had failed, not one of the new taxes having produced any thing near the fums they were eftimated at. His Lordship then faid, that the great object he had in view, and all the Lords who acted with him, had been mifrepresented as an attack upon the power of the Crown; and an innovation on the form of Government. To clear this matter up, he defired their Lordships to remember that he was always an advocate in that House for the prerogative and legal power of the Crown; this he would never oppose; but it is the influence of the Crown arifing from the vast number of offices created by the system of funding and taxation, and which must increase so long as that system continues, that hath brought this country into the state of profution and waste now complained of. His Lordship then difcuffed the difference between regal power, and the minifterial influence of the Crown. His Lordthip proceeded to give a very humorous description of the progress of the public money, in only one fingle tax, the Land-tax. He shewed what a number of hands it went through, who had perquifites for collecting it, for auditing it, for telBing it, for locking it up in a cheft, for iffuing it out again, for paying it to the army, navy, &c. &c. It was first abridged, he faid, by the Tax-gatherers; they had 3d. in the pound; adly, by Collectors, they had d. in the pound; 3dly, by the Receivers, they had 3d. in the pound. After this, the process was still not a quar ter gone through; it was to be clipped at the Accomptant's office, at the Teller's office, at the Excise office, at the Clerk of the Rolls-office, at the Treasury-office, and at a thousand other intermediate offices, at every one of which it received its proportionable production, till at last it came out from these repeated furnaces, with not above half the magnitude with which it originally went in; and befides the poundages, he mentioned the several refting-places where it remained some time in the hands of different persons for their profit. Upon the whole, he made it plainly appear that many of these offices are uselefs, and that the public money might be collected and expended on a plan of econohy that would be a very great faving to the nation, and an ample recourse to prevent fresh taxes on the people. With refpect to the affumption of the 100,000l. addition to the civil lift granted to his Majesty a few years since, if that was thought a proper step, he understood it would come properly into one act of Par liament, and would be proposed in a few days by a Gentleman of great abilities in the other House; he should therefore only trouble the House with his ideas concerning the other propofitions in the resolution to be moved. He meant to have all grants of monies and all expenditures brought within acts of Parliament, in order to prevent the vast sums in extraordinaries drawn for upon Government, and not accounted for to Parliament. To open all contracts to the best bidder; that no favourites of Ministers might have it in their power to make immense fortunes at the public expence; to reduce the number of Officers for collecting, auditing, paying, &c. of the taxes, by some plan to be agreed on with the Bank of England; and to abolish undeserved penfions. This done, he vowed to God his intention was to retire into the country, and very feldom even to vifit London. But till the ministerial influence, which struck at the root of the constitution, by a system of corruption, venality, and profufion, is destroyed, he could not retire in peace, for no man would be fafe in any corner of the kingdom. The Earl of Coventry seconded the motion, and gave a melancholy account of the situation of affairs in the counties where his estates lie; the landlords cannot get their rents, the farmers cannot get a proper price for their commodities, and are unable to pay their taxes; from whence, and the sense of the people expreffed in their petitions, he concluded that it would be highly proper for the House to come to the refolution moved by Lord Shelburne. The Earl of Carlifle only objected to the mode, and thought it rather an impeachment of the honour of perfons holding offices under the Crown to exclude them from being of the Committee. This idea was adopted by several other Lords, and was by some confidered as a very high affront; they resented the imputation that they were not at liberty to promote the welfare of the nation by a plan of economy as well as any Lord out of office. Lord Hillsborough was very warm a gainst the motion; he said, if he had not known the candour and abilities of the noble Lord who made it, he should have confidered it as a string of libels, and fo fortified with infurmountable objections, that it must have been intended to make the majority of the Lords put a negative upon it; which negative was to be the ground for a pompous proteft to be printed, and re-echoed back to the county afssociations, in order to foment discontent, and to force Parliament into the measures of the petitions. The leaders of these associations, he faid, would go to the brink of rebellion, their inclinations perhaps led them further, but it was not quite so safe. After shewing the impracticability of the motion, his Lordship said, he hoped fome proper method of obtaining the fame end would foon be proposed to Parliament. The Duke of Manchester spoke in favour of the motion, and in support of the rectitude of the conduct of the petitioners; and Lord Sandwich having observed that there would be a majority of protestors against the petitions, his Grace was fevere upon the protestors of Huntingdonshire, as acting under his Lordship's influence, and faid it was unusual for majorities to proteft. The Duke of Richmond, in a long speech, combated every objection that had been made to the motion and to the petitions. He defired the motion might be amended, by leaving out the words both Houses of Parliament, and appointing only a Committee of their House; and he went over every argument he had used on former occafions, concerning the state of the nation and the neceffity of the measure. Lord Mansfield replied, and agreed to every thing that had been faid in favour of some plan of economy; but he said, there were easy, plain remedies, without involveing the two Houses in difpute. If any man commit a fraud in the disposal of the public money, the King represented the Public, and he might be called to account for it by law. He remembered, when he was Attorney-general, he had prosecuted an Agent Viqualler for taking five per cent. on all the rum furnished to the army in the war before last, and he was obliged to refund. He had also prosecuted a Colonel of a regiment at Antigua, who received the pay for the cloathing of a complete regiment, though he had 400 men defective, and he had made him refund the money into the proper office. His Lord thip was of opinion, that the redress ought to begin in the other House, and then it would come up regularly in the form of a bill. Lord Shelburne replied; after which the Lord Chancellor made a long speech against the motion, ending it with saying, that he hoped no noble Lord would be terrified from voting against it, since it required no very large thare of personal courage to be able to defy all the malice that could be shewn without doors, against those, who, though they were as willing to adopt any feafible plan of economy, as the noble Earl whose proposition was under discussion, dared to object to a motion impracticable in its manner, and fruitless in its object. Lord Camden replied, and defended the motion, declaring he did not regard it as the single motion of the noble Earl near him, but as the motion of the majority of the people. His Lordship mentioned his pension, which he said was the price of long services, and so small, that as much, if not more, had been given to a puisne Judge as a recompence for refignation. At half past one the House divided, when there appeared 5°2 6 55 81 101 Majority against the motion LORDS PROTEST. 20 Die Martis 8 February, 1780. st, BECAUSE, however the waste of public money, and the profusion of useless falaries, may have been heretofore overlooked in the days of wealth and profperity, the neceflities of the present time cạn no longer endure the same system of corruption and prodigality. The fcarcity of money, the diminished value of land, the sinking of rents, with the decline of trade, are melancholy proofs that we are almost arrived at the end of taxation, and yet the demands are annaally increased, while the hopes of peace are every year put to a greater distance. For let any man consider the immenfe debt increasing beyond the possibility of payment, with the present accumulation of taxes upon every article, not only of luxury, but of convenience, and even of neceffary use; and let him carry, his thoughts forward to those additional duties which must immediately be imposed to make good the interest of the approaching loan, and of that debt which will remain unfunded, he will find that at least one million and a half of interest must be provided for, befides what may be farther neceffary to make good the deficiencies of the late taxes. Under these circumftances, the favings of a ftrict and vigilant economy in every branch, and the application of overgrown salaries, unmerited pensions, and utelefs places to the public fervice, are almost the only fo ex only resource left in the exhaufted ftate of our finances. But, besides this strong argument of neceffity that presses upon the present moment, fuch and so great are the abuses in the management and expenditure of the public money, as would call for the strictest enquiry and animadversion even in the best of times. The practice of expending immenfe fums, without con fent of Parliament, under the fallacious head of Contingencies and Extraordinaries, the greater part of which might easily be comprized in an estimate; but because some unforeseen articles are not capable of fuch precision, the Minister bas, under that colour, found out a method of expending the public money first ad libitum, am, and when it has been pended, has found means to induce Parliament to think itself bound in honour to ratify and make it good; deserves the highest cenfure; and no Minifter who shall dare to stake the public credit, for money that has not been voted, ought to be juftified by a less authority than an act of indemnity. The millions which remain in confequence unexplained and unaccounted for; the shameful facility of admitting almost every claim; the improvident bargains made for the public fervice; the criminal neglect and even contempt of the few checks established in the Board of Treafury, befides great part of the money being shared in its paffage among a tribe of collectors, clerks, agents, jobbers or contractors, or paid away by official extortion, or stopped in its course to breed interest for fome ingroffing individuals; are grievances which the prefent motion has in view to remedy. adly, But, great and important as the motion is in this view of it, it is ftill more important in another, as it tends to narrow the wide-spreading influence of the Crown, that has found its way into every corner of the kingdom. It is fufficient to allude to this grie. vance, without any further enlargement: but this argument, though perhaps the strongeft in favour of the motion, has been turned into an objection to it, as if it meant to abridge the rights of Monarchy, and make the Crown dependent upon the Parliament. If the objection means to infinuate that corruption is neceffary to Government, we thall leave that principle to confute itself by its own apparent iniquity. That this motion is intended to diminish the conftitutional power of the Crown we deny. The conflitutional power of the Crown we are no less folicitous to preserve than we are to annihilate its unconstitutional influence. The prerogative rightly understood, not touched, or intended to be touched by this motion, will fupport the Crown in all the fplender which the King's personal dignity requires, and with all the authority and vigour neceffary to give due effect to the executive powers of Government. It has been argued, that this is not a proper time for reformation, when all the attention of the kingdom should be employed upon the war, as the great and only object in the present time of diftrefs; to which we beg leave to infint, that the present is, for that very reason, the propereft time, because nothing is so effential to the conduct and prosecution of the war as the frugal management of that fupply. by which only it can be carried on with any profpect of success. Nor ought the plan of economy to be any longer delayed at the rifque of a general bankruptcy, and from the history of this, as well as other countries, times of neceffity have been always times of reform 3dly, Because we conceive that the mode of a Committee, which might be to act with a Committee of the other House, and might if necessary be rendered durable, and vested with due powers by an act of the whole legislature, might bring back the public expenditure to its constitutional principle, might devise proper regulations for opening contracts to the proposals of every fair bidder, for reforming the abuses of office, and the enormity of fees, with a variety of other abuses, particularly that of large fums of money lying in the hands of individuals to the lofs of the State. An objection has been strongly urged on the ground of an apprehenfion expreffed by fome Lords, as if they ferioufly entertained it, of its producing, a quarrel between both Houses of Parliament, in consequence of which, the public business might be obstructed by a claim, on the part of the House of Commons, to an exclusive right of confidering and providing for the subjects of this motion. Such a claim certainly cannot be fupported as a confequence of the claim of that House to originate money-bills. Not a single Lord appeared to entertain an idea that fuch a claim would be well founded. In truth, the objection supposes it to be ill founded, and that therefore this House will refift it; and yet it affumes that the House of Commons will advance and perfift in this ill founded claim. We cannot dif discover any colour for such a fuppofition, protest againft the rejection of the above a claim in the other. But we, who would be underftood to think with more respect of both, cannot entertain an apprehenfion so injurious to the House of Commons, as that they would, at this time especially, and on this occafion, have advanced fuch a claim. The motion has likewise been objected to on account of its disqualifying perfons poffeffing employments or penfions to be of the proposed Committee. We are far from fuppofing that the poffeffion of place corrupts integrity or the penfion neceffarily of the poffeffor. We have feen, and the public have feen, many illustrious initances of the contrary; yet we cannot But fuppofe that the public expectations of advantage from this measure would have been lefs fanguine, if they had feen perfons poffeffing offices selected to diftinguish how far their offices were useful or their falaries adequate; they perhaps would not think the poffeffor of a pension or office the fittest judge how far that pension or office had been merited or was neceffary. We cannot therefore think the motion justly exceptionable on this ground; it rather appears to us to have been drawn with a proper attention to noble Lords in that Parliament exempting them from a fituation which they muit neceffarily with to decline. We conceive ourselves warranted in the mode propofed by precedent as well as reafon, and it was stated to the House to have been recommended by the most approved conftitutional anthors who have written fince the Revolution, but having offered to meet any other proposition which might carry with it substantial remedy, and no fuch being offered, notwithstanding the time this propofition has lain be. fore the House, we cannot help confidering the prefent negative as going to the substantial as well as formal part of the motion, and hold ourselves obliged to avail ourselves of our night of entering our 4thly, We are farther impelled to prefs this motion, because the object of it has been seconded and called for by a confi derable majority of the people, who are affociating for this purpose, and feemed determined to pursue it by every legal and constitutional method that can be devised for its fuccess; and however some may affect to be alarmed as if such associations tended to disturb the peace, or encroach upon the delegated power of the other House, we are perfuaded it has no other view but to collect the sense of the people, and to inform the whole body of the Reprefentatives what are the fentiuments of the whole body of their constituents, in which respect their proceedings have been orderlv, peaceable, and conftitutional. And if it be asked what farther is to be done if these petitions are rejected, the best answer is that the cafe cannot be fuppofed; for although upon a few separate petitions it may be fairly faid that the other House ought not to be decided by a part only of their constituents, yet it cannot be prefumed they will act in defiance of the united opinion of the whole people, or indeed of any great and notorious majority. It is admitted that they have a power to vote as they think fit, but it is not poffible to conceive that fo wife an Affembly will ever be rash enough to reject fuch petitions, and by that means cause this dangerous question to be broached and agitated, 'Whether they have not broke their truft ? The voice of the people will certainly be complied with. Minifters may, as they feem to have done in a recent instance, deprive any man of what he holds at their pleafure, for prefuming to exercise his undoubted right of thinking for himself on these or other public fubjects; but it will not be wife in them to treat thete affociations with contempt, or call them by the invidious name of FACTION, a name by which the minority in both Houses of Parliament have been so frequently and to falfely calumniated, because the name fo applied will recoil back upon themselves when acting against the general fenfe of the nation, nor will they be able to reprefent those numbers so refpectable in rank and property (as they did but too fuccefsfully the difcontented Americans) as a mob of indigent and feditious incendiaries, becaufe the people to whom this is addressed, M HOUSE OF COMMONS. Wednesday, January 26. THE Committee of Privileges fat in one of the Committee-rooms to hear the complaint moved by John Wilkes, Efq; against the Duke of Chandos, for having interfered in the Hampshire election. The letter on which Mr. Wilkes grounded his complaint being produced, evidence was given that it was the hand-writing of his Grace the Duke of Chandos, after which Mr. Wilkes moved a resolution to the following purport : That it appears to this Committee, that the Right Hon. James Brydges, a Peer of Parliament, and Lord-Lieutenant of the county of Hants, hath concerned himself in the late election of the faid county, in direct violation of a vote of the House, of the 26th of November, by which it was Resolved, That it is a high infringement of the liberties and privileges of the Commons of Great Britain, for any Lord of Parliament, or any Lord-lieutenant of any county, to concern themselves in the elections of Members to ferve for the Commons in Parliament." Mr. Lovel Stanhope objected to the motion, contending that it infinuated more than was true, because it had not been made appear to the Committee, that the Duke of Chandos had interfered as a Lordlieutenant, or ufed any of those powers to influence the election, with which he was invested as his Majesty's Lord-lieutenant of Hampshire. Mr. Henniker supported the fame argu ment. Mr. Wilkes and other Members, on the other hand, maintained that it was by no means necessary to ascertain that the Duke of Chandos had concerned himself in the election as Lord lieutenant, but that it was an ample justification of the motion, and a perfect compliance both with the letter and fpirit of the vote of the House of the 26th of November, to prove that the Duke of Chandos, confefsedly a Peer of Parliament, and confefledly Lord-lieutenant for the county of Hants, had interfered in the late election for that county. Mr. Stanhope, persisting in his pofition, was determined to take the sense of the Committee upon it, and therefore moved as an amendment, that the words and Lord-lieutenant of the county of Hants, do not stand part of the motion. The Committee divided, but it was carried against the amendment by a confiderable majority. Wednesday, February 2. Mr. Bacon brought up the report from the Committee of Privileges, wherein it. appeared that the Duke of Chandos had written between three and 400 letters to Freeholders in Southampton to influence them in their choice of a Representative in Parliament for that county. Lord Nugent exprefied his concern that the proceedings on the noble Duke's letter had been carried so far; he had expected that the honourable Member (Mr. Wilkes) on whose motion the business had been taken up, would have before then returned to his former good-humour and goodnature. The Duke, he said, was as amiable a hearted man as lives; and though he would not attempt to justify his interference in elections, yet he was confident that Peers of great property never could be prevented from using the natural influence they derive from that property: if they could not do it openly, they would certainly smuggle themselves into elections, and direct as much as they could. His Lordship concluded with moving, that the further confideration of the report should be postponed to that day four months. Mr. Wilkes faid, that if the noble Duke had in the warmth of friendship recommended his friend to an acquaintance, he never would have taken up the matter; but when he faw him make use of the Crown |