theoretical physics, medicine, aerodynamics, and marine biology, to name but a few areas of Soviet strengths. They are at the forefront of research in nuclear fusion, high-pressure and ionospheric physics, high frequency radio-wave propagation, and magnetohydrodynamic power generation. We believe that their high energy laser program is comparable to our own. However they are still several years behind us in such critical areas as computers, integrated circuitry, and microtechnology.

2. Civil Technology

Scientific possibilities alone do not pay off in useful end products, and the Soviets continue to be hampered by the lack of a strong civil science and technology base, which in the U.S. is the source of advanced research and engineering capabilities that translate theories and concepts into designs for the mass production of almost any item the market demands. The weakness of the Soviet non-military sector is the product of its distinctly second-class status with respect to resources and incentives. The result is twofold: an average level of Soviet civil technology that is below that of the U.S. in almost every major industrial area; and a civil technological base that is unable to provide significant assistance to the military acquisition.

process.

3. Military Technology

The situation is entirely different in the military sector, where Soviet priorities have focused massive and growing human and material investments for over 20 years. Nevertheless, we believe the

U.S. still holds an overall lead in basic military technology, although the scope and magnitude of the Soviet effort has reduced this lead, and,

in a few areas, the quality of their military technology appears to be

on a par with, or perhaps ahead of, our own.

a.

development.

Strategic Forces Research and Development

The Soviets have placed heavy emphasis on strategic missile
The peak of their test activity in 1973-4 is now being

translated into deployment of a significantly improved strategic
missile force. There is no doubt that the activity in the last several
years has enabled the Soviets to reduce our lead in MIRV and inertial
guidance technology. The impact of these developments on the strategic
nuclear balance and their future implications are discussed more fully

in Section D.

The

In other technologies applicable to the strategic balance, the Soviets have had relatively less success. The U.S. remains significantly ahead of the USSR in space-based surveillance technology, in the light-weight guidance and propulsion technologies applicable to cruise missiles, and in solid fuel propulsion technology. balance in over-the-horizon backscatter radar technology appears roughly even, although the Soviets are currently developing very powerful facilities. The balance in technologies applicable to antisubmarine warfare is difficult to assess because there are gaps in our knowledge of the extensive Soviet development efforts and their significance.

The U.S. leads in most basic technologies primarily

applicable to tactical weapon systems, but, as will be discussed later, we have not adequately exploited many of these leads. A major exception is in tactical aircraft technologies, where the U.S. advantage in jet engine and avionics technologies has produced superior system performance. The U.S. propulsion lead is due in large measure to our ability to achieve higher turbine inlet temperatures than Soviet engines, which in turn is the result of coupling better advanced cooling techniques and high quality, high temperature alloys, with superior manufacturing capability.

The current U.S. lead in avionics technologies may increase in the near term, although a longer term estimate is difficult, because of our uncertainties about Soviet progress in R&D. The U.S. clearly has an ability to improve its deployed inertial navigation, radar guidance, and airborne digital computer systems; the Soviets have yet to introduce comparable systems into their deployed forces.

Although the Soviets have already mastered the technologies requisite to swing-wing aircraft, future major improvements in aircraft maneuverability and survivability may hinge on the development of light-weight composite materials, new wing designs and low observable aircraft. We believe the U.S. leads in all of these development areas. The technology balance in the land and naval mission areas

shows current parity or a U.S. lead in almost all basic technologies, but a Soviet advantage in deployed technology in certain significant areas (see Section D below). The U.S. leads in basic technologies

applicable to torpedoes, precision guided weapons, armor, armor penetration, rapid-fire cannon, fire control, and battlefield Surveillance and warning. The Soviets lead in application of ship propulsion and hull technologies.

Many of our current leads in basic technologies applicable to both strategic and tactical forces can be traced to our superiority in certain key technologies which we believe will become even more important to military force capabilities in the future. These technologies include computers, semiconductors, electronic solidstate devices, optics, and sensors.

Although the Soviets have vigorous

military R&D programs in most of these areas, we do not expect them to close current technology gaps by indigenous efforts alone in the near future.

c. High Risk/High Payoff Technologies

Their MHD work is the

The Soviets are making major R&D efforts in the areas of high-pressure physics, pulsed power technology, magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) power generation and high energy lasers. largest in the world and continues to grow. MHD is a technology area where the Soviets clearly lead the U.S. in demonstrated capability, but specific military applications are not yet clear.

Overall, we believe the U.S. and USSR high energy laser

(HEL) programs are roughly equal at the present time, although we

believe we have an advantage in the technologies by which HEL outputs

must be applied to meet future military requirements.

Many

The Soviets have done an excellent job of translating the R&D-level technology they have available into deployed weapon systems. In the main, the Soviet approach has been dedicated to large quantities of effective, reliable systems that can be built, operated, and manufactured within the constraints of their industrial base. Soviet weapons have tended to be designed with a single mission in mind. The U.S., on the other hand, has opted for smaller quantities of systems that are usually more technologically advanced and designed for multiple missions. The Soviets have ordinarily proceeded incrementally with newer systems evolving from older ones with a great deal of commonality of components. They have subsequently fielded some systems in relatively small quantities despite apparent deficiencies, and they have introduced follow-on modifications on newer models and upgraded the older models. By contrast, we have often tried to eliminate all the deficiencies during the R&D process and have frequently introduced modifications to basic designs before the first operational system is deployed.

We believe that the U.S. continues to lead in most basic technologies applicable to future military capabilities, but our leads are perishable. The Soviet military R&D effort is comprehensive and significantly larger than our own. It is also focused on offsetting

particular areas of U.S. strength. already been eliminated or reduced.

Several of our former leads have

In a number of areas, the Soviets