cost-effective ways to build SSBN's, whether they be the current submarines or future ones.

The other part of that question is that we do look at

Senator MCINTYRE. There has been no serious effort? I would like to know why there hasn't been a serious effort.

Admiral KELLN. Efforts have gone on. This committee was furnished the results of the study of how to reduce the cost of the overall force. I think the studies that we provided you very dramatically indicate that for a given mission that the Trident II missile with the larger throw weight, using the capability of the current submarines, is by far the more efficient low-cost method of approach.

Senator MCINTYRE. Do you feel that the original request was ill conceived even at the time of submission, even though it had been disciplined by the executive budget process and was supported both by President Nixon and Secretary Schlesinger? What specific flaws in the request can you identify?

Admiral KELLN. I would like to think on that answer and provide that for the record.

Senator MCINTYRE. You mean you would like to answer that for the record?

Admiral KELLN. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

There has not been a serious effort since 1974 to reinstitute the fiscal year 1975 budget request to support concept and design studies for a smaller SSBN. That program was considered premature and deleted from the fiscal year 1975 budget by Congress. The SSBN-X program was formally cancelled by the Secretary of Defense in August 1974 based upon preliminary studies which indicated that such a submarine, envisioned as carrying 16 Trident I (C-4) missiles, was not competitive with the Trident design.

The results of these studies showed a submarine which would cost up to 75 percent the cost of a Trident submarine without having either the growth room for advanced missile systems of greater range, payload and accuracy; or for the quieting improvements which will be incorporated in Trident. We were therefore facing a system, in SSBN-X, which would cost more than Trident on a missile tube at sea basis and would be significantly less cost-effective than Trident on a missile weight at sea basis. The latter is due to the ability of the Trident missile tube to accept future growth in missile size.

The Secretary of Defense, in cancelling the SSBN-X Program, initiated an SSBN Subsystem Technology Program which is designed to investigate technologies which might be productive in increasing the cost-effectiveness of future sea-based deterrent systems through lower cost of subsystems.

Senator MCINTYRE. All right.

Without objection. I would like to insert the descriptive summary the Department of Defense submitted to this committee in support of that request for fiscal year 1975.

[The information follows:]

FISCAL YEAR 1975 R;D.T. & E. DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY

PROGRAM ELEMENT: 68588N; TITLE: IMPROVED 88BN ; CATEGORY: ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT; BUDGET ACTIVITY: 5-SHIPS, SMALL CRAFT AND RELATED EQUIPMENT; PROJECT: B4667 IMPROVED SSBN

Background and description. The program element is a new start and consists of concept and design studies for a new, smaller SSBN to complement the Trident in providing a higher survivable deterrent forec with a "High/Low" capabilities mix of missiles and submarines. This SSBN will be designed to replace some of the Polaris/Poseidon submarines not replaced by Trident, and at a lower

nitial acquisition cost. Additionally, this pain would permit more extended se of the Trident I (C-4) missiles as the Trident II missile becomes available or the Trident submarine and the last of the Polaris/Poseidon SSBNs are etired. These SSBNs are expected to be larger than our current SSBNs and maller than Trident, and will incorporate many state of the art improvements now included in Trident. Although lacking the missile growth room and space for uture technological improvements available with the Trident submarine, this mproved SSBN will provide significant increases in effectiveness over our present SSBN submarines.

Related activities.-Trident Submarine System (Program Element 64560N, Project 1519), Trident Missile System (Program Element 64363N, Project 81509), Fleet Ballistic Missile System (Program Element 11221N, Project 1310), Reactor Propulsion Plants (Program Element 63501N, Project S4604), SSN 688 Class Program.

Work performed by.-Trident Project Office (Project Management and Principal Development Activity); Naval Ship Systems Command and Strategic Systems Projects Office (Supporting Activities). This is a new Program Element. Other government activities and contractor participants have not been selected. Program accomplishments and future programs.—

1. Fiscal Year 1974 and prior.—NA.

2. Fiscal Year 1975 planned program.-Program initiation is planned for fiscal year 1975. Commence Advanced Development studies to define propulsion plant design, Strategic Weapon System design in support of Trident I (C-4) missile interfaces, and the overall design concept and feasibility of an improved SSBN. 3. Program to completion.-Development and design studies initiated in Fiscal Year 1975 will be completed. Initiation of full scale development will depend on a decision to proceed once the advanced development effort is complete. 4. Milestones:

a. Program initiation: Date, upon congressional approval; estimated cumulative cost to reach milestones, 0.

Senator MCINTYRE. Admiral Kaufman, you were involved at the very genesis of the Trident system. As you recollect, what were the major choices which DOD made in the design of the submarines? In particular, what choices did you make for enhanced capability which would substantially increase the cost of the boat?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Well, listening to what I just have been hearing sounds like we are back to 1971 on some of the questions-depth, all these other things. Among the choices that were made that substantially increased the cost of the submarine, the size, of course, was the biggest. The number of missile tubes that were looked at did notthey increased the cost of the submarine, but on looking at the so-called cost-effectiveness basis, they reduced the size of the force that was then planned, 10 submarines.

I think one thing that might be well to touch on here is to point up that we did look in fact at greater numbers of tubes than 24. We looked at number of tubes from 2 to 32, and the 2 was a nonstarter. It involved missiles that were 140 inches in diameter, and I don't think the missile would fly, hydrodynamically, according to Admiral Wertheim. We looked at it because we responded to the wishes of every adversary

group in Washington, I believe, and I think we had over 100-someI don't remember the exact number of various models.

We had everything to fit everything, and you could practically say they were very resilient designs because they were rubber submarines. We had them from 2 tubes to 32. The 32-tube ship was an arbitrary number, and we kind of found a flat on the curve of cost effectiveness somewhere between 22, as I recall, and about 32 tubes.

There are some people in the systems analysis business who would have had us put more tubes on the ship. They would have had us put on so many tubes we would have had to dig another river to launch the submarines. So we got down to somewhat a subjective judgment, compromising, if you will, between cost effectiveness and practicality, the same thing we did with Polaris.

There is nothing magic about 16 tubes. A lot of people thought we ought to continue 16 tubes in Trident because by that time the Russians, the French, and the British also had 16 tubes. Just for that rationale. We did in fact look at the cost effectiveness. I think, had the original Polaris been designed and built only by missile designers, you would find it would have had 24 missile tubes or 20 instead of 16. But those designers acceded somewhat to the desire of crusty old submarines, who were much older than I am now, but who thought the submarine was getting too big. So there was some compromise. Only in those days we didn't have all the systems analysis groups looking into cost effectiveness.

We made the ship have 24 missile tubes. We in the uniform Navy would have liked it perhaps to have 20 missile tubes. Other things drove the size larger and larger, in a desire to have that growth room. For one thing, larger advanced reentry vehicles that we could see coming down the pike, as envisioned by the ABRES system. Things that would [deleted] and get additional range, and things that might have to maneuver against a sophisticated ABM.

But things that really drove the costs up were the size of the ship, and that is driven by two things. It is a combination. You can't say it is all missile. You can't say it is all powerplant. It is a combination of the two.

We did set up a speed that we called for of [deleted] knots as what we felt was a fairly essential speed for the types of threats we could see, and to protect the submariners in their maneuvers, to overcome casualties you would have, and all this sort of thing. So you make the missile tub bigger, to get that speed you make the propulsion plant bigger, and the combination then makes the ship more expensive. And if you say what drives the cost of the ship, really size and complexity. If we could prove it is more cost effective to put 40 missile tubes on the submarine; but, as you start doing that you recall, Mr. Chairman, one of the biggest complaints we had from a number of adversary groups was that we were putting too many eggs in one basket.

There were many who would have had us going back to 16 tubes so we could have an eventual 41-ship force, the same force level we have today, and have more dispersion, and so forth. So it is kind of a indgmental compromise between cost effectiveness, having enough flexibility with ships, and then you look really at what happens when you

tart overhauling the ships. If you get too small a force level, and you tart running into trouble with shipyards and getting ships out on ime, suddenly you don't have a force at sea.,

That is a whole lot more than you asked for, but basically the size and the complexity is what drives it.

Senator MCINTYRE. We will now move to the ELF discussion. I see no reason why Admiral Shapiro and why Admiral Wertheim and Admiral Kelln need to remain, but I think probably Dr. Zeiberg would ike to remain.

All right, Admiral, we are always glad to welcome Admiral Kaufman, who is long experienced in this particular program, and in the program we have been looking at, Trident submarines, is as well, known to the subcommittee.

In the interest of time, we would appreciate a summary of the situation with ELF today. Hit any high spots you think need to be highlighted, since we last met on this question, then we have a number of questions we would like to ask you.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. ROBERT Y. KAUFMAN, USN, DIRECTOR, COMMAND AND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

Admiral KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have a very lengthy prepared statement which I would like to submit for the record at this time. Senator MCINTYRE. Without objection, it will be entered in the record at this time.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. ROBERT Y. Kaufman, DIRECTOR, COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen: I am Vice Admiral Robert Y. Kaufman, U.S. Navy, Director of Command and Control and Communications for the Navy within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

It may be useful for a minute or two to briefly run through the means by which we communicate with our submarines, as a backdrop to a discussion of the ELF system which, as you know so well, is much needed but also caught up with political controversy.

The Navy's strategic role in our strategic deterrent posture dictates a survivaole communications system for relay of nuclear control orders to U.S. ballistic missile submarines. Communications survivability is achieved principally hrough redundancy of stations and multiple media i.e., very low frequency (VLF), low frequency (LF), high frequency (HF), ultra-high and super-high requency (UHF SHF), transmissions from land based stations, ships at sea and aircraft and satellites.

A dedicated force of TACAMO aircraft, the Hercules (C-130) workhorse of pur military aircraft, is utilized as the primary survivable system for relay of uclear control orders. The TALCAMO system is linked with land and airborne command posts which provide multiple frequency input connectivity in the VLF through UHF spectrum.

TACAMO transmits a 200 KW highly jam resistant VLF signal. TACAMO transmissions are utilized as a primary source of nuclear control order delivery to all strategic submarines and the CINCEUR airborne command post and are monitored as a backup link by Air Force ground command posts.

TACAMO is a system which we are currently addressing with a very sharp ye towards our needs for the future as well as our near term problems, especially as we introduce TRIDENT into the Pacific. We got into trouble in this system permitting it to "gracefully degrade," numbers-wise, during the years when the Department of Defense was viewing the very hard SANGUINE (ELF)

system as the keystone of surviving communications to our deterrent forces During those years, we drew down TACAMO assets in one command to keep 24-hour airborne capability in another, and with the change in concepts-shifting from the very hard SANGUINE to the soft and less survivable SEAFARER system-our planning and budgeting has hardly kept pace with the ravages of time and accidents. This year's request, for example, contains as the largest Navy capital expense item in the request before you the replacement of the TACAMO EC-130 aircraft which crashed in the Pacific last year.

An additional setback occurred last year with the denial of $6.1 million from the budget which was requested to conduct a service life extension program (SLEP) for our older aircraft to maintain the TACAMO force into the early '1980s. This reduction resulted largely from an investigative staff report which indicated that this expenditure could be postponed by decreasing the number of flight hours flown. In a parallel action, $1.2M was deleted from flight hour funding. The House Appropriations Committee directed us to examine the cost and operational aspects of TACAMO in ground versus airborne posture. Early in this process, it became apparent that three of the older aircraft (one of which was lost) under even a most austere flight schedule could not be retained in a serviceable condition in fiscal year 1978 without a SLEP maintenance. We were subsequently allowed to reprogram to start the SLEP în fiscal year 1978 That program must be completed as scheduled. We now completed two major studies in the TACAMO program; a Navy TACAMO staff study which deals largely with program and operational issues such as force levels, TRIDENT support and management, and a TACAMO operational posture study (TOPS) which examines the cost and operational aspects of ground alert versus gir borne alert as directed by the Congress last year.

The small but very significant improvements we did make to the TACAMO system in the recent years have resulted in many-fold advancements which guarantee delivery of the all-important execution message to our POLARIS POSEIDON submarines. Its VLF transmission capabilities are superior to those of any other airborne command post. Frequent JCS tests continue to point up the very great effectiveness of our communications to our deterrent submarines. The studies conducted in the past year have enabled us to establish a firm pregram baseline from which effective and steady improvement in this system can be expected.

EXTREMELY LOW FREQUENCY (ELF)

As effective as our communications are to our submarines in the day-to-day environment, they leave something to be desired in that none of the systems avai able to us today free our submarines from the requirement to have an antenna of or near the surface. As mobile as our SSNs and SSBNs are, none are free to ex ploit the full envelope of their capabilities because of the levy placed by cur rent communications equipments for near surface operations. I have discussed this weakness before both Houses of the Congress since 1972; the facts have not changed. The real problem in ELF is not technical-it works! Our testing over the past few years has revealed impressive results. While it is, of course, a low data rate system, it has great operational value to our SSNs and SSBNs. This has been demonstrated even with the slower data rate test system in oper ation in Wisconsin today. Environmental and ecological/biological concerns have been addressed in over 50 studies; the National Acadamy of Sciences has in an independent appraisal of all ELF work available-not just that done by the Navy-reported that the very low fields caused by the ELF system (and the one under study was the very large SEAFARER system), were not a cause of con cern. The Acadamy did cite a concern for a potential shock hazard under cer tain situations; however, the report stated that correction was a function of design and encouraged the Navy to make such correction. This, of course, is being accomplished and will be submitted to appropriate State review bodies prior to commencement of construction. The real problem, now as in past years, is in my view purely political. Some opposition groups undoubtedly have a genuine fear for the potential of damage by this system despite the inability of er periments to show such damage. This is understandable. In other opposition groups, it is obvious when one strips down the argumentation that the nub of the opposition lies in an anti-war, anti-nuclear, anti-military sentiment with strong reflection of distrust of government.

Since my appearance before this Committee last year, the following things significance have occurred :