inevitable over time and that the sharing of certain technologies and end products is essential if we are to maintain a dynamic U.S. industrial base. In addition, the capability of our allies to deter or fight Warsaw Pact aggression will be enhanced if we ensure that NATO maintains a strong technological position. To this end, the sharing of technology within the Alliance is essential. On the other hand, we believe that design and manufacturing know-how must be closely controlled to retain our national technological advantage relative to our principal adversary, particularly in those leading-edge, high risk technologies and keystone manufacturing equipments which are the keys to maintaining the future military balance. This same know-how, when shared within NATO, can lead to a more credible deterrent and a more efficient fighting capability. 7. NATO Standardization and Rationalization Cooperative actions to integrate more fully the NATO members' research, development and production capabilities, and to achieve interoperable systems would greatly enhance the effectiveness of deployed NATO forces and increase the efficiency of the limited resources the individual NATO members allocate to their security requirements. The This Warsaw Pact enjoys a significant advantage over NATO in terms of weapons standardization and the integration of military production. advantage tends to offset NATO's superior but fragmented technological and industrial base. The U.S. and its NATO allies can no longer afford the costs of inefficient and militarily ineffective independent RDT&E and acquisition programs. The U.S. will therefore continue its emphasis on coordinating research, development and major acquisition decisions with its NATO partners. We will also give greater weight in technological sharing issues to the additional strength such sharing can give to The acquisition balance now clearly favors the Soviets in terms of quantities of weapons being produced in almost all mission areas. Moreover, our qualitative lead may have declined to the point where, in some cases, it may not offset entirely the Soviet numerical superiority. In too many cases, we have not translated our technological leads into deployed weapon system capability. The Soviets, in contrast, have applied their technology more effectively, even in areas where their technolc, is comparatively weak. In addition, the Soviet military production base operates at near capacity levels, is expanding, and is closely integrated with that of its Warsaw Pact allies. In view of the impressive Soviet build-up of military power, it is evident that we must improve our ability to translate technology into deployed weapon systems to maintain confidence in our defense, to ensure deterrence, and to get the most for every dollar we spend on defense. Although there is little doubt that the current trends in the magnitude of military research and development, acquisition and investment favor the Soviet Union, the ultimate outcome of these trends in terms of the character of the future military balance remains uncertain. This is so because the current levels of effort and competence alone are not indicative of relative military capabilities. Of great importance is the success of the competitors to exploit and to use their existing technology and productive capacity. Our "track record" of recent years must be improved, for as the qualitative balance approaches rough parity, the efficient application of technology will become at least as important to the overall military balance as the level of technology itself. There are two essential steps in improving the use we make of our technological and productive assets. First, technology and production are not ends in themselves. Instead, they are means to objectives defined by military doctrines, strategies, tactics, roles and missions, as well as by other significant elements of national policy. Therefore, we must understand better the inter-relationships among these factors and our technology. Second, we must improve our understanding of how the Soviet Union applies its assets toward achieving its own military goals and how this will affect the future Soviet military posture. Clearly the emerging Soviet threat will include weaknesses we can exploit, as well as challenges we must offset. Identifying these and implementing appropriate responses require better information and better assessments of Soviet strengths and weaknesses relative to our own. |