tion of air traffic control computers. Hopefully, your oversight and input will help FAA to develop and purchase the optimum system which modern data processing technology is capable of producing. PATCO is no stranger to the issues involving air traffic control computers. Indeed, it was this organization which first brought to congressional attention the dangerously deteriorated status of the IBM 9020 systems which currently provide radar data processing at each of FAA's 20 air route traffic control centers. Since that original appearance in November 1979, we have testified nearly a dozen times before various congressional panels.

Sadly, the status of the present computer system has not improved significantly in that time. During fiscal year 1979, these machines experienced 6,651 failures. During fiscal year 1980, that number diminished to 6,223. FAA officials have stated that further reductions are unlikely and could be achieved only at a very high cost.

Rather than begin a top priority effort to enhance computer reliability or provide for a compressed timetable to bring new equipment on line, FAA attempted to denigrate the truthfulness of PATCO's charges by claiming that those charges were merely cordwood for the fueling of a labor dispute.

Fortunately, Members of Congress were sufficiently alarmed to commission an inquiry by the General Accounting Office. Their report, released late last year, confirmed the substance of all of PATCO's assertions. The investigators found, among other things, that FAA recordkeeping was haphazard, that some outages went unreported, and that the FAA had been unable to substantiate its often-repeated claim that the equipment would last another decade.

With that perspective, we cannot help but look toward the future with trepidation. In the near term, our membership is deeply concerned that the IBM 9020's are rapidly approaching the end of their useful lives. While air traffic continues to increase as forecast, the computers at several centers now approaching capacity will soon exceed it, leading to slower response times and more outages.

In the far term, we are deeply concerned about the pace as well as the substance of the FAA's planning process for the next computer generation. The FAA intends to award an initial concept study contract in the next fiscal year. But under current timetables, the initial production contract will not be signed until 1988, with the installation of production systems not scheduled until some time in the next decade. It is our very serious concern that the present equipment will never survive that long.

It is premature to comment in detail on the FAA's concept plans for the new system. The acronyms, such as DABS and ATARS, do not yet reveal sufficient detail about the shape of the next computer generation.

But two points should be emphasized now. Some of the early documentation on the computer planning contains claims that the new automated equipment will allow for massive productivity gains, and a concomitant reduction in the controller work force. This is an unwelcome reprise of similar assertions made when the current computers were purchased. Actual experience bore out

and some officials acknowledged as much-that such claims were mythical.

If productivity is measured in terms of safety, the more data readily available to the controller about each aircraft under his control, the more productive he or she can be. But in no way does the automation process allow a controller to handle safely any more aircraft at any given time.

Second, up to now, the FAA has made virtually no effort to seek input from working air traffic controllers on the design of the new system. We feel this is an inexcusable oversight and urge that this subcommittee direct FAA to seek sustained and comprehensive input from its controller work force. PATCO is eager to assist in this endeavor.

At this time, I would like to again express our gratitude to the members of the subcommittee for their interest in the computer development issue. On behalf of PATCO's membership, I look forward to a close continuing association with you as we work together to develop the best possible air traffic control system for the future.

Mr. GLICKMAN. We thank you for your testimony.

We have three members of the committee here, and we would like to have 10 or 12 minutes apiece for questions. I realize this is an interesting period of time for all of you. Some of the questions that we ask may have some bearing on current work problems. Feel free to answer those questions as you deem appropriate, because I think they relate to the issue we are talking about today. Because computers are the hardware of your job, and what we are trying to decide in this committee is, do we need a computer replacement, at what level, what type, what does it do to your job, and how best can it protect the safety of the American flying public?

I, therefore, would like to ask a basic question of you all, particularly those who work at the centers: In your judgment, do we need a replacement of the current 9020 computer system?

Mr. GALLOWAY. Yes, sir, most definitely we do.

Mr. GLICKMAN. Do you all feel that way?

Mr. WEBB. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. GLICKMAN. At what stage do you think, or are we there, is the current system incapable of handling the intensity or saturation of traffic?

Mr. GALLOWAY. I think we are already past that point. We have many outages, as Mr. Simons' statement pointed out. We have regular outages. Now we have a backup system, a computerized backup system, but we have no control over the backup system, so when the radar goes down, we just wait until someone throws a switch for the backup to come on. Under those conditions a single failure is enough to express a need for needing new equipment

now.

Mr. GLICKMAN. What is the cause of the outages as a practical matter?

Mr. GALLOWAY. There are quite a few causes. One of the causes that has been a problem is the color radar scopes they are putting in at Washington Center. They put them in before; they had prob

lems with them; they have taken them back out. Now they have put them back in again only on certain selected sectors, and right now they are not operational sectors, but I understand that has caused some of the outages.

Mr. GLICKMAN. There have been outages all over the country involving computers that don't have these more sophisticated

scopes.

Mr. GALLOWAY. You can sometimes tell when the computer starts getting overloaded. The time it takes to answer your message, when you enter messages, you can see it start lagging.

Mr. GLICKMAN. Are the outages primarily caused by an overload as opposed to other technical problems?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe that to be true. I work at Washington National Airport, and I spent 8 years at the center. Washington is a high-density terminal facility. During periods of peak traffic our flight data-processing equipment gets so backed up, you wouldn't believe. Oftentimes, we don't get the proposed flight plan until after the pilot has called for clearance, and oftentimes we have to work from a handwritten or controller-generated strip, not one that comes from the computer, until we can force one out of the system.

Mr. GLICKMAN. That is because the computer can't operate quickly enough?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It can't do it fast enough.

Mr. GALLOWAY. Also, quite a few of those outages occur right in the middle of heavy traffic with no warning, and it is very hard to get information. I have never been able to go up and ask what happened and have an answer given to me.

Mr. WEBB. When you throw in the element of weather, that takes an awful lot of compute-time just to display that. When you get into that type of situation with aircraft deviating for weather, it takes a lot of compute-time to put new information back in the machine so that control sectors can get information to this aircraft. When there is a lot of traffic, it just saturates the computer, puts it on edge every time in that type of situation.

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Dunn.

Mr. DUNN. In very simple language, tell this committee what happens to the flying public up there when you get an outage of 1 minute. Tell us exactly what happens.

Mr. GALLOWAY. It depends on what type of outage. In some cases the radar scope just goes completely blank, and you have no information available at all. Then you have to take this radar scope and physically put it down, pull it out and lay it down in a horizontal position. Then you have to re-identify all the aircraft involved, because when you first come up, if you go on the broad-band system, the old nonradar system backup, you see every aircraft. Normally you are only working aircraft in your stratum. In fact, in all cases you are only working aircraft in your stratum, but you will see aircraft in all strata at all levels.

Mr. DUNN. You are saying for the time of the outage, you, as controllers, do not know where the aircraft are?

Mr. GALLOWAY. That is correct. We knew where they were when it started. You know, in your mind, if you had conflicts that were arising, and you take steps immediately to try and take care of

those conflicts, with the computerized radar, you can find out a lot quicker. With the new backup, you can find out a lot quicker. When the DARC comes up, you can read the computer codes.

Mr. DUNN. A majority of the outages are less than a minute. You are assigning altitudes, descent, or ascent rates a minute before. You knew what they were doing; you know where they are going to be in the next minute.

My question is: That outage of less than a minute, is the general flying public really in trouble for that minute?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The minute that we are talking about doesn't have to be a full minute duration. It can be a 30-second duration, but the time can be that critical to the controller, to the pilot, and the bodies on the aircraft.

If I am working a large number of aircraft, and I am weaving through departures with arrivals, so to speak, and I am running them as close as I legally can, running the system to its maximum capability, and that system fails, the only backup that I do have as a controller is my memory, which, quite frankly, speaking for most controllers, is a very good memory. However, we are not legally allowed to run aircraft that close without a radar presentation of some kind, so we have to revert back to nonradar standards, and it can't be done instantaneously. It does take a cumbersome task of either reidentifying by some other means or establishing altitude separations or lateral separation between the aircraft involved. Oftentimes, a controller will be descending an aircraft through a climbing aircraft departing on a crossing course, or an almost opposite direction course. As long as the computer is functioning properly, the controller can comfortably monitor and anticipate rate of climb and descent. Without that tool, he can no longer do that. Action must be taken quickly in order to avert a situation with crossing traffic or head-on traffic, when the controller no longer sees an updated real-time altitude readout on the aircraft. Mr. DUNN. I am trying to ask a very specific question: How valid are the scare tactics that sound to the general flying public like a disaster, to say "Aircraft suddenly disappear from a radarscope for a minute or less." How valid is that?

My perception is that the scare tactics are not very valid; that you do have the backup systems you are talking about; you knew where the aircraft were going before, and outages of less than a minute, while they are cumbersome to handle, do not represent a serious threat to the flying public. Would you agree or disagree? Mr. ELLIOTT. I would disagree, and I think it does represent a serious threat to the public.

Just yesterday, we had a radar outage at Washington National which lasted approximately 2 minutes. The technicians tried to revert to a backup system. Fortunately, we have the Andrews radar piped into Washington National. In the switching process that system failed. We were without radar for 2 minutes. Fortunately, we were not busy. I did have a Piedmont 737 on an approach course whose speed I had noticed, fortunately, just prior— just prior to radar failure, which was rapidly overtaking the aircraft on approach, and I took measures. Now, had I not seen that, the moment prior to the radar outage-I will let you guess.

Mr. GLICKMAN. I suppose it depends on where the outage occurs. It is obviously more critical at Washington National than it would be at――

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am sorry; that is not correct, Mr. Chairman. It is critical everywhere in the system where aircraft are close together. Mr. GALLOWAY. Most of the outages seem to happen at your busier times, and that is just the time when you don't need the outage.

Mr. GLICKMAN. Which would imply there is an overload of the computer occurring.

Mr. GALLOWAY. If I am working very busy at Washington Center-I work the southern part of Washington Center's airspace, which is over Raleigh, Durham, Wilmington, North Carolina, and I have aircraft landing at Washington National Airport-we have to start those aircraft down at Raleigh/Durham to land at National. There is quite a bit of crossing traffic, so you are constantly monitoring.

As Mr. Elliott says, the rates of descent, the rates of climb, the rates of turn, all vary. You can catch it with the radar if the rate of descent slows or speeds up or turns. As soon as the radar goes, then you are assuming that the rate of climb and the rate of descent are still staying the same until you get your backup.

Mr. GLICKMAN. I want to compliment the controllers. I think you have kept the system working safely through your efforts. The fact is that we have, as far as I am concerned, and statistics prove, remarkable safety statistics, and I think to a large extent it is due to the competency of people who run the air traffic control system. I think there has been a clear need demonstrated for modernization of the equipment that we are using.

In your statement, as well as a lot of things I am reading in the press now-for example, the FAA has made virtually no effort to seek input from you regarding the design of the new system. I quote: "We feel it is an inexcusable oversight and urge the subcommittee direct FAA to seek sustained and comprehensive input from its controller workforce.'

My point is this: You are obviously a key part of the air traffic control system—and vice versa. There obviously is a real problem in relationships between FAA and controllers in this country. I am not getting judgmental on what that problem is. It is a problem enough that we face a possible work stoppage at midnight on Sunday night. The design of these computers we are going to be dealing with are a critical part of the future of this air traffic control process.

In your statement, you say FAA has allowed you no significant input in the design. I assume ever so often a question is asked, but I wonder if you might comment on all these things.

Why have we gotten to this point where we are, up to Sunday night, without commenting on the specifics of the problem? Why are we where we are now with regard to the air traffic controllers and the FAA?

Mr. GALLOWAY. The color TV's I mentioned before, I don't know how much that is costing; I don't know one controller in the center who likes it. It costs a fortune. Last month, we had radio failures with no radio backups. We lucked out in that one of the aircraft