We cannot afford to lose our present advantage in the concepts, technologies and innovative approaches to ballistic missile defenses, for such a loss would eliminate our ability to develop hedges against unexpected Soviet developments that could alter the future strategic balance. We must also maintain a capability to assess and respond appropriately to Soviet programs in this area. We request $128 million to continue development of our surveillance and warning capabilities (CONUS OTH-B radar, the JSS system and DEW line and BMEWS upgrade), and to investigate space-based detection systems. Our request of $128 million for space defense R&D focuses on improving our ability to locate, track and identify objects in space; enhancing the survivability of our satellite systems; and developing an anti-satellite capability. Since our military space systems play an important role in a wide range of mission areas, providing appropriate levels of survivability is essential. The Soviet development of an anti-satellite (ASAT) system has emphasized this need. Growing Soviet capabilities to use satellites for military and intelligence support has created a need to provide the option for a U.S. ASAT capability. In addition, a U.S. ASAT capability could act as a deterrent to Soviet use of their ASAT. 2. Tactical Programs Rough parity at the strategic and theater nuclear levels heightens the continued importance of maintaining substantial conventional forces as a requisite to deterring conventional conflict and to raising the nuclear threshold. NATO Allies are faced with Pact quantitative superiority in most categories of weapons and a Soviet modernization program which challenges the performance advantages we still possess. I believe we have no more important requirement than to act now with our NATO partners to make those improvements in the Alliance's capabilities necessary to retain key force balances in both the near and far term. Our FY 1979 budget request of $5.1 billion for RDT&E and $23.5 billion for procurement of tactical warfare weapon systems therefore focuses on: Our major focus is on Europe, where we and our The program we have designed is predicated on two major principles. First, the conventional balance is measured in terms of deployed capabilities; therefore, we are emphasizing development and acquisition of systems that can be fielded rapidly and in sufficient numbers. Second, NATO must respond collectively to the multiple challenges which face us; therefore, we are emphasizing a number of cooperative programs which cut across several mission areas. These are described later in my Statement. The Soviet Union has long maintained substantial nuclear forces directed against Europe and is modernizing those forces at a rapid pace. Soviet doctrine, training and deployments emphasize the importance of theater nuclear weapons in a European conflict. Because of the vital role our theater nuclear forces play in deterring both nuclear and conventional conflict, it is imperative that we take steps now to improve their effectiveness in pace with the growing threat. Thus, in addition to our program to modernize battlefield weapons, we are continuing the development of ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles. The FY 1979 budget request provides for programs to satisfy the most critical near-term requirement of increasing the survivability and security of our nuclear weapon storage facilities, particularly those sites overseas. It also supports a comprehensive assessment of theater nuclear force modernization requirements for the longer term. 3. Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C31) We request $1.1 billion for RDT&E and $3.1 billion in procurement in FY 1979 for programs to improve our Defense-wide surveillance, warning, force control and intelligence capabilities. Our major goals are to enhance the combat effectiveness of our forces and to reduce costs and increase the efficiency of C3 activities. We have designed our program to exploit the close interrelationship which exists among the C31 functions. All involve accumulating, processing and disseminating information. The consolidation of responsibilities for c31 systems which I described earlier in this Statement is an important first step in increasing the leverage which an effectively coordinated c3 posture can provide to our force capabilities. The second step is to apply our technological strengths to correct key deficiencies in our current c3 systems. The major areas of concern addressed by our budget program are the survivability of our global and battlefield communications assets, the capability of our warning sensors to deal with increasingly sophisticated offensive threats, our communications links with our fleet ballistic missile forces, the vulnerability of our tactical c3, and a lack of interoperability among NATO and U.S. command and control systems. Our major programs to meet these deficiencies are discussed in Chapter VII of this report. 4. The Science and Technology Program The Science and Technology Program is the source of the innovative concepts and developments which are the foundation of our future weapon systems and of our continued leadership across a broad spectrum of critical military technologies. The program employs the scientific and engineering resources of defense and other government laboratories, industry and the academic community. Our FY 1979 budget request of $2.6 billion for the Science and Technology Program highlights the following priority areas: communities. Identifying those critical technology areas on Increasing the reliability and performance of Continuing the development and demonstration of I would also note the important role which the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) plays in our Science and Technology effort. DARPA is charged with the responsibility of exploring those technologies with potentially high payoffs in terms of future mission capabilities. DARPA's current work in space defense and surveillance; cruise missile technologies; anti-submarine warfare; land combat survivability, mobility and firepower; air vehicles and weapons; and C3 is discussed more fully in Chapter VIII of this report. I believe the DARPA program is critical to the formation of options which can make a real difference in our future military capabilities, and I am requesting |