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General Jones. A credible Naval Surface Fire Support program is a critical component of forcible entry from the sea, and DD(X) is a vital component of that capability, essential to realizing the full potential of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. The systems envisioned for DD(X), which include the 155mm Advanced Gun System and the Advanced Land Attack Missile (ALAM), are essential elements of an expeditionary fire support system that will provide responsive, all-weather fire support "from the sea" in support of forces operating throughout the depth of the littoral battlespace.
I am concerned, however, that DIXX) will be fielded with less warfighting capability and in fewer numbers than previously planned for DD21. The magazine capacity of DD(X) must be sufficient to provide sustained fires in support of Marine, joint, or coalition forces ashore, and there must be a sufficient number of ships available to sustain fires for extended periods of time. Additionally, there must be enough Vertical Launch System (VLSVAdvanced Vertical Launch System (AVLS) cells dedicated to the ALAM, which will provide the Landing Force Commander (LFC) with responsive, medium-range interdiction, and battlespace shaping fires throughout the duration of operations.
In order to provide sustained fire support, DD(X) must be capable of rapid underway replenishment within the theater of operations. Sustainment is a key element in providing sustained fire support, and there must be sufficient numbers of ALAM and 155mm Long-Range Land Attack projectiles available to replenish the magazines and VLS/AVLS cells of DD(X).
AMPHIBIOUS LIFT CAPABILITY
134. Senator Collins. Admiral Clark and General Jones, the fiscal year 2003 proposed budget would reduce our force structure by two amphibious warfare ships, one combat logistics ship, one mine warfare ship, and 42 active aircraft. What short- and long-term impacts do you anticipate this force structure reduction will have on the OPTEMPO and the PERSTEMPO of our fleet?
Admiral Clark. The proposed fiscal year 2003 budget will reduce the force structure by 2 amphibious warfare ships, 1 combat logistics ship, 1 mine warfare ship, and 42 active aircraft. This reduction in the number of ships and aircraft will have minor impact on personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) and operations tempo (OPSTEMPO) for the remaining force. Planned and on-going operations are the primary drivers for PERSTEMPO and OPSTEMPO changes. The global war on terrorism is currently the primary worldwide operation causing increases in the PERSTEMPO and OPSTEMPO of naval forces.
The current active amphibious fleet exceeds the 2.5 MEB AE lift threshold in all areas except that of vehicle square—currently at 2.07 MEB AE. Vehicle square will be reduced to 2.01 MEB AE with the planned reductions in force structure.
General JONES. These reductions should have little impact on the OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO of marines. However, while it has long been recognized that we require an amphibious ship force structure capable of simultaneously lifting the assault echelons of three Marine Expeditionary Brigades, today's amphibious lift can only support two-thirds of this requirement in certain aspects of the lift footprint. We need to commit to redress this shortfall as a matter of urgent priority.
We remain concerned that further schedule slippages in the LPD-17 programs will directly impact our ability to maintain forward deployed naval capabilities sufficient to meet the challenges of both peace and war. In addition to LPD-17 development, it is critical to replace the aging LHA-1 Tarawa-class ships. Congressional support for amphibious snipping is vital to our continued success.
Decommissioning one LSD 36 class ship and the remaining LST in fiscal year 2003 will result in the following amphibious ship lift reductions:
• Troops. 649;
• Vehicle (square feet): 27,500;
• Cargo (cubic feet): 4,800; and
• LCAC Spots: 2.
The Marine Corps amphibious ship lift requirement is 3.0 MEB AE in order to support our warfighting and forward presence requirements. The current Navy amphibious shipbuilding plan results in an active amphibious force capable of lifting a fiscally constrained 2.5 MEB equivalents, which is not achieved until 2015 upon delivery of the twelfth and final LPD-17-class ship. Today, amphibious lift force structure can support only two-thirds of the 3.0 MEB AE requirement in certain aspects of the lift footprint. This reduced force structure, coupled with the decommissioning of active amphibious ships, adversely impacts Marine Corps warfighting and crisis response capabilities, thereby increasing operational risk.
135. Senator Collins. Admiral Clark, you testify that your fiscal year 2003 proposed priorities invest in current readiness for our naval forces. However, I am aware that there have been some deferred depot maintenance periods due to current operations (i.e., combating terrorism) on the Los Angeles-class submarines in fiscal year 2002, which will impact fiscal year 2003 and out-year workload schedules, placing the fleet ready submarines at risk to meet future missions as required by the Commanders in Chief. These delays not only adversely affect fleet readiness; they can also cause dramatic workload imbalances at our shipyards. I am concerned that continued shifts in the workload to future years will place undue stress on the fleet and the yards. I would like your commitment that your workload plans will be adjusted to maintain a stable workload and workforce at the shipyards.
Admiral Clark. Ship depot maintenance plans are continuously updated to incorporate actual execution, operational impacts, and financial resources. Availabilities are deferred only after the risk to fleet readiness associated with deferring the work is determined and deemed acceptable.
The Navy actively works to refine and schedule ship depot availabilities for effective shipyard execution. Keeping the shipyard workload level is essential to efficient operation and is a key' consideration in scheduling availabilities.
A skilled and motivated shipyard workforce is essential to maintain the Navy's high state of material readiness. Recognizing that many in the public shipyard workforce are rapidly approaching retirement eligibility, a primary focus of the Navy's depot maintenance program is maintaining a stable workforce with the skills we need. We appreciate the support Congress has give the naval shipyard apprentice programs.
AVIONICS AND NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
136. Senator Collins. Admiral Clark, the Multi-Mission Aircraft is scheduled to replace the aging P-3 platform in 2010 to 2012. Currently, the high OPTEMPO of the platform is rapidly diminishing its service life significantly. The P-3 platform, while it has been upgraded incrementally, has an average age of 25.5 years. Are there plans in this budget to continue upgrading the existing platforms' avionics and navigation systems to keep the P-3s viable, in order to bridge the procurement to its replacement in future years?
Admiral Clark. Yes. The fiscal year 2003 President's budget (PB-03) contains funding for three P-3C modernization programs. Four P-3C Anti-surface warfare Improvement Program (AIP) kits and installations are funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 ($96.6 million). The AIP provides upgrades to sensor; command, control, communications, and intelligence (CMI); weapons; and survivability systems. A comprehensive Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) program is also funded across the fiscal year 2003 FYDP ($58 million). This program will develop an open cockpit architecture that will support present and future CNS/ATM requirements and will begin to procure and install equipment needed to support CNS/ATM requirements. Finally, a Communications Improvement Program (CIP) is funded across the PB-03 FYDP ($31.8 million). The CIP provides a common configuration of VHF and UHF communications radios, a satellite communications system that is compliant with current bandwidth and transmission protocol requirements, and an Advanced Narrowband Digital Voice Terminal encryption device.
These programs will combine to keep the P-3 a valuable warfighting tool and will allow it to be the bridge needed until its replacement, the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) reaches full operational capability.
DEFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEM
137. Senator Collins. General Jones, I have been told that a Defensive Weapon System (DWS) for the V-22 is required. I understand that the competition for that system has been completed for almost 2 years, however the Corps has not executed the contract for this DWS. In reference to this program, could you tell me when the Corps plans to initiate that DWS program?
General Jones. The General Dynamics, GAU-19 (.50 cal multi-barrel gatling) was announced as the winner of our gun competition in August 2000. The events of the past 2 years forces us to prioritize the funding and engineering efforts for the V22. We must ensure the V-22 is a safe, flyable aircraft that is operationally capable, before we commit to acquiring the Defensive Weapon System. Our primary focus of effort, near term, is to return the aircraft to flying in the test mode. The V-22 program is following an "event driven" philosophy with regard to major program changes and decisions. Integrating the Defensive Weapons System at this early stage would cause additional delays and potential program event risks.
138. Senator Collins. General Jones, even if production began immediately, will there still be 90 aircraft built before the weapon system is available?
General Jones. No. If the Defensive Weapon System integration and production began today, we would be putting the gun system on the Lot 11 aircraft first. This means there would be 107 aircraft built before this weapon system is available. However, we are anticipating that we would only retrofit approximately 70 of the 107 aircraft. The 37 aircraft not requiring the Defensive Weapon System include projected attrition, basic training aircraft at the Fleet Replacement Squadron, and the Continued Development aircraft used by the test community.
139. Senator Collins. General Jones, aren't the retrofit costs for the DWS continuing to grow with these delays?
General Jones. Yes. The cost to outfit a V-22 with the Defensive Weapon System on a retrofit basis is approximately $900,000 more than a forward fit. The longer we delay the start of this Defensive Weapon System integration development effort, the more aircraft we will have to retrofit.
C-17 STRATEGIC AIRLIFT
140. Senator Collins. General Jumper, I believe Congress authorized another multiyear procurement of 60 aircraft for the C-17 strategic airlifter. I think most people thought that would be 15 aircraft per year for 4 years, starting in fiscal year 2003. Why are there only 12 C-17s in the fiscal year 2003 budget?
General Jumper. Due to Air Force funding constraints, the Air Force requested and received congressional approval for a 6-year multiyear. The Air Force notified Congress during this request of the intent to buy 12 aircraft in fiscal year 2003. Since this contract is a multiyear procurement, Boeing will be able to maintain the optimum production rate of 15 aircraft per year. This funding approach will execute the 60 aircraft follow-on multiyear within the Air Force Total Obligation Authority.
[Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 2002
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Warner, Inhofe, Allard, Collins, and Bunning.
Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff director.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, Republican staff director; L. David Cherington, minority counsel; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member; George W. Lauffer, professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; and Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Daniel K. Goldsmith, Andrew Kent, and Thomas C. Moore.
Committee members' assistants present: Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka; Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Margaret Hemenway, assistant to Senator Smith; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee meets this morning to receive testimony from Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham on the budget request for the Department of Energy's (DOE) national security activities, which account for approximately two-thirds of the entire Department of Energy budget.
We welcome a friend back to what was, for a time at least, his home away from home. We all know Spence well. We are delighted that he is the Secretary of Energy and that he is with us this morning.
We have a number of important issues to discuss with Secretary Abraham, including the adequacy of the Department of Energy's environmental management (EM) budget; the progress of its programs to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and DOE's plans, if any, for modifying existing nuclear weapons or developing new ones.
Today, the United States is confronted by a wide range of threats to our security from a wide range of potential adversaries. In the past, our Nation has led efforts to reduce these threats to the United States and to our allies through diplomacy and, when necessary, through military action.
The United States led by example in 1959 when we initiated the Antarctic Treaty to internationalize and demilitarize the Antarctic continent. We led by example when we signed the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) on the first day it was open for signature in 1968. We led by example in our efforts to reach an Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START).
We led by example, when we took our long-range bombers off nuclear alert status, when we unilaterally eliminated tactical nuclear weapons from the Army and the Marine Corps, and removed them from Navy surface ships and submarines.
We have also led the way to increase the safety and security of nuclear weapons and materials. Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in the Defense Department and the nonproliferation programs of the Department of Energy, the United States has secured tons of nuclear materials in the countries of the former Soviet Union.
We have helped deactivate, dismantle, or destroy thousands of Russian nuclear weapons and delivery systems that once threatened our security. We have helped provide employment for hundreds of Russian scientists and engineers with expertise in building nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and who otherwise might be tempted to sell that expertise to unfriendly nations, or even terrorist organizations. All of these efforts to reduce the dangers from nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons have directly contributed to our own national security.
Today the United States has an opportunity to lead again by carrying out real reductions in the number of nuclear weapons in our arsenal and by reducing the incentives for other countries to build or keep nuclear weapons.
In May 2000, President Bush recognized this opportunity for leadership when he said, "America should rethink the requirements for nuclear deterrence. The premise of Cold War targeting should no longer dictate the size of our arsenal."
The United States has the opportunity to lead a safer world. The United States should be prepared to lead by example, because it is in our best interests and the best interests of the world.
This would be an act of principled leadership, seizing the moment and beginning a new era of security, a new era of cooperation on proliferation and nuclear security.