resources and scope. Accordingly, selectivity will become an increasingly important factor in U.S. plans and programs, as will closer collaboration with our allies, particularly our NATO allies. But selectivity in turn requires an improved understanding of the Soviet R&D and procurement efforts; of how and when these will pay off in terms of future war fighting capabilities; of relative military strengths and weaknesses; and of the impact of our own programs on future Soviet developments and deployments. In short, we must improve the base of knowledge on which the selective application of our scarce resources depends. This will be a major focus of our effort to develop a long-term strategy for defense technology and acquisition resources. We do not minimize the difficulties inherent in this effort. Attempts to make assessments of the quality, level of effort and outputs of Soviet military technology and acquisition programs suffer from significant gaps and ambiguities in our information about current activities. Attempts to formulate and project future Soviet capabilities are even more uncertain. Nevertheless, we believe our assessments to date have clearly demonstrated the disturbing implications of the Soviet effort for the future military balance. Now we must work to improve these assessments, particularly insofar as they focus on trends and milestones of the Soviet effort, for these are essential to determining the most efficient level and scope of our own programs aimed at competing successfully with the USSR in the long run. In the following sections, the overall U.S./USSR military technology and acquisition balance is assessed in terms of these Priorities and methods. The technology balance--a comparison of the U.S. and Soviet The acquisition balance--a comparison of weapon syst.. B. PRIORITIES AND METHODS Although the U.S. and Soviet research, de. opment and military acquisition processes are quite similar in terms of functional stages, there are important differences in decision processes, organizational structure and operating methods which affect both the inputs and outputs of the two systems. Since these differences cut across all elements of the technology and acquisition process, they will be identified as a preface to the detailed comparison of the component balances in Sections C. and D. which follow. The Soviet Union's decision process is highly centralized, rigidly structured and nearly exempt from public scrutiny and criticism. The management structure is strongly focused on providing those resources essential to the support of priority national goals. Since military needs have been placed consistently among the highest national priorities, both Soviet research institutions and industry are required to ensure the availability of manpower, research facilities, and production and material rescurces necessary to satisfy military requirements expeditiously, even at the expense of other sectors of the economy. Thus the momentum of the Soviet system, generated by clear, longterm priorities and maintained by constant pressure from the political and military leaders and by salary and perquisite advantages, tends to reinforce rather than dissipate their weapon development and acquisition activities. This momentum is also supported by a high degree of stability in terms of budgets, manpower levels and composition of research institutes and design teams and by established relationships among military "customers" and suppliers. The almost total absence of public debate on the goals, activities and costs of the military sector effectively precludes external interference with military development and acquisition plans and programs. But what in theory is a monolithic, smoothly operating system turns out in practice to contain several important shortcomings. There is little flexibility in the centrally administered system; the supply system is unreliable; managers are confronted with a complex series of regulatory constraints and disincentives to innovate; and compartmentalization and discontinuities among the research, development and production phases create interface problems which inflate Soviet weapons costs, delay production and tend to reduce innovation, technical sophistication and performance. By contrast, the highly diversified U.S. and allied decision and management process generates a complex array of participants, interests, procedures, and regulations which diffuses goal definition and a coordinated, focused and continuous effort to apply resources to meet established goals. U.S. military requirements and programs compete openly and on an annual basis with other national needs; priorities, funding, resource allocations and even the requirements themselves often lack durability. Thus, the development and acquisition process tends to be episodic rather than regular, and continuity is difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, the flexibility, innovative nature, technical competence and incentives of U.S. and allied industry allow levels of system performance that often cannot even be contemplated by the Soviets. The industrial establishments of the U.S. and its allies are highly flexible and, given appropriate incentives, can respond rapidly to changing military demands. Competition and relatively open debate throughout the entire technology and acquisition process encourage competence in both ideas and end products. In summary, the Soviet Union has established considerable momentum in its program of military technology and acquisition. Serious structural and procedural weaknesses reduce the efficiency of the Soviet effort and their ability to innovate. The Soviets recognize these difficulties and are attempting to remedy or compensate for them, but many of their problems are fundamental to their system. The U.S. and our allies confront this Soviet momentum and purpose with the flexibility and competence that only a competitive environment can provide. These are great inherent strengths, but we must apply them more coherently and effectively if we are to achieve those 26-253 - 78 - 9 improvements in our deployed military capabilities which will meet the future Soviet challenge. The major goals we have established to improve the application of our technology during the next few years are as follows: Develop a long range plan for the near optimal application and management of acquisition resources that will exploit U.S. strengths and Soviet weaknesses, and will hedge against future uncertainties. Improve U.S. deployed military technology and capability by Identify and exploit Soviet weaknesses with U.S. military systems. Increase survivability as a means of increasing deterrence. Increase cooperation in R&D and production with our NATO allies so that our resources can be more effectively meshed. THE TECHNOLOGY BALANCE The process which ultimately results in the deployment of new and improved military weapons is founded in the basic sciences and a wide range of technologies which translate knowledge into concepts, designs and experimental hardware with potential applicability to military requirements. 1. Basic Science and Technology Soviet basic science appears to be on a par with our own, both in scope and quality of effort. Excellent work is being done in |