Admiral SHAPIRO. I will have to figure it out. I gave it in nautical miles. Mr. SMITH. Could you for the record; we are trying to make sure we understand. This would indicate that the C-4 would be substantially longer range than the MIRV'ed SSN-18. Admiral WERTHEIM. If I may, the range of the missile, of the Trident I, is [deleted] miles or more, but that is not with the full payload. That would be associated with offloading reentry bodies. Mr. SMITH. That is the discrepancy. Thank you. Admiral WERTHEIM. Yes, sir. Dr. ZEIBERG. The design point is [deleted] miles, as a matter of fact. That may be the number General Brown quoted. Mr. SMITH. Perhaps for the record you could provide an apples to apples comparison. Senator MCINTYRE. How many warheads on each, Admiral? Admiral WERTHEIM. I can only speak of the Trident I, Mr. Chairman. It has a full payload of [deleted] warheads and the option for removing warheads in exchange for increased range. Senator MCINTYRE. Mr. Shapiro, what is the story? Admiral SHAPIRO. Mr. Chairman, we expect it to have Admiral SHAPIRO. [Deleted.] Sentor MCINTYRE. What is the throw-weight of each of the two missiles? Admiral WERTHEIM. I would like to provide that for the record, to be precise. Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, it would be helpful, perhaps, if we could enter this chart that is in General Brown's posture statement into the record at this point, and ask the two admirals to comment on it to make sure that the comparisons are apples to apples. [The information follows:] Admiral WERTHEIM. The following chart displays the effect on range as reentry bodies are reduced, and the payloads associated with the numbers of reentry bodies: Senator MCINTYRE. What is the yield, what is the CEP and which is the higher achievement in SLBM technology? Can you testify to that? Admiral WERTHEIM. I think, Mr. Chairman, the Trident I represents the currently available technology in this country and certainly in the areas of the microelectronics and the guidance technology that is in there. That is, I think, generally acknowledged to be substantially advanced over anything that is available in the Soviet Union. I think we can similarly claim that the solid propellant technology that is reflected in the Trident I is superior to that that has been demonstrated by the missiles in the Soviet Union. Mr. SMITH. Dr. Zeiberg, is that your assessment as well? Dr. ZEIBERG. Yes; I expect we have a higher level of achievement. I would like to point out, for the record, that the SS-N-18 does have features such as a [deleted] and so forth, but probably not in the same [deleted] league as we have. Senator MCINTYRE. Admiral Shapiro, what is the range of the single RV version of the SS-N-18? Admiral SHAPIRO. Mr. Chairman, I believe that is the version that was actually fired to the [deleted] NM range. I think I was probably in error when I talked about the multiple reentry vehicle. It would be something less than that, something on the order of [deleted] I would like to verify that and submit it for the record. Senator MCINTYRE. Admiral Wertheim, if we chose to modify the Trident I and put a single warhead on it, approximately what range could you achieve with it? Admiral WERTHEIM. It depends upon what warhead we choose, Mr. Chairman. Assuming any warhead that we developed for this missile, which is the Trident I, [deleted] warhead. Mr. SMITH. Say a [deleted] warhead or [deleted]. Admiral WERTHEIM. There is no room up there for such a warhead. There is no volume available for carrying a warhead that large. So the question really doesn't apply. The largest warhead that we have developed the Trident I for is [deleted] and of course we could carry substantially more than one of them to [deleted] NM. That is the design limit range for the missile. So the answer is [deleted] NM but then you would have payload to spare. Mr. SMITH. When you get it to an apples and apples comparison the C-4 is clearly a longer range missile for roughly equivalent force loading to the extent one can compare them with the SS-N-18? Dr. ZEIBERG. The reentry bodies for the SS-N-18 are [deleted] the reentry bodies on the C-4. I believe they are [deleted]. Why don't we provide for the record a comparison of the equivalent megatons and the parameters of measure that tend to eliminate the design features that seem to be obfuscating the answers. Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Senator MCINTYRE. Admiral Wertheim, do you have a development schedule for the Trident II, which your current request assumes? Admiral WERTHEIM. Yes, sir, I do. We have a nominal schedule which is compatible with availability date of [deleted]. Senator MCINTYRE. According to the plans protected by your budget request this year, when would you enter advance development? Admiral WERTHEIM. In fiscal year 1980, Mr. Chairman. Senator MCINTYRE. When would you enter full scale? When would you first flight test? What would be your approximate IOC? Admiral WERTHEIM. The IOC, as I indicated, would be [deleted]. The first flight test would be just a moment, sir-approximately 3 years before that, [deleted]. Mr. SMITH. [Deleted.] Admiral WERTHEIM. Yes, sir. Senator MCINTYRE. When would you enter full scale development? Admiral WERTHEIM. [Deleted], I believe. Senator MCINTYRE. Now, if you were provided the funds and direction, how much could you accelerate each of these milestones? Admiral WERTHEIM. Well, obviously if we were provided the funds we could start development tomorrow, but I think that may not be what you had in mind, Mr. Chairman. I don't think there are any laws of nature that would prevent us from starting immediately. What I would have to caution about, though, is that we would not have the technology in hand, if we started tomorrow, to provide a great deal of confidence about our ability to achieve the accuracies that I have shown in my presentation. To a considerable extent these accuracies I am projecting reflect the completion of the accuracy improvement technology program. So, while we could undertake the development of the Trident II missile almost right away, we would have to say though that the accuracy improvement would be what we got rather than being able to specify an accuracy and commit ourselves to meeting that. Senator MCINTYRE. To meet that schedule for the Trident II, on which you have just given a rundown, how soon would you need to flight test candidate RV's? Admiral WERTHEIM. If the RV selected was one which had already been developed we wouldn't need to flight test any sooner than we flight tested the missile. Mr. SMITH. Could you provide for the record any other candidates that General Bratton mentioned and then describe which would require flight testing and whether you would have to flight test them separately prior to the flight test that you mentioned? Admiral WERTHEIM. Yes, sir, I will. Mr. SMITH. In [deleted]. Admiral WERTHEIM. Yes, sir. [The information follows:] In order to achieve an IOC of [deleted] flight testing of a candidate new RV would need to begin as early as [deleted] depending on the candidate chosen for deployment. Senator MCINTYRE. Dr. Zeiberg, would you know of any provision in the current U.S. negotiating position at SALT which, if adopted, would inhibit the planned or even accelerated development of the Trident II? Dr. ZEIBERG. No; I don't believe there is any inhibition in connection with SLBM's. Senator MCINTYRE. Check it for the record. Dr. ZEIBERG. The last summary of the joint draft statements I saw had no inhibitions. Senator MCINTYRE. Admiral Wertheim, as I recall the primary original rationale for Trident II was that it would enhance the survivability of the Trident system by enabling the submarine to patrol at greater areas of the ocean and thereby compounding the Soviet ASW problem. Could you elaborate briefly on that? Admiral KELLN. Our studies indicate, Mr. Chairman, that ranges in excess of the current Trident I ranges of 4,000 to [deleted] miles would have marginal gain in prelaunch survivability for our force. It is a matter of geography that ranges in excess of [deleted] miles would not be that productive, percentage wise, and therefore would be unnecessary. Mr. SMITH. So the range in question here is [deleted] rather than 4,000. Just to clarify the conclusion of that study, you concluded you would get only marginal utility beyond [deleted]. Admiral KELLN. That is correct because we do have the option to reduce RV loading to increase Trident I range out to [deleted] miles. We see little utility in talking about a range of [deleted] miles. Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Senator MCINTYRE. You testified that both mid-course-updated and terminal sensor approaches to SLBM accuracy improvement might be susceptible to countermeasures. Would you briefly describe these vulnerabilities? Admiral WERTHEIM. The nature of the countermeasures I had in mind were largely jamming, where we are depending upon electromagnetic communications with the missile whether it be from a satellite or from the missile itself to the ground. Those communications could be interfered with by electronic jamming. Another form of countermeasure might be attack on the satellite itself, should that be the guidance aid that is being used. That sort of thing. Mr. SMITH. Admiral, you talked about accuracy improvements, due to SLBM technology. In your improved accuracy program you have been scrutinizing some technologies related to the navigation system of the submarine. Do you continue to investigate any promising technologies in that area that might add to the vulnerability of the submarine itself? Admiral WERTHEIM. Let me perhaps correct an incorrect impression I might have left with you. The accuracy improvements I have been discussing have assumed improvements in all of those areas, navigation, fire control, as well as missile guidance itself. So let me add that at the outset. Over and above that, there are some techniques that are being examined in the navigation area, particularly, which do have the po tential for adding detection capability of vulnerability to the submarine if this isn't done exactly right. What I have in mind specifically is a type of [deleted] which would help pin down more precisely the submarines [deleted]. We are very concerned. We are very aware of the vulnerability question and we certainly would not move in any new direction without having given that very careful consideration. STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. ALBERT L. KELLN, USN, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR SUBMARINE WARFARE Admiral KELLN. I don't want to mislead you that we have, for instance, designed new, low cost SSBN's but there are considerations which are worthy of review, and things that are ongoing which I would like to bring to your attention. I will discuss briefly three areas. The reduced cost consideration. That is philosophical approach, the same sort of considerations we went through in coming up to the characteristics for the Trident submarine, things that reduce the cost of the overall force, and when we look at the individual elements and worry about that cost, but if we could do the job more effectively, within a force, and reduce those costs significantly, that is, to reduce numbers, those things should be more of concern, too, and then I will just briefly touch on some developing technologies. REDUCED COST CONSIDERATIONS • REDUCE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY DECREASE SSBN SIZE • EFFICIENT BUILDING RATES STABLE EMPLOYMENT LEVELS • MULTI-SHIP BUYS OF EQUIPMENT • DESIRE EFFECTIVE 30 YR INVESTMENT PRODUCT • UNPREDICTABLE THREAT • UNPREDICTABLE NATIONAL TARGETING NEEDS • PREDICTABLE INCREASED RELIANCE ON SEA-BASED LAUNCHERS The things that are considerations as far as reduced cost considerations, we obviously could reduce the cost of an SSBN if we affected its offensive capability, changed its size, and I will discuss those in more detail. Many of the things that reduce cost of the SSBN in the force area is the fact that we approach the shipbuilding program from a stable, logical, planned, predictable point of view. We have not done that. It is difficult to do that with varying building rates, it prevents the shipyard from having stable employment levels, prevents them prebuying multiple-ship buys of equipment, metal supplies, and so on; therefore, we inherently increase the cost of our SSBN's by the way we authorize our ships. |