GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE The ground-launched cruise missile, or GLCM, is currently under development. It has a number of useful features and some limitations in the theater role. Survivability should be satisfactory due to its mobility. [Deleted.] With an appropriate warhead now under study, the ability to attack a variety of targets should be acceptable. With [deleted] commensurate with its high accuracy, [deleted] collateral damage can be limited. The potential for safety and security of the warhead with a modern PAL is excellent. SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE The sea-launched cruise missile, or SLCM, shares many of the char acteristics of the GLCM. Since the GLCM was extensively discussed with you last year, I will not discuss it further today. FURTHER MODERNIZATION OPTIONS In addition to the cruise missiles now under development, considerations are being given to a medium-range ballistic missile; [deleted] kilometer range. We will be giving this more attention during the preparation of the fiscal year 1980 budget request to Congress. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to break to request Mr. Haas, who testified to you on Tuesday, to describe our findings on a cost and operational effectiveness comparison of the Pershing II and GLCM weapon systems. Senator MCINTYRE. You have told us now what we have on the ground over there, ready to go? General PALERMO. Yes, sir. Senator MCINTYRE. You have also told us of all these improvements. General PALERMO. Yes. Senator MCINTYRE. Are any of these improvements underway! General PALERMO. Mr. Chairman, the answer is "Yes." Senator MCINTYRE. Will you indicate what improvements are underway? I don't mean the President's decision the other day, but what was underway 4 or 6 months ago. I would like to know how much was ongoing 6 months ago on these improvements, the new shell for the 155 and the rest. General PALERMO. Yes; we will provide you that information for the record. [The information follows:] ONGOING PROGRAMS 6 MONTHS AGO All theater nuclear programs discussed in my statement were ongoing 6 months ago. Of course, the President's decision on ER has affected the nature of the improved 8-inch round and the improved Lance warhead. General PALERMO. Major General Bratton will also be discussing the present improvements in the nuclear rounds following Mr. Haas. Senator MCINTYRE. Mr. Haas? STATEMENT OF PETER HAAS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY Mr. HAAS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you and present our findings on a cost and operational effectiveness comparison of the Pershing II (PII) and groundlaunched cruise missle (GLCM) weapon systems. As you know, the Pershing II weapon system is currently scheduled for its Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council, DSÅRC II, review in July of this year. At DSARC II, the Defense Department must determine whether the Pershing II should enter engineering development. At the request of the Department of the Army and the Under Secretary for Defense Research and Engineering, DNA has supported the DSARC process by preparing the required Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis, or COEA. In the Pershing II COEA, some 13 weapon systems options, including ground and sealaunched ballistic missiles; air, sea and ground-launched cruise missiles; and land and sea-based dual capable aircraft were compared on a cost and effectiveness basis. The draft of this COEA will be delivered to the Under Secretary on Friday, April 14. The report you will hear today represents a subset, a very limited subset, of the overall COEA effort and was requested as a separate document by the Under Secretary. This report, which compares two Pershing II options and one GLCM option, was delivered on April 3. The technical approach taken in this report consisted of addressing six major areas for each weapon system option: System characteristics, missions and targets, costs, prelaunch survivability, probability of arrival, and effectiveness. In our analysis, every effort has been made to insure all systems are compared in a consistent manner. This has been difficult because there exists wide disparity in the degree of each system's definition. The Pershing II options have drawn on the experience of almost 20 years of Pershing I deployment and are thus quite well defined. The GLCM, on the other hand, is an entirely new system and thus contains inherently greater uncertainties. Where uncertainty exists in major parameters, the inclusion of multiple scenarios and additional excursions has served to quantify their sensitivities. We believe we can demonstrate that each system possesses unique capabilities which complement each other and stress the Warsaw Pact defense force in complementary ways. In addition, we have found that the addition of either system will improve the capability of the NATO theater nuclear force and that the addition of both types of system would produce additional effectiveness synergisms. Finally, I want to point out that this briefing still only represents preliminary findings, especially since the ground-launched cruise missile basing concept has not yet been firmly determined. Additionally, I would like to point out that neither the Army nor the Air Force have had enough time to thoroughly review our conclusions and that this briefing does not necessarily meet their concurrence. Now with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I have prepared an intensive statement which I would like to offer for the record and at this point I would like to use some visual aid material to summarize some findings. [The statement follows:] PERSHING II-GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE COMPARISON—SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS In the area of system characteristics, a detailed description of each weapon system was developed. This included a description of the missile, its ground support equipment and manning requirements, and its deployment mode and operational concept. The principal characteristics of each system are summarized below. The PERSHING II is a two-stage ballistic missile. It utilizes a maneuverable reentry vehicle and radar area correlator guidance (RADAG). [Deleted.] The PII systems are each configured with one missile mounted on a launch vehicle. PERSHING II is a manpower intensive system, utilizing approximately 3,800 men for 108 missiles on launchers. The Army plans to deploy a PERSHING II brigade in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); this brigade will consist of three missile battalions of 36 missile launchers each. Finally, PII is a fully mobile system. That is, the entire brigade and all of its support can move to the field and operate indefinitely, without being dependent upon fixed bases for support. The GLCM is a Tomahawk cruise missile which is modified to be launched from a truck; it utilizes terrain contour map correlation guidance. [Deleted] nautical miles from the last fix. Recent test data indicate the accuracy will be about the same as that stated for PERSHING II. In contrast to PII, the GLCM will deploy four missiles on each launch vehicle, and will not be as manpower intensive. [Deleted.] The GLCM is a mobile system, but is planned to be dependent upon its main operating base (MOB) for much of its support. Unlike PII, it cannot operate in the field for extended periods of time without support from the MOB. Two system excursions were considered in the analysis. One considered PII with two new missiles per launcher and the second considered GLCM deployed in a more mobile mode of operation. MISSIONS AND TACTICS In the area of missions and targets, all systems were evaluated for each of three missions important to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). These include the general nuclear release (GNR), the selective nuclear release (SNR) and the general support missions. A target data base was developed which consisted of both fixed and non-fixed targets. [Deleted.] The non-fixed target set contained a total of targets, and was developed from a hypothetical deployment of Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact ground forces. [Deleted.] A separate analysis of time-urgent targets determined that, for some targets, PERSHING's short time of flight could be a significant advantage. For the re maining cases, system responsiveness was not an issue. Finally, all systems were found to decrease collateral damage. [Deleted.] The PII earth penetrator, which was used to attack hard point targets, was determined to be very effective in reducing collateral damage. COSTS Life cycle costs (LCC) were developed for each system. These include research and development (R&D), procurement, and operations and support (O&S) costs for 10 years of level-off operations. All costs were expressed in fiscal year 1978 dollars, with costs prior to fiscal year 1979 considered sunk. Costs associated with the nuclear warheads (with the exception of special nuclear material costs), were included. [Deleted.] PRELAUNCH SURVIVABILITY Prelaunch survivability (PLS) assessments are highly scenario dependent. For his reason, weapon system PLS was calculated under four separate scenarios. 'he first scenario used was that of a nuclear attack against NATO with no arning. The second scenario assumed a Pact nuclear attack after 24-48 hours of arning. Next, a three-day conventional war following five days of warning was ostulated. Finally, the conventional war scenario was extended to include a 'act nuclear attack following the conventional conflict. [Deleted.] Finally, it should be noted that the absolute PLS numbers have uncertainties ssociated with them. The standard deviations associated with these numbers, owever, do not overlap. Therefore, the relative PLS comparisons between PII nd GLCM are considered. PROBABILITY TO PENETRATE Probability to penetrate (PTP) is the most sensitive parameter affecting the ssue of GLCM operational effectiveness. Two threat estimates were used in the TP analysis. The baseline threat was developed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). [Deleted.] As an excursion, a second threat was developed. Deleted.] Because cruise missile penetrability may be sensitive to raid size, flight tactics mployed, and defense countermeasures, four penetration scenarios were deeloped. The first scenario assumed perfect penetrability, or complete defense uppression, and thus served as a bounding case. In addition, scenarios incorpoating varied raid sizes and flight tactics appropriate for each of the three misions (GNR, SNR, and GS) discussed earlier were developed. [Deleted.] It is noted that ongoing cruise missile survivability tests should greatly reduce he uncertainty in cruise missile penetrability. EFFECTIVENESS As mentioned earlier, three types of effectiveness analysis were performed. In the pure force effectiveness analysis, each missile system was used to attack the target sets in order to determine the minimum number of missiles required to lestroy a fraction of each target class. The results were determined in number of missiles per high priority target destroyed, and took into account prelaunch survivability, weapon system reliability, probability to penetrate, and desired damage expectancy. In the mixed force effectiveness analysis, a postulated theater nuclear force inventory for the 1987 time period was used to attack the target set, and each missile system added parametrically in order to determine the added effectiveness to the overall theater force. Finally, life cycle cost estimates were incorported with the results of the effectiveness analysis in order to arrive at a set of overall cost effectiveness estimates. [Deleted.] A number of conclusions and observations can be made as a result of this analysis. First, the uncertainties inherent in GLCM development probably prohibit an authoritative statement concerning comparative Pershing II/GLCM cost effectiveness at this time. However, it can be concluded that each system possesses unique, complementary capabilities. Next, the addition of either system will increase the effectiveness of the overall theater nuclear force, with the addition of a mix of both systems producing synergisms in effectiveness. [Deleted.] Finally, both types of system should continue in development at least until greater certainty concerning their comparative cost and operational effectiveness can be attained. Senator MCINTYRE. Proceed. PURPOSE TO PRESENT THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES AFFECT- • PERSHING II (PII) BASELINE (PII B) MISSILE PERSHING II EXTENDED RANGE (PII XR) MISSILE GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (GLCM) (IN TWO POSSIBLE BASING SCHEMES) Mr. HAAS. What I am proposing to do, Mr. Chairman, is to present the principal issues by which we are comparing Pershing II baseline missile, an extended range Pershing II XR missile, and the groundlaunched cruise missile in two possible basing schemes. First of all, the characteristics of the two systems, [deleted]. PERSHING II CHARACTERISTICS Pershing II has one missile per launcher. It is what we call a manpower intensive system; [deleted]. It is a fully mobile system, independent of fixed bases for support. GLCM CHARACTERISTICS Now the GLCM is to use the Tomahawk cruise missile. That is the submarine-launched cruise missile using the terrain contour map correlation and guidance system. [Deleted] to that of the Pershing II. GLCM will use four missiles per launcher. In the present basing modes that are proposed, it would use considerably fewer men than Pershing; [deleted] men for [deleted] missiles and launchers. [Deleted.] MISSIONS AND TARGETS ALL SYSTEMS EVALUATED FOR THREE MISSIONS • GENERAL NUCLEAR RELEASE (GNR) • SELECTIVE NUCLEAR RELEASE (SNR) • GENERAL SUPPORT (GS) TARGET DATA BASE CONSISTS OF FIXED AND [DELETED] |