statements which represent and are identified as personal and individual judgment, opinion, and conviction, although it is proper that such statements be reviewed for policy content prior to any public release. 11. That professional, scientific, and technical articles to be published in professional service journals be treated as liberally and lightly as possible in the review process. (C) Troop Information and Education CONCLUSIONS 1. The overall and primary objective of the troop training program, including troop information and education, is to convert untrained American manpower into dependable fighting forces. Exhaustive technical and tactical training in the use of weapons and the methodology of war, coupled with relentless exercises in the field, are of primary importance in the development of the efficiency, morale, dependability, and confidence of our military forces. 2. The armed services have a responsibility to furnish training and teaching which will instill and develop in military personnel firm belief in, and appreciation for, the American principles of democracy and freedom and an awareness of the threat of communism to this country and the free world. 3. The troop training and teaching program should place positive and affirmative emphasis upon the values, merits, and advantages of our own form of government so that there will be instilled in our fighting men a positive conviction of the virtue of our own cause. 4. The sheer volume of training material made available by the Department of Defense-some excellent, some mediocre, some worseitself presents a problem since the commander may not have the qualifications or the time to select the specific material best suited to the needs of his troops. 5. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has a proper function in preparing and distributing material for service use, including certain major emphasis material equally applicable to all services. 6. Troop training, education, and information is essentially a command function and the Department of Defense should not carry its activities to the extreme of depriving the local commander of responsibility, initiative, and freedom of action in balancing his own training program. 7. One of the major problems in the troop information program is the lack of an adequate number of trained, skilled, and accomplished instructors. 8. Another deficiency in the program lies in the absence of adequate and effective measures to appraise and assess its effectiveness. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. That adequate guidance be given from the Department of Defense down through the echelons of command to the unit level so that the subordinate commander will be better able to select intelligently the specific troop information material which is best suited to the needs of his command. 2. That the Office of the Secretary of Defense develop for common use major emphasis material which is equally applicable to all services and which is designed to illustrate by comparison the magnificent heritage and priceless values of our own free system as contrasted with communism and other tyrannical systems. 3. That, however, the concept that troop training, including troop information, is basically and essentially a command function should not be impaired or infringed upon and, therefore, any program should leave the local commander with freedom of action in developing and balancing his own training schedule. 4. That every effort be made to make troop information as hardhitting, factual, interesting, and inspiring as possible, particularly in view of the necessity for balancing troop information with combat, tactical, and weaponry training in an already crowded schedule. 5. That a specialized program should be adopted, designed for, and vigorously directed at training junior commissioned officers and senior noncommissioned officers, which should place emphasis upon developing instructional skill and capacity. 6. That there should be a full exploration of the possible use of demonstration teams, not for the purpose of giving direct instruction at the unit level, but for the purpose of visiting major subordinate commands, and demonstrating to information officers and instructors the plans, programs, requirements, materials, and procedures which are essential in the internal information program. 7. That some system be provided whereby higher headquarters can evaluate whether troop information materials have the desired effectiveness, how extensively they are used, what areas need improvement, whether there is adequate understanding of the objectives of the program, and whether an individual commander is giving adequate emphasis to the training. 8. That those responsible for troop information at all echelons should capitalize to the fullest extent upon the services available from and the information gathered by intelligence in the preparation, review, and screening of materials and in the dissemination of information to the troops in the field. (D) Public Seminar or External Information Program CONCLUSIONS 1. While it is not the primary responsibility of the military to alert and educate the public as to the dangers and menace of communism and the issues involved in the cold war, qualified military men, because of their experience and specialized knowledge, have a proper and legitimate function in this field. 2. It is appropriate and desirable for the military to support and participate in appropriate cold war or anti-Communist seminars for the public provided that proper care is exercised to preclude involvement in political matters, local issues, and other partisan or controversial issues and areas. 3. While much of the past criticism of specific seminars was unjustified, there have been a number of instances where the criticism was valid because there was military participation in seminars without adequate screening and evaluation in advance to prevent the military from being identified with sponsoring groups or participants which were controversial or had political or partisan objectives or views. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. That military participation in and support of proper and appropriate cold war or anti-Communist seminars for the public be continued. 2. That adequate guidelines, policies, and procedures be established to insure that proposed seminars will be given adequate advance screening, assessment and evaluation to preclude military involvement in a seminar (a) not based on a broad base of community support; (b) at which a controversial or partisan speaker is to appear on the program; (c) at which partisan or political subjects are to be discussed; or (d) which otherwise involves partisan, political, or controversial issues. 3. That responsible military officials develop an alert awareness of the problems which can arise in the seminar program and that, in all cases where military support or participation is requested, extreme caution be exercised and that a careful and independent evaluation of the propriety and worth of the seminar be made by the military itself. III. THE COMMUNIST THREAT Even a casual student of the world scene knows that the Communists make no secret of the fact that their ultimate and inalterable goal is to dominate the world-by means of subversion, infiltration and boring from within if possible; by force of arms, if necessary. Communism's own tenets and theories make a superficially plausible case of the historical advent and development of their cause, its inevitable triumph as the wave of the future, and the wisdom of joining the winning team. These tenets and theories are, however, based on a false, misleading, and empty premise. Since World War II it has become increasingly apparent that, if we are to remain free, we must be prepared and armed to resist and repel the Communists, both militarily and in the field of ideas. History records that Communist aggression has made serious inroads into the free world by the timely use of military forces but, more often, the gains of the Communists have been scored by infiltration, subversion, terrorism, and purges. As Admiral Arleigh Burke, retired Chief of Naval Operations, said in his testimony before the subcommittee: We are at a pivotal time in history, and this becomes the backdrop of these hearings. We are witnessing a powerful social order, communism, trying to get control of the whole world. The Communists have already seized control of a large part of the world and they ruthlessly maintain that control once they have seized power. This they have done, and are doing, in Cuba. The Communists use all elements of power to achieve their aims of dominating the world, their aims of destroying all other social orders in the world. They use military power, economic power, subversion, propaganda, political negotiations, every means possible, in their attempts to gain their ends. This has been said many times, but it is important for us to realize that the Communists have demon- Thus it is that, if we are to meet and defeat the Communist threat on the widespread and all-encompassing battlefield, we must be aware of the nature of the menace and the subtle techniques of propaganda, infiltration, subversion, and other psychological warfare methods which are utilized. Of equal importance, we must be aware of and dedicated to the basic philosophic foundations of liberty and the true meaning of the hallowed and cherished traditions of our American way of life. These questions are of increasing and growing importance to our Nation today. For the first time in our history we are forced to maintain large military forces even though there is no shooting war. As part and parcel of the cold war, our worldwide commitments have made it necessary that we station our troops far beyond our own borders and in isolated spots all around the globe. By the nature of the subject matter assigned to us we have been concerned in this hearing primarily with the political and propaganda aspects of the Communist threat and with its efforts to capture the minds of men. This report should be read with this in mind. The Communists concentrate their efforts upon our military personnel as a prime target. Therefore, it is of crucial importance that servicemen, as well as civilians, know our enemy and stand firm and stanch in the face of enemy techniques and methods of subversion, infiltration, and propaganda. This can best be done if every citizen, in or out of uniform, comes to realize that he has a personal stake in the ideological struggle; that he is a part of our Government and its operation; that individual liberty and freedom are not self-perpetuating but that they can be lost; and that our Government is not selfoperating but requires support and sacrifice. It is not meant to suggest the each person should become disturbed and agitated and should lash out wildly with his own personal antiCommunist crusade. We concur with Rear Adm. William O. Mott, Judge Advocate General of the Navy, in his statement (Tr., p. 597) that amateur anti-Communists "are about as useful as *** amateur brain surgeons" and that we have no need for "space-age witch hunters." In the fight against the increasing pressures of our Communist foes, frenzy and panic are not reliable or effective weapons. While the extent of the menace posed by the philosophy of communism is clear and obvious, and while our duty to defend our own way of life is equally clear and obvious, it is essential that we attack and oppose communism wisely, calmly, rationally, and objectively. IV. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN OUR DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY The traditional principle of civilian supremacy over the military has not been attacked or challenged directly during the course of the hearings. However, the manifestations of public uneasiness and the rumblings of discontent in the background dictate that we should restate and reaffirm the proposition that, by the Constitution, by cus 90625-62- -2 tom, by tradition and by precedent, in our democratic society the military is and must be a subordinate to established civilian authority. Periodically throughout our history as a nation, the question of civil-military relations and the issue of the military in politics have become matters of widespread public concern and extended public debate and comment. Through all these debates and challenges the adherence to the concept of military subordination to civil authority has been clear, strong and steady, and as a result, today there are few aspects of the American constitutional tradition which are more firmly established than that of the predominance of civil authority. Thus, the current consideration of the proper role of the military man in today's public life takes place against a solid, well-established, enduring and illuminating background. In the Constitution, it is expressly provided that a civilian official, the President of the United States, shall be both Chief Executive and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. More recently, the Congress itself declared, in creating the Department of Defense by the National Security Act of 1947, that it is established "as an Executive Department of the Government." In spite of some public discussion and rather tortured logic by some uninformed persons, the entire history of our Government establishes clearly and beyond successful challenge that the military has been, is now and should be subject to day-by-day supervision, control management, and administration by civilian authority in the executive branch of the Government with all lines of responsibility leading up to the President in his constitutional role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It distorts the entire system of checks and balances and the very basis of our system of government to suggest, as some have, that Congress rather than the Chief Executive has primary authority and responsibility in this field. Congress does have direct responsibility and authority in the laying down of policy. In restating and stressing the subordination of the military to civil authority, it is not our purpose to debase or denigrate the role, responsibility or professional judgment of those who are professionally trained in the art of war. All will agree that, if war should come, it can be conducted successfully only by professionals in that art and that if strategy or tactics come under the influence or direction of unskilled amateurs, sacrifice in blood is inevitable and victory is in doubt. Thus, it is essential that, in the decisionmaking process, military men be given the opportunity within official circles to express their views freely and fully on matters of military competence. Freedom of expression and even dissent during this period should not only be countenanced but should be encouraged. If our military men are not able to voice their professional opinions on military matters within the established channels, the very existence and survival of the Nation is placed in jeopardy. However, once the decision has been made by the properly constituted authorities, the military man must support it loyally and faithfully while he remains in uniform. He is not free to substitute loyalty to his own personally-developed convictions and ideals for the loyalty which he owes to his superiors. If, in good |