nuclear battlefield system such as Lance. Similar problems also apply to conventional forces.

Further, even with respect to fixed targets, the TNF is relatively weighted toward shorter range systems; the question whether this is an appropriate posture needs review.

Even if the Warsaw Pact was not modernizing its theater nuclear forces, we would want to improve ours as to better meet the criteria to which I have just referred.

SOVIET MODERNIZATION

We are going to hear shortly more detail about this from Major Wallace. Let me just very briefly sketch some of the modernization in which the Soviets are engaged. We expect the Warsaw Pact to introduce new battlefield nuclear weapons to replace their older systems, such as Frog. We believe the Warsaw Pact has already fielded [deleted]. The Warsaw Pact is also modernizing its nuclear capable aircraft. The [deleted] is now being replaced by the [deleted] of similar characteristics.

The modernization of the Scud medium-range system would seem reasonably likely in the near term. The Soviets are also deploying the mobile SS-20 MRBM to replace the SS-4's and 5's. The SS-20 provides greater flexibility than the older systems through an increase in warheads, greater accuracy, and improvements in mobility. It is, as you know, a system which has raised considerable concern in Europe among our allies.

Finally, we expect the Backfire bomber will continue to be deployed against Western European targets.

If the need for improvement from a military point of view is clear, we must, at the same time, understand the critical political issues surrounding the modernization of nuclear forces in Europe. The deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe has from the very beginning been highly controversial. When, 20 years ago, Matador missiles were introduced in West Germany, hundreds of thousands of persons demonstrated in the streets against "atomic death." Recently, the enhanced radiation weapon controversy demonstrated again how difficult it is to obtain allied consensus on nuclear deployments and modernization in Europe.

NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

Even with the consultative mechanisms of the Nuclear Planning Group established now more than 10 years ago, the critical political dilemma remains: militarily, nuclear modernization may be appropri ate; but politically, modernization may be seen as increasing the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used on Western European soil. I do not want unduly to emphasize the potential political restraints In fact, we have underway today a TNF modernization program to upgrade nuclear weapons safety, security, and command and control: to improve the physical security of the nuclear storage sites; to modernize the B-61 bomb; and to develop a new 155-millimeter howitzer round and the Pershing II missile system. We are also devoting a very large amount of money to developing cruise missiles.

NATO will introduce a number of improved tactical aircraft, for example, F-16, Tornado, Jaguar. We are also studying the desirability of [deleted]. Finally, we are in the process of defining a NATO-wide TNF modernization program as part of NATO's long-term defense program. All of these things have gone forward without major controversy.

Let me interrupt my prepared testimony, Mr. Chairman, for one short comment which bears on what I have just said in relation to ER and modernization.

As you know, in connection with his decision on enhanced warheads, the President has ordered the Defense Department to proceed with the modernization of the Lance nuclear warhead and the 8-inch artillery warhead, leaving open the option of installation of enhanced radiation capability in those warheads later.

As the President said in his statement:

The ultimate decision regarding incorporation of the ER feature into those weapons will be influenced by the degree to which the Soviet Union shows restraint in its conventional and nuclear arms programs and force deployments affecting the security of the United States and Western Europe.

Let me conclude by reiterating what I see to be some of the critical policy guidelines which should form the basis for future NATO TNF improvement planning. Modernization would: maintain a high nuclear threshold; respect the priority aim of improving NATO's conventional defenses; retain tight political control over the employment of nuclear weapons; prevent any perception of decoupling of the TNF either from strategic nuclear forces on the one hand or conventional forces on the other.

With these guidelines in mind, we plan to continue to move forward deliberately in improving NATO's theater nuclear forces.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer questions now or after the other witnesses have finished.

Senator MCINTYRE. I think it would be preferable if we have all of the testimony in before we start asking questions.

Senator Goldwater?

Senator GOLDWATER. We have the Navy presentation at 10. Will we be through by then?

Senator MCINTYRE. No; I don't intend even to try to make it. Senator GOLDWATER. I have to be there. Let me ask a couple of questions.

Senator MCINTYRE. Go ahead.

Senator GOLDWATER. Mr. Secretary, what is the character of the restraint the Soviets must exhibit in order not to prompt President Carter to order production of the enhanced radiation warhead?

Mr. McGIFFERT. Senator Goldwater, as you know, as the President's statement suggests, there is not at this point a specific answer to your question. That is a matter on which we will wish to consult with the allies.

Senator GOLDWATER. Will consultation with the NATO forces be required?

Mr. McGIFFERT. Senator, this is an allied problem. It is an allied weapon system. There is no way in which we can employ the weapon without the agreement of the allies. So that it is a matter for appropri

ate consultation.

ALLIED WEAPON SYSTEM

Senator GOLDWATER. Could you give an educated guess as to when a decision might be forthcoming?

Mr. McGIFFERT. No. As far as I know, there is no specific schedule at this time. That is another matter we would want to discuss with the allies.

Senator GOLDWATER. Just one more point. On page 5 of your testimony you get back to an old, old baby that I have lived with for a while, and although I don't think it necessarily requires public decision, I think this committee should know of any change. You say only the President can authorize the use of the enhanced radiation warhead and that would be done only after consultation with our NATO Allies. Now, I know that you can't set up any guidelines now, but we certainly would know when war is imminent. I would like to feel if that time approaches that it wouldn't require a consultation between the President and the NATO Allies before we would retaliate with inkind or like weapons if the Soviets would attack our airfields with nuclear weapons. I would like to feel that our commanders in NATO could immediately retaliate.

Do you think that would be, not a public decision, but a decision that we could come to sometime after discussion?

Mr. McGIFFERT. The arrangements we have with the allies in this regard tend to vary somewhat country by country but I think, generally speaking, Senator Goldwater, it is fair to say that our allies will wish to have a role in the decision whether to use nuclear weapons from their territory, and that desire is generally recognized in those agree

ments.

And I must say, given my hypothesis that the attack is taking place on their territory, it seems not an unreasonable desire on their part. Now, arrangements are always subject to the condition that time and circumstance permit, and I suppose that at a particular time that is in part a matter of judgment.

Senator GOLDWATER. It is nothing we can decide today.

I would like to suggest that sometime, Mr. Chairman, not im. mediately, that those of us who are interested in this particular subject sit down with some of the people in the Pentagon and discuss the procedure. I feel very strongly that if we have a delay of more than 12 hours in a decision that we won't be able to last more than 2 to 3 days with their continued use of tactical nukes while we figure out who we want to make mad or not make mad.

I thank you for your comments.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCINTYRE. Thank you Senator.
Senator GOLDWATER. I have to leave.

Senator MCINTYRE. I agree with you about the importance of that question. When I was out at SAC headquarters, I asked about the President's being available immediately. What if he wasn't avail able immediately? Well, the "looking glass" as we call it, that is up in the air, has the right to order our planes up. I am thinking of an intercontinental attack, of course.

[Deleted.]

Senator GOLDWATER. Yes. It even went so far, about 13 years ago, that we found out, after I got my tail kicked all over the United States [deleted].

I don't want that made public, but I do think a discussion on what General Haig would be faced with, say, if our airfields were attacked, that would be the first attack

Senator MCINTYRE. Well, I will ask Mr. Smith to see if he can't put together a forum sometime later in the year. We try to meet our deadlines on authorization.

Senator GOLDWATER. I appreciate that.

Senator MCINTYRE. I think it is a good idea not only for ourselves, but sometimes to make the military think through these things. All right, thank you, Senator.

Go ahead now with the DIA specialist, Maj. Bruce Wallace. Will you proceed to testify.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. BRUCE WALLACE, USAF, SOVIET FORCE DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST, DIA

Major WALLACE. Mr. Chairman, my testimony is top secret. If there are questions which go into a higher classification, we prefer to defer those until the next session.

I will be presenting a brief overview of Soviet nuclear forces which appear to be intended primarily for use in a theater conflict. Both longrange and short-range tactical Soviet nuclear capable delivery systems which could be employed in any future nuclear conflict in Europe or Asia will be discussed, though I will focus upon those nuclear forces opposite NATO.

I will highlight improvements which are underway in these forces and trends which we see in both quantity and quality of weapons systems. Where possible, I will comment upon Soviet R. & D. efforts which could result in the development of improved weapons systems. Mr. SMITH. Just for the record, will the Department of Defense vouch that all people in the room on your side of the table are properly cleared, and I do for those on this side.

Thank you.

Senator MCINTYRE. Proceed with your statement, Major Wallace.

SOVIET CONCEPTS ON NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT

Major WALLACE. A brief discussion of Soviet concepts on employment of nuclear weapons and some related command, control, and communications developments in Europe will be presented.

I have provided for the committee data sheets on the weapon systems which I will be addressing today for you to peruse as I go through my testimony.

Soviet nuclear capable forces for a theater conflict can be divided into two broad categories: The first is comprised of Soviet long-range peripheral attack forces located within the U.S.S.R. and adjacent sea areas which are intended for use against targets in a theater of war on the periphery of Soviet/Warsaw Pact territory. [Deleted.]

The second category consists of tactical systems which are generally of shorter range [deleted].

These tactical forces are located in East European (non-Soviet Warsaw Pact) countries as well as in the military districts of the U.S.S.R.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEM

First, I would like to discuss the tactical nuclear capable delivery systems which could support Soviet ground operations in a European or Asian conflict. These systems are available in Soviet ground, air, and naval forces. For the purposes of today's discussion, we can consider the tactical systems as falling into two range categories, shortrange battlefield systems and intermediate range systems.

The short-range nuclear capable ground systems available include [deleted] FROG unguided rocket launchers.

Senator MCINTYRE. What does unguided mean?

Major WALLACE. There is no guidance once they are launched.
Senator MCINTYRE. Just aim them?

Major WALLACE. Yes; and their accuracy reflects that.
Senator MCINTYRE. Do they still have them on the line?

Major WALLACE. Yes, sir.

Senator MCINTYRE. What was their IOC?

INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

Major WALLACE. The initial operational capability of the FROG was in the late 1950's and the one that is most widely deployed was introduced in 1963.

Mr. SMITH. Is that yield [deleted]?

Major WALLACE. [Deleted.]

Mr. SMITH. [Deleted] is the smallest yield?

Major WALLACE. As far as we know. This is, as you know, an old system. The new version of Frog-7 was introduced in 1965.

It has a maximum range of [deleted] and a CEP of [deleted] meters. [Deleted] rockets are expected to be available for each Frog launcher, approximately [deleted] percent of which are estimated to have nuclear warheads available. [Deleted.]

The Scud shortage ballistic missile falls in the intermediate range category. The first version of the Scud reached IOC in 1957 and the second version in 1961. The second version, the Scud B, has a range of [deleted] and a CEP of [deleted] meters. The last of the Scud family, the KY-3 Scud, was initially deployed in 1965. It's range is [deleted], but a poorer CEP of [deleted] meters results. [Deleted] Scud missiles are expected to be available to each launcher, [deleted] of which are estimated to have nuclear warheads available. Some [deleted] Scud launchers are available for use in Europe.

REPLACEMENT FOR SCUD

We have been seeing evidence of the development of a replacement for the Scud system for several years. [Deleted.] In addition to improved range and accuracy we believe it will be a solid propellant system with a faster reaction time and better reliability.

The Scaleboard, the first solid propellant ballistic missile, became operational in 1965. It has never been deployed outside of the Soviet