commander is giving adequate emphasis to this training. Only by determining the results of the past program can the requirements of a future program be analyzed and determined.

From the testimony, it appears that it is desirable that there be greater coordination with intelligence personnel in the preparation of troop information material and in implementing the program in the field. However, this does not mean that the troop information function itself should be turned over to intelligence personnel or that the intelligence branch should be given primary responsibility for it. It simply means that those responsible for troop information should capitalize to the fullest extent upon the fact that the intelligence branch gathers certain information which can very usefully be disseminated to the troops generally. Although there is an inherent limitation in the use of intelligence data for troop information because much of it is necessarily classified and is, therefore, not readily available for troop information purposes, it is clear that the intelligence sections can make a distinct and significant contribution to the internal information program of the services. It is recommended that in the future there be greater coordination with the intelligence sections in support of information and education activities than in the past. At the same time, unnecessary classification of intelligence information should be avoided.

It is beyond the scope of the subcommittee functions to make detailed recommendations of the appropriate content of the information program or of the materials to be used in it. The Department of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the individual services and other governmental agencies, should be in a position to develop an excellent program in this area. The primary purpose of the program should be to develop in the individual serviceman pride in his heritage, faith in his freedom, acceptance of his responsibility as an American citizen, and the ability better to see and understand the nature of the hostile forces which seek to destroy our cherished institutions. The program should also include current worldwide social and political developments so that our military men will not be totally unaware of developments in connection with international politics. As stated above, it is believed that the intelligence services and agencies can play a greater role in assisting in developing such materials for troop instruction. In making the foregoing comments and recommendations with respect to the troop information program, it is not to be inferred that the subcommittee believes that the young men of today are weak, soft, or morally unfit, or that there is something so badly wrong with modern society that it inevitably produces inferior products. There is no reason to believe that the U.S. serviceman today is in any manner inferior to his predecessors. In the event of a further or continued. crisis, we are convinced that today's military man will respond with the same patriotism, courage, steadfastness, and dedication which have marked and distinguished our military forces in the past.

However, today the struggle in which we are engaged is both unique and complex. The fighting man today faces problems which did not exist in the past. His battle involves more than weapons of awesome destructive power. It involves subversion, propaganda, infiltration, political maneuvering, economic sabotage, and the corruption of ideas. and ideals. While he must know that eventual success in the struggle

will depend first of all on our country's continuing superiority of arms, beyond that he must know all of the areas in which the struggle is conducted. Such knowledge will inevitably promote in the individual serviceman an awareness that he has a vital mission in today's armed services and will thus increase his value as a soldier and as a citizen of the society which he has sworn to defend. The military internal information program should be dedicated to the attainment of those objectives.

While, as indicated above, the troop information program can and should be improved, the subcommittee has found no evidence that it is approached with a "soft on communism" attitude or policy. True it is that the implementation of it has not been uniform. In some commands there has been an apparent tendency to play down or neglect the program and, in such instances, there has been an absence of the desired vigor and aggressiveness. What is needed is a hardhitting, factual, informative, and balanced program. There is no reason why this cannot be attained.

VII. PUBLIC INFORMATION OR SEMINAR PROGRAM

For several years it has been the national policy to use the material and personnel resources of the entire Government, including the Department of Defense, to keep the American people informed of and enlist their support for national security objectives. With rare exceptions, however, the term "seminar" or "cold war seminar" is not used in any of the official directives or documents dealing with the subject.

It has been almost universally assumed that this policy stemmed from the National Security Council directive of May 5, 1958, which was superseded by the National Security Council paper of August 5. 1959. Curiously enough, this assumption is disputed by former President Eisenhower who asserted that, to the best of his recollection, "there is no national security document specifically directing military involvement in the internal problem" (Tr., p. 6).

Nevertheless, it is clear that for a number of years now it has been the policy of the Defense Department to utilize military personnel and facilities for the purpose of informing and educating the public about the issues and menace of the cold war, and for gaining public support for national security objectives. These activities are officially sanctioned by directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the several military departments.

For many years there have been, and still are, several Department of Defense directives designed to guide the military services and Department of Defense personnel with community relations programs and participation in public events, which are construed to cover and include public cold war seminars.

By Department of Defense Directive 5122.5 of July 10, 1961 (Tr., p. 444), which is the charter of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), it is provided that the Assistant Secretary is "the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for public information and community relations" and as such, under paragraph V A2 of the charter, the Assistant Secretary has authority to "provide public guidance to the commands and other organizational entities established by the Secretary of Defense-and the conduct of any informa

tional programs directed in whole or in part to the general public." He also has authority, under paragraph III 7, to "evaluate and approve requests for DOD cooperation in programs involving relations with the public."

We are not primarily concerned here with the National Security Seminars of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the National Strategy Seminar held in 1959 under the joint sponsorship of the Reserve Officers Association and the Institute for American Strategy, or the Defense Strategy Seminars sponsored and conducted by the National War College under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These, and the followup local and regional seminars sponsored and conducted by the military departments, having been under the direct sponsorship and control of the military, have presented few problems and little or no criticism except from those sources from which criticism of any anti-Communist program is to be expected. By and large, where problems or criticism have resulted they have been in connection with the cold war or anti-Communist seminars for the public which the military has sponsored, cosponsored, supported with personnel, facilities or otherwise, or for which military speakers were provided. These seminars have proved to be controversial in a number of instances.

For example, during the period from July 1, 1960 to January 1, 1962, the Department of the Army participated to some extent in 21 regional or local seminars and three of these resulted in adverse critieism, publicity or complaints. (Tr. pp. 1633, 1634.) During the same period the Department of the Navy participated in 42 of such seminars and 9 resulted in adverse criticism, publicity, or complaints. (Tr., p. 1791.) The Air Force during this period participated in 22 such seminars, none of which inspired adverse criticism, publicity, or complaints. (Tr., p. 1734.) The controversy about military participation in these seminars apparently reached its peak in July, August, and September 1961.

The Secretary of Defense on October 5, 1961, issued a memorandum spelling out the criteria to be used in implementing Department of Defense policy with respect to the participation of Department of Defense personnel and the use of military equipment in public information programs sponsored by nongovernmental organizations or groups. (Tr., p. 1644.)

This memorandum is, to some extent, a restatement of prior policies. In one particular, however, it goes a step further and provides that no "public information program shall be sponsored or cosponsored by a military organization unless expressly authorized by the Secretary of a military department." Thus, while the memorandum reaffirms the established responsibility of local commanders to make determinations of whether support shall be furnished, this is now subject to the qualification that approval of the department Secretary is required for sponsorship or cosponsorship.

Under the October 5, 1961 memorandum, military and civilian personnel of the Department of Defense are authorized to participate as speakers in public information programs when:

(a) Such participation does not interfere with their assigned duties.

(b) They address their remarks to a discussion of subjects within the cognizance of the Department of Defense.

(c) The views they express are nonpartisan in character and are in accord with established national policy.

(d) Their participation does not lend an air of sponsorship to the statements of others which may be either partisan in character or contrary to established national policy.

Similarly, under the memorandum, military facilities, equipment and personnel may be used to support such programs when:

(a) The use of such facilities, equipment, and personnel will not interfere with the military mission or operational commitments of the command,

(b) Such programs are sponsored by responsible organizations, (c) Such programs are known to be nonpartisan in character and there is no reason to believe that the views to be expressed by the participants will be contrary to established national policy. This memorandum created a rather widespread belief that it was intended to limit severely or restrict military participation in cold war seminars for the public. This belief has not yet entirely been dissipated. If such was not the intent then steps should be taken to explain and clarify the true status of these seminars.

We have made an effort to study and examine those military-supported seminars which provoked adverse criticism, publicity, or complaints. We find that, in a number of cases, the criticism was so minor as to be picayune and, in others, it was clearly unjustified. However, there were a number of cases in which the criticisms were valid. In almost all of these cases, we have found that the fault lay in the fact that the military became involved in a seminar without adequate "quality control" by the military to insure that the sponsoring command or participating military speaker would not become identified with groups or participants which were controversial or had partisan or political objectives or views. The controversiality of the sponsoring group or the speaker then became attached to the military by unavoidable association in the public mind.

The bona fide difficulties experienced with a small minority of the seminars should not, of course, be allowed to become a justification for the suppression of military support of the program. Each seminar must be judged upon its own worth and merit.

The subcommittee believes that it is important to our national security that the public be informed and educated upon the nature and menace of the cold war and upon the threat which the alien philosophy of communism presents to our way of life. While it is not the primary responsibility of the military to perform this task, military men have a proper and legitimate function in this field. Many of them, because of experience and specialized knowledge and training, have an understanding of the issues involved and of the nature of the enemy which is not always available from other sources. Therefore, where feasible, qualified military personnel should be utilized in this program.

We believe, then, that it is appropriate and desirable for the military to support and participate in proper and appropriate cold war or anti-Communist seminars for the public. Military support of, and participation in, this program should be continued.

However, we believe that it is of paramount importance that adequate guidelines, policies, and procedures be established and disseminated so that the pitfalls encountered in the past will be eliminated to

the greatest extent possible. These guidelines should be designed to insure adequate screening, evaluation, and assessment in advance to preclude:

(a) Military involvement in a seminar not based on a broad base of community support.

(6) Military participation in a seminar at which a speaker is to appear who is known to be controversial or politically partisan in his utterances.

(c) Military support of a seminar at which partisan political or otherwise controversial subjects are to be discussed.

(d) Military involvement in a seminar which involves partisan, political or otherwise controversial issues, whether local or national.

We realize, of course, that controversy cannot be avoided in all cases. Even with the best of intentions and the most intelligent and careful screening, problems and criticism are bound to arise. In our judgment, the program should be designed to maximize the contribution of the military in furthering the seminar program and, at the same time, to reduce the problem areas to the greatest extent possible. To achieve these objectives it is of vital importance that the local commander exercise caution and circumspection in this field.

More harm than good can result from these programs unless there is complete cooperation by local persons of sound judgment and discretion. The local military commander, as a matter of prudence, should always retain a direct role in planning or approving the major elements of the program. At the very least, he must retain a veto power on every major step. In addition, he should withhold all participation in the program if he has any doubt of the propriety of it.

VIII. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS

(A) Executive Privilege

During the course of the hearing the subcommittee made an effort to elicit information identifying specific Defense Department reviewers with specific changes and deletions in specific speeches. After the subcommittee had rejected the plea by Secretary of Defense McNamara that this information should not be furnished because he assumed full personal responsibility for the reviewer's actions, the Secretary of Defense, acting at the written direction of the President, invoked Executive privilege and declined to furnish the information requested. (Tr., pp. 508, 509.)

The plea of Executive privilege was invoked by the President on the express ground "that it would be contrary to the public interest" to make the requested information available. This plea, when interposed by the President on this ground, has always been upheld by the legislative branch of the Government from the time of George Washington down to the present. The same privilege on the part of the legislative branch has consistently been recognized by the executive department. The chairman, therefore, sustained the plea. (See pp. 509-512 of the transcript for the chairman's ruling.) No member of the subcommittee appealed from or expressed disagreement with the ruling of the Chair."