threat to our vital interests or those of our allies well into the future. However, we are likely to confront one or a combination of adversaries armed with a wide range of capabilities, including nuclear, biological, chemical, and other advanced weapons and the means to deliver them over a long range. In this context, the Nuclear Posture Review concluded that nuclear weapons would continue to play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies, and friends. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats including WMD and large-scale conventional attack.

The Nuclear Posture Review shifts planning for our strategic forces from the threat-based approach of the Cold War to a capabilities-based approach. As the nonnuclear strike capabilities, defensive capabilities, and responsive infrastructure of the new triad are fielded, the requirements for operationally deployed nuclear forces may be reduced beyond what we can now foresee. If so, the reductions path announced by the President may prudently be undertaken more rapidly and/or deeper reductions may be possible.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BEN NELSON

THE U.S. STOCKPILE: LOWEST NUMBER

9. Senator BEN NELSON. Secretary Feith, last summer in testimony before the Strategic Subcommittee, Admiral Ellis's predecessor, Admiral Mies, stated that to maintain a "viable nuclear triad," the bottom line for our nuclear stockpile should remain above 2,000 warheads-somewhere in the neighborhood of 2,200. President Bush has said that the bottom line could drop as low as 1,700. Which figure is correct?

Secretary FEITH. The two statements are generally consistent. As the NPR indicates, the total number of operationally-deployed nuclear warheads is a subset of the total number of weapons in the stockpile. We are maintaining nuclear weapons in storage in part to address the issue Admiral Mies raised, as well as to maintain

a responsive capability should developments in the international security environment warrant re-deploying some weapons. The final number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile has not been determined.

Based on these considerations, the NPR concluded that a diverse force structure of ICBMs, bombers, and SSBNs should be preserved, and that 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads on a force structure that could be reconstituted efficiently would be adequate to meet these requirements. However, a range is necessary when attempting to identify requirements for 2012 because we cannot now know with absolute precision what the requirements for operationally deployed nuclear forces will be a decade from now. Many of the factors that will contribute to determining those requirements, including, for example, the state of the threat environment, are dynamic and cannot be predicted with the precision necessary to identify "the number" of operationally deployed nuclear warheads that will be required

in 2012.

THE RUSSIAN STOCKPILE: RISKS

10. Senator BEN NELSON. Admiral Ellis, are you concerned about the risks of proliferation from terrorists or governments that support terrorists if Russia stockpiles old weapons instead of destroying them?

Admiral ELLIS. Yes, I am concerned about the risks of proliferation associated with the Russian nuclear stockpile; however, I believe the CTR program is addressing these concerns. Sometimes referred to as the Nunn-Lugar program, CTR has enjoyed broad, bipartisan support since its inception in Congress in 1994. As a first priority of CTR, the United States is helping ship nuclear warheads to consolidation and dismantlement sites to encourage their reduction. CTR is also enhancing the security of the weapons storage sites that will remain open, and is a cost-effective means to aid in the "denuclearization" of former Soviet states, to continue to promote stockpile safety and security in Russia, and help stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

11. Senator BEN NELSON. Admiral Ellis, should the United States and Russia agree to destroy their warheads?

Admiral ELLIS. The United States will dismantle retired weapons or those scheduled for retirement as approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council. From a warfighter's perspective, it is vital to maintain a credible and reliable stockpile, so I support our current schedules for dismantlement as well as warhead life extension programs. We can prudently pursue additional warhead dismantlement programs when we successfully complete the life extension programs, or when we expand the capacity of the nuclear weapons infrastructure complex in order to concurrently extend warhead life and dismantlement, or when the United States has an adequate warhead production capability.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

12. Senator BEN NELSON. General Gordon, when you testified before the Strategic Subcommittee on April 25, 2001, I inquired about the cuts in President Bush's fiscal year 2002 budget made to the Department of Energy's nonproliferation programs. There were cuts of approximately $400 million. That included the Material, Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (MPC&A), which improves physical security at Russian nuclear weapons facilities, which was cut by $31 million, and the Nuclear Cities Initiative, a program to assist Russian weapon scientists transition to commercial positions, which was cut by $20 million. How did these programs fare this year, and how important are they in the post-September 11 world?

General GORDON. The budget request for fiscal year 2003 is $233 million for MPC&A. This is below the fiscal year 2002 level; however, due to the fiscal year 2002 supplemental of $120 million, we have enough funds to accelerate significantly our MPC&A work by as much as 2 to 3 years.

Regarding our NCI and IPP programs that have now been consolidated under the Russian Transition Initiatives (RTI), we have sufficient funds in RTI to meet our goals. This is because $10 million was recently released (late in fiscal year 2001) due to the lifting of a legislative restriction, and $15 million was received in fiscal year 2002 from the emergency supplemental.

Since the September 11 attacks, we have developed a set of aggressive measures to accelerate MPC&A upgrades and complete them 2 years ahead of schedule. Our new schedule is to have the Russian Navy nuclear warhead sites done by 2006 and

all the MinAtom (Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy) sites completed by 2008. This program has taken on new resonance in the post-September 11 world.

September 11 also illuminates the importance of the IPP program. It is critical to prevent the adverse migration of scientific knowledge into the hands of those that would use this knowledge for their own diabolical ends.

13. Senator BEN NELSON. General Gordon, are the resources in the fiscal year 2003 budget request for MPC&A enough?

General GORDON. Yes, I fully support the President's request for a fiscal year 2003 funding level of $235 million for our MPC&A and Second Line of Defense work. That amount-combined with the fiscal year 2002 budget of $293 million, of which $120 million was received as part of the emergency supplemental packageprovides the program sufficient resources to accelerate its planned activities with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, Russian Navy, and Russian Customs.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND U.S. NUCLEAR FACILITIES

14. Senator BEN NELSON. General Gordon, could you please provide information about the homeland side of our war on terrorism and address the safety of our nuclear stockpile from a terrorist threat?

General GORDON. The DOE/NNSA has a defense in-depth approach to security. This approach consists of access control, physical security systems, and protective force response. Only authorized personnel are allowed unescorted into nuclear weapons security areas which are controlled by armed Protective Force members. Authorized personnel must have a DOE "Q" clearance, be in a human reliability program (i.e., personnel assurance program or personnel security assurance program), and have a "need to know." All other personnel are under strict escort requirements and all personnel entering such security areas are subject to search for prohibited articles.

Physical security systems include barriers, intrusion detection systems, video assessment, and access controls. Protective forces provide additional assessment capability and are present in numbers sufficient to defeat the DOE's Design Basis Threat. The efficacy of the barriers providing delay, systems providing detection, assessment, and response are thoroughly modeled, assessed, and validated by the DOE/NNSA.

The DOE/NNSA also has in place contingency procedures for the recovery of a stolen nuclear weapon and maintains specialized teams that can be readily deployed to nuclear or radiological events.

In addition to physical security measures described above, the DOE/NNSA_ employs use control on its weapons systems. This includes: Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety which prevents the electrical systems from accidently firing the detonators during accidents; Insensitive High Explosives which unlike conventional explosives are highly resistant to unintended detonation; Permissive Action Links which are electronic locks inside the weapons which prevent it from unauthorized detonation; Command Disable Features which facilitates non-violent disablement of a weapon by destroying critical components if loss of control is eminent; and Active Protection Systems which automatically disables weapons upon unauthorized tampering.

15. Senator BEN NELSON. General Gordon, what efforts and specific steps have you taken to increase security measures at our nuclear facilities?

General GORDON. Following September 11, NNSA immediately increased its security posture from Security Condition 5 (routine security) to Security Condition 2 (terrorist action is imminent). Security Condition 2 includes enhanced response capability, more stringent access controls, additional searches, and heightened awareness. We are currently maintaining security capability at our sites at Security Condition 3 (terrorist activity is more predictable) with some additional measures. NNSA also conducted a vulnerability assessment of our facilities based on the events of September 11 to determine the types of new concerns that needed to be addressed. An emergency supplemental was requested immediately after the events of September 11. These funds are being used by NNSA to increase the protective forces and address the highest priority security improvements to meet heightened security implemented as the result of September 11. Additionally, I established a Combating Terrorism Task Force to review headquarters and field actions implemented to protect our site assets.

16. Senator BEN NELSON. General Gordon, does this budget provide enough resources to ensure that our facilities remain as safe as possible?

General GORDON. As we understand the threats and requirements at this time, the total safeguards and security request of $510 million for fiscal year 2003 fully funds the Department's current priorities. As we learn more and understand more about the threats we will continue to reshape and rework our requirements and our programs.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

NEW CAPABILITIES

17. Senator THURMOND. Secretary Feith, in describing the new triad, you state that nuclear forces will be integrated with, rather than treated in isolation from, other military capabilities. This creates opportunities for substituting non-nuclear strike capabilities for nuclear forces and defense systems for offensive means. What new capabilities must we develop to get the same effects as a nuclear weapon?

Secretary FEITH. Advanced, non-nuclear strike capabilities, integrated with the other capabilities in the new triad, would provide a broader range of effective options for national leaders to consider than has been available in the past. By developing new capabilities, we will enable a future President to make tradeoffs among various options.

The challenge of defeating an adversary's mobile ballistic missiles illustrates these tradeoffs. At present, using existing C3I systems and conventional capabilities, it is difficult to precisely locate mobile launchers and deliver weapons on each target in a timely manner. Should a potential adversary arm such missiles with weapons of mass destruction and launch, or threaten to launch them at the United States or a major ally, it would obviously be urgent that we defeat the threat. In theory, highyield nuclear weapons could destroy mobile missile launchers in a barrage attack, but such an attack would pose problems of its own. The Nuclear Posture Review seeks to develop capabilities that will give the United States the ability to target and defeat such weapons without resort to nuclear weapons. For example, improvements in intelligence capabilities, coupled with advanced, conventional weapons that continually cover a threat region for an extended time and respond quickly to targeting needs could be more effective and desirable for this important mission. Similarly, ballistic missile defense could help mitigate the threat posed by mobile ballistic missile launchers.

AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

18. Senator THURMOND. Secretary Feith, I understand that you believe the adjustments to the nuclear stockpile should be done without negotiations since they would impede or derail the significant reductions that both the United States and Russia want. Does the administration propose to sign an agreement on the reductions? If not, why not? If we sign no agreement, what is the legal standing of any understanding we have with Russia?

Secretary FEITH. The United States is working toward an agreement on reductions of strategic nuclear weapons with Russia because the Russian government has made it a high priority. We will make the announced reductions in our operationally deployed strategic weapons whether or not there is an agreement.

Since the Russian government desires a signed document, the U.S. is willing to consider a range of agreements to promote transparency, predictability, and flexibility.

We are discussing a package of agreements with the Russians, some of which may be legally binding, some of which may be politically binding, and some of which may be statements of intent, with transparency. Substance will determine the final form of the agreement.

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS

19. Senator THURMOND. Secretary Feith, although the United States has announced that it will reduce the number of its operationally-deployed nuclear warheads, I am not certain to what degree Russia has announced that it will reduce its nuclear stockpile. Could you please provide the details on Russia's nuclear reductions?

Secretary FEITH. Unlike the United States, Russia maintains its stockpile by continually renewing it, i.e., Russia manufactures new nuclear weapons and dismantles

old ones on an ongoing basis. President Putin has stated that Russia is willing to conditionally reduce the number of its strategic warheads to 1,500 to 2,200 from its approximately 6,000 accountable warheads under START I.

The Intelligence Community estimates that deployed Russian strategic nuclear weapons will fall to fewer than 2,000 warheads by 2012, irrespective of an arms control agreement.

OPERATIONAL VS RESPONSIVE FORCE

20. Senator THURMOND. Admiral Ellis, in Secretary Feith's prepared statement, he describes the responsive force as an augmentation of the operationally deployed force, largely through the loading of additional warheads on bombers and ballistic missiles. Does the responsive force include additional force structure or is it solely additional warheads?

Admiral ELLIS. The responsive force does not include additional force structure. The responsive force is comprised of warheads that are retained to increase weapon loading on existing strategic platforms.

INVESTMENT IN STRATEGIC FORCES

21. Senator THURMOND. Admiral Ellis, the NPR calls for renewed investment in existing and future operating forces. General Myers has already highlighted the need for improved command and control capabilities. What specific improvements in the operational force are your highest priorities?

Admiral ELLIS. My highest priorities for my operating forces are full funding of Trident II and Minuteman III life extension, E-4B and E-6B command and control aircraft modernization and sustainment, modernization of our bomber communication suites, and the supporting strategic cryptographic systems. Our current air, land, and sea based strike assets will remain the backbone of our strategic capability for at least the next 20 years. Many of these assets are scheduled to remain in service well past their original design life and require robust sustainment and modernization programs in order to remain viable until planned replacement dates.

The Nuclear Posture Review calls for development of a broad spectrum of new capabilities. We must invest in new strike, command and control, and intelligence capabilities leading to the full dimensional defeat of the rapidly proliferating hard and deeply buried and mobile target sets. We must transform our strategic war planning system into a system that retains the rigors and expertise developed over the last 50 years, yet employs modern computing techniques and streamlined processes to significantly improve our planning capability. This effort is a critical element in enabling the required rapid, flexible crisis response that integrates nuclear, conventional, and non-kinetic weapons into our war plans.

FACILITY IMPROVEMENTS

22. Senator THURMOND. General Gordon, the NPR calls for improving the nuclear infrastructure to increase confidence in deployed forces, eliminating unneeded weapons and mitigating the risk of technological surprise. How does this goal translate into funding requirements for the Department of Energy?

General GORDON. Nuclear weapons will remain a vital part of the national security strategy for the foreseeable future. Indeed, the R&D and production infrastructure needed to develop, build, and maintain nuclear offensive forces is a key element of the "new triad" established under the NPR. As long as we rely on nuclear weapons, we will require this infrastructure, and talented and skilled personnel, both to ensure the safety and reliability of the enduring stockpile and to permit us to dismantle safely weapons no longer needed.

Substantial work must be completed soon to restore capabilities and capacities in time to begin refurbishment work on key warheads later this decade. Among other things, there is a backlog of $800 million in deferred maintenance of facilities, and a need for about $500 million per year over the next 10 years in additional investment to recapitalize the production complex. This investment does not include new construction projects (e.g., a modern pit facility) to ensure sufficient capacity and capability for future-decade stockpile refurbishments.

The condition of the nuclear weapons facilities and infrastructure will, as the backlog of required maintenance increases each year, present increased risk to the stockpile stewardship program. The majority of the facilities in the infrastructure are 40 years old; some facilities are unavailable for use. Many facilities were not designed to meet today's safety, security, and environmental standards. Indeed,