have demonstrated an ability to narrow substantial U.S. technological leads in a short period of time, e.g., missile guidance technology. In areas where the Soviets have made relatively little progress--in microelectronics and computers, for example--the Soviets are attempting to close the gap by combining their indigenous R&D with a deliberate effort to acquire advanced Western technology.

We should also emphasize that although a technological lead can be important in influencing perceptions of capability, it is not militarily significant if it is not translated into a deployed military capability. Too many of our potential advantages have yet to be exploited. For example, our lead in technologies fundamental to target acquisition, fire control, and munitions has not been fully exploited, while the Soviets are making a major effort to develop somewhat less sophisticated technologies for ultimate deployment.

On the other hand, the Soviets have developed and deployed very capable weapon systems in spite of relatively unsophisticated component technologies. The ZSU-23-4 and the MIG-25 are examples of excellent deployed weapon systems employing relatively obsolete technology by U.S. standards. All of this emphasizes again the importance of applying technology well.

Finally, the size and scope of the Soviet military R&D program now provide them with a variety of alternative approaches by which to offset deficiencies created by U.S. qualitative advantages in a particular system. Their large investments in speculative military technologies and a number of enigmatic R&D activities indicate that

the Soviet leaders are committed to expanding their options for

developing future military advantages, countering our own strengths,

Since 1960, the Soviet Union's remarkable program of military growth and force modernization has strengthened every major element of the Soviet force structure with large procurements of improved weapons. Figure 11-1 indicates the relative Soviet procurement effort since 1960.

NOTE: TO PROVE COMPARABILITY, US DATA INCLUDE NON-DOD DEFENSE PROGRAMS (eg, DOE, COAST GUARD)

Figure 11

Note in particular that the Soviet spending trend is consistently up

and has exceeded U.S. outlays for the past eight years. During this period the Soviets have achieved a quantitative advantage or narrowed the existing U.S. quantitative leads in nearly all weapons categories. While many U.S. margins of qualitative superiority remain, in several key areas U.S. leads in deployed weapon system performance have either vanished or diminished to the point where Soviet quantitative advantages could become dominant factors in the military balance of power.

A summary comparison of the quality of some of the more significant types of weapon systems is shown on pages 11-26, 11-27, and 11-28. The Soviets have achieved an impressive force by configuring

their military production base close to the needs of war-time mobilization and by insulating this base as much as possible from the shortcomings of their non-military economy. This is discussed more fully in Section D.5. below, but we emphasize here that the implications of the diverging trends between the Soviet and U.S. production base are serious and we intend to analyze this issue thoroughly in 1978.

2. Strategic Forces

The USSR is continuing vigorous production and deployment of intercontinental strategic missiles. Since 1966, the Soviets are estimated to have produced many more ICBMs than the U.S. during this period. Since 1970, the Soviets have deployed variants of at least five ICBM systems (SS-9, SS-17, SS-18, SS-11 and SS-19) and development of a sixth, the SS-16, is essentially complete. The SS-16 may be

intended as a land-mobile system, although we have no evidence that

deployments to date have been in a mobile configuration.

In addition,

there are at least four more ICBMs currently in development and about

to enter flight-test status. By contrast, the most recent U.S. ICBM, MINUTEMAN 111, was deployed during the 1970-75 period, and we will have no follow-on system in flight test until the 1980s, at the earliest. Technological improvements in deployed Soviet ICBMs manifest themselves in improved accuracy, increased throw-weight, MIRV capability, improved survivability and the introduction of "cold launch" systems. Of particular importance in this regard is the Soviet accuracy improvement effort, which is closing one of the key U.S. ICBM performance leads that has given us our past strategic force advantage and which today offsets Soviet throw-weight superiority. Most importantly, the Soviet deployed accuracies expected in the early to mid-1980s, coupled with projected throwweights and numbers of warheads, could place at risk the U.S. fixed,

land-based ICBM force.

Similarly high levels of Soviet activity are evident in other strategic weapons categories. During the period 1966-76, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet activities have exceeded comparable U.S. outlays by sizable amounts in the following areas: ballistic missile submarine production and operation; strategic defense; and strategic command, surveillance and warning. Only in strategic heavy bombers has the U.S. undertaken a larger effort.

3. Military Capabilities in Space

U.S. space-based systems are generally superior in performance to their Soviet counterparts across the board, although the Soviets lead in deployed radar surveillance from space, and may be closing the gap

in operational missile detection capabilities. The Soviets have in part attempted to compensate for limitations in the performance of their satellites by launching a greater number of vehicles. The U.S. has been able to reduce its numbers of launches and costs in many cases without a reduction in capability by developing and orbiting longer-life satellites.

Before anti-satellite attacks were viewed as a real threat, the relatively small number of satellites deployed by the U.S. entailed no penalty in terms of survivability. However, the recent Soviet achievement of an anti-satellite capability now threatens our important satellite capabilities in the mission areas of c3, surveillance and warning, and navigation. The Soviet anti-satellite program is another example of a Soviet lead in deployed capabilities despite relatively unsophisticated technologies.

4. Tactical Forces

The Soviets outproduce the U.S. in numbers of most key

conventional warfare equipments. But several factors which are not applicable to assessing relative strategic force and space capabilities must be taken into account in assessing this production balance. First, in selected areas such as Europe, the U.S. counts on its allies to

produce and deploy a substantial percentage of the conventional warfare