ing procedures of pacific settlement which will shortly be concluded by the American Republics. This reference became the fourth clause of the preamble, following the language of drafts proposed by Mexico and the United States.

The fifth paragraph of the preamble was proposed by the delegation from Peru and states, although in very general language, the essentially peaceful purposes of the treaty. The penultimate paragraph is the result of an amendment put forth by the Uruguayan delegation and reflects two basic concepts: That juridical organization is a prerequisite for international security and peace and that it is necessary to make democracy work if it is to have a sound foundation, with the concomitant acceptance of the desirability of the international recognition and protection of human rights and freedoms.

The purpose of the final paragraph of the preamble, a United States proposal, is to link the preamble to the substantive portion of the treaty and to make reference to the twofold distinction maintained in the treaty between action to meet an armed attack and action to deal with other types of aggression.

Renunciation of the Use of Force

Preliminary to a statement of the specific obligations in the treaty, articles 1 and 2 contain a reaffirmation of the basic principles previously adhered to by the American Republics of repudiating the use of force in their international relations and of settling disputes by peaceful means. Such reaffirmation, found in one form or another in all the proposals submitted,1 was generally accepted as an appropriate expression of the desire of the parties to make maximum use of the procedures of pacific settlement. In addition to obligating the parties "to submit every controversy which may arise between them to methods of peaceful settlement," article 2 provides that the parties will "endeavor to settle any such controversy among themselves by means of the procedures in force in the inter-American system before referring it to the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations." This, in effect, restates the obligations in articles 33 and 52 (pars. 2 and 3) of the United Nations Charter, but does not, of course, impair the right of the states (art. 35 of the Charter) to bring a dispute to the attention of the United Nations.

There was no disagreement among any of the delegations on the desirability of these two articles and the only problem was one of trying

to find the most satisfactory way of stating the permitted exceptions to the proscription of the use of force. As proposed in the United States draft, the language as finally agreed upon for article 1 follows in general that of article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter as the most recent acceptance of the principle by all the American Republics. The undertaking not to resort to force "in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or of this treaty" thus includes the exceptions of the use of force in self-defense against an armed attack under article 51 of the Charter and article 3 of the treaty and the use of force in collective action pursuant to the direction of the Security Council, under article 42 of the Charter, or the authorization of the Council under article 53 of the Charter and article 6 of the treaty.

Basic Distinctions in the Treaty

With respect to the provisions of the treaty dealing with the action to be taken in the event of aggressions or threats of aggressions, two major threshold issues of a general nature confronted the framers of the treaty on which decision was necessary before the detailed provisions could be agreed upon:

1. Whether a distinction should be drawn between the obligations to be undertaken and the procedures to be followed in the event of an armed attack and the obligations and procedures in the event of other acts or threats of aggression.

2. Whether a distinction should be drawn between the obligations and procedures in the event of aggression by a non-American state against an American state and those in the event of aggression by one American state against another.

As to the first problem, the Act of Chapultepec made no distinction between an armed attack and other aggressions; and spoke merely of "threats or acts of aggression." The possibility of making such a distinction was raised by the provisions of the subsequently drafted United Nations Charter applicable to regional action in the security field.

Chapter VIII of the Charter clearly recognizes the validity of regional arrangements for dealing with appropriate matters concerning international peace and security, provided they are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter. It provides, however, that "no enforcement action [to deal with any "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression"] shall be taken under regional arrangements . . . without the authorization of the Security Council."

Nevertheless, Article 51 of the Charter provides that nothing in the Charter shall "impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs. . . until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." In other words, when there is an armed attack, the members of a regional arrangement may, in self-defense, immediately take measures which, in the case of any other act or threat of aggression, they may take only with the authorization of the Security Council. The original proposals submitted by Chile, the United States, and Uruguay, and the proposals subsequently submitted to the Conference by Mexico and Uruguay, embodied this clear distinction in treatment between an armed attack and other aggressions.1 And certain other proposals, those of Bolivia, for example, approximated this distinction by separating in different articles the treatment of acts of aggression or armed attack and of threats of aggression. In its analysis of proposals previously submitted, the report of May 19, 1946, of the Special Committee of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union2 had given separate consideration to the problem of armed attack and, since the general outline of this report was adopted as the outline of work for the committees of the Conference, acceptance of the desirability of making such a distinction was facilitated.

Thus, in the final text, articles 3, 4, and 7 deal with the problem of armed attack and article 6 is concerned with other types of aggression. The establishment of this distinction in the treaty was a sound decision. By this means it became easier, both to assure that the treaty would be fully consistent with the United Nations Charter-a consistency which was pledged in the Act of Chapultepec itself-and to take full advantage of the freedom of action permitted by the Charter under the right of self-defense.

The second major initial problem was the basic decision as to whether a distinction should be made in the obligations and procedures depending upon the source of the aggression-whether of extracontinental or intracontinental origin.

In the preliminary discussions at the Conference, a certain amount of support was manifested by some of the delegations for such a distinction. For example, the Argentine delegation submitted proposals which would confine the application of the treaty to extracontinental aggression, taking the view that no coercive measures should be applied in the case of controversies among American states, since to do so would depart from tradition, detract from the essence of inter-Ameri

can solidarity, and abandon the pacifist spirit which prevails in interAmerican relations.

The Venezuelan delegation, in submitting formal observations on the proposals presented by other governments, took the position that traditionally inter-American solidarity has always meant the union of the American Republics against aggression from outside the continent and that the objective in such case is solidary action until the aggressor is defeated. It was urged that, on the other hand, the objective in the event of intra-American aggression is not for the American Republics to take sides in the conflict, but for them to apply pacific settlement procedures to restore peace. The Venezuelan delegation, therefore, suggested either that two separate treaties be concluded, or at least that different sets of procedures be agreed upon for the two types of cases. In the proposals for the treaty submitted to the Conference by the Uruguayan delegation, such a detailed set of procedures for the pacific settlement of intra-American conflicts was set forth.

The Peruvian delegation likewise submitted a series of articles to provide, in the case of any breach of the peace among American states, for the application of measures to check the conflict before any action. should be taken against the aggressor.

On the other hand, a majority of the other proposals, including those of the United States, made no such distinction, and the United States delegation expressed opposition to the distinction on the following grounds: (1) It would, in effect, be a retreat from the Act of Chapultepec; (2) such a distinction was not necessary since nothing in the proposed treaty would in any event impede the full employment of methods of pacific settlement in the case of an inter-American dispute. To make this explicit in the treaty, the United States delegation suggested the inclusion of a provision to the effect that action under the treaty to meet threats and acts of aggression other than armed attacks "shall be without prejudice to the application in appropriate instances of procedures and measures of pacific settlement"; (3) to fail to provide in the treaty for prompt action against an American aggressor would lessen its effectiveness as a deterrent to aggression; (4) to make the suggested distinction by providing less effective methods to meet an inter-American attack would tend to give the treaty the deceptive appearance of an alliance directed against nonhemispheric countries.

After general discussion in the subcommittee entrusted with the drafting of this portion of the treaty, a general compromise was reached in which it was agreed that both the principle that an attack against one is an attack against all, and the operative provisions of

the treaty calling for action to meet aggression (arts. 3 and 6), should apply with equal force whether the aggression was committed by an American state or by a non-American state. Thus, the treaty makes no distinction in principle between aggression from inside and aggression from outside the continent, considering that all crimes against the peace are equally to be condemned, whatever the source. However, in the case of an intra-American conflict, in which the states involved would be parties to the obligations of the regional arrangement, and to the inter-American tradition of pacific settlement, article 7 provides that, without lessening the obligations of article 3, the first objective of the collective action should be to order the contending states to suspend hostilities and restore the situation existing before the outbreak of the conflict and to take all other measures necessary to reestablish peace and seek a solution of the issue by peaceful means, if possible. To this extent, therefore, different initial collective procedure is provided for in the event of a conflict in which no extracontinental power is involved. This provision is considered in greater detail below.

Action in the Event of an Armed Attack

Having agreed to separate the concept of "act of aggression" as contained in the Act of Chapultepec into its component elements of armed attack and other aggression, the framers of the treaty then decided to preface the provisions dealing with armed attack with a restatement of the principle of the Act of Chapultepec, that an attack against one is an attack against all, specifying its application to an armed attack. This statement is contained in the first part of paragraph 1 of article 3 and thus provides a specific motivation for the two concomitant obligations which are set forth in the article.

The extent of the obligation laid upon the parties in the event of armed attack is a principal feature of the treaty. Three of the original eight proposals submitted for the treaty by the American Republics in December 1945-those of Chile, United States, and Uruguay—envisaged the possibility of immediate individual or collective action to repel the attack, permissive in the Chilean draft and obligatory in the United States and Uruguayan drafts. In the consultations undertaken by the American Republics prior to the Conference on the principal points to be included in the treaty, the specific question was asked, in the light of the proposal in the United States draft, whether in event of armed attack the parties were obligated by the principles of inter-American solidarity and in the right of self-defense recognized