egories. In order to improve the quality of life for the men and women serving in Korea, what do you consider your most urgent need and why?

General SCHWARTZ. We have articulated our vision in a comprehensive Fix Korea Business Plan which incorporates training, infrastructure, and quality of life. The ultimate goal of our plan is to make Korea an assignment that service members will actively seek. Our Fix Korea Business Plan is the right solution for the problems we face today and this roadmap balances resources with requirements and provides the key to Balanced Readiness.

I need stable Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization funding of approximately $260 million per year. Current Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization funding levels have allowed us to provide day-to-day critical maintenance of our facilities, the Sustainment, but we have not been able to get to the Restoration and Modernization piece.

I also need stable Military Construction (MILCON) funding of $200-$300 million per year. Our infrastructure, with regard to electrical power, water and sewer upgrades, must be fixed if we are to sustain readiness levels. We must have power generation systems, water distribution and sewage treatment plants that we can rely upon in times of emergency or crisis. We do not have reliable systems today. We must take action now to fix these enormous readiness and quality-of-life con

cerns.

Unaccompanied Housing Improvements is also a part of this critical priority. Our objective is to provide enlisted service members with quality housing by the Department of Defense mandated date of 2008. Even with our great on-going renovations we will continue to face a shortfall in fiscal year 2003 of $44.7 million of our total requirement. Adequate housing for unaccompanied senior enlisted soldiers (E7-E9) and officers is urgently needed as well. Unlike CONUS Army units, all Second Infantry Division soldiers, including senior enlisted and officers, are required to live on post. Even with the Army's support to buyout ALL unaccompanied housing requirements by fiscal year 2008, we will still have senior enlisted and officers living in inadequate housing when the barracks buyout is complete. We urgently need congressional help to support this $81 million Military Construction requirement beginning in fiscal year 2003.

To correct other quality-of-life deficiencies we need to replace or upgrade 52 maintenance facilities and 17 physical fitness centers throughout U.S. Forces Korea. For fiscal year 2003, we need your help with a Military Construction of $102.4 million for maintenance facilities and $23.0 million for physical fitness centers, $13.1 million for a chapel and two fire stations and $32.9 million for mission-oriented facilities. Additional Military Construction funding will enable us to execute a comprehensive construction program and eliminate the unacceptable living and working conditions in aging facilities that U.S. forces in Korea face every day.

COLOMBIA PEACE PROCESS

25. Senator THURMOND. General Speer, the United States has made Colombia its third-largest recipient of foreign aid after Israel and Egypt. Until now the aid, mostly for military equipment and training, has been channeled to the war on drugs. Now that the peace process in Colombia has fallen apart, will there be an effort to channel this aid effort toward fighting the terrorist/rebel groups?

General SPEER. Although we have seen great progress of the Colombian military over the last 4 years, the military still lacks the resources to create a safe and secure environment in Colombia. Fundamental security and stability are necessary for the government of Colombia to re-establish its ability to govern. In addition to combating the FARC and its current terror campaign, protecting infrastructure, and protecting the electoral process, the Colombian military must contend on a daily basis with the ELN, AUC and other drug trafficking organizations, further strapping their limited manpower and resources. As a minimum, the Colombian military needs additional resources whether it is through security assistance or another form of funding.

All assistance that U.S. Southern Command provides to Colombia will continue to stay within congressionally defined boundaries and be consistent with existing policy. If the President or Congress change the policy/law to support beyond the current counterdrug focus, then we will adjust accordingly. Given the threat to Colombia's democracy, they could certainly benefit from additional support aimed at the three declared foreign terrorist organizations creating such turmoil in their country.

SECOND COUNTERDRUG BRIGADE

26. Senator THURMOND. General Speer, your statement reflects the administrations support for training and equipping a second counterdrug brigade for the Colombian Army during this fiscal year. Considering the current crisis in Colombia, is this the most effective use of our resources?

General SPEER. I believe that funding a second counterdrug brigade is the most effective use of our resources. Fundamental security and stability are necessary for the government of Colombia to re-establish its ability to govern. The first counterdrug brigade is the best trained and equipped brigade in the Colombian Army. The plan to build a second counterdrug brigade for the Colombian Army follows the overall strategy outlined in the original Plan Colombia, which is to expand the effort against coca growing and processing into other areas of the country. The success of the first brigade gives us good reason to be optimistic about Colombian efforts to expand the war on production of cocaine into more of their country.

Moreover, additional resources are needed for the Colombian military to create a safe and secure environment in Colombia. The myriad of challenges facing Colombia will benefit from all forms of U.S. assistance. In defining our assistance, it is important to recognize the inextricable link between the foreign terrorist organization and drug trafficking.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN VENEZUELA

27. Senator THURMOND. General Speer, one of the more controversial leaders in South America is Venezuela's President Chavez. Based on press accounts, he is harboring leftist groups and sees himself as another Fidel Castro. Whatever his political views, what is the political situation in Venezuela and how does it affect the rest of the region?

General SPEER. The political situation in Venezuela is tenuous. President Chavez was elected president as a result of the traditional political parties losing credibility, worsening economic conditions, and a general sense among the marginalized sectors of Venezuelan society that their quality of life could only be improved by a radical departure from the political status quo. Chavez' popularity has greatly declined, due to his failure to deliver on his campaign promises.

His extreme political rhetoric has contributed significantly to the polarization of the Venezuelan political landscape. President Chavez has taken undemocratic steps that have solidified his power, increasing opposition from different segments of society including business, labor, media, elites, clergy, and members of the military. Although opposition has grown in the last several months, it lacks a single leader who can unite all of its elements. Consequently, the opposition lacks direction and cohesion.

Likewise, Chavez' rhetoric and actions have strained Venezuela's relationship with Colombia, due primarily to the perception that Chavez and/or important members of his government maintain a relationship with the guerrillas. The FARC moves across the border with ease. There are weapon shipments to the FARC and ELN that originate in Venezuela. Although we do not have any evidence linking official government involvement to these weapons shipments, there are certainly strong implications that support official complicity. Moreover, Chavez' anti-U.S. and "Bolivarian" rhetoric continues to irritate Venezuela's Latin American neighbors. He maintains strong ties with Cuba and has visited terrorist-supporting governments, including Iraq and Libya. Chavez' apparent disdain for Venezuelan democratic institutions and systems raises the specter of the "strongman" presidencies seen in the seventies and has the potential to undermine the democratic progress made in the region in the last 20 years.

DMZ

28. Senator THURMOND. General Schwartz, are there any special arrangements for evacuating women soldiers from the areas near the DMZ if the feather drops? A commander back in the 70s said it was his greatest concern.

General SCHWARTZ. We have no special arrangements or plans to evacuate women soldiers in Korea in case hostilities become imminent. Any potential evacuation would be evaluated on an individual case-by-case basis.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB SMITH

CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS IN KOREA

29. Senator SMITH. General Schwartz, what would be the first signs if Pyongyang were taking National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice's road map and pulling back some of their conventional armaments on the DMZ? What would be our minimum requirement?

General SCHWARTZ. Despite numerous attempts by the Republic of Korea government to discuss substantive military confidence building measures (CBMs) with North Korea, they have shunned all attempts at dialogue. The general principle is that North Korea needs to respond to tangible CBMs that are both verifiable and transparent. Any reference to specific minimum requirements would be speculation until North Korea begins to respond to CBM proposals in good faith.

U.S./CHINA MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGE PROGRAM

30. Senator SMITH. Admiral Blair, I am very disturbed by reports that the Department of Defense is considering renewing the U.S./China military-to-military exchange program even after the EP-3 incident and the illegal detention of that crew, and especially given so many-reports that inadvertent disclosures of militarily useful information to the Chinese during these exchanges. For example, the Chinese learned bar coding after a visit to FEDEX in Memphis. I find this outrageous. Do you believe these exchanges are reciprocal and can you tell me what is the U.S. interest in having the Chinese observe the Cobra Gold military exercise?

Admiral BLAIR. U.S./China military-to-military contacts did not totally cease in response to the EP-3 incident, but were substantially reduced to a few carefully reviewed and appropriate activities. For example, the U.S.-People's Republic of China (PRC) Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) held a special meeting in Guam in September 2001 to discuss ways to avoid incidents such as the EP-3. This incident and subsequent MMCA meetings underscored the need for contacts that keep communications open between us, especially when misunderstandings arise. I can assure you that, since I became the Commander in Chief of U.S. Pacific Command in February 1999, our contacts have been reciprocal, with little chance of national security risk for either side. This year, the Chinese, along with other nations from the region, will observe the humanitarian assistance aspects of Exercise Cobra Gold. This is meant not only to encourage China to participate constructively in theater security cooperation efforts, but also to satisfy our ally, Thailand, who has raised concerns about conducting exercises next door to their giant neighbor. It also assures our other allies and friends in the region that we are not trying to use them in any effort directed against China.

31. Senator SMITH. Admiral Blair, have we established a strong counter-intelligence program to prevent inadvertent disclosures of information?

Admiral BLAIR. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Army Military Intelligence, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, under their respective service Counter-Intelligence (CI) charters, provide both threat assessments and defensive briefings for official travelers to the People's Republic of China (PRC). [Deleted]. Defensive briefs provided by the Service (CI) agents in one-on-one sessions further enhance visitor awareness. These briefs use the information contained in the threat assessments, as well as database information that can be tailored to the specific mission of the traveler. [Deleted]. This activity occurs not only at the Service component headquarters in Hawaii, but throughout the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) AOR at the sub-unified command and unit level."

[Deleted].

In summary, awareness of the threat is key to the prevention of inadvertent disclosure, and I am confident that the military CI services in this theater are taking a proactive approach in reducing the vulnerability of DOD travelers to PRC intelligence collection activity.

I should point out that the Chinese CI is not very effective. A senior Colonel defected from China last year-he has extensive contact with American officers and grew disenchanted with his lot in China.

32. Senator SMITH. Admiral Blair, are Chinese officers vetted by our Embassy for any human rights violations before being asked to visit the United States?

Admiral BLAIR. Yes. Both the Department of Defense-which would typically nominate Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) officers for participation in U.S. Government-sponsored programs-and the Department of State are keenly aware of U.S.

human rights laws and policies, and would not extend invitations to known PLA human rights violators. Multiple formal and informal institutional screening processes that precede final approval of such participation provide adequate assurances against the admission of such individuals to this country.

CHINA: SOUTH CHINA SEA AND BORDER DISPUTES

33. Senator SMITH. Admiral Blair, I'm concerned that the Chinese are still using maps that claim the entire South China Sea as their territory, including parts of Russia and India. What parts of India and Russia are they claiming and how far do their South China Sea claims extend?

Admiral BLAIR. There are three main areas of territorial contention along the disputed India-China border. The People's Republic of China (PRC) claims some 26,200 square nautical miles (nm) of Indian-occupied territory in India's Eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, as well as several small areas along the India-China border west of Nepal. India claims China is illegally occupying about 12,520 square nm of northern Kashmir, including 1,514 square nm ceded to seijing by Pakistan in 1963. Although Russia and China have approximately a 2,500-mile border, the specific disputes are confined to several islands in the Amur River in northeast China. As the river shifts in its channel, the location of the islands shifts, favoring one side or the other. At present, neither side has chosen to make this a major diplomatic issue.

The PRC began publishing maps in 1993 that show an extensive South China Sea claim, in addition to the internationally recognized 12nm territorial sea limit and 200nm Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). The claim includes the Spratly Islands between Vietnam and the Philippines, and the natural gas fields lying within Indonesia's 200nm EEZ. The Chinese claim that their "historical waters" include the South China Sea and associated islands. However, it is clear their claims in the Spratlys are grounded in protecting and pursuing both strategic and economic interests in the region.

CHINA: STABILITY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

34. Senator SMITH. Admiral Blair, what does this portend for stability-does China still have their military presence at Mischief Reef, which is in the 200 mile economic zone of the Philippines?

Admiral BLAIR. China has used its own maps to good advantage, claiming they support Beijing's claims of sovereignty over areas on the country's margins. In the case of the South China Sea, the so-called "Chinese Line" that takes in most of that body of water has been, and remains, purposely ill defined. By asserting territorial rights and sovereignty over large expanses to which other nations also claim rights under international conventions, China believes it gains some degree of leverage in negotiations.

China continues to maintain a military presence on Mischief Reef, and has upgraded its facilities there substantially since the original construction of the facility in 1995. As you have noted, Mischief Reef lies well within the Philippines, 200 nautical mile (nm) Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ), 120nm west of Palawan, and is 150nm east of the Chinese headquarters facility on Fiery Cross Reef.

Nevertheless, the political temperature has cooled somewhat in the last 2-3 years. Beijing probably believed, initially, that it could finesse any Philippine objections to Mischief Reef in bilateral talks. There are other claimants to the Spratlys (Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan), and Beijing found itself in the unaccustomed and uncomfortable position of having to deal with the entire Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) grouping on this issue, in a multilateral forum. In addition, as China engages increasingly on the international stage-as with its World Trade Organization accession and selection as an Olympic venue Beijing is discovering it must continually fine-tune its international relations and prior

ities.

In short, we can say at this point that China's interests in the South China Sea are attuned more to stability than conflict, and that instability there would impede the pursuit of more important goals. Last fall, ASEAN agreed to develop a free trade zone with China, for instance, and China and the Philippines are scheduled to begin talks this year on "joint development" of the Spratly archipelago. China now has considerably more interest in maintaining stability in the South China Sea than in asserting its sovereignty.

It would be premature to forecast a resolution of competing South China Sea claims because the underlying territorial and sovereignty issues remain. However,

it seems unlikely that the Chinese will stir up conflict in this area in the foreseeable future.

U.S./CHINA MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGE PROGRAM

35. Senator SMITH. Admiral Blair, as you are aware, the U.S./China military-tomilitary exchange program has been an ongoing concern of mine and several of my colleagues in recent years. In the near future, I anticipate a response back from Secretary Rumsfeld to a letter I co-wrote with Senator Helms and Representative Rohrabacher, which, among many recommendations, expressed our belief that a program needs to be implemented by the Department of Defense to ensure U.S. military personnel do no divulge, inadvertently, militarily sensitive information to the Chinese People's Liberation Army during exchanges. From what I have read from various sources, you continue to enthusiastically endorse and believe that the U.S./China military-to-military exchange program is essential to our relationship with China, and will some day pay dividends, despite the fact that such exchanges continue to favor China and continue to hemorrhage information which, in my view, carelessly places U.S. forces in the Pacific in jeopardy.

I am sure you have seen the article in The New Republic dated April 1999 regarding a U.S./China exchange. U.S. and PLA officers conclude the days itinerary by breaking bread at the Officer's Club and continue “relationship building"one of the exchange program's goals. Many things were discussed, including U.S. aircraft carrier vulnerabilities. This was not classified information, however, it could only be pieced together by exhaustive research through decades of military journals. Instead of letting the Chinese at least have to work to piece together information, this Nation continues to embrace a program where the PLA is given direct access to our officers, who have no real program in place to guard against such information-gathering by the PLA.

Do you agree this aspect of the U.S./China military-to-military exchange program is a problem and represents a threat which cannot be tolerated?

Admiral BLAIR. The April 1999 article to which you refer describes activities said to have taken place back in 1998, before my tenure as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), so I am not in a position to comment on the article's accuracy. There were very few contacts in USPACOM in 1999 before the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. I would not accept the characterization of these contacts as hemorrhaging information to the Chinese. Military-to-military contacts ceased for the remainder of 1999, following the accidental bombing. Since 2000, all of our military-to-military contacts with China have been conducted in accordance with the provisions of Public Law 106-65 (Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act), which prohibits Chinese exposure to 12 categories of activities with the potential to create a national security risk. When visiting Hawaii in 2000, members of one Chinese delegation even commented on their lack of exposure to operationally oriented activities. Finally, I have found personally in my visits to China that in discussions with PLA officers I learn more classified information about China than the Chinese learn of classified information about the U.S. Armed Forces.

36. Senator SMITH. Admiral Blair, in light of examples such as the one I highlighted (please see information in question # 35), what have you done, and what are you doing presently, to counter such information-gathering by the PLA?

Admiral BLAIR. I do strongly believe that U.S./China military-to-military exchanges are essential to our understanding of China's military intentions and capabilities. Due to the closed nature of their society, every interaction results in our side acquiring information and developing an understanding that is otherwise denied. The Chinese participants in the interaction learn no more than what was already in the public domain, due to our much more open society. I can converse at length on military issues using information already in the public media, which tends to result in my Chinese counterpart revealing information which was previously unknown to us. Military-to-military exchanges have many other benefits, such as creating relationships that can be very useful to us in managing crises.

Recognizing the value of military-to-military exchanges, we do not neglect the importance of counter-intelligence (CI) programs to protect classified and sensitive information. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Army Military Intelligence, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, under their respective Service CI charters, provide both threat assessments and defensive briefings for official travelers to the People's Republic of China (PRC). [Deleted]. Defensive briefs provided by the Service CI agents in one-on-one sessions further enhance visitor aware