DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1979

TUESDAY, APRIL 11, 1978

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D.C.

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., in room 224, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas J. McIntyre, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators McIntyre and Goldwater.

Also present: Larry K. Smith, Rhett B. Dawson, Robert Q. Old, and Donald Cotter professional staff members; Betty Mayo, clerical assistant; Charles Stevenson, assistant to Senator Culver; Peter Gold, assistant to Senator Hart; and Ron Lehman, assistant to Senator Bartlett.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR THOMAS J. MCINTYRE,

CHAIRMAN

Senator MCINTYRE. The subcommittee will come to order.

This morning's hearing is the first of two which this subcommittee will conduct this week on our theater nuclear forces.

Last year we concentrated on R. & D. programs for one element of these forces-long-range theater systems/the GLCM, the theater land attack SLCM, and the Pershing II. Our hearings this week will continue in that inquiry and add to it an examination of R. & D. of shorter range, battlefield weapons.

EFFORTS TO IMPROVE NUCLEAR FORCES

There are, of course, R. & D. efforts to improve other capabilities of our theater nuclear forces command and control, safety and security, surveillance and target acquisition, land-based defensive systems such as nuclear mines, and fleet systems such as ship air defense and antiship weapons. As important as these issues are, time does not permit us to inquire extensively about them today or Thursday.

I have found in nearly a decade of reviewing military R. & D. that it is meaningless to try to judge the value of a weapon's development without relating it both to specific national policy objectives and to other developments designed to perform similar military functions. (6543)

We will, therefore, use the same integrative method in these two hearings that we have developed over the years.

First, we have asked Secretary McGiffert to detail our Government's theater nuclear policies which are articulated in United States and NATO policy documents. We have asked him to list specific military functional requirements which these policies define.

SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS

Next, we will look at the threat which could inhibit us from achieving these objectives. We have asked DIA to describe present and future Soviet nuclear systems. And we have asked the Defense Nuclear Agency to report on their extensive analysis of how the Warsaw Pact would use their weapons in the European theater.

On Thursday we will look at functionally related sets of research and development programs which will counter Warsaw Pact threats and insure our ability to meet the military requirements of our policies. Secretary Robert Moore, Dr. Perry's Deputy for Tactical Systems, will describe DOD's programs, and Maj. Gen. Joseph Bratton will discuss DOE's developments of nuclear weapons to meet DOD requirements.

I feel that this integrative approach is particularly critical in assessing research and developement programs for our theater nuclear forces, because the subject includes such a baffling complex of difficult policy, diplomatic, force planning, and technical issues. I believe that the failure of our Government to define clearly to ourselves and to our allies the relationship between theater nuclear weapons developments and national policy has compounded the disorderliness of the debates about enhanced radiation weapons and about SALT negotiations regarding GLCM's and theater land attack SLCM's. Without such an analytic frame, the orderly resolution of differences within our Government and in the alliance is impossible. Indeed, without such a clear logic, I fear that the deterrent effect of our theater nuclear forces is endangered.

So, I look forward to these two hearings. So far as I know, they are the first systematic congressional review of these developments in their full policy and military context. I hope this inquiry will shed some light at a time when we certainly have quite enough heat.

So I want to welcome all of you here this morning, Secretary McGiffert, Mr. Peter Haas, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Defense Nuclear Agency, Maj. Bruce Wallace, specialist, Defense Intelligence Agency.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID E. McGIFFERT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, PETER H. HAAS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY, AND MAJ. BRUCE A. WALLACE, USAF, SOVIET FORCE DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. McGIFFERT. Mr. Chairman, Senator Goldwater, I also have with me at the table Mr. Henry Gaffney, from my office.

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

I would like to review for you today the nature of our theater nuclear forces, our so-called TNF, in NATO, and the policies which govern them, including why we maintain them, the general nature of our current programs, and some of the issues associated with modernizing the TNF.

NATO, as you are well aware, maintains a combination of conventional theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces, which are designed to deter both conventional and nuclear attack by the Warsaw Pact. Should Warsaw Pact forces attack across present borders, NATO forces are intended to stop such an attack with minimum loss of territory and ultimately to restore prewar boundaries.

The conventional, theater nuclear and the strategic forces each have a role to play in accomplishing those goals.

Conventional forces are designed to withstand the initial shock of a cross border attack and to conduct an effective defense in forward

areas.

Strategic forces provide both a capability for selective use in support of NATO defense and, because they can inflict unacceptable damage against the Soviet Union, deter the all-out use of nuclear weapons in support of a Warsaw Pact cross border attack.

Theater nuclear forces provide the link between conventional and =strategic forces, both for deterrent purposes and militarily.

TNF OBJECTIVES

The primary objective of our TNF posture is a deterrent one: We believe that the deployment of our 7,000 theater nuclear weapons in Europe poses, for the Warsaw Pact, risks all out of proportion to any advantages it might hope to gain by an attack. Should aggression occur, NATO's theater nuclear forces could be used, in a wide range of contingencies, from battlefield support of the conventional forces to attack on targets as far east as [deleted] the Soviet Union, in order to bring home to the other side with unmistakable force the risk of continued aggression.

To make deterrence credible, and in the event deterrence were to fail, the alliance has prepared, over the years, a substantial body of agreed principles and guidances governing the employment of nuclear weapons. Most importantly, NATO plans a wide range of options for the selective use of nuclear weapons.

In selective use, the fundamental objective is political-to induce the enemy to cease his aggression and withdraw. TNF does not compensate for deficiencies in conventional forces; or does it substitute for strategic forces; or is it intended to gain a victory in the classic military sense. Instead, what we seek to do is to convince Warsaw pact planners that they could not obtain their aims at any given level of conflict and, also, to demonstrate that any increase in the level of destruction would be counterproductive from their standpoint. We would hope to cause Warsaw Pact leaders to recognize that there could be no winner from a resort to force.

NATO's options for selective theater nuclear use are, accordingly, designed with two purposes: First, to be militarily effective and capable of being applied with shock and decisiveness; and second, to signal restraint, thereby inducing the enemy to halt his attack without further escalation. At the same time, the forces we hold in reserve including U.S. Strategic Forces offer the possibility of further and even greater destruction. Ultimately, if escalation cannot be controlled, NATO's recourse would be a general nuclear response. Remaining theater nuclear forces then would be used in conjunction with U.S. SIOP forces against the Warsaw pact and, in particular, against Soviet military capabilities.

SHORT-, MEDIUM-, AND LONG-RANGE WEAPONS

The current NATO theater nuclear forces consist of short-, medium-, and long-range weapons, as well as certain defensive systems. Some of the TNF are dual capable, that is they can deliver both nuclear and conventional weapons. A good example is the U.S. F—4 aircraft in Europe. Additionally, NATO's command, control, and communications systems, as well as its surveillance and target acquisition systems, support both conventional and theater nuclear forces.

We define short-range systems as those capable of engaging targets up to approximately 100 kilometers. These are the so-called battlefield systems and presently include the 8-inch and 155-millimeter howitzers and the Lance and Honest John surface-to-surface missile systems. Over [deleted] warheads support these forces, equivalent to approximately [deleted] percent of the current TNF stockpile deployed in Europe.

Medium-range systems are defined as those with a capability to attack targets up to a range of approximately 1,000 kilometers. The Pershing surface-to-surface missile system and NATO's tactical aircraft, including most prominently, F-4's and F-104's, fall in this category. Approximately [deleted] warheads, or [deleted] percent of the TNF stockpile in Europe, are devoted to medium-range systems.

Long-range TNF systems are those with a range in excess of 1,000 kilometers. The systems available to NATO include the U.S. F-111 aircraft based in the United Kingdom, the British Vulcan bomber. the British Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and the offshore [deleted]. Bombs in support of long-range aircraft come from the inventory of [deleted] warheads generally counted as mediumrange weapons; warheads for the [deleted] are not counted as part of the 7,000 TNF warheads stored in Europe.

DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS

In addition, NATO currently maintains defensive systems: Nike Hercules nuclear air defense and atomic demolition munitions. Warheads in support of defensive systems number about [deleted] or about [deleted] percent of the stockpile in Europe. The remaining [deleted] percent of the stockpile in Europe are air delivered maritime ASW weapons which support maritime patrol aircraft.

In considering these figures, it is also useful to remember that the French maintain an independent nuclear force which would supplement the NATO TNF.

The NATO TNF program is largely under the control of the United States. "Largely" because the United Kingdom also maintains, within the NATO force structure, nuclear forces of its own. Other than the United Kingdom warheads, all of the NATO TNF warheads are under the control of the President of the United States and none can be used without his personal consent.

Thus, although our allies man and maintain certain of the TNF launchers-for example, [deleted] surface-to-surface missile system is manned by the United States [deleted]-only the President can authorize the use of TNF warheads should that be deemed appropriate.

CRITERIA FOR TNF

NATO has established a set of criteria for TNF:

They should be distinctive, providing significant military advantages over conventional alternatives and clearly involving a qualitative change in warfare.

Their command and control should be so organized as to make their use responsive to the direction of political authorities, permitting the controlled and flexible application of nuclear force.

A significant portion of the force should be able to survive initial attacks and remain survivable throughout a period of conventional or nuclear conflict.

Thereafter nuclear forces should provide militarily effective attacks with minimum collateral damage.

Theater nuclear forces should be able to penetrate with high assurance enemy defenses.

The security and safety of nuclear weapons should be maintained in peacetime, crisis, and in war.

Our current forces meet quite well some of these criteria, but others are not achieved in a fashion that we consider wholly adequate.

There is no question that our TNF retain their distinctive character; the nature of warfare would be significantly altered should they be used. Similarly, with respect to another criteria, the so-called nuclear I threshold remains appropriately high. Further theater nuclear forces are responsive to the direction of the political authorities. As I have already indicated, only the President can authorize their use, and that would be done only after consultation with our NATO allies.

On the other hand, the survivability of these systems is not as good as it could be. Today, for example, we have to plan against serious losses of nuclear capable aircraft relatively early in the conflict. Also, command, control, and communications systems are not as survivable as we would like; and while the security of our TNF weapons is good, it certainly can be improved.

Our TNF are reasonably effective militarily against fixed and closein mobile targets. However, acquisition of mobile targets beyond the line of sight of engaged combat forces becomes more difficult as the range increases, thus limiting the effectiveness of the longer range