against NATO would require an extensive buildup and deployment of Soviet reserves, thus providing NATO with more adequate time to mobilize and

deploy countering forces.

The major thrusts we have defined to enable meeting the

The primary goal for new developments in harmonious introduction into the NATO environment. While NATO has a higher Gross National Product and a more advanced technology and industrial base than the Warsaw Pact, we have been less successful in deploying the output of our laboratories in a timely fashion. A major thrust is rationalization of our new developments with our NATO allies, agreement on operational requirements and shortening of the development cycle, without overly increasing program risk.

Significant progress has been made in complex international

programs such as the F-16 multi-national fighter/attack aircraft and the ROLAND surface-to-air missile. We plan to follow these successes with the joint development of ASSAULT BREAKER, a potentially highly-leveraged system using a new battlefield attack missile for the destruction of armor targets deep in the enemy's territory. Further, the joint pursuit of an improved family of air-to-ground munitions for NATO attack aircraft will provide for munitions cross-servicing from any allied airfield. These major efforts will significantly increase the defense capability of

the NATO countries.

Table VI-1 summarizes on-going efforts at strengthening

alliance force capabilities.

A portion of the FY 1979 tactical development and acquisition program augments the funding of some of the items in Table VI-1 and supports a number of new initiatives. Table VI-2 summarizes the FY 1979 new initiatives in NATO cooperative defense. While the gaps in both tables imply that much remains to be accomplished in broadening the base of support for these initiatives, the key point is that we are taking steps to define a number of foreign candidates for a true "two-way street" with NATO. A key ingredient in many of these programs is the transfer of technology among the NATO countries.

As discussed in more detail in

Chapter IV, our policy is to provide critical technology to NATO nations

if the return on investment is an improved NATO force posture.

Given the apparent Soviet/Pact commitment to upgrade the

quality and quantity of their forces at the expense of the civilian

economy, the most affordable way that we can continue to maintain deterrence is by more clever application of our technology through force multipliers. A major thrust of our FY 1979 development and acquisition program is focused on several potential force multipliers, examples of which include:

O More responsive reconnaissance, intelligence and
targeting systems--to provide real-time or near
real-time information for attack and reaction to
look beyond the Forward Edge of the Battle Area
(FEBA).

For the first time, we are testing sytems, utilizing various sensors, which will synthesize the battlefield intelligence picture, and provide for battlefield sensor management and real-time targeting information. An example of this integrated effort is a joint Army/Air Force/ DARPA test project called the Battlefield Exploitation and Target Acquisition (BETA) system. It will provide a test-bed for the development of automated sensor fusion centers for use at Army Corps/Divisions and at the Air Force Tactical Air Control Centers which will be interoperable, in that they will be able to exchange sensor-derived data in near realtime. Targeting systems like BETA, coupled with high-leverage lethal systems such as the ASSAULT BREAKER, will provide the force multiplier which should prove, "If you can sense it to a significant range in front