can strive for as much automation as possible, but I firmly believe that at all times the final authority for the safe separation of aircraft must rest with a human controller. Given the performance of the present computers, I do not believe that we can expect to rely on computers alone to direct this nation's air traffic. For Another option which was discussed, and which I believe is more feasible, involves a computer directed system whereby the human controller carries out the commands of the computer. instance, in the current system, a computer will warn a controller if two planes are on a collision course, but it is up to the controller to decide what action to take to avoid a collision. However, under the computer directed system the computer could spot the problem and also tell the controller what action to take in order to route the planes in a different direction and avoid a disaster. The controller would then inform the pilots involved of the computer's decision. As you can see, Mr. Chairman, we are talking about major technological advances that are going to take years to accomplish. It is a very awesome task to design machines to take over the work of man, and whatever system the FAA chooses to develop, it is certain that it will include more automation than we currently have today. More automation means less input and work from controller, and more technological advances which are essential for the development of such a system. le we may look forward with awe at the possible ry real problem today technology in the years ahead, we can not forget that the skies of this nation are reasingly crowded and the strain on current equipment ter. We must not only look ahead to the system that as into the 20th century, but we must also take decito avoid senseless tragedies in the meantime. onfident that FAA Administrator Helms will meet these hallenges head on, and that we can begin to make ward developing the safest air traffic control system nly possible. , I must warn that if we fail to act now, the consed be devastating. Although while in office Adminis refused to admit that serious problems lay ahead, a ssued as one of his last official acts speaks for ng to his FAA report forecasting needs for the next T STANIYORD LIBRARIES It is our job, and the job of the FAA, to prevent this from However, if we are going to succeed we must begin to not in five years, not in ten. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to appear before this committee today. Mr. GLICKMAN. Thank you, Bob, for your excellent testimony and also for your yeoman's work in bringing up this issue and giving it some degree of national attention. I only have one question for you and that's on the issue of interim replacement of computers. The FAA studies indicate, at least to date, that the development and implementation of an interim computer system would not only be costly, but could really screw up their long-term goals; that is, you could be going in nine different directions and end up with a much more complicated air traffic control process. In addition, the cost of an interim system varies anywhere between $400 million and $1.4 billion, and even though it comes out of the Airport Trust Fund, we know that this administration, like the previous administration, does not really consider that as a trust fund. It's considered as part of the General Treasury revenues and therefore, if expended, goes to further increase Government spending, even though you know, as I do, that that was intended to be a segregated trust fund, when, in practice, it's not. So the question I'm asking you is that inasmuch as this administration, probably like the last, is going to treat any expenditures from the trust fund as if they were expenditures from the Federal Treasury, and inasmuch as we could be embarking on an interim system which may be confusing, I wonder what is your response to that concern. Mr. WHITTAKER. Dan, I firmly agree with you that if any attempt is made to install or place into operation an interim system that is not coordinated with the overall apparatus of the equipment in use, that we're going to end up throwing money away. This has been one of our basic concerns. But I'm also sure that you have run into, just the same as I have, that all too frequently this is exactly what the FAA has thrown out as a-what would you say?—a diversion tactic to literally throw us off track, to keep us from proceeding. Whenever we would make substantive inquiries about the reliability of the current system and to ask them if instead a new system or an interim system shouldn't be installed, they have come back and said, well, yes, maybe we acknowledge that the time is limited for the implementation of the use of the old system, but we don't have our plans together yet to design a system that's compatible with everything else. I've just run onto that excuse so many times that I look at it as more a diversion. I cannot conceive that we do not have minds and mentality existent there in that agency that they can't, with some 0 gree of commonsense and common purpose with the ultimate Mr. GLICKMAN. Well, I would note, while Mr. Helms will, I'm Mr. WHITTAKER. Beautiful. Mr. GLICKMAN. So it looks to me like, at least from what I read paper, that they are on that same theme as you would wish em to be. Mr. WHITTAKER. That's fantastic. We've been asking for that, for er a year and a half. Mr. GLICKMAN. Well, we have a new Administrator and I have nfidence in him. Mr. WHITTAKER. That's great. Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Goldwater? Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Harkin? Mr. HARKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You've been asking for for a year and a half. Mr. Whittaker, this subcommittee has been volved in this process at least going back to when I first came on ard, back in 1975, and Mr. Goldwater, back before that. While we all have perhaps our own feelings about what the FAA ght to be and ought not to be, it is my belief, and I will speak ly for myself and no one else on the subcommittee, it is my belief at over those periods of years that I've been tracking it, that the AA has been, indeed, doing just what you said. Now you may argue about the time that it's taken. Maybe it will ke a little bit longer. But I would perceive that some of the oblems-I don't believe that the burden will be entirely reved-but I think many of the problems have been caused by eir being forced to respond to so many different attacks put upon em by different forces, pulling them one direction, pulling them other direction. I can remember the battle we got into a couple or 3 years ago, Well, sure, you can go that way. You can approach that 100 this plan, it's about time. They've been working on this plan at least since I've been on this subcommittee since 1975. As I said, you can argue about the slowness of it and I think that's a fair criticism. But to say that they have not paid attention to it, that they have ignored it, I think is an unfair criticism of the FAA and all the fine people that work there. Mr. WHITTAKER. I very highly respect my colleague's comments and I would simply comment that in the past-for that matter, the majority of the material that I've read of the previous committee testimony where a direct inquiry had been made of the FAA, that frequently they do attempt to respond to an initial concern that's addressed on a current basis at that time. But it has led to exactly what you have related-to a fragmented-type response. Put out the little brushfires rather than to plan for the overall forest management. My concern has been much of what you have expressed yourself. When a member of my staff attended the Atlantic City seminar, just the point you made was evident at that time and the fact that you, as a pilot, feel that because of your expertise and background, you have a contribution to make toward the design of a new en route computer system. And yet, it was very, very apparent that there was a serious lack of either pilots or controllers at this seminar. There were an abundance of electronic manufacturers represented, but there was an obvious displacement or lack of representation of just the kind of people that you say, and I agree with you, should have a very valid input. And I think all too much we've had some comments coming to the FAA, but not necessarily from the consumer's point of view in terms of the pilots or the controllers that have to actually use the system. But I still contend that an overall design and a master plan can be implemented. We do it for everything else. Business does it routinely. We in government have to try to plan on a master plan. Mr. HARKIN. I understand that and I think that they do have that master plan. They've been working on that master plan. But what I'm saying is that at least in two areas they have been pulled in various directions-one by Members of Congress, both the Senate and House, who may take a special interest in one area. There are some friends of mine who have been intensely interested in the collision avoidance systems, who have been involved just in that one aspect who have caused, I think, innumerable delays in the FAA's process of developing this system. Others who are involved in approach systems get involved. That's why, as I said earlier I think to Mr. Burton that we can look at certain specific avenues and certain specific areas of the FAA, but they have to take into account the full integrated system. And that's why it's so hard to respond. Also, I would say that the Professional Air Traffic Controllers, for whom I have a great deal of respect, and I think that that's another area that we ought to be looking at, their working conditions and things, but I have a feeling that they have their own ax to grind. And perhaps some of the concerns that they've raised and the approach that they've taken, I feel may come back to bite them in the rear end a little bit later on, because the approaches they want to take are not going to be |