INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND Page C. Censorship of professional journals.. D. Application of policy censorship to cold war themes_ 2. Justifications advanced for censorship-- 3. Reflection of foreign policy in censorship.. 3. Blacklisting professional views.. 4. Deprecation of the military. III. Internal education and motivation activities, etc.-Continued 1. Senior service schools. 2. Specialty schools- 3. Officer acquisition schools.. G. Evaluations.. 1. Organization, materials, and capabilities. 2. Policy implications_ H. Recommendations.. IV. Organized cold war information programs for the public.. A. Scope-- B. Origin and development.. 155 C. Number and types of cold war seminars with military partici- • ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 155 157 160 160 160 167 170 171 171 172 175 I. GENERAL BACKGROUND The scope of the Special Preparedness Subcommittee's study was specified in the authorizing resolution adopted by the Committee on Armed Services, which defines the area of inquiry as "the use of military personnel and facilities to arouse the public to the menace of the cold war and to inform and educate armed services personnel to the nature and menace of the cold war" (H-3)*. What might otherwise be considered a rather limited subject in both nature and importance takes on new and larger dimensions when placed in perspective as a part of the continuing struggle between the forces of communism and freedom. The Communist offensive against freedom is of a nature to force nation-states to adjust and expand their traditional defensive postures so as to meet this challenge to their survival. The techniques utilized by Communists in their efforts to dominate the world-including propaganda, infiltration, subversion, limited conventional warfare, ideological persuasion, agitation, diplomatic suasion, psychopolitical warfare, economic devices based on political objectives rather than profit-are not new devices originated by the Communists. The novelty lies in their total integration in a planned continuous assault on all other peoples and nations. This "total resource approach" is magnified by an even more novel and nontraditional aspect of the Communist offensive, which is the international-or supranational-and conspiratorial framework from which they operate. This supranational, conspiratorial framework is camouflaged by blurring and confusing standards that have up to now formed the guidelines for the conduct of foreign relations, whether of a friendly or hostile nature. At the heart of this smokescreen of confusion is the intentional departure of the Soviet political organization from the concept of a "nation-state." The Soviet governmental structure obliterates distinctions based on historical entities, geographical boundaries, ethnic or racial origins, or common points of heritage. In lieu thereof, it adopts a governmental entity limited only by ideological homogeneity, power of control, and similarity of political organization. The term "soviet" does not reflect the ethnic or historic origin of a people, only the type of political administration to which people are subjected. Its applicability is not limited to nationalities within "soviet" territory, but may at any time include other nationalities, provided they are subjected to the "soviet" type of political administration with common ideological dictates. The nature of the Soviet Government itself is more significant in their international conspiratorial framework than is their perversion of the nation-state entity-a perversion sufficiently subtle to permit continued resort to the national sovereign entity as a front from behind which to maneuver. This "government," or system of soviets, is not a lawmaking or policymaking instrumentality, but References made in this manner are to the pages of the printed hearings. 48 rather a system of transmission belts. These work as levers of power to convey the dictates of a superimposed entity-the hierarchy of the international Communist movement. The source of power of the Communist system is external to the system itself, and largely international in derivation. This calculated and clinical confusion of traditional concepts is applied across the spectrum of Communist operations. The Communists, beginning immediately after their seizure of power from the Russian revolutionaries, set about obliterating the line of demarcation between peace and war. Leon Trotsky, as a delegate from the Petrograd Soviet,' on February 10, 1918, met with representatives of Imperial Germany to discuss a peace treaty. In response to Trotsky's doctrine of no peace, no war, the chief German delegate, Gen. Max Hoffman, said: "Unheard of."2 The Communists have adhered ever since to a doctrine of no peace, no war, maintaining a synthesis of war and peace in their operations. Traditionally, the governments of non-Communist nation-states "shift gears" when the line between peace and war is crossed. The Communists do not recognize any difference of status or operational methods between peace and war, and conduct themselves partially within the framework of both. By these means, they paralyze nationstates by inducing them to remain in the traditional process of "shifting gears." The center of the shift is necessarily "neutral." The consequence in non-Communist nations is extensive confusion. Neither the thought processes acquired during generations of civilization's refinement, nor our semantics, are readily adaptable to cope with a resurgence of a now sophisticated and scientifically equipped barbarism, which ignores the political, economic, social, and moral progress and institutions which accompany the advance of technology. Our fumbling for a word that would describe the Communist assault on freedom and civilization has produced the term "cold war." Many non-Communists reject the term, some because the conflict does not conform in any sense to traditional warfare. The point was made by the State Department at the hearings that the United States had not legally declared war (H-2913). Other non-Communists reject the term "cold war" because frequently there is nothing cold about the situation, as in Vietnam at present. Similar objections, for equally valid reasons, could be posed to such a term as "hot peace," for it is equally lacking in preciseness. One serious effort to find a descriptive term to fit the conflict of civilizations of the magnitude being waged by the Communists brought forth the term "polyreconism," a word coined from Greek roots to convey the concept of the merging or the fusion of war and peace. The absence of adequate semantics to describe the existing situation has created much confusion in non-Communist societies in and out of official circles. This has resulted in apathy, frustration, and violently conflicting opinions as to the proper way to cope with the Communist offensive. 3 1 "Communism in the U.S.S.R.," DA Pam. 21-78, vol. 3, p. 8. At this time, the Communists had firm control only in Petrograd, although they were strongly contesting for complete control in Moscow, also. Gerald Freund, "Unholy Alliance: Russian-German Relations From the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin" (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1957). Dr. J. D. Atkinson, "The Edge of War" (Chicago, Henry Regnery & Co., 1960), p. 726. The consternation caused by the unorthodox nature of the Communist offensive is illustrated by the innovations and improvisations in the structure of the executive branch of our National Government, that began markedly soon after World War II. A major legislative attempt to achieve political-military coordination and unity of effort in the executive branch was made with the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947. This created the National Security Council and incorporated the three military services into a Department of Defense. Subsequent organizational changes in the Department of Defense were made by statute in 1949 and 1958. Statutory changes in structure are a small portion of the organizational game of "musical chairs" that has occurred by Executive order or administrative action since World War II. In July 1951, as an outgrowth of experiences culminating in the Korean conflict, the Psychological Strategy Board was created by Executive order. The Board was grafted onto the National Security Council structure in an effort to achieve long-range planning and coordination in the psychological warfare field. At that time this was largely equated with propaganda, and was usually limited to it. The Psychological Strategy Board had no operational function. In practical effect it probably served no useful purpose other than being a focal point where varied opinions might crystallize on how to effectively plan, coordinate, and conduct psychological warfare. Differing concepts about a reorganization of the Psychological Strategy Board led to a study by the presidentially appointed Jackson committee. This brought about the creation, by Executive Order 10483, on September 5, 1953, of the Operations Coordinating Board as part of the NSC structure. As the name implies, the Operations Coordinating Board was charged with overseeing implementation efforts of NSC plans by the various executive departments. Its responsibilities were broader than the "propaganda-plus" jurisdiction of the Psychological Strategy Board. There was a subsequent attempt to consolidate propaganda activities under the State Department in the U.S. Information Service, which subsequently became the independent U.S. Information Agency. In 1961, both the Operations Coordinating Board and the policy-planning section of the National Security Council were abolished or abandoned by the new administration.* None of these innovations lessened the confusion or the conflict in ideas on how to combat the Communist cold war offensive. Instead of being an organization to resolve this conflict of ideas among our officials, the Operations Coordinating Board, internally and in its relationship to the NSC planning board, provided a forum for a "bloodless war" over conflicting concepts and approaches. The clash of ideas within our governmental structure is nurtured and magnified by a number of circumstances. Almost unanimous. lip service is paid to the principle that it is virtually impossible to separate or compartmentalize the political, military, psychopolitical, and economic aspects of the present struggle. President Eisenhower told the subcommittee: I need not remind your committee, especially, that in these times military considerations and economic, political, and For detailed discussions of National Policy Machinery Changes, see Hearings of Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, "Organizing for National Security" (1961), vols. 1–3. |