Hearings, Reports and Prints of the Senate Committee on Armed Services

Also present: George H. Foster, Edward B. Kenney, and E. George Riedel, professional staff members; Betty Mayo, clerical assistant; Charles Stevenson, assistant to Senator Culver; Bill Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; and Ron Lehman, assistant to Senator Bartlett.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR CULVER, CHAIRMAN

Senator CULVER. Good afternoon.

The subcommittee meets today to hear testimony on the Army's tank programs. Senator Bartlett and I have been monitoring the Army's tank programs for the past three fiscal years and have followed the evolution of the XM-1 tank, the M-60A3 product improved tank, and the M-48 tank modification. While we have made I think many inquiries into the proper plan for the Army's tank programs, we have generally deferred to the Army's judgment on these issues. I have always had not only the Army's strength and effectiveness in mind, but also the cost effectiveness of these programs for the taxpayer who is required to pay for these programs.

During this period when I have been specifically reviewing the Army's tank program, I have learned to have a wary concern about the Army's programs and presentations. I have tried to look at the Army's tank programs with some reasonableness and practical judg ment, but all too frequently these programs appear to be based on judgments and promises that, frankly, have not been fulfilled.

Each of the past 3 years the committee has expressed its concern with the Army's behind schedule tank production. Each year the Army has promised that it had a catch up schedule to recover its deliveries. Last year, as I recall, the Army was some 135 tanks behind. This year I understand it is nearly 300 tanks behind schedule, and still advising the committee of a catch up schedule.

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During the fiscal year 1977 budget hearing, I proposed the possibility of the Army's developing a hybrid turret that was capable of accepting the 120-millimeter gun. I was advised that a hybrid turret would cost more, add weight, and delay the program and that the Army saw no requirement for a hybrid turret at that time. A few months later, the Secretary of the Army directed the contractors to delay the program and provide an XM-1 design to be built with a hybrid turret. In 1975 I discussed with General De Puy the problem of common threat, trying to get some agreement on common tactics between the United States and NATO forces. In 1976 I discussed this issue again with General Baer. Last year General Cooksey, as I recall, advised me that the Army and the Germans had agreed on the common threat but had not agreed on the judgment to be made as a result of the threat. By April 1977 the Army and Germany had agreed that they each had a weapon, the 105-millimeter gun in one case and the 120-millimeter gun in the other, that could meet the threat, but the Army was not willing to accept the 120-millimeter gun in the interest of standardization because of cost, size, and weight of that item. Earlier this year the Army advised the committee that they had selected the German 120millimeter gun as the future main armament of the XM-1 tank.

In 1975 we were told by the Army that a requirement for 3,300 XM-1 tanks was being studied and would be completed that summer. For the next 2 years we were advised of a three-phase program in which the Army would plan to reach a product capacity of 150 tanks a month and a total of about 7,000 tanks. We were advised specifically last year that the need for this capacity would be hard to justify and that a decision to go to this capacity did not have to be made in fact until 1981. In response to a direct question, the committee was told that there were no funds in the fiscal year 1978 budget to go to this 150-per-month capacity and the funds were only to be made available to facilitate the Lima plant. We now have learned that the Army is spending fiscal year 1978 funds for this 150-per-month capacity, after another Army study revised the program of the past few years to accelerate the production capacity and tank deliveries.

The issue of a second source for the hull and turret castings was of major concern to the committee. The Army assured the committee that they had made the best selection for additional castings even though this still limited the Army to a sole source of production. The Army now is faced with a threatened stoppage or holdup by the contractor unless the Army pays additional funds that do not appear to have been agreed to in the contract. The Army still appears to be following this same course of action by accelerating the production capacity to single major suppliers, without considering later second source options.

Finally, last year, during our conference with the House committee we were advised that the T-72 tank was to begin production in Poland for the Warsaw Pact countries. This intelligence estimate has not been supported and in fact we are now advised that the T-72 tank reported with the Soviet forces in the Warsaw Pact is in fact a T-64 tank. We find that Poland and other Warsaw Pact countries are still using the much older T-34 and the T-54/55 tanks and have not been issued the T-62 tank in quantities.

Now we are told on the eve of this hearing about new intelligence data on the T-72 and T-64 tanks. These new threat estimates are like the flowers in the spring that come up around every budget time like perennial flowers. The convenience of this timing, you will forgive me.

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