The Trident system will be less vulnerable to ASW forces. The MK-500 evader reentry vehicle counters possible upgrading of Soviet ABM systems. And the SSBN security program, which looks at the ASW threat to our own submarines will identify technically feasible Soviet ASW capabilities and wll specify and develop feasible ountermeasures.

In the midterm, the Trident II missile will increase the capability of the strategic forces. As you know, the Trident I has a full payload range of 4,000 miles with an accuracy equal to Poseidon. Trident II will provide the same range capability as Trident I but with more accuracy and almost twice the throw weight. These characteristics will allow a targeting flexibility supportive of current and future SLBM responsibilities.

Senator MCINTYRE. More accurate, you say, than the Trident I Admiral ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir. The effort on Trident II is greater accuracy with greater throw weight at 4,000 [deleted] miles.

Senator MCINTYRE. The effort on Trident II is not a very heavy pace right now?

Admiral ARMSTRONG. No, sir, $15 million in 1979.

Another development in the strategic world is ELF communications which are necessary for the SSBN forces.

Senator MCINTYRE. Is that actually working out there today? Are you having any luck with it?

Admiral ARMSTRONG. The Wisconsin site has gone through a full test program, in an operational sense and is working. It is working. The vugraph on the left shows that other communications systems require an antenna, wire or bouys at or near the surface possibly disclosing the submarine's position. ELF communications would enhance submarine survivability by minimizing detection opportunities by hostile ASW forces.

The SSBN subsystem technology program will identify and develop more cost effective systems concepts for future FBM submarines. Examples are the self-contained missile tube complex and composite nonmetallic superstructures.

In the long term, we are looking for new materials for future generations of strategic systems.

SUMMARY

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

ADVANCED MOBILITY SYSTEMS
STANDOFF GUNFIRE SUPPORT

ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE

INCREASED STANDOFF RANGE

UNDERKEEL MISSILE

INTEGRAL ROCKET-RAMJET

SURVEILLANCE & TARGETING

OVER-THE-HORIZON SYSTEMS

MINE WARFARE

MINE STOCKPILE UPGRADE
INNOVATIVE MINE USE

STANDOFF DELIVERY

MINE-COUNTERMEASURES

SUMMARY

MULTI-MISSION NAVAL SYSTEMS

SHIP DESIGN & SURVIVABILITY
DEEP SUBMERGENCE

IMPROVED PERFORMANCE

ANTI-AIR WARFARE

DEFENSE IN DEPTH

AUTOMATIC DETECTION, TRACK AND
ENGAGEMENT

SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE ADVANCES

STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT

TRIDENT II - FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
SSBN COST REDUCTION

SECURE COMMUNICATIONS

In summary, these vugraphs highlight the warfare areas that I have discussed. They are indicative of the major efforts that we have embarked on. There is one thing that I did not do for you, sir. You asked me to highlight those areas where we might accelerate. This is always a risky effort, because we are currently working on the 1980 budget, and beyond. If we were to increase the funding in 1979 for either amphibious warfare or standoff gunfire support, or over the horizon targeting systems, not so much in the mine warfare program, or looking at multimission systems, in sensors, particularly the world of weapons and AAW, we would have a problem in following on with a good program in the subsequent years in the time frame of our planning.

Senator McIntyre. I have a few questions here for you.

I will address those to the Secretary, and where you can answer, fine. Or your backup people can answer.

COST INCREASES IN LAMPS MARK III PROGRAM

In the 12 months since last year's budget submission, the Lamps MK III program has undergone the following changes:

R.D.T. & E. costs have gone from $448 million to $719 million. Total program costs for 204 aircraft have gone from $2.7 billion to $4.2 billion.

The IOC has slipped from March 1983 to July 1984.

Even with the cost increases the program will provide less than half the aircraft needed to equip our destroyers, cruisers, and frigates for the ASW mission.

Dr. Perry has testified that the main cause of this radical change has been bad initial estimates. Can you be more specific on what parts of the program were underestimated as to cost?

Mr. MANN. I think it is partly difficult for me to reconstruct at this distance which parts were badly estimated. When we began to look at the program last summer, it became clear that as far as we could tell almost every part had been underestimated or poorly estimated, and it was about time that a number of changes were proposed and insti

tuted both within the Navy and the principal contractor, IBM. The changes that have occurred as a consequence of difficult, but admittedly poor, estimation have resulted in essentially a new program structure within the Navy: a new program manager, upgraded from a captain to a flag officer, Admiral Baughman; much tighter controls: the replacement of the earlier program manager at IBM by a senior IBM executive, Mr. Bitonti, the institution of an assessment conducted in behalf of the Navy Project Office, by Lockheed, an organization that has no direct connection with the Lamps program, which has had a long and successful history of ASW airborne ASW development and integration. As a consequence of their investigation for the Navy and reporting back to the Navy, a number of additional changes have been made.

I think Admiral Armstrong may wish to add something, or Mr. Cann, but I think that my own view and my own assessment for the committee, Mr. Chairman, is that the earlier record of our estimates and program structure, not on technical but on managerial grounds, are not a particularly proud or happy chapter so far as the Navy is concerned.

I think that we now recognize, we collectively, that there were a number of difficulties and mistakes made then that should have been caught. We now feel that we have taken the necessary steps to rectify that and to avoid their recurrence in the future.

We will, since the Lamps program is a major ingredient, major element of the whole ASW area-well, when Rear Admiral Metzel and Mr. Cann, present the ASW on Thursday, we will go through that for you.

Senator MCINTYRE. Although I do not profess to be an expert, it appears that all this involved was taking a helicopter and wedding it to a destroyer; one of our three 4,000- to 10,000-ton ships. The problem was magnified because of the sea state in bringing that helicopter back.

It had two packages. There was an ASW package and an antiship package. These packages could be removed.

What alternatives have you considered for reducing the cost of the individual unit so as to equip more ships?

It is clear that the submarine threat is much greater than the sur face threat. Navy studies and testimony suggests that the Soviet surface fleet would not venture into areas of heavy combat. Why doesn't it make sense to make the Lamps helicopter solely an ASW helicopter so as to reduce cost and be able to buy more?

LAMPS III COLLATERAL MISSION

Mr. CANN. Senator, the LAMPS III program helicopter is pri marily an ASW system. The collateral mission of providing both electronic surveillance and over-the-horizon targeting is truly a collateral mission. There are some unique pieces of equipment that are on board that aircraft for that purpose, and I don't have the specifie numbers, but they are a small subset of the total cost and I will provide those to you.

But the thing that drives this particular program into a large helicopter is the requirement to be able to get the helicopter out to at

least a range of [deleted] which is [deleted] or greater from the ship, and carry the necessary sonobuoys, processing equipment, and two torpedoes.

We have looked very hard over a long period of time at alternatives to this particular system. There has been a lot of discussion about reducing the scope of the capability of this system. Every system that I have looked at, existing helicopter systems, and we have looked, I think, at every single helicopter that exists today, which draws down into a situation wherein we could only get out to approximately [deleted] and in many cases not be able to carry the necessary number of torpedoes and/or the necessary processing equipment.

Now, the technical progress on this program has really been excellent. In the process of looking at the program when we started this review last July, which resulted in the changes that Dr. Mann indicated in management structure, we also instituted a review of what could we take out of the system? We looked at reductions in on onboard processing, which was an obvious thing to look at, and after a considerable amount of looking at this problem we decided that was a trade off that would not be advantageous operationally for the following reason:

If you data link; that is, take all the data from the sonobuoys and so forth, and go through the aircraft and put all that data back to the ship, it requires that the helicopter stay at a certain altitude at all times in order not to break that data link.

We have experience from the earlier testing with the GUAM, you remember, the sea control ship experiments that were run some years ago it indicated that that kind of operation didn't work very well. Once we decided that we really could not take very much off the ASW suit

Senator MCINTYRE. I will ask one more question and then I will yield to Senator Bartlett and Senator Anderson. Time is getting short. I have some questions I will submit for the record.

FOLLOWON TO THE SSN-688 CLASS

Mr. Secretary, are we pursuing any R. & D. programs that are aimed at producing an attack submarine to followon the SSN-688 class with any vigor? It seems to be the concept of the thinking of the future attack submarine in terms of its size, how deep it operates, what weapons we put on it, and what missions it will perform.

Are there any changes in missions? It is possible, for instance, to build submarines that are no bigger than the SSN-688 and perhaps even smaller, but would be more effective because of the improved weapons and equipment?

Does the Navy intend to move at all in this direction as we look downstream here 10 or 20 years?

Mr. MANN. I was going to say that I would prefer to try to answer your questions in reverse order.

The Navy is attempting to examine a whole range of alternatives in its initial consideraton of those so-called followon to the 688. There is, if I am not mistaken, a modest program. Admiral Armstrong

can

Admiral ARMSTRONG. $500,000 in design.