37. Senator BUNNING. Secretary Feith and Admiral Ellis, can the United States afford to shrink the inventory of operationally-deployed warheads without a national missile defense?

Secretary FEITH. Missile defenses have an essential role in the new triad. The Nuclear Posture Review sets forth a new deterrent strategy whereby U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear force levels and future missile defense forces are not sized to Russian offensive or defensive force levels. Instead, we are pursuing a capabilities-based approach that is not country-specific, but which is designed to address the uncertainties of the future.

Admiral ELLIS. The Nuclear Posture Review envisions a re-shaping of our strategic capabilities, to include passive as well as active defenses, non-nuclear and even non-kinetic as well as nuclear strike capabilities, a responsive infrastructure and improved C4ISR that enables each of these elements. We will field the capability to respond promptly, decisively, and proportionately to any threat. Our ability to respond is not tied to any one element, but rather to the unique capabilities of each of the elements and the synergies achieved by their interaction. This synergy allows us to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons and meet the President's goal of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed weapons by 2012. Without a demonstrated missile defense capability, we may not be able to meet the President's goal.

38. Senator BUNNING. Secretary Feith, without a nuclear weapons production capability and a national missile defense, will the United States be able to maintain strategic nuclear flexibility?

Secretary FEITH. The operationally deployed forces are sized to provide the capabilities required to meet U.S. defense goals in the context of immediate and unexpected contingencies, i.e., a sufficient number available on short notice to counter known or unexpected threats. Nevertheless, greater flexibility is needed with respect to nuclear forces and planning than was the case during the Cold War. U.S. forces must take into account an increasingly complex security environment in which surprise is a dominant strategic consideration.

In this context, the Nuclear Posture Review found that fundamentally, a diversified portfolio of offensive and defensive forces-combined with a responsive infrastructure and enhanced command, control, communications, intelligence, and adaptive planning capabilities-provides the U.S. with more flexibility than the Cold War triad. Against adversaries with limited ballistic missile capabilities, defenses can provide protection if deterrence based on offensive strike capabilities fails. Defenses that intercept ballistic missiles, particularly missiles fired from mobile launchers, can ease the task of offensive strike capabilities. Similarly, offensive strike capabilities that destroy enemy ballistic missile forces can ease the task of active and passive defenses.

The Nuclear Posture Review also found that nuclear weapons continue to play a critical role by providing credible military options to deter a wide range of threats. Thus, a modern, responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure is indispensable, especially as operationally deployed forces are reduced.

THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM: DATA RELIABILITY

39. Senator BUNNING. General Gordon, since the SSP is based on data from actual nuclear weapons tests, and since we have not had an actual underground nuclear test for some time, how certain are you as to the reliability and certainty of the data generated by the SSP?

General GORDON. Over the last several years, the Stockpile Stewardship Program has greatly increased our understanding of fundamental physical principals and properties of nuclear weapons, far beyond what we had during nuclear testing. Subcritical experiments and gas gun experiments using plutonium have improved our knowledge of issues that affect the performance of a primary in a nuclear weapon. High energy density experiments on NOVA, Omega, and the Sandia Z-machine are increasing our knowledge of properties and processes under conditions relevant to the performance of the secondary stage of a nuclear weapon. When NIF becomes operational in 2004 we will begin experiments for the stewardship program that will lead ultimately to a greater understanding of the pressures, temperatures, and densities that affect the performance of secondaries. The three-dimensional simulation capabilities being developing in the ASCI program provide far more powerful predictive and analytical tools than we have ever had in the past. So in a certain sense, the data we are getting now is better and better analyzed than any we had during the testing era.

Stockpile Stewardship is based on using this improved knowledge and these better capabilities to analyze the effects on performance and reliability of changes in the stockpile as it ages or as we replace components. The goal will be to manage those changes so that we remain confident in the stockpile with the tools we have in hand or will develop.

40. Senator BUNNING. General Gordon, do you foresee a need to test in the future, based on the available data in the SSP?

General GORDON. Senator, obviously we cannot predict the future; however, over the last 6 years both the Secretaries of Energy and Defense have annually reported to the President that the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable, and that there is no need to conduct a nuclear test. At the same time, the stockpile is aging beyond its original design life, refurbishments and modernizations, as part of the Life Extension Program, are underway (W87) or planned (B61, W80, W76) that will help to ensure that these systems will remain safe, secure, and reliable for an additional 20-30 years. Responsible stewardship requires that we maintain a prudent capability to resume underground testing if an issue rises that undermines our confidence in a weapon system in the stockpile.

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003

TUESDAY, MARCH 5, 2002

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, DC.

UNIFIED AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS ON THEIR MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:39 a.m. in room SH216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Warner, Inhofe, Roberts, Allard, Sessions, and Collins.

Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff director; and Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk.

Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Jeremy L. Hekhuis, professional staff member; Maren Leed, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, Republican staff director; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff member; Gary M. Hall, professional staff member; George W. Lauffer, professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Ann M. Mittermeyer, minority counsel; Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Daniel K. Goldsmith, Thomas C. Moore, and Nicholas W. West.

Committee members' assistants present: Jason Matthews and Jeffrey S. Wiener, assistants to Senator Landrieu; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Benjamin L. Cassidy, assistant to Senator Warner; Dan Twining, assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Mike Bennett, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Kristine

Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and David Young and Derek Maurer, assistants to Senator Bunning.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee meets today to receive testimony from three of our regional combatant commanders. All of our witnesses are well known to this committee. Admiral Dennis Blair is the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command. General Thomas Schwartz is the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command-Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea. Major General Gary Speer is Acting Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command.

Admiral Blair and General Schwartz are before the committee for the last time in their current assignments. I just want to thank them on behalf of the committee for their tremendous careers and commitment to the well-being of this Nation.

Our witnesses today command U.S. military forces stationed from the DMZ and the Korean peninsula to the farthest reaches of the Pacific Ocean, to the Caribbean and the South American continent. I would ask each of you to convey the appreciation of this committee to the men and women under your command for their professionalism, their dedication, and their service.

We have a number of important issues to discuss with our witnesses this morning. Among them are the following: Admiral Blair commands the Special Operations Forces recently sent to the Philippines in response to the request from Philippine President Arroyo. The mission of these forces is to help train the Philippine Army to more effectively fight terrorists and insurgents. The terms of reference signed by U.S. Pacific Command and the Philippine Army representatives state that the training exercise is targeted against the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the southern Philippines. But there are other terrorist groups with bases located close to those of the Abu Sayyaf. At least one of them, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, has indicated that they would take military action if U.S. troops encroached on their territory.

I am concerned that our operations in the Philippines could unintentionally expand beyond training the Philippine Army to fighting the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group. I understand that U.S. forces are providing training at the battalion level only, but those headquarters are located out in the jungles. Could the mere presence of our troops on the island of Basilan make them the target of attack not just by the Abu Sayyaf, but by other groups?

How are we operationally and tactically limiting our involvement to training the Philippine Army rather than becoming caught up in the actual fighting between the Abu Sayyaf and the Philippine Army? How are we ensuring that our involvement will remain limited to the Abu Sayyaf threat? Is the 6-month duration for this training mission realistic?

General Schwartz commands our armed forces in South Korea. We all want to reduce North Korea's threatening military posture. I am concerned that the lack of negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea and between North and South Korea is turning back the clock on some of the diplomatic advances that have been made over the last several years.