ness. These briefs use the information contained in the threat assessments, as well as database information that can be tailored to the specific mission of the traveler. [Deleted]. This activity occurs not only at the Service component headquarters in Hawaii, but throughout the U.S. Pacific Command's area of responsibility at the subunified command and unit level.

[Deleted].

In summary, due to the volume of open source information that is already readily available to the Chinese, and because of the proactive approach of the military CI services in this theater to prevent inadvertent disclosures, I am confident that our side acquires more information that was previously unknown to us than the Chinese obtain from us via military-to-military exchange programs.

SHARING INTELLIGENCE

37. Senator SMITH. General Speer, I have one comment and then a question. General Serrano has a sterling reputation on Capitol Hill as former head of the Colombia Narcotics Police. He is now being considered for director of the U.N. Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention-which would be ideal for him given his experience. The State Department apparently is backing a candidate from Italy with no counterdrug experience, despite the fact that the next person in this job will have a key role in creating an anti-narcotics police force in Afghanistan. I'd like you to do whatever you can in your capacity to promote General Serrano as the best candidate for this very important job-I think its vital to our success in Afghanistan and in the war on terrorism.

Second, I am mystified as to why we're not helping the Colombian Armed Forces with intelligence sharing. The narco-guerrillas have been on a rampage, kidnapping one Senator, and murdering uncooperative Colombian citizens. Please explain to me what possible rationale there could be for not sharing intelligence on the whereabouts of these Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) terrorists? General SPEER. [Deleted].

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICK SANTORUM

STRATEGIC AND AMPHIBIOUS LIFT ASSETS

38. Senator SANTORUM. General Speer and General Schwartz, General Tommy Franks, USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, recently indicated that improving strategic and amphibious lift is a top priority in his AOR. While Mobility Requirements Study 2005 (MRS–05) established a requirement of lifting 54.5 million-ton-miles-per day, it is unclear whether the military can meet this new requirement. Does the United States military have enough strategic and amphibious lift assets to meet the requirements of your particular AOR?

General SPEER. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently identified that the "Department of Defense has worked diligently to overcome shortfalls in strategic lift capabilities. . . However, we remain concerned about the effects of a sustained high operations tempo on the force, strategic lift and sustainment shortfalls, and shortages of ISR assets as well as the challenges associated with WMD, antiterrorism, and force protection. Additionally, in some locations, we face operational limitations that may affect mission success.'

The United States military does not have enough strategic assets to meet U.S. Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) requirements together with all of the other Commands' requirements. Strategic lift satisfies the majority of routine support requirements for Embassy and Mission personnel. In some instances, operational requirements are met using training hours. In a typical month, USSOUTHCOM requires approximately eight C-141 and two C-5 strategic assets to satisfy our routine requirements. Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events, however, can be more problematic.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the establishment of Joint Task Forces 160 and 170 in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba highlighted concerns over the competition for limited strategic airlift to support real world contingencies. On several occasions, OEF contingency missions in the USSOUTHCOM AOR were delayed or rescheduled regardless of their priority. For example, on 19 March, the aircraft scheduled to deploy a secure communications suite in support of JTF 160 was rescheduled for a higher priority mission. The secure communications suite deployed 9 days later. Future GWOT and DOD operations, Presidential travel and other CINC's requirements will further limit availability of a finite number of strategic lift assets further complicating mission execution. Our ability to execute more robust contingencies in

the AOR will be significantly impacted if other Major Regional Contingencies are ongoing.

Sustaining military to military engagement and security cooperation, preparation for contingency operations, and our mission personnel are the center of our strategy to meet the national interest. Sustained availability of ample and properly resourced strategic lift is crucial in accomplishing this strategy.

Admiral BLAIR. The U.S. military has sufficient strategic airlift and sealift to meet U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) wartime requirements when considered independently, meaning when we are not conducting a limited number of smaller-scale contingencies. [Deleted].

[Deleted].

[Deleted] we strongly support the Air Force effort to procure 180 C-17 aircraft as well as improve the C-5 aircraft capability through the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engineering Program and the Avionics Modernization Program. [Deleted]. General SCHWARTZ. The United States military does not have enough strategic and amphibious lift assets to meet the requirements of the Korea AOR.

We fully support the Joint Chief of Staff in the establishment of an increased airlift capability requirement. However, we are concerned that 54.5 million-ton-miles per day (MTM/D) does not represent a large enough increase. In fact, there must be an increase in strategic lift to ensure sufficient operational capability arrives in theater as quickly as possible. CFC must have more sealift and airlift to close forces earlier than indicated in the MRS-05 study. By expediting the arrival of required combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, we enhance our capability to attack the enemy throughout his depth, increase our friendly operational tempo, and decrease the risks to our forces.

While acknowledging the limitations of MRS-05, we believe future studies should increase realism to accurately simulate the true nature of warfare on the Korean peninsula. Increased involvement of the warfighting CINC is a necessity to provide subjective response to the model in accordance with current and projected threat capabilities and OPLAN CONOPS. Additionally, to insure simulation fidelity and enhance validity we recommend continued investment in computer simulations used to conduct these types of studies. Based on our analysis, MRS-05 findings are conservative estimates of future programmatic requirements. Although increased lift requirements are identified, we believe those requirements are understated.

Additionally, there has been a long-standing requirement for amphibious lift for the assault echelon of three Marine Expeditionary Brigades. Having this Expeditionary maneuver capacity aids our Korea warfighting requirements.

NORTH KOREA

39. Senator SANTORUM. General Schwartz, during his State of the Union speech this past January, President Bush called special attention to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea-singling them out as members of an “axis of evil." Terrorism, warned President Bush, was not the paramount danger facing the U.S. Equally worrisome were efforts by Iraq, Iran, and North Korea to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

The President's National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, has stated that "North Korea is now the world's number one merchant for ballistic missiles, open to anyone, no matter how malignant the buyer's intentions." The Bush administration notes Pyongyang remains a grave concern because of its direct support for terrorist organizations which operate in many countries to which North Korea has exported and continues to export missiles and technology.

Although North Korea has suffered from economic stagnation and famine, do you believe that there is any reason to believe that the state of North Korean army or its arsenal of ballistic missiles is any less ready than it was 5 years ago.

General SCHWARTZ. No! In fact, the North Korean ballistic missile arsenal has improved over the past 5 years, as evidenced by the Taepo Dong launch in 1998, engine testing and increased production. I would state that North Korea has improved capabilities in the last few years. Their proliferation of missiles have given them regional operational reach and global impact.

North Korea operates what can be described as a wartime economy, allocating resources to the military at the expense of the civilian sector. The North Korean Army actually produces hard currency that is used for its own sustainment as well as for use by the North Korean leadership. Consequently, North Korea's economic problems and famine (1994–1998) failed to impact the military in the same way it impacted the civilian sector. We expect North Koreas "military first" policy to continue

as the North's leadership maintains its reliance on the military to sustain the security of the Kim Regime and ensure North Korea's regional position.

Between the early and mid 1990s, economic distress and social turmoil eroded readiness and overall military capabilities of the North Korean military in Cold War terms, but not in 21st century threat terms. The North has learned by studying us and through a methodical readiness and force improvement program that continues today. This program includes measures such as increased training of key units; movement of large numbers of artillery assets forward; expansion and upgrading of its ballistic missile inventory; creation of new units in the forward area; command and control enhancements; acquisition and production of limited quantities of new weapons systems; and equipment such as submarines, tanks and artillery.

40. Senator SANTORUM. General Schwartz, do you have any reason to believe the current regime in North Korea has severed links to terrorist organizations?

General SCHWARTZ. We have detected no North Korean direct links with active terrorist groups. However, it continues to provide sanctuary to terrorists of the Japanese Red Army (JRA). These terrorists had hijacked a plane to North Korea over two decades ago. While the JRA itself is no longer an active terrorist group of concern to the U.S., these terrorists and North Korea's assistance in allowing them to elude justice remain a lasting concern. We consider that the expulsion of these terroists would constitute a credible action by North Korea that it no longer supports terrorism. However, we do have credible information that North Korea continues to sell missiles and other weapons to countries in the Middle East and Africa that do directly support terrorism.

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003

THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 2002

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, DC.

SERVICE CHIEFS

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m. in room SH216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Cleland, Landrieu, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Carnahan, Warner, McCain, Inhofe, Roberts, Allard, Hutchinson, Sessions, and Collins. Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff director; and Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk.

Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Jeremy L. Hekhuis, professional staff member; Maren Leed, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; and Michael McCord, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, Republican staff director; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff member; Gary M. Hall, professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; George W. Lauffer, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Daniel K. Goldsmith, Andrew Kent, and Nicholas W. West.

Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Cleland; Marshall A. Hevron and Jeffrey S. Wiener, assistants to Senator Landrieu; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Neal Orringer, assistant to Senator Carnahan; Brady King, assistant to Senator Dayton; Benjamin L. Cassidy, assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher J. Paul, assistant to Senator McCain; John A.

Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee meets to receive testimony from the chiefs of the military services on the fiscal year 2003 budget request. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Jones, and General Jumper, we welcome you back to this committee. We have had a long tradition of receiving frank and candid advice from our senior military leaders on national security issues, and we look forward to your testimony this morning. As we meet today, U.S. Armed Forces are deployed around the globe meeting new commitments in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and other places, and fulfilling longstanding commitments in Korea and Germany. The loss of life in Afghanistan this week is a vivid reminder of the risks that our men and women in uniform take when we send them in harm's way. Their courage is inspiring, their commitment to their mission is total, and our debt to them is immense. Their performance is also a tribute to the entire leadership of the Department of Defense, including our witnesses today, because that performance depends on the training and equipment that the services are responsible for providing.

Some of the systems that are essential to today's forces are recent acquisitions, such as the unmanned aerial vehicles which have been in use only a few years. Many have been in our inventories for decades. The investments that we make today in this budget are needed to ensure that our military is as prepared for future wars as it has proven to be for Operation Enduring Freedom. For this reason, we will be particularly interested in the trade-offs that this budget makes between investments in our legacy forces and investments in military transformation and the basis on which the services are recommending these trade-offs.

The administration's budget request for fiscal year 2003 includes the largest proposed increase in military spending in two decades, $48 billion more than the amounts provided for during the current fiscal year. I remain concerned that this increase comes without a comprehensive strategy or a detailed plan to guide that spending. The administration has not yet submitted its national security strategy, which is required to be submitted annually with the budget by section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. That was a provision which Senator Warner authored and which this committee has strongly supported.

The Department has not issued any military strategy to the best of my knowledge, nor has the Secretary of Defense submitted his annual report to the President and Congress, which is required by section 113 of Title 10 to be submitted annually with the budget, and the Department has not yet submitted a Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), which is also required to be submitted annually with the budget by section 221 of Title 10.