ways of Germany were being used to transport the parts for assembly on the coast. Along some waterways completed submarines were being delivered to be commissioned. At the same time, crews were being trained on a huge scale. We must, therefore, expect that very shortly we should have to deal with a vastly increased number of submarines, working in co-operation with aircraft against our shipping.

As regards raw materials, Germany had acquired enormous resources in occupied territory. For example, in France alone they had captured thousands of barrels for anti-aircraft guns, which were now being adapted for German anti-aircraft units. Oil and raw materials were available in abundance. The only embarrassing shortage was the shortage of fat, and this was being overcome by various expedients.

Finally, there was not the slightest hope of bringing about a revolution in Germany. Hitler possesses the blindest confidence of the German masses.

The third and shortest part of the discourse was devoted to the reasons which had brought him here and the proposals which he had to make. He said that horrified at the prospect of the prolongation of the struggle, he had come here without the knowledge of Hitler in order to convince responsible persons that since England could not win the war, the wisest course was to make peace now. From a long and intimate knowledge of the Fuehrer which had begun eighteen years ago in the fortress of Landsberg, he could give his word of honor that the Fuehrer had never entertained any designs against the British Empire. Nor has he ever aspired to world domination. He believed that Germany's sphere of interest was in Europe and that any dissipation of Germany's strength beyond Europe's frontiers would be a weakness and would carry with it the seeds of Germany's destruction. Hitler would sincerely regret the collapse of the British Empire. At this point Hess tried to make my flesh creep by emphasizing that the avaricious Americans had fell designs on the Empire. Canada would certainly be incorporated in the U.S.

Reverting to Hitler's attitude, he said that only as recently as May 3rd after his Reichstag speech, Hitler had declared to him that he had no oppressive demands to make of England.

The solution which Herr Hess proposed was that England should give Germany a free hand in Europe, and Germany would give England a completely free hand in the Empire, with the sole reservation that we should return Germany's ex-colonies, which

she required as a source of raw materials. I asked, in order to draw him on the subject of Hitler's attitude to Russia, whether he included Russia in Europe or in Asia. He replied "In Asia". I then retorted that under the terms of his proposal, since Germany would only have a free hand in Europe, she would not be at liberty to attack Russia. Herr Hess reacted quickly by remarking that Germany had certain demands to make of Russia which would have to be satisfied, either by negotiation or as the result of a war. He added, however, that there was no foundation for the rumors now being spread that Hitler was contemplating an early attack on Russia.

I then asked about Italian aims and he said that he did not know them. I replied that it was a matter of some importance. He brushed this aside and said that he was sure that Italy's claims would not be excessive. I suggested that Italy scarcely deserved anything, but he begged to differ. Italy had rendered considerable services to Germany, and besides England had compensated defeated nations like Rumania after the last war.

Finally, as we were leaving the room, Herr Hess delivered a parting shot. He had forgotten, he declared, to emphasize that the proposal could only be considered on the understanding that it was negotiated by Germany with an English Government other than the present British Government. Mr. Churchill, who had planned the war since 1936, and his colleagues who had lent themselves to his war policy, were not persons with whom the Fuehrer could negotiate.

The above statement took about two hours and a quarter to make. At intervals I made a mild protest against some of Herr Hess's more ludicrous statements; and I occasionally threw a fly over him in order to induce him to develop a point which seemed of interest. But, in general, I allowed even the most outrageous remarks to pass unanswered, since I realized that argument would be quite fruitless and would certainly have deprived us of our breakfast.

COPY OF DOCUMENT M-1-18

RECORD OF AN INTERVIEW WITH HERR HESS ON

MAY 14, 1941

We started by asking Herr Hess how he was. He replied that he was feeling better. A number of complaints which he had had to make about his treatment had been remedied. In particular he

had objected to being under the constant supervision of a private soldier. He also had a number of small requests to make, namely, the loan of certain books including "Three Men in a Boat", the return of his drugs, the return of his camera and a piece of his aeroplane as a souvenir. The Duke of Hamilton said that he would make enquiries as to the possibility of giving him satisfaction on these points.

Herr Hess then passed to an account of his flight. He said he had left Augsberg at 5.45 p.m. and on arrival off the coast of Scotland had found it too light to fly inland. He had then circled for an hour and a half over the North Sea, until he judged that it had become dark enough to cross the coast. He described at length the difficulty he had had in leaving his machine. On two occasions he became unconscious, the second time being after pulling the ripcord of his parachute. He was still unconscious when he reached the ground. He had been very well treated by the farmer on whose land he had come down, but he had been painfully surprised to be lodged in a common cell at Glasgow.

He then passed to political questions. He said that, on reflec tion, he had omitted to explain that there were two further conditions attached to his peace proposals. First, Germany could not leave Iraq in the lurch. The Iraqis had fought for Germany and Germany would, therefore, have to require us to evacuate Iraq. I observed that this was going considerably beyond the original proposal that German interests should be confined to Europe, but he retorted that, taken as a whole, his proposals were more than fair. The second condition was that the peace agreement should contain a provision for the reciprocal indemnification of British and German nationals, whose property had been expropriated as the result of war.

Herr Hess concluded by saying that he wished to impress on us that Germany must win the war by blockade. We had no conception of the number of submarines now building in Germany. Hitler always did things on a grand scale and devastating submarine war, supported by new types of aircraft, would very shortly succeed in establishing a completely effective blockade of England. It was fruitless for anyone here to imagine that England could capitulate and that the war could be waged from the Empire. It was Hitler's intention, in such an eventuality, to continue the blockade of England, even though the island had capitulated, so that we would have to face the deliberate starvation of the population of these islands. I observed that so far as the actual maintenance of life was concerned, we should probably

not require very much shipping, but Herr Hess replied that the German blockade would be so effective that it would not be possible for us to run the blockade even with one or two ships a day.

As we were leaving he said that if conversations were initiated, as he hoped, he trusted that a qualified interpreter would be provided and that the conversations would not be attended by a large number of persons. As a Reich Minister he could not place himself in the position of being a lone individual subjected to a cross fire of comment and questions from a large number of persons.

COPY OF DOCUMENT M-119

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION WITH HERR HESS
ON MAY 15TH, 1941

Herr Hess started by making various small complaints and requests. The guard made too much noise at night, might he have certain books etc., etc. I said I would do what I could on all these points.

I then said I had been surprised at his remarks the previous day about Iraq. He replied that he was not acquainted with the details of our relations with or treaty rights in Iraq. All he had meant to say was that since Iraq had fought for Germany, Hitler would have to take account of this fact in any peace settlement.

I then threw a fly over him about Ireland. He said that in all his talks with Hitler, the subject of Ireland had never been mentioned except incidentally. Ireland had done nothing for Germany in this war and it was therefore to be supposed that Hitler would not concern himself in Anglo-Irish relations. We had some little conversation about the difficulty of reconciling the wishes of the South and North and from this we passed to American interest in Ireland and so to America.

On the subject of America Hess took the following line.

1. The Germans reckoned with American intervention and were not afraid of it. They knew all about American aircraft production and the quality of the aircraft. Germany could outbuild England and America combined.

2. Germany had no designs on America. The so-called German peril was a ludicrous figment of imagination. Hitler's interests were European.

3. If we made peace now, America would be furious. America really wanted to inherit the British Empire.

693261-47-4

Hess concluded by saying that Hitler really wanted a permanent understanding with us on a basis which preserved the Empire intact. His own flight was intended to give us a chance of opening conversations without loss of prestige. If we rejected this chance, it would be clear proof that we desired no understanding with Germany and Hitler would be entitled-in fact it would be his duty-to destroy us utterly and to keep us after the war in a state of permanent subjection.

If conversations were started, as he hoped, he would like the assistance of:

Doctor E. Semelbauer, No. 43125
Kurt Maass, No. 44012

Huyton Camp,
near Liverpool.

also one German stenographer (from a camp) and one typist. He also hoped he would be told beforehand with whom he would have to negotiate and that it would not be with people who had taken a leading part in the war agitation against Germany.

Generally speaking, it was difficult to get him to talk politics. He thinks he has told me all he has to say and wishes to use me principally as a channel of complaint. In particular he objects to be closely guarded. He says he came here at great risk to himself and having got here safely has no intention of trying to run away or commit suicide.

[Initialled] I.A.K.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT M-120

"GERMAN BASIC HANDBOOK", Part III, Chapter IV, Para. 4, Page 76

The VDA and the Nazi Party.

Under cover of independence, an all-out propaganda campaign, concerning the situation and conditions of German minorities abroad, was launched during the years 1933 to 1938, to prepare the German people by leaflets, pictorial publications, charts, population maps, and bulky volumes, for future aggression. "Every third German lives outside the border", was the most popular slogan. To arrive at this figure it was necessary to include "ten to twelve million overseas Germans in the United States", 2,860,000 in Switzerland, and 250,000 in Luxembourg. The same pamphlet, of which 300,000 copies were distributed, stated with regard to Denmark:

Denmark: 60,000. Among them 50,000 in the lost North Schleswig. Our racial comrades in lost land. They have to pre