ment reviewers. Examples of these are shown on pages 834 through 844 and pages 2763 through 2769 of the printed transcripts. No consistent pattern of deleting all strong anti-Communist statements has been established by the evidence.

A few examples of anti-Communist statements which were permitted after review are:

On May 19, 1960, Adm. Arleigh Burke was allowed to say "For today you enter a world threatened by the ruthless aggressive expansion of communism-of Communist imperialism."

On November 3, 1960, Admiral Burke stated that "We all know the Communists seek to dominate the entire world."

On February 26, 1961, Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll declared that "we are now engaged in a struggle with the Communist world for our national survival.'

On April 20, 1961, Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman was permitted to state that "We must have the national will and spirit to engage the Communist claims on a worldwide basis."

In a speech delivered on January 25, 1961, Major General Mayo had clearance to say that "we can rise triumphant over the menace of atheistic communism. We can and we must."

On May 11, 1961, Mr. Eugene Merrill was allowed to state that "the Communist threat continues to be ominous. We can continue to meet and overcome this threat."

On March 17, 1961, Rear Adm. Joseph N. Murphy said "That threat, self-identified and self-proclaimed, is international communism. A more determined, resourceful tyranny has never stalked the earth. The free world is locked in a life-and-death struggle with the Communist world."

On February 2, 1961, Rear Adm. W. A. Schoech stated that "We, who are working to advance world freedom, must meet and overcome the array of challenges which communism presents."

Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau stated on May 27, 1960, that "I, for one, do not believe that the Soviets have relented in the slightest in their determination to dominate the world and destroy the democratic way of life."

General Trudeau said on March 9, 1961, that we must "meet and beat the Communist challenge."

On July 4, 1961, Hon. Eugene Zuckert urged that we "foresee and be prepared fully to respond at those threatened points in the world where Communist engulfment would seriously undermine the structure of the free world."

The testimony and evidence presented to us shows that most of the deficiencies in the speech review process might be summarized as follows:

1. Too often the speeches even of high level military officers were reviewed routinely and by a relatively low-ranking military or civilian official. This should not be. The policy review of military speechesparticularly those of high-ranking officers-should be performed at the highest, most experienced, and most qualified level possible.

2. There appears to be an inherent difficulty in establishing and disseminating clear policy and guidelines in the vast complexes of the Defense and State Departments. We were not able to determine clearly during the hearing exactly how those persons writing, deliver

ing, and reviewing speeches are kept advised of policy and the constant changes in it. There should be a clearer enunciation of policy, a specific identification of it as policy, and widespread dissemination of it to all persons affected. In this manner both persons preparing speeches and persons delivering them would be better enabled to steer clear of troubled, sensitive, or delicate areas.

3. More than the usual confusion about the true review policy developed and existed during the first months of the new administration when new officials assumed the positions of responsibility. This confusion was magnified and compounded by Secretary McNamara's directive of May 31, 1961, stating that Defense officials should "avoid discussion of foreign policy matters" and his prior public statements to the same effect. This contrasted with the previous rule that the prohibition was against public statements "as to foreign policy which is in conflict with our established foreign policy." The May 31, 1961, directive was far too broad and literally precluded all discussion of foreign policy. It was not definite or specific. While it has not been formally modified, in actual practice its application seems to have been clarified. It is now recognized that discussions of foreign policy matters are permissible provided they do not conflict with established foreign policy and provided they are cleared with, and approved by, the Department of State. The May 31 directive contributed to a bad situation. The interpretation now given it should have been clearly and fully spelled out from the outset.

4. Another basis for misunderstanding was the failure by Department of State reviewers for several months to indicate whether changes or deletions noted by them were suggested or mandatory, with the consequent result that Defense personnel generally considered them to be mandatory. This has been corrected as a result of the StateDefense agreement of December 5, 1961. (Tr. pp. 454–455.)

5. Another reason for misunderstanding arose from the failure of the State Department reviewers to note or specify the grounds or reasons for the changes when speeches were returned to the Department of Defense. Obviously speakers would be more inclined to accept changes if furnished with a logical explanation for them and, just as obviously, the furnishing of such explanation would afford guidance for the future. This deficiency has also been corrected by the State-Defense agreement of December 5, 1961, under the terms of which State Department reviewers are now required to specify their reasons for changes in writing.

6. There appears to have been little liaison or close contact between the Defense Department reviewers and their counterparts in the State Department until recent months and a mutual understanding of what was essentially a common problem was sadly lacking.

7. The Defense Department reviewers seemed to have no clear and consistent understanding of what does and does not constitute foreign policy. Individual judgment, differing from reviewer to reviewer, controlled. As a result many speeches were sent to the State Department for review which should not have been so sent. More adequate guidelines in this area are clearly necessary.

8. Some State Department reviewers seemed to consider that they had the responsibility and obligation to review a speech, not merely for consistency with foreign policy, but for literary style and content

as well. Stylistic considerations seem to have been the real basis for some of the changes which are otherwise inexplicable.

There is sound basis for criticism of many of the review and censorship decisions. However, nothing brought out in the testimony or which has otherwise come to our knowledge in the study and investigation of the review and censorship practices, procedures, and policies of this and the preceding administration establishes in any way that there is, or has been, any lack of devotion to American principles, any absence of a will to fight, if necessary, and to win, if compelled to fight, any intentional compromise of the Nation's security or best interests, or any tendency to sacrifice our national interest by appeasement of the potential enemy.

(C) Military Statements to the Congress

The subcommittee was both surprised and disturbed to learn that statements prepared by military officers for presentation to congressional committees in executive sessions have been subject to prior review and clearance, not only by the Department of Defense, but also by the Department of State. This is a highly objectionable and improper practice and can only be calculated to obstruct unduly the free flow of information to which the Congress is entitled. Two specific examples of such censorship in connection with military statements will be mentioned.

One involves a prepared statement of Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau delivered to the Science and Astronautics Committee of the House of Representatives in executive session on February 16, 1961. This statement was subjected to prior review and at least seven changes of varying significance were mandatorily required. Five of the changes were made by the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and two changes were made by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) "under State guidance." (Tr., pp. 49-50.)

Parenthetically, it might be mentioned that one of the statements deleted from this speech had been approved and cleared in identical language in a speech given by General Trudeau to the Brookings Institute on January 13, 1961, just about a month prior to the general's appearance before the House committee. It is rather difficult to understand why something should be permitted in a civilian speech and not be permitted to be said before an important committee of the Congress.

Another flagrant example of this practice occurred with respect to the prepared statement of Gen. Thomas D. White, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, delivered to the House Armed Services Committee in executive session in March 1961. The changes and deletions mandatorily required in this statement by the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) and the State Department prior to its delivery were so extensive that several pages had to be rewritten. (Tr., pp. 181-182, 881.) General White's statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 11, 1961, was also subjected to less extensive mandatory changes.

It is true that Francis W. Herron, Deputy Director of the Policy Plans and Guidance Staff, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, testified (Tr., pp. 895-898) that it was his understanding that

no document goes from the Department of Defense to the Department of State for review "unless it is understood that it is for public release." Nevertheless, it affirmatively appears that military statements to be presented to a congressional committee in executive session are sent to the State Department for review prior to their delivery in those cases when a "sanitized" version is going to be later released to the public. Under the system then, whatever the intent might be, the result is that Congress, even in executive session, is told what the Defense and State Department decides the officer should be permitted to say and not what the officer himself wants to say.

Since the system produces this result, it should be changed. There is no justification whatsoever for submitting a statement by a military man which is to be delivered behind closed doors to a congressional committee for prior policy review and censorship by the State Department. This arbitrary and unjunstified restriction upon the free flow of infomation to the Congress can only have the effect of hampering the legislative branch of the Government in the discharge of its constitutional duties and functions.

Some limited review by the Department of Defense may be warranted. A military officer who appears before a congressional committee has the obligation to state the official Defense Department or national policy on the issue under consideration. He should do this clearly and accurately and should be so instructed by the Secretary of Defense. Review by the Defense Department of that portion of an officer's statement which purports to reflect established national or Defense Department policy is justified for the purpose of insuring

accuracy.

However, the Secretary of Defense should also make it clear that a military man testifying in executive session is free, after stating the official position or policy, to give his own personal judgment, opinion, and conviction provided it is clearly identified as such. This portion of his statement should not be subject to prior censorship by either State or Defense. Congressional committees are entitled to receive, in executive session, the personal and individual views, opinions, and concepts of our military leaders without the discoloring effect of prior policy review.

It is to be remembered that very often grave and serious questions and issues are involved in these presentations to the Congress. It is not inconceivable that direct and specific questions on matters of vital importance may be overlooked if the military witness is not free to give his opinion without direct interrogation. Members of Congress cannot be expected to know every detailed aspect of all matters presented to them. Therefore, without a full and free presentation by the knowledgeable military people, the Congress cannot obtain the full benefit of their specialized and expert views and thoughts.

It is unthinkable that in our deliberations we should be restricted to the views and opinions of the Secretary of Defense. In reaching decisions on critical issues we must have complete information. We should know, for example, the views of the particular service involved, whether it be Army, Navy or Air Force. We should also have the benefit of the individual thinking of the witness testifying before us. We need all of the facts and all of the arguments and should not be restricted to a one-sided presentation which merely parrots the views of the Secretary of Defense.

No particular problems in this area should arise. The Secretary of Defense should have no difficulty in making arrangements with the appropriate committees to insure that no statement given in executive session is released to the public without being reviewed for its policy content. We recommend that this be done.

(D) Professional Service Journals

It is the judgment of the subcommittee that a particular and peculiar review and clearance problem is presented in connection with articles scheduled for appearance in professional journals such as the Navy's JAG Journal, the Air University Quarterly Review, and other service-connected academic and professional publications which are supported by appropriated funds.

In 1961 it was proposed to devote an entire issue of the JAG Journal to a symposium in the field of international law. Three of the articles in the issue were rejected for publication by the Directorate for Security Review in early April 1961 on the solid ground that they were in disagreement with the policy expressed in DOD Guidance No. 18 (Public Statements in Foreign Policy Area and Related Activities) even though they had been cleared by the Department of State, the agency having primary jurisdiction in the field, for their foreign policy content.

Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), frankly admitted in his testimony before the subcommittee that the rejected articles had been treated rather "heavily." (Tr., p. 458.)

The Air University Quarterly Review initiated planning in November 1959 for an issue to be entitled "Aerospace Force in the Sixties." By January 31, 1961, all of the 29 proposed articles had been cleared by the Department of Defense. However, in late February 1961 the editor of the Review was advised that a second review might be required and the process of publication was halted and copies of the material were forwarded for review. As a result of the second review only 25 of the 29 articles were cleared, with 2 of the remaining 4 being disapproved, and the other 2 not being returned with either clearance or rejection. After a delay of 3 or 4 months, the issue finally went to press without the four articles which had not been cleared.

The concept of these professional journals is to nurture and stimulate professional thought and to contribute to the enhancement of our professional military men. To further this, contributors should be permitted to discuss unclassified military and professional concepts and doctrines in these journals with as little interference as possible. If those who contribute their talents to these journals are arbitrarily restricted in what they write and if there is a rigid definition of the parameters within which they may express and present their theories and concepts, then original, novel and unorthodox concepts and theories are likely to be stifled and free discussion of professional topics killed. These journals stand in a very different category than public addresses by military men and should be treated accordingly. Their very purpose is to stimulate the professional thinking and a free discussion of professional topics by persons knowledgeable in professional fields. They should be allowed wide latitude to do this without undue restrictions even though there is a possibility that some of the