While some of the senior military men who testified were not critical of the policy clearance procedure, and some even went so far as to defend it, their testimony made it clear that this procedure was not in accord with the principles of organization and procedure they had been taught, and had practiced throughout their careers, as professional military men. For example, General Shoup, Commandant of the Marine Corps, testified that he now had no objection to submitting his speeches for prior clearance for policy consistency, and that he had submitted his speeches for such clearance since early in 1961. Under questioning by the subcommittee counsel, however, General Shoup admitted that earlier he had objected strenuously to submitting his speeches for review, and, in fact, had not done so. General Shoup testified as follows:

I believe in early 1960, when I first became Commandant, I submitted my first speech in accordance with the regulation. Having come from a field command where I did not have to do it, I questioned this and I was provided with the Department of Defense regulations relating thereto. I did send in my speech for review. I also sent a statement saying that I thought that this was a waste of time on my part and the people who were to review it and that I should be expected to have enough intelligence to know whether or not a speech should be sent for clearance.

I did not hear any more about this until, oh, some weeks later. It was taken up in a Department of Defense meeting, policy council meeting.

Secretary Gates mentioned the fact, having read my memorandum, and I discusssed my feelings about it, that I felt I should have enough sense to know, and particularly the chiefs of the service should have enough sense to know what to say in public and that they should be held responsible for what they said.

If they did not say what they should, then there were administrative methods of getting a new chief.

It was decided at that time-Secretary Gates stated that he would accept that situation and that if we wanted to send them, we could, but my understanding was that we did not have to.

From that time on, until about February 1961, I never sent a single speech for clearance (H-207).

General Shoup did not explain to the subcommittee what circumstances had caused his change of attitude about submitting his speeches for policy review, which change of attitude evidently occurred about February 1961. However, there can be no question but that General Shoup once viewed the policy review procedures as a departure from recognized and responsible principles of military practice and organization.

Gen. George H. Decker, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, stated:

I think if there was some clear policy established and distributed so that everyone would have access to it, that it might improve the entire matter (H-538).

Obviously, General Decker had felt the lack of clear policy dissemination. Prior to his statement above quoted, General Decker had testified that more than half of his public speeches, since he had been Chief of Staff of the Army, had been changed in the process of review (H-537).

It is also clear from General Decker's testimony that senior military officials are reluctant to accept the comments of juniors, or of personnel in another department, as to what is or is not official policy. For instance, General Decker was asked whether a censor's comment in the margin of a censored speech that "it is only the externally aggressive type of communism which the United States is committed to check" reflected official policy. He responded: "I know of no policy that would lead to a conclusion such as you have stated, as written in the margin of the proposed talk" (H-544). Yet, this very statement of policy by a nameless censor was defended by Mr. Ball, in his testimony before the subcommittee (H-2826-2828).

Adm. George C. Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, described the method which would be consistent with sound principles of military practice and organization. He stated:

The same situation is pertinent, I believe, to the problem of what we should and should not say, not only on the subject of communism, but on any other subject. Certainly we require guidance from higher authority relative to our country's policies, both foreign and domestic. In fact, those of us who are senior officers cannot effectively and efficiently discharge our military duties unless we are thoroughly familiar with national policies.

And this applies particularly to the chiefs of service who are also members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Military, political, and even economic affairs are far too thoroughly intertwined today for any one of us to go charging off on his own for a tilt at a windmill.

But once guidance has been received, then it is my firm belief we should be permitted the opportunity to exercise our own best judgment and the prerogative to do so with regard to what we say. I know no more dedicated Americans than those who serve our country in uniform. When we do speak out, it is in the interest of preserving of our country, and the principles on which the greatest Nation on earth was founded. This is our only goal, and it is our desire to use all of the means at our disposal to attain it (H-262, 263). The heart of Admiral Anderson's suggestion is that if policies formulated at the proper civilian level of government are clearly and specifically stated and disseminated in regularized form, by the proper civilian authority to senior military officials, those military officials are not only willing, but capable of insuring compliance of military personnel with the policies. As General Trudeau expressed it in his testimony, "We do not have any trouble getting our orders carried out within the military, and if we know what higher authority wants, we usually execute their orders" (H-67).

The violation of sound principles of military organization and practice by prior review, for policy purposes, of statements by military personnel, has persisted for more than a decade. It was begun in the

Truman administration, continued through 8 years of the Eisenhower administration, and has been rigidly enforced during the Kennedy administration. It can surely not be justified simply by 12 years of partial usage by three administrations. Indeed, President Eisenhower, in a letter to the subcommittee, explicitly and emphatically advised against its continuation. With the wisdom of experience and the objectivity of retrospect, President Eisenhower stated:

I believe, therefore, that your committee will render valuable service by rejecting the recent spate of attacks upon the competence and loyalty of the military and by disapproving any effort to thrust them, so to speak, behind an American iron curtain, ordered to stand mutely by as hostile forces tirelessly strive to undermine every aspect of American life. I say, let our informed military speak, always under properly established policies and in the general, not petty, supervision of their civilian superiors. Should they, here or there, speak or act partisanly, imprudently, or in contravention of national policies, then hold them directly accountable, for it is a function of command to keep military personnel properly respectful of the obligations of the uniform. At all events, I am certain of this: Give military leaders a lucid explanation of the Nation's policies, and they will, with rare and easily controllable exceptions, loyally perform.

Generally, in the same connection, I question the desirability of requiring the topmost Government officials, whether military or civilian, to submit their proposed public statements for what amounts to censorship of content-as distinguished from security matters-prior to their utterance. I am aware, in saying this, that procedures in my own and in the administration of my predecessor may have functioned in this way. But in thoughtful reassessment of this procedure, I incline to the view that when responsible and respected officials feel compelled to submit to censorship, we are smothering the concept of personal responsibility under a practice of heavyhanded and unjustified staff supervision. Responsible officials, when in doubt, will voluntarily coordinate proposed public statements within their own and sister departments so as to protect the Nation, their services, and themselves, but such voluntary coordination is some distance from censorship. I would hope that all who study this problem objectively will see the virtues of such a cooperative system as opposed to censorship, except, of course, where security is involved. I have always believed as I now do that good faith and close understanding among the important officials of great human organizations are far more important to success than are any number of arbitrary regulations and pedantic instructions. This is really the meaning of this letter (H-7).

There appears to be no good reason why the policies of our Government should not be communicated in writing, with specifics, to our military commanders, and the responsibility placed on them for insuring compliance therewith by all military personnel, unless, of course, the civilian formulators of policies have so little confidence in

public support of such policies that they fear the reaction of the American people should they learn about these policies.

G. Recommendations

1. That senior military officials should be informed of all major policies, including foreign policies, in writing where feasible, in sufficient detail that they can reasonably be expected to comply therewith, and senior military officials should advise their subordinates to the extent necessary to assure their compliance.

2. That prior review of speeches for policy-as distinct from security-purposes, be discontinued, and in lieu thereof, senior military commanders be held responsible for their own public statements, and, in conformity with normal command procedures, for those of their subordinates.

If these recommendations are rejected in favor of retention of the prior review censorship procedures, the following recommendations are made with respect to the prior review system:

1. That testimony by any military official before a congressional committee should be exempted.

2. That the function of speech review for policy censorship be divorced from the function of review for security purposes; and that policy censorship be performed within the Department of Defense by personnel specially trained for that purpose in the details of policy and in specialized courses such as that conducted in "Document Analysis" by the Department of Army at the Army Intelligence School in 1955.

3. That for each change made in a speech or article submitted for review, the originating author be furnished with a written explanation setting forth the necessity for the change and the policy or facts which require it.

4. That the participation of the State Department, or any other Department than the Defense Department, be limited to an advisory function, regardless of the subject matter of the speech or article, so long as it is proposed by a military person.

5. That in order to preserve distinct and direct channels of command, the appeal authority on censorship actions be vested in the Secretary of Defense, subject only to the decision of the President, and within the Department of Defense to the Secretary through such senior officials as the Secretary may designate.

6. That maximum reliance be placed by all officials, including censors, on disclaimers-that is, statements by officers that their remarks represent only their own views and not those of any part of the Government-in order that military officials can be extended the maximum freedom of speech characteristic of a free society and commensurate with the professional competence of such military officials.

III. INTERNAL EDUCATION AND MOTIVATION ACTIVITIES OF THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

A. Scope

That part of the resolution of the Armed Services Committee which charged the subcommittee with a study of "the use of military personnel and facilities * to inform and educate armed services person

nel on the nature and menace of the cold war" (H-3) constituted the broadest area of inquiry of the three subjects of study pursued by the subcommittee.

The subcommittee made diligent efforts to review the entire spectrum of this field. No precedent for such a comprehensive study in this area was available to the subcommittee as a guide, for apparently there has been no previous effort to correlate the varied aspects of internal education and motivation activities into a form that lent to it the necessary perspective to permit its evaluation. The scope of the subcommittee's study included the full range of its charter in three dimensions. In level of command, the study went from the role of the Office of Secretary of Defense, where the highest responsibility resides, to the ultimate recipient in the ranks at squad level. In the range of intensity, the study covered the area from the generalized need of line troops to the highly specialized requirements of individuals who are assigned to specific cold war intelligence functions. Laterally, the study included active duty personnel, Reserve personnel and personnel assigned to non-Federal forces such as the National Guard and the Reserve Officer Training Corps.

The nature of the activity in this area of study revolves around means, methods, and goals. Information is the means of achieving the goal of motivation and education of service personnel, and, as will be developed below, the methods of imparting information are numerous. They include lectures, formal schooling, and the use of films, publications, and audio tapes.

B. Need

The study of the subcommittee revealed no authoritative denial of the existence of a requirement for an internal informational effort on the subject of the nature and menace of the cold war within the armed services. This requirement, or need, is comprised of two elements, which are distinct but interrelated and, often, overlapping in application. One element of the need is for motivation, and the other is for education; the former to insure the will, and the latter to insure the capability to perform assigned missions.

1. Motivation

Motivation of the individual serviceman constitutes the point of distinction between the "mercenary" and the responsible citizen in uniform. This distinction spells the difference between weakness and strength, between reliability and unreliability and, in the time of crisis, between victory and defeat, freedom and enslavement.

The essentiality of proper motivation for military personnel was presented to the subcommittee by numerous witnesses. All the testimony pointed toward the principle that regardless of the degree of perfection of instruments of science and weaponry with which military forces are equipped, there is no strength unless the individuals who comprise the military forces are inspired to use them effectively. Mr. Carlisle P. Runge, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), in explaining to the subcommittee why the Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Education and Manpower Resources was created, said: But faith in the cause, the why we fight rather than the how to fight, is a matter of utmost importance to my office (H-907).

90625-62- -8