conscience, he cannot live with a decision he should divest himself of his uniform and carry on his fight in a civilian status.

We do not propose to tackle in depth the thorny and complex problem of "free speech" by those in uniform. It is impossible to establish any clear or fixed line of demarcation in this field and to say that the right of free speech carries a military man-or a civilian governmental official, for that matter-up to but not beyond a specific point. However, it is crystal clear that some limit necessarily exists and that, by donning a uniform or by accepting national service in a civilian capacity, an individual accepts, as a corollary, some infringement upon his right of freedom of speech. In the great majority of cases, in the military and elsewhere, professional pride, duty and loyalty will impose their own limit even if self-restraint and good taste do not. The military itself accepts the historic principle of civilian supremacy. More than any country in the world, perhaps, we are indebted to our dedicated and skilled career officers. For more than 185 years they have faced our enemies in hot war and in cold war with loyalty, dedication, faithfulness, and efficiency and have always been equal to the trust we have placed in them. In these troubled and perilous times, more than ever before, our fate and destiny is in their hands. There is no reason to believe that they will be any less responsive to their obligations and responsibilities in the future than they have been in the past.

In our civil-military relations and particularly in the field of partisan politics, we must continue to place a substantial degree of reliance upon the professional pride, loyalty, dedication, self-discipline, and self-restraint of our professional military men. The traditional and time-honored concept that the military shall, under no circumstances, become involved in partisan politics must be rigidly adhered to. Military men must not participate or engage in political activities, and, of equal importance, political considerations must not control or affect the civil authorities in the promotion, assignment or appointment of military personnel.

The continued growth, dignity and prestige of the military profession is directly dependent upon the related traditions of civilian control and noninvolvement in partisan politics. In fact, it would have been impossible for the military to become a truly great profession without these principles. It is essential that military men remain nonpartisan and nonpolitical both in word and in deed.

If military men should become political then their promotions, assignments and appointments will depend, not upon their military ability, skill and fearning, but upon whether they are in or out of favor politically with the administration in power. Their actions, policies, statements and opinions will have to be tailored to fit the prevailing political climate and professional competence will inevitably become secondary to partisan considerations.

It is manifest, therefore, that nothing short of our existing and traditional system will insure the selection, promotion, and appointment of military officers on a nonpartisan basis. Only under this system can the military profession continue to grow and flourish in its own right.

V. REVIEW AND CLEARANCE OF MILITARY SPEECHES

(A) Propriety of Review and Clearance

From what has already been said, it is abundantly clear that the executive branch of the Government, acting through duly constituted officials, and with the lines of authority leading down from, and up to, the President, has the inherent power and authority to lay down requirements that military officers submit their public utterances for policy review and clearance prior to their delivery. The real and fundamental questions are whether this inherent power and authority should be exercised, and, if so, the manner in which it should be exercised and the safeguards and restrictions that should be placed around it.

The evidence which this subcommittee has received establishes overwhelmingly that the power to review and clear military speeches for propriety and for consistency with our national and foreign policy should, in the best interests of the Nation, be exercised, provided that it is exercised in a proper and responsible manner.

The propriety of a responsible review system can be clearly bottomed upon the best interests and the welfare of the Nation. It is unthinkable that the four military services should go divergent ways and contribute to the public confusion by speaking with diverse tongues upon our foreign or domestic policy and objectives. Irreparable harm can result if the thousands of military officers are free to express publicly their own personal views in conflict with or dissent from the policies laid down by their Commander in Chief. If we fragment and undermine our national policy by allowing military men publicly express views not in consonance with established policy our enemies will be comforted and aided and our friends confused and bewildered. The urgency and necessity of the cold war itself requires that, with respect to established national and foreign policy, we speak with one tongue and not with a thousand.

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The magnitude of the problem is underscored by the fact that there are now approximately 1,250 generals and admirals on active duty in all branches of the services. Throughout the Government there are more than 12,000 civilian officials of grade 15 and above and about 3,800 of these are in the Department of Defense.

Some witnesses have suggested that, even though a review system is generally necessary and desirable, the very top ranking military and civilian officials should be exempt from it for the alleged reason that there is something inherently humiliating in requiring a man who has risen to the top to obtain prior clearance before making a public utterance. With this we do not agree. If it be conceded that harm or injury can result from ill-advised or inadvertent statements by military officers, it should be clear that the more important the officer the greater the harm which can result. It is apparent that a dissenting or improper statement by a four-star general will have a much greater impact upon our friends and our foes alike than the same statement by a lesser ranking officer.

In addition, a properly administered and responsible review system does not degrade the individual submitting a speech for clearance. It can and should be a service and valuable aid to him since not even the best informed officer can be expected to be aware of the many facets

of our foreign policy which must, of necessity, change from week to week, and even from day to day, to meet the exigencies of a changing international situation. There is a thin and difficult line of demarcation between purely military matters and those matters which involve foreign or national policy and boundaries in this area cannot be drawn precisely.

The propriety of requiring the clearance of military speeches for policy matters prior to public utterance was generally, although not unanimously, supported by the testimony and statements of the knowledgeable witnesses who appeared before us.

For example:

Hon. Robert A. Lovett, former Secretary of Defense, viewed the prior clearance system as being "entirely reasonable." (Tr., p. 11.) Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified that he found the prior clearance system "to be helpful" (Tr., p. 102) and that "I endorse it." (Tr., p. 105.)

Gen. Thomas D. White, former Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, stated that he believed that military speeches "are controlled-and should be" and that the prior clearance system "is a proper policy." (Tr., p. 185.)

Gen. David M. Shoup, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, testified that the reviewing agency provided "a useful service." (Tr., p. 206.)

Gen. George H. Decker, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, testified that it is "both proper and desirable" that public utterances of military men. be reviewed. (Tr., p. 522.)

Gen. Nathan F. Twining, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that "no reasonable military man objects in principle" to the review system and that "there would be chaos" without such a system. (Tr., p. 570.)

Gen. J. Lawton Collins, former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, said that "it would be unwise, in my judgment, for Congress to interfere with the regulations and procedures established by the Department of Defense for governing military information programs and public utterances by military men." (Tr., p. 566.)

Hon. Thomas S. Gates, former Secretary of Defense, told us that "as a measure of guidance, all senior officials of the Department of Defense must coordinate their statements under some formal system." (Tr., p. 3119.)

A summary of the history, background, procedures, and application of the speech review process, prepared by the staff of the subcommittee, appears as Appendix C to this report.

(B) Discussion of Review Actions

The witnesses who testified before the subcommittee whose speeches had been censored exhibited more concern over the actions of the reviewers than because of the existence of the review system. However, all of these witnesses agreed that there was no discernable difference between the stringency or strictness of review and clearance under this administration as compared to its predecessor. As Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau testified (Tr., p. 31), "it appears apparent to me that there has been little difference in policy review procedures between

this administration and the last, despite a change in the very toplevel officials." To the same effect was the testimony of Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer (Tr., p. 106), Gen. Thomas D. White (Tr., p. 187), Gen. David M. Shoup (Tr., p. 209), and Gen. George H. Decker (Tr., p. 538). As General Trudeau stated (Tr., p. 37) this indicates that the difficulties with speech review is "apparently not a political problem."

Although the subcommittee is convinced that a system for prior review and clearance of military speeches for policy aspects is altogether proper and desirable, the record of the hearing reflects that the actual operation of the present system has left much to be desired. Many of the changes and deletions are justifiable grounds for perplexity. It does not overstate the case to say that in many cases the actions of the reviewers both in the Department of Defense and the Department of State have been characterized by ineptness, inconsistency, caprice, arbitrary personal judgment, and even irresponsibility. All of the witnesses whose speeches had been altered in the process of review testified that the changes reflected no detectable pattern or policy and, indeed, that the only consistency about them was the clear inconsistency. Many of the changes simply defy logical explanation.

However, it is significant that, despite their inability to understand certain changes, all of the military officers appearing before the subcommittee whose speeches had been censored and who testified on the point agreed that none of the changes and alterations had prevented them from getting their message over to their listeners.

For example, General Trudeau said in his prepared statement (Tr., p. 30) "The amendments in my speeches, even though substantial in number, have not prevented me from getting across my basic message." General Decker testified (Tr., p. 534) that the "changes did not prevent me from getting across the message I was trying to convey.'

Since the significant changes and deletions considered by the subcommittee have already been included in the record (See Part 7, p. 3163 to 3269), it would serve no good purpose to reproduce them here. However, at least one change made by the State Department deserves specific comment.

In a speech prepared for delivery by Brig. Gen. John W. White to the National Security Forum, Columbus, Ohio, on March 3, 1961, the State Department reviewer substituted the phrase "defeat of Communist aggression" for the word "victory." The original explanation furnished the subcommittee was:

The word "victory" has a militaristic and aggressive ring less suited than the substituted phrase to describing our national objectives. It also implies an "all or nothing" approach leaving no room for accommodation. (Tr., p. 3234.)

However, when Under Secretary of State George W. Ball testified before the subcommittee on June 4, 1962, he renounced this explanation and described it as "perfectly fatuous." He explained instead that the recommended change did not reflect any reluctance to speak of "victory" but rather a desire to make clear that the Com

munist bloc is responsible for the cold war and that victory in the cold war can be achieved only by the defeat of Communist aggression. (Tr., pp. 2769, 2794.)

The subcommitee is not impressed with either explanation. The change appears to be completely unjustified and incomprehensible. There is no valid or logical reason why official spokesmen of the Government, whether military or civilian, should not be permitted to speak of "victory" for our side or of our desire to "win" and "emerge victorious." These terms are commonplace in the debates on the floor of the Senate. Arbitrary and unrealistic restrictions of this nature are not helpful to our cause in any manner.

The phrase "emerge victorious" was also deleted from a speech by General Trudeau delivered in April 1961. (Speech No. 10, Tr., pp. 3166-3167.) Some of the other changes, alterations, and deletions which have given us concern are found in speech No. 4 by General Decker (Tr., p. 3164); speech No. 17 by General Trudeau (Tr., pp. 3169-3170); speech No. 21 by General Trudeau (Tr., p. 3172); speech No. 30 by General Decker (Tr., pp. 3175-3176); speech No. 32 by General Schewe (Tr., p. 3176); speech No. 44 by General Losey (Tr., p. 3181); speech No. 51 by Secretary Stahr (Tr., p. 3184); speech No. 57 by General Trudeau (Tr., pp. 3186-3187); speech No. 99 by General Dodge (Tr., p. 3207); speech No. 130 by Secretary Stahr (Tr., p. 3224); and speech No. 137 by General Everest (Tr., p. 3227). Space does not permit an extended discussion of these changes.

It should be pointed out, however, that nothing in this report should be construed as implying blanket condemnation of all changes and deletions or as suggesting that we have, in all cases, found the reasons given for the actions to be inadequate or insufficient. It is recognized that there are many complex and difficult problems involved in this area, particularly in view of the already discussed necessity of insuring that the public remarks of our military officers conform with our established national and foreign policy. Viewed in the context of the times, many of the review decisions appear to have been completely justified.

The State Department has pointed to and emphasized the necessity for considering particular speeches or particular statements in connection with the political or diplomatic conditions existing at the time. For example, the subcommittee was told that, in periods when the relations between the United States and the Communist bloc are in a particularly sensitive or critical state, it is necessary to review the military speeches for harsh or provocative phrases more carefully in order that negotiations or foreign relations might not be injured or disturbed. There is some merit in this position and, viewed in the light of the then existing political and diplomatic climate, many of the actions of the reviewers take on more meaning and validity.

There would be more reason for apprehension and concern about the results of the speech review process if it were true that harsh and provocative statements about communism and vigorous statements about our own military strength were invariably deleted. Such is not the case, however. The record reflects clearly that numerous tough and strong anti-Communist statements by Government officials, in and out of the military, were cleared by both Defense and State Depart