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sary to point once more to the obvious similarity between the opinions professed by Koch and the instructions given in the Bormann letter. Leaving aside the question whether this similarity is accidental, in any case the result is that Koch's opinion has prevailed over that of the Minister. Judging by previous experience, it cannot be assumed that Bormann's letter will remain for long unknown to the Reich Commissioners, at least in regard to its general tendency. Thus the question arises whether this development is to be allowed to take its course, and whether the matter can be allowed to rest where the report to the Feuhrer of 11 August 1942 left it. Only the Minister himself can decide upon this question. Even so the following considerations are useful: ever since the Ministry was set up on the principle of concentration and unity of leadership, it lost more and more power in striking contrast to that principle. The question of the relationship with the Police, so important in practice, was settled to the disadvantage of the civil administration. Unified leadership in the hands of the District Commissioners was thus dissolved. The higher SS and Police leaders refuse to pay the usual respect to the General Commissioners such as reporting, etc. All technical questions are decided upon by Speer. Agricultural questions are dealt with by a department of the Ministry of Food and by the Office for the Four Year Plan; the same applies to Forestry and Trade. Authority in racial questions is assumed more and more by the Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood. Nor is there any unity among the authorities in questions of propaganda. It is not surprising in view of this development that the Supreme Reich Administration continue their attacks and try to pry loose one prerogative after the other. Nor is it surprising under these circumstances that in the Berlin Offices it is openly rumored that the Ministry is to be changed into a mere staff organization. This is not the place to enter further into these matters. They may rather serve as a background against which the necessity of a clarification of basic policies stands out all the more sharply. The Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories enjoys particular prestige with the public because of the personality at its head. This is not the prestige of an able tactician, or of a reckless tyrant, but the public have rightly confidence in clear-cut spiritual solutions. In the same way the prestige enjoyed by the Ministry from the other Reich Authorities rests specifically on this foundation. The considerations set out above lead perforce to the conclusion that the existence of Bormann's letter constitutes an attack against this foun

dation. The political line therefore is doubly threatened by the organizational difficulties mentioned above.

II

What has been said so far shows how necessary it is that the situation be clarified; how and when this is to be done, is for the Minister to decide. In his letter of 11 August 1942 he has left open for himself the possibility of a special audience with the Fuehrer. There are, however, several more points which need clarification.

1. Without wishing to criticize in any way the statements of Party Director Bormann it is yet necessary to point out that the working of his letter does not always bring out clearly the importance of the issue at stake. A phrase like "brisk trade in contraceptives" had better not be brought into connection with the name of the Fuehrer. In the same way abrupt phrases like: "vaccination of the non-German population is out of the question", "under no circumstances higher education", "the population must not rise to a higher standard", "under no circumstances German Health Services" would hardly seem to be entirely in keeping with the importance of the historical problems involved. Compared with the dignity of the conception of the German State phrases like these would seem altogether inadmissable as instructions for the German policy in the East.

2. As has been mentioned above, the Reich Commissioner Koch leads an especially strong agitation against the so-called "soft" policy. Any action founded on understanding and on a politically commendable respect for the justified susceptibilities of foreign nationhood is at once denounced from their quarters as weakness and slackening of the "master consciousness". But this attitude leads to the same inconsistencies which were discussed above in Part I, Paragraph 5, in connection with the question of tactics. In the "Voelkischer Beobachter" of 20 August 1942 Koch proudly speaks of the Ukrainians having been furthered in their cultural and intellectual efforts. This shows that even if one starts from his viewpoint, it is impossible to disregard entirely foreign nationhood. The unfortunate "master" complex, however, surrounds even sensible measures with those clouds of mental reservations and tactical insincerity which were characteristic of Czarist policy in regard to non-Russian nations. For the rest, it is entirely incomprehensible why there should be any fear lest we might breed "by any of our measures a master-feeling" in Slav nations. (Bormann letter, Point 5) Surely it goes without saying that no

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body thinks of subjecting even the most russified person of German blood to Ukrainian or Esthonian judicature or police. Nobody knows the German nation better than the Fuehrer. He knows only too well that the German sometimes tends to be all too decent and careless. But he also knows that judging by past experience all the worst instincts are usually aroused by appeals to the master spirit as propagated from Rovno. Certain incidents in the Government General ("Kreishauptmann" von Hirschfeld, Cpt. von Sahla) ought to serve as warning examples. It should be emphatically stressed that the German claim to leadership is a matter of course, and that a continuous, mistrustful overstressing of that claim is only liable to cause breakdowns in personal and political relations.

3. A further important point which needs clarification is constituted by the numerous historical errors on which these various authorities base their opinions. [This paragraph and the following (4) contain historical proof that there is a Ukrainian nation and that it is wrong to speak of a "uniform Slav rabble".]

III

The statements set out above may appear very sharp. They are, however, dictated by concern and duty. [This paragraph contains proposals of policy. Germany ought to rule for the benefit of Europe and not on the principle that the occupied countries are to be exploited for the benefit of Germany alone. The nations in the East should be ruled, but not oppressed. "One can lead only those whom one respects." Proposals for simplification and unification of administration. The letter ends:]

These demands of political philosophy are being realized in a grandiose manner by our Japanese ally in his newly occupied southern districts. The general rules for the administration of Greater Asia which were published a short time ago ("Foreign Policy", July 1942) contain a classic formula for a Reich policy of this kind. The dangers inherent in the character of the Japanese nation such as arrogance, misuse of power, lack of respect for foreign nationhood are exercised by an open challenge by the highest official authority, an act of frankness which gives the impression of supreme self-reliance. The political opinion thus expressed is strikingly similar to the Minister's own concept. The fate of the Reich will depend on whether or not this concept can be realized.

(signed) Dr. M

. [stamped]: Personal Staff, Reichsfuehrer SS File No. Secret/67

Reich Security Main Office [RSHA]

Communication of Information

Information Communication No. 219, DR BERLIN NUE NO 229793 16 December 42 2100-GR

To Reichsfuehrer SS

At present: FIELD COMMAND POST

urgent secret

In connection with the increase in the transfer of labor to the concentration camps, ordered to be completed by 30 Jan 1943, the following procedure may be applied in the Jewish Section.

1. Total number: 45,000 Jews

2. Start of transportation: 11 Jan 1943. End of transportation: 31 Jan 1943 (The Reich railroads are unable to provide special trains for the evacuation during the period from 15 Dec 1942 to 10 Jan 1943 because of the increased traffic of armed forces leave trains.)

3. Composition: The 45,000 Jews are to consist of 30,000 Jews from the district of Byalystock, 10,000 Jews from the ghetto Theresienstadt, 5,000 of whom are Jews fit for work who herefore had been used for smaller jobs required for the ghetto, and 5,000 Jews who are generally incapable of working, also over 60 year old Jews. In order to use this opportunity for reducing the number of inmates now amounting to 48,000, which is too high in the interest of building up the ghetto, I am requesting special authority for this action. As herefore only such Jews would be taken for the evacuation who do not have any particular connections and who are not in possession of any high decorations. 3,000 Jews from the occupied Dutch territories, 2,000 Jews from Berlin-45,000. The figure of 45,000 includes the invalid [underlined] appendix (old Jews and children). By use of a practical. standard, the screening of the arriving Jews in Auschwitz should yield at least 10,000 to 15,000 people fit for work [underlined]. For the chief of the security police & the SD IV B 4 KLEIN A -2093/42 KLEIN G (3910)

signed: Mueller

Lt. Gen. [Gruppenfuehrer] of the SS.

The Reich Leader SS Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood

Berlin-Halensee, 15.4.41
Kurfuerstendamm 142/143

Instruction for Internal Use on the Application of the Law concerning Property of Poles of 17.9.1940

1. Where the Act is to be applied: The Act is applicable not only within the incorporated areas in the East, but in the entire area of Greater Germany, excluding the General Government of the occupied Polish areas; in the latter area the Decree of the Governor General concerning the Confiscation of Private Property located within the General Government of 24.1.40 (VBLT GG.I No. 6, pp 23 ff.) is applicable.

2. With regard to which persons it is to be applied: The act is to be applied with regard to every national of the former Polish State. Alterations of nationality completed after 1.9.1939, as may result for instance from the division of Poland or from naturalization of Poles in enemy or neutral countries are not to be considered. Therefore anyone who was a Polish National on 1.9.1939 is subject to the Act unless the exception of section 1,ss. 2 applies.

3. According to section 1, ss.3, No. a of the Law concerning the List for Repatriation of German Ethnic Groups [Deutsche Volksliste] and the German nationality in the Incorporated Eastern Areas of 4.3.1941 (RGBI.I 118) those stateless persons of non-German race who had their domicile or permanent residence within the frontiers of the former Polish State, are in the same position as nationals of the former Polish State. There is nothing against applying this principle when applying this Act.

5. "Where on 1.9.1939 nationals of the former Polish State were at the same time nationals of another state (for instance America) the Act is applicable in principle, but before any action may be taken, there has to be a report to me via the Central Estate Office in order to negotiate an agreement with the Foreign Office or the Custodian of Enemy Property.

6. The important exception in section 1, subs. 2 will permit practical action and especially definitive measures on the basis of the Act only after determination of the race to which the person belongs (see my Decree regarding Races of 12.9.40, the Circular of the Minister for the Interior concerning Acquisition of

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