bit further, your suggestion in your testimony, and in your response to some of the chairman's questions, that there should be some kind of limitation on the use of arms that have been provided to a nation.

I suggest that that is virtually impossible, mainly because there is no sanction. If you put the limitation on the grant of arms, and later that limitation is violated, you have no effective remedy. Have you any comment on that?

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Of course, sir. The problems of sanctions are immensely difficult in this area. I do have in mind, however, the present instance, the fact that a friendly government which is a recipient of so much U.S. assistance is now in need of more. The fact that a government which is receiving U.S. weapons, would I am confident, be in need of replacements.

Now, the sanctions that are attached to our arrangements are really sanctions related to the renewal of these arrangements and the way we extend them, the way we are willing to meet new requests. They are sanctions that cannot be imposed in any way except in subsequent negotiations that may take place at a later date.

This doesn't mean that we should not go forward with attempts to limit the use of these weapons, and I don't mean here to limit the use in a way that would be interfering in the government's right to conduct its affairs as it is entitled to. This we cannot do and it would be a mistake to attach strings to aid. We must respect the legitimate claims of governments to sovereignty. But the legitimate claims of governments to sovereignty and independence do not extend to the right to use weapons and assistance in violation of the minimum requirements of international law.

This, they cannot ask. And in this sense, we can try to negotiate arrangements. For example, arrangements that would suggest that in conflicts not of an international character, whenever U.S.-supplied weapons are used, the rules of international conventions governing such conflicts should be brought into full effect, and for example that the relief offered through international humanitarian agencies should be accepted.

Now, this would not in any way jeopardize the sovereignty and independence of the recipient state.

I am not arguing in favor of assisting the opposition, or in favor of claiming that in a fight between the opposition and the government we should always be neutral. Rather, sir, the argument is somewhat different. It is only that a particular type of conflict has within it a great potential for complications, and these are conflicts involving self-determination.

When we face a province, or a part of a country which is seceding as in East Pakistan, the moment such movements are taking place, the potential international ramifications and the risks of intervention by other powers are such that we may find ourselves always on the verge of getting directly involved ourselves.

I am not suggesting that we should arm one side rather than the other, but merely have a warning to ourselves. When we face wars of self-determination, we must find a way of staying out of them.

Mr. DU PONT. I think that is correct, and I think your observation that the only true sanction we have on this year's aid is the threat of reducing or canceling next year's aid, is a correct statement of the position. That is virtually all we can do, because once the guns and

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the bullets are there, we, of course, have no effective control at all over their use.

Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor, I agree with the chairman and my colleague, Mr. du Pont. I even take it a step further. Not only do we get involved in these wars in these countries by supplying arms, but is it not true that food substance itself is used as a lever by the controlling government, whomever it may be in these countries, but denying it to their opposition.

Mr. GOTTLIEB. I am afraid there is evidence that this may be the case. We did have that situation in Nigeria-Biafra, where statements were made by responsible persons, regarding the use of blockade as a legitimate means of warfare. Here again, I would have hoped that the United States may find its way to take the lead in seeking a convention for the prohibition of starvation as a legitimate means of warfare. As a matter of fact, the American Society of International Law is now preparing some models along these lines, to meet precisely that problem. What such a convention would do, and what the sanctions for such a convention would be, again we don't yet know. Except that is, in terms of negotiations for further arrangements with countries violating their provisions.

Mr. MURPHY. I think the chairman has a good point when he says that the Congress itself is becoming very leary of this type of aid, whether it be foodstuff or arms, because we always seem to find ourselves embroiled in a civil war. We are then accused of intervening and interfering with the legitimate government, whether de facto or de jure, and we always seem to come out the losers even when everything is done in the name of humanitarianism. The scorecard doesn't look too good as far as we are concerned.

I am sure that was the motivating force in our intervening in Vietnam, and now look what we have. So I think, professor, it is, as you point out, and my colleagues here point out, not an easy step for the United States to take. We should be aware of the ramifications of our actions, and I am not too sure that even being aware is the answer in and of itself. Our experience has shown that we usually end up the loser in this instance also.

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Sir, this is a very concise way of putting it. This is why my emphasis has been on making whatever aid we do make available, on making it available through appropriate international agencies. We don't wan to go there ourselves. We don't want to see American personnel involved.

If volunteer services are willing to pick up the job, fine. We should support them. Senator Kennedy did refer to the extremely distinguished job that they have done in Nigeria-Biafra.

Here again, in the East Pakistan situation, we should try and encourage both volunteer agencies and United Nations multilateral agencies to do the assisting. The U.N. institutions would however need our support-financial and material. The U.N. institutions would need our diplomatic support to be allowed to get in. The Red Cross would need our diplomatic support to be allowed to get in. In that sense, we may be able perhaps to-I don't say solve, but to mitigate, the difficulties that you have just stated, by negotiating directly with a government like Pakistan for the receipt not of U.S. aid, but for the

receipt of Red Cross assistance, for the receipt of WHO and WFP— World Food Program-aid.

In that sense, perhaps we will avoid the fatal first step which has lead us into Vietnam.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Murphy. I recall one of the first fatal steps leading us unto Vietnam was a great many people saying that we should not supply arms or assistance or aid to the Diem regime, because they were repressive. However, I think if we could bring back Madam Nhu, and get off the hook in Vietnam, that the ADA today would give Madam Nhu an endorsement.

Mr. Halpern?

Mr. HALPERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I wish to compliment our very distinguished and able witness on his superb testimony.

I noted with interest your observation about discontinuing economic assistance. You stated that it would only hurt those people who need help the most, and sort of right into that, you mention all assistance, and I am pleased you clarified that point in response to a question from the chairman, as you would apply military assistance, which obviously, in all likelihood, arms under that assistance program could be utilized by the central government of Pakistan, against the East Pakistanis, or the people of Bangla Desh, as they call themselves. Now, in order for the United States to maintain strict neutrality in this matter, in my opinion, we should withhold any further deliveries under the October 1970 arms offers, and avoid further arms guides.

In my view, such action together with moral and diplomatic pressure, could bring an end to the hostilities, and help resolve the situation there. Now, if I heard correctly, when Mr. du Pont asked you about the cutting off of military assistance, you said that you thought that that should be an act that we should do, in the future.

Don't you feel that we should be withholding all deliveries, at the present time?

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Military deliveries.

Mr. HALPERN. Under, as I mentioned, the October 1970

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Yes. I am wholeheartedly in agreement with you, sir. I think that the sooner this is done, the more complete the stopage, the clearer our position is on that, the better. There is no question at all that by making our stand absolutely clear, we would be helping ourselves not merely in Pakistan, but in other future situations elsewhere.

After all, by taking a clear and resounding stand on matters like that, we really would be putting friendly governments on notice that "if you are going to wage an internal conflict, gentlemen, be quite sure that you wage it in a way that will not embarass us as your helpers." Mr. HALPERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Halpern.

Mr. Wolff?

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I just would like to find out if Professor Gottlieb has had an opportunity of reading the hearings that this subcommittee held last year in September and October. Have you had an opportunity to read these? Mr. GOTTLIEB. Candidly, I did not, sir.

Mr. WOLFF. Well, at some point in the testimony, two professors, Professor Wilcox and Professor Hinton, made statements relative to East Pakistan. The statement by Professor Wilcox.

In Pakistan, the most vigorous politician with foreign affairs experience is Ali Bhutto, and he has said in election campaigns that Pakistan's future hopes in foreign policy lie principally with closer ties with China.

This is especially true because the Soviet promises of military assistance to Pakistan have not been realized in any major degree. Moreover, Pakistan is a less stable political system and China might find opportunities in the domestic situation as well.

The statement made by Professor Hinton:

From the revolutionary viewpoint, Peking has long cherished the hope that luxuriant fissiparous tendencies in Southeast Asia would lead to Balkanization, and Communist seizures of powers in the resulting fragmenting. This hope probably is at least partly responsible for the fact that Peking has treated Pakistan with politeness and sometimes courtesy from the time of its emergence, which emergence certainly appeared to be a promising beginning of Balkanization.

Do you think the present situation is a result of some of the previous efforts that have been evidenced by these two statements on the position of mainland China that is responsible in some way for intervention in Pakistan?

Mr. GOTTLIEB. The question you raise, sir, is a most difficult one to answer. The role of the Peking Government in the events in the Indian subcontinent is an ambiguous and obscure one. There is evidence that both in the role that China took during the Kashmir crisis and in the role they took in the lengthy and bloody incidents with India, they clearly wished to see to it that nothing would exist south of the Himalaya border, that could be considered as a strong and cohesive hostile military force.

Balkanization of the subcontinent from the standpoint of balanceof-power politics might certainly be in the Chinese interest. On the other hand, it doesn't mean that because it is in the Chinese interest, it is therefore necessarily adverse to the United States own interests.

I would hate to draw that inference automatically, and this is why, again, in this matter, I feel that the U.S. interest in the Indian subcontinent, the political interest, may be one worth clarifying by the subcommittee. That is where I would be most enlightened by your debates.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment further. I support your idea, of international assistance, and the idea of international observation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Professor Gottlieb, for your fine contribution in bringing a better understanding to this subcommittee of this terrible tragedy in Pakistan. Because of the vote, the subcommittee will now stand adjourned until 2 p.m. on Thursday, when there will be an executive session with the State Department and at 3 p.m. on Thursday, when there will be a further open session. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Thursday, May 13, 1971.)

CRISIS IN EAST PAKISTAN

TUESDAY, MAY 25, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 3:20 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will come to order.

We are in the process of a vote about to be taken on the floor. Some of the members had to leave, and I believe they will return.

We apologize for the delay in starting the public hearings.

Our next witness is Dr. Robert Dorfman, professor of economics at Harvard University.

We are pleased to see you.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT DORFMAN, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS,

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. DORFMAN. Thank you for giving me an opportunity to come here. My remarks will concern a somewhat different matter from what I gather you have been hearing in the previous testimony, but there is a close and tragic connection.

Senator Kennedy and the others have already called your attention to the terrible problems of feeding and caring for the millions of refugees, both in Pakinstan and in West Bengal. I have nothing to add to that, except my personal sympathy and concern. But the distress of those millions of persons is just one aspect of the civil war that is now going on, and I want to devote my few minutes to America's role and attitude in that war.

Let me qualify myself. My name is Robert Dorfman. I am professor of economics at Harvard, a member of the Council of the American Economic Association, former president of the Institute of Management Sciences, and so forth. I have published a number of books, and I have all the usual academic credentials. I have been concerned professionally with the economics of the less developed countries, including Pakistan, for the last dozen years. My interest began in 1960 when I had the honor of serving as a member of a panel appointed by President Kennedy to advise the Government of Pakistan about the serious problems in the Indus Basin. 1 flatter myself that this Presidential panel made a substantial contribution to reversing the downward course of agriculture in that region. We proposed a sensible plan for increasing the yields of irrigated agriculture, while arresting the ominous progress of environmental decay, building on much excellent