of what has gone on heretofore. We don't quite know what correc tions, et cetera, have been made.

We found one other thing-that somehow, if a maintenance person finds that there's something wrong in the computer and he reports that on a log, that goes back here and that makes the head of that regional traffic control center look bad. Why, I can't figure out. In other words, the computer has got a problem. The maintenance person finds it. But that looks bad for the control center. Therefore, they're encouraged not to report such things because it doesn't look good and it goes against that center.

Well, how in God's name you can have a policy where a mechanic finds something wrong with an automobile, unless it is the fault of the driver, that that should go against the driver's insurance policy. And that's really what happens here. They report faulty equipment and unless the cause of the equipment is due to the fact that the supervisor hit it with a baseball bat, I don't know how he could worry about that being on his or her record. But they do and the maintenance people are encouraged, or shall we say discouraged, from reporting.

And we also found that in order to come in with the low budgets that the maintenance personnel on these computers were not at an adequate level and that the maintenance work was not done at an adequate level. It just seemed to be a terrible way to run an air traffic control system.

I thank you very much again. For the record, we'll have our report and the GAO's

Mr. GLICKMAN. For the record, I think that we should incorporate the GAO's letter as a part of the record. I think that your report can be referred to in the record. It's a public document. Mr. BURTON. That's right.

Mr. GLICKMAN. Let me ask you this one question, John. I gather from you that this report was pretty much a unanimous agreement by your subcommittee.

Mr. BURTON. All unanimous. We have never had anything but a unanimous thing on the FAA, which tells you something. We've got a fairly broad spectrum of philosophy on the committee.

Mr. GLICKMAN. Considering everything, based upon your knowledge of the FAA's management expertise, do you believe that they should proceed with this computer replacement program?

Mr. BURTON. Well, they have to come up with something better. I think they have to justify what the mission is, what the goal is, show how it's going to achieve it.

One of the problems with the 9020's I think dealt with the maintenance and it dealt with overcapacity. I mean they've reached a capacity as far as the amount of traffic that's coming in. When you're having trouble with the main computer and you talk about spending money to replace the backup, to me it seems kind of stupid when the DARC system is just a little bit better than the broad band and it will take about $100 million to bring it up to, I think, 50 percent of the capability of the 9020.

It would be my judgment that if we are going to go, I would work on something that was an improvement in the 9020 and not an improvement in something that worked in World War II. Mr. Bond, I mean, boy, he made a statement that this DARC was going

STANFORD LIBRARIES

ettle all the problems. They still haven't figured out how to k the system and found bugs in it because it's not compatible some of their other stated long-range goals.

o there has to be a program going forward, but that doesn't in a buying spree. It means a program, it means a mission, and heans how these things are going to fit into the total traffic trol system that plans on being implemented, how it will fit a collision avoidance system, how it's going to improve present abilities.

have been told by a computer person that there could be some lifications to increase the capacity of the 9020's. I think that t would be worth looking into if that was an accurate statet. As I say, you couldn't prove that by me.

think that DARC is a waste of money, an absolute, flat out ste of money. When you have trouble with the primary system you spend money to improve the backup system that they tell American people is almost as good as the primary system, you ow that there's problems somewhere with the logic and the nagement of the agency.

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Goldwater?

Mr. GOLDWATER. John, thanks for coming here because you ow aviation real closely and get into areas that sometimes we not. I think it's important.

Mr. BURTON. I'm happy to do that. We view our committee as ng an oversight committee. We do have time because we don't ve to legislate to get into certain areas and to make that knowle available to the authorizing committees and appropriation nmittees for whatever action they deem fit.

Mr. GOLDWATER. You've followed the FAA for a number of years
d you've obviously been quite critical of their management ex-
tise or capabilities. I wonder, the subject here today is the
nputer replacement. I'm wondering, in light of your observations
out their capabilities, I guess as a followup to what Dan was
king, do you think that that FAA is qualified to proceed in
placing the computer or should it be turned over to another
ency or an outside operation?

What would be your recommendation in that regard? Or are you
Iling to wait and see what the new administration-

Mr. BURTON. It's my opinion that, and it's very difficult-we're
king about the foxhunter from Virginia's administration. You
ve a new administration here. And as I say, it's kind of difficult
place all of it there. But just historically, we found the agency,
their procurement policies, to not have a mission. They should
low the directions that were given them by the Senate Appropri-
ions Committee. I think you ought to make believe that this is
e first time that you ever heard about computers or anything.
ey have to justify from zero to the top what they're going to do.
hey're going to have to tell you what it's going to mean. They're
ing to have to tell you how it's going to work. They're going to
ve to tell you why it's going to do it, how it's going to tie into a
lision avoidance system, what the manpower things are, what
e maintenance-

Mr. GOLDWATER. In other words, you're willing to leave the reonsibility to the FAA, but you feel that they probably should

take a different approach. I assume that you made that recommendation in this report.

Mr. BURTON. To leave it within, the FAA and the Department of Transportation. They could probably use some outside experts, but they're asking you to authorize the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayers' money. They used to get it because they asked for it and say, we need it and this is happening and that's happening.

I think you've got to start like you've never heard of a computer and why are they even needed, and they've got to justify exactly what they're going to do, not that they need computers. What is the mission? What is the long-range mission?

That is what you will find in Birch Bayh's subcommittee report, that they never have defined for a congressional committee what the long-range mission is in the justification for things. You know, whether it's the FAA, whether it's the Pentagon, whether it's the GSA, whether it's House Administration. Whoever comes before this committee, you've got to start like you don't know anything and they've got to lead you through it and convince you.

Mr. GOLDWATER. In other words, the FAA is qualified to do the job. They've just got to do a better job of laying it out.

Mr. BURTON. I wouldn't say that they're qualified to do the job. They've got the responsibility to do it and you've got to make sure that they do it well and they're qualified.

Mr. GOLDWATER. If they're not qualified, then who do you suggest is?

Mr. BURTON. Well, I mean, I don't know. Do you want to turn it over to Max Palovsky of IBM, someone who knows something about computers? But they've got the responsibility and they should be qualified. I think maybe the committee has to spell out the qualifications of what they are supposed to do and the parameters. It's their responsibility.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Let me ask you another question real quickly. You've been very hard on the FAA over the years. You've been very critical. You've looked at them under a microscope. The thing that's sometimes hard for me to understand in criticizing that agency is when you take into consideration their responsibility for aviation safety and you look at the statistics in the last 2 years, there has not been a fatal jet airline crash.

Mr. BURTON. Thank God, and due to God.

Mr. GOLDWATER. How do you justify that criticism if aviation safety has that kind of good track record?

Mr. BURTON. Well, of course we haven't talked about what's happened to commuter planes in the last 2 years that have gone down. Maybe it's because we have been kicking them in the tail for 2 years that maybe they're doing better. Maybe it's because the good Lord is looking at them.

You know the bay area, Barry. If all of the radar systems are out, what you've got is the same type of thing that they had when Icarus was flying with his wings. All right up here, looking up in the sky, and if it was one of those early morning fogs, the chances for midair collisions are great. Sure there weren't accidents. And I don't think it was because of them; I think it was in spite of them.

STANFORD LIBRARIES

Mr. GOLDWATER. I can't argue with you. There's always a certain sk in transportation, whether it's in an automobile or an airane. The FAA is an agency of the Federal Government with the ission to enhance aviation safety. When you look at the track cord of no fatal commercial aircraft in the last 2 years and you atch actually an improvement in commuter safety over the past

ear

Mr. BURTON. Over the past year. The year before it was up 200

ercent.

Mr. GOLDWATER [continuing]. I'm not so sure that your harsh iticism is always justified.

Mr. BURTON. I think that it is. We're here to prevent accidents. hat's what the air traffic and safety system is for. And the potenal for accidents exists. If you tell me when both computer systems e out on the radar that that's a safe situation, Barry, I have to sagree with you. We're here talking about safety. We are here lking about the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars. Mr. GOLDWATER. I'm not arguing. There's not a problem. But metimes it's difficult to support your justification for criticizing e FAA when you look at the track record.

Mr. BURTON. Well, the track record has got nothing to do with it.
o you think Langhorne Bond really had something to do with the
act that there were no accidents in the last 2 years? I think it was
od. And you talk to the pilots and you talk to the controllers and
hey'll tell you the same thing. But for——

Mr. GOLDWATER. I think the responsibility lies with the person-
el of the FAA. I think Mr. Langhorne Bond, nor Mr. Lynn Helms
directly responsible for the interaction of the total system of the
AA. The fact still remains that it takes not only the pilots and
he system itself working together to enhance safety.
No one person, including God, is responsible.

Mr. BURTON. God is responsible for everything, Mr. Goldwater.
aughter.]

Mr. GLICKMAN. We'll take the good Lord's help any day.

Mr. BURTON. If you're running for the Senate, you'd better strike mat from the record. [Laughter.]

Mr. GLICKMAN. I would ask the committee's indulgence.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I have His endorsement. [Laughter.]

Mr. BURTON. Hers. [Laughter.]

Mr. GLICKMAN. We have another congressional witness and then Mr. Helms has quite a lengthy statement. So I would ask the ommittee's indulgence to stick by the 5-minute rule.

Mr. Hall?

Mr. HALL. I'll be brief, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Congressman Burton, for your presentation. I'm not going to totally discount God's help. I think I will read your pamphlet. It's not hard for me o discount the information that I have from here back because I have very little. I certainly thank you for coming aboard. Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Dunn?

Mr. DUNN. Would your committee be able to determine how many of these outages happen per year, per day?

Mr. BURTON. We have some statistics on that, but as Mr. Walker could tell you, the reporting of them-we kept getting apples, oranges, and tangerines and couldn't put them together. We could

supply that for the record. There seemed to be a spree over about what, a 4- or 5-week period where they were just occurring all ove the place and I don't believe that there have been too many recent ly. But I don't have right with me that specific number.

We have the numbers that the FAA supplied, but they, again, were not accurate numbers because there were different definitions. I think Mr. Walker later could comment on that for you. Mr. DUNN. I see figures that there is about one a day per center. That would be about 20 a day in the country.

Mr. BURTON. That could be.

Mr. DUNN. Do you know how many commercial flights there are a day in this country?

Mr. BURTON. Lots. I wouldn't give you the figures here.

Mr. DUNN. Do you know how many GA flights there are a day in this country?

Mr. BURTON. More than a lot. [Laughter.]

I've never been a statistician.

Mr. DUNN. What if you have a pilot at 20,000 feet heading west and there's an outage? He's en route. He's at 20,000. Could you tell me what that 1-minute outage, the mean is?

Mr. BURTON. The 1-minute outage? Dave, how many miles would they miss if he was out for 1 minute?

Mr. DUNN. What is he going to do in that minute?

Mr. BURTON. What is the pilot going to do?

Mr. DUNN. Yes, at 20,000 feet assigned altitude. The computer goes out for 1 minute. What's he going to do?

Mr. BURTON. I guess he just keeps going.

Mr. DUNN. I would agree with that. How about the guy 20 miles out, if he's coming the other way, what's he going to do?

Mr. BURTON. Everybody keeps going because nobody knows where they are.

Mr. DUNN. That's exactly right. Now you tell me how those two crash.

Mr. BURTON. Well, how they crash. If they happen to be going in the same, this way [indicating], and they both happen to be at the same level. Or if the computer went out and they lost-they've had planes missing for 200 miles.

Mr. DUNN. How does the FAA assign altitudes?

Mr. BURTON. Pardon me?

Mr. DUNN. How does the FAA assign altitudes?

Mr. BURTON. The traffic controllers would be assigning them if the planes were coming into the center.

Mr. DUNN. That's if you have two planes going this way [indicating].

Mr. BURTON. Yeah.

Mr. DUNN. That's not the way you assign altitudes.

Mr. BURTON. Well, you tell me how they assign altitudes. As I said before the committee, I'm not an expert on anything.

Mr. DUNN. I would agree you're not. You haven't been able to answer any of my questions.

Mr. BURTON. Give me the relevancy of your questions.

Mr. DUNN. I'm asking how planes, one heading east, one heading west, one at 20,000, one at 21,000, I'm asking a very simple ques