the United States proposals this is stated in a generally worded provision to the effect that "the consultations and measures referred to in the preceding articles shall be carried out through such procedures and agencies as are now in existence, or as may hereafter be established by agreement of the high contracting parties". With respect to specific functions of a security character which might be undertaken under the treaty the Bolivian and Ecuadorean drafts would empower the Board to determine or direct the adoption of provisional measures by parties to a dispute. Likewise the proposals of these two countries (Articles 8 and 2 respectively) as well as those of Mexico (Art. 10) would place upon the Board certain responsibilities in determining the aggressor state. Certain special functions would be granted the Board under the proposals of Mexico and Uruguay: the draft of the former provides (Art. 8) that a party confronted with special economic problems in the application of measures under the treaty may consult the Board regarding their solution and the Uruguayan draft states in its Article 3, par. 4 that "the Pan American Union shall promote all the agreements necessary to give such actions (under the treaty) the required efficiency and rapidity. . . ." The two drafts (those of Bolivia and Ecuador) which set forth specific procedures of pacific settlement grant certain functions to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union in this field. 2. Voting Provisions: Three of the drafts, those of Ecuador, United States and Panama contain specific provisions regarding the vote by which action under the Treaty shall be decided upon. The United States and Panamanian projects provide that agreements on collective measures to be taken under the Treaty shall be reached by a vote of at least 2% of the high contracting parties and that the decisions shall be binding on all concurring therein. The Ecuadorean project states that 23 vote of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union shall be required for all decisions under the Treaty. 3. Administrative and Procedural Functions: Five of the proposals (Bolivia, Art. 11, Brazil, Art. 5, Chile, Art. 9, Ecuador, Art. 5, par. 2, and Mexico, Art. 3, par. 2) provide that necessary liaison with the United Nations shall be carried on through the Board. This includes the transmittal to the Security Council of information on measures taken and/or requests for authorization. However, in the observation submitted by Panama it is stated that in the judgment of the Panamanian Government the Governing Board should not be used for this purpose since (1) the Union is now prohibited from exercising political functions; (2) it is not believed advisable to invest the Union with political powers; and (3) from the language of the United Nations Charter it may be deduced that the intended communication must be direct. The proposals of Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay would direct the Governing Board to establish the permanent military agency discussed in the succeeding section. Observations and Questions: 1. Should the treaty seek to specify the agency or agencies by which the consultations shall be carried out and the substantive decisions taken in the case of alleged aggression or should the choice of consultative methods be left to the contracting parties in each case as in the Act of Chapultepec? 2. Should the treaty specify the agency or agencies by which liaison will be effected with United Nations? 3. If it is decided that specific means be designated for these purposes, what responsibilities in this connection should be assigned (a) to the Meetings of Foreign Ministers, (b) the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, or (c) any special agency to be created for the purpose? 4. In either event should provisions regarding voting be included in the treaty? Similar problems exist, of course, with respect to the procedures and agencies of pacific settlement if it is decided that provisions dealing with this subject also be negotiated at the Rio Conference. B. Military Agency and Supply of Forces. Four of the drafts submitted include reference to the establishment of a permanent military agency. Those of Bolivia (Art. 9), Chile (Art. 5) and Uruguay (Art. 3, par 4) provide that the agency should be established by the Governing Board. The Mexican proposals (Art. 7) state that the parties "agree to form" the organization. The Bolivian, and to a lesser extent the Mexican proposals, indicate the functions of the proposed organization and include a statement that it would exercise the command or direction of forces which might be employed under the treaty. Both drafts also refer to relations between the organization and the United Nations, the first providing that the organization shall "assist the Security Council in the adoption of forceful coercive measures for the preservation of regional peace and security." and the second stating that the organization "may act as a regional subcommittee of the Military Staff Committee." Although the other four drafts do not make specific mention of the creation of a military agency the United States proposals contain general provisions quoted above to the effect that action under the treaty shall be carried out through such procedures and agencies as now exist or may hereafter be established. Three of the eight drafts (Bolivia, Art. 10; Chile, Art. 6; Mexico, Articles 5 and 6) provide in addition that the parties will supply armed forces in accordance with a special agreement or agreements to be concluded separately. No similar provisions are found in the proposals of the other five countries. Observations and Questions: The above provisions indicate a desire on the part of at least half of the Governments submitting proposals that a permanent military agency be created. This, of course, involves consideration of a number of important questions concerning the organization, functions and relationships of such agency. With respect to the proposed treaty itself, however, the following immediate questions are presented: 1. Should action be taken by the forthcoming Conference looking toward the establishment of a military agency? 2. If it should be decided in the affirmative, should provisions for the creation of the agency be inserted in the treaty itself or, alternatively, be made the subject of a separate agreement or resolution? With respect to the supply of forces, the provisions referred to above in three of the drafts pose the issue as to whether the treaty should contain specific provisions on this subject or whether problems of the military implementation of the treaty should be worked out subsequently through the proposed military agency if one is created. IV PREAMBLE, PROTOCOLARY ARTICLES AND MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS A. Preamble. All of the proposals except those of Bolivia and Uruguay contain preambles. Their various provisions differ in length and phraseology employed. Nevertheless, it may be said that all projects agree substantially on the inclusion of the following major points: 1. Reference to the Act of Chapultepec as a principle basis for the treaty; 2. Reference to the Charter of the United Nations and the rights and obligations recognized and assumed therein, specific reference being made in most of the drafts to those provisions dealing with regional arrangements; 3. Enumeration or mention of certain guiding principles which serve as a frame of reference for the treaty. It may therefore be assumed that these principal points should be incorporated in the preamble, the definitive draft of which can probably best await final agreement on the text of the substantive provisions of the treaty. B. Protocolary Articles. Although there are certain variations among the proposals in the drafts of the articles on ratification and duration, and provisions for denunciation of the treaty, the two important differences which become evident from an examination of the drafts relate to the point at which the treaty shall come into effect and the inclusion of reference to denunciation. The proposals of three of the countries (those of Ecuador, Art. 8, United States and Panama, Art. 12) stipulate that the treaty shall enter into effect when 3 of the signatories have deposited their ratifications. The Bolivian and Uruguayan projects provide that it shall become effective among the high contracting parties as their ratifications are deposited. The Chilean draft would require ratification by a majority of the signatory states in order for the treaty to become effective. The remaining drafts are silent on this point. It will be necessary to determine what provision should be made in this regard. With respect to denunciation of the treaty the drafts of the United States and Panama make express provision and the question thus arises as to whether a specific article on this point should be included. Both of these issues raise the problem of the application of the treaty to American States which have not become or may have ceased to be parties. In this connection, the Ecuadorean proposals contain a statement (Art. 7, par. 1) that the treaty provisions shall be applied to any American State that does not sign or ratify it. C. Miscellaneous Matters. The provisions falling under this heading in the annex to this report are those which appear in one or another of the draft proposals but which do not fall clearly within the major topics discussed above. They concern such matters as the following: The general relationship of the provisions of this treaty to rights and obligations of the parties under the United Nations Charter (See the following drafts, Ecuador, Art. 1, par. 1, and Uruguay, Art. 5; United States and Panama, Art. 5); Participation of contracting parties in collaborative measures. (See the following drafts, Brazil, Art. 7; United States, Mexico, Art. 5 and Panama, Art. 7) ; Any specific provision regarding assistance to aggressors and pre vention of activities aiming at the overthrow of other governments. (Brazil and Panama, Art. 4.) In view of the fact that the present report is limited to major problems presented by the proposals, detailed analysis of these miscellaneous provisions is not included. However, each of these, of course, merits careful study in order that the final text of the treaty may reflect all the suggestions of this nature on which there is general agreement. The undersigned Committee has thus sought to carry out the directive given it by the Governing Board of the Pan American Union. From the foregoing analysis of the major problems of the treaty in the light of similarities and differences of various drafts it has become possible to appreciate the wide area of agreement which exists among the proposals, both as to basic approach and as to language employed. This solid common ground should facilitate the attainment of a treaty satisfactorily representing the consensus of the views of all. CONSULTATION ON THE PRINCIPAL POINTS Points of Consultation Submitted to the Governments 1 RIO DE JANEIRO At the meeting of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union held on June 27, 1947, the following resolution was approved: 1 Report of the committee of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union on the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, of Rio de Janeiro. |