It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that could include the Vietnamization and the phased withdrawal which could be interpreted as a means of withdrawing from a situation in which we now find ourselves, whatever mistakes may have been involved in arriving at where we are. I don't know whether you want to comment, but I want to thank you for that thought which it does seem to me applies to our present situation. Mr. MARK. I had it in mind even though it wasn't expressed at that point, since I know the chairman is interested in European developments and American-Soviet relationships, but I would say even there, for example, even if a president were to deplore the arms race and to deplore the amounts of money that have been spent on it over the past several decades, he would have to take account of the fact that there are all of those missiles and airplanes and tanks, submarines and so forth, on both sides, that they do enter into the calculations of each of the two super powers about its security and enter also into the relationships which each has with its allies and with other countries, and therefore you have to start from that point, even though you think you never should have gotten there, and proceed in a rational, sensible and I think gradual way, a conservative and prudent way, perhaps, to dismantle it to the extent that you can. Mr. BUCHANAN. I want to thank you for that contribution. I would also raise the question. You were so fair, Mr. Mark, and so diplomatic and impartial in your oral statements concerning the nature of the cold war, that your response to the chairman a moment ago just before my questions started implied something I would like to nail down. It is not as simple as being tweedledum and tweedledee, is it, as to the degree of the responsibility for the cold war and the situation of conflict and danger, if it can be so described, that is, are we tweedledum and the Soviet Union tweedledee? Mr. MARK. Well, I put it this way: That I think the situation would have developed more or less along the lines that it did even if two quite different countries had been involved. I put into the written statement a reference to incidents in the 19th century in which such countries that we think of as quite similar such as France and Britain were virtually at swords' point over how to divide up some area in which there was no power and in which, in other words, the political order had collapsed. Of course, the collapse of Europe was much more tremendous in its implications for everybody and in that sense even if we and the Soviet Union had been, let's say, much more like each other than we are, I think these difficulties would have arisen in a fairly serious form. But of course I agree with you. After all, I work for this Government by choice and I happen to believe in the system which it serves and the general constitutional relationships that we have and the philosophy that is behind them, and from that point of view, of course, I feel that the positions that we have taken, let's say in building up a relationship with European allies, with countries that by and large are similar to us and that represents similar ideals. and aspirations, is a very worthwhile thing to do, and generally speaking I would like to see in the world a lot more countries of that stripe than those in the Soviet camp. But I don't think that sort of an approach, that is, applying my own value system or your value system is particularly helpful in try ing to work out these major difficulties between East and West. I think that there we have to try to keep as dispassionate and unemotional as possible in order that we can continue a dialog on a fairly reasonable basis with the other side over all sorts of issues that are emotionally stimulating enough without adding personal preferences and beliefs to it. Mr. BUCHANAN. I must say you use the word personal preferences now and psychological differences a few minutes ago. Passionate or dispassionate, there seems to me to be a distinction between a system of totalitarianism and a system where there is exercise of freedom and self-determination. There is a great difference for the people involved and it seems to me for people not necessarily who would have an American point of view but would have some feelings about that. Isn't there some basis for conflict over the absence of the freedom of the people of Czechoslovakia to exercise self-determination or the absence of the ability of the people of Hungary to exercise self-determination, and when they have tried to revolt in the 1950's and 1960's to be slapped down, is there not a continuing basis for conflict which has nothing really to do with the cold war bad habits but with the realities of the condition of there being in the world some totalitarian states which are oppressive, and where human rights are not taken into account and there is no participation of people in the government, and rights like freedom of religion and worship are denied? Isn't there some difference in substance between such systems and more democratic societies? Of course, there is a third world of developing countries. But aren't there some realities that distingish parties to the conflict that bring some substance into a continuing contest of some kind between the ideas and implications of the totalitarian repressive approach on the one hand and of a democratic and free approach on the other? Mr. MARK. There certainly is a difference of substance, and I think whether you express it as my personal preferences or the personal preferences of 200 million Americans who think and act and are organized the way we are, or whether you express it as you did that the substantive difference is there, I don't think that necessarily has to mean a basis for conflict. It seems to me that there would be a basis for conflict only if we defined it as our interests to undo totalitarian systems wherever they appear in the world or that we had some sort of obligation as a part of promoting the American national interest to make sure that all nations in the world and all peoples enjoyed the civil liberties and the other blessings of democracy that we are fortunate enough to enjoy. I don't think that is the case, at least I don't believe that it has ever been our policy under any administration since the Second World War. As a matter of fact, one can say, and a number of countries in the North Atlantic Alliance do say at the present time, that the possibility of improving the situation of the peoples of Hungary and Czechoslovakia is more likely to grow to the extent that we can decrease the tensions that exist between East and West, primarily between the United States and the Soviet Union, so that in this less tense atmosphere the Communist rulers of all those countries may feel that they do not need, in order to secure their own ascendency, the same type of rigid controls and the same totalitarian devices that they have had to use in the past. Indeed, in the more relaxed atmosphere that has al ready come about in the last few years one can notice here and there in Eastern Europe, changes which are encouraging in that direction and certainly the alterations in the internal fabric of Yugoslavia during the years in which it became disengaged from the cold war have been very encouraging. Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, gentlemen. We have a vote now, but I think we have covered the subject matter very thoroughly and very carefully. Mr. BUCHANAN. I wondered, did you have a comment, if the chairman would permit it? Mr. MORSE. Very briefly, sir, I wish to say that I question, too, whether the rhetoric has as much to do with the situation as does the substance. Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you. The subcommittee stands adjourned until Friday at 10 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, June 11, 1971.) THE COLD WAR: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS NATO, U.S. Military Policy in Europe, and the Cold War FRIDAY, JUNE 11, 1971 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee is in order. We are continuing this morning our consideration of matters that are of concern to the subcommittee on Europe, particularly with regard to NATO and U.S. military policy in Europe and all of the underlying assumptions of the cold war insofar as they relate to those policies. We are particularly fortunate this morning that we have with us a distinguished former Ambassador to Moscow and London and former Governor of the State of New York, the Honorable Averell Harriman. We will be very pleased to hear from you. STATEMENT OF HON. W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW AND LONDON Ex-governor, ex-govt. official, b. Nov. 15, 1891, B.A., Yale, 1913. Vice president, purchases and supplies, Union Pacific R.R., 1915-17; chairman board, 1932–46; chairman board Merchant Shipbldg. Corp., 1917-25; W. A. Harriman & Co., Inc., 1920-31; partner Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (merger), 1931-46, limited partner since 1946; chairman executive committee Illinois Central R.R. Co. 1931-42, director, 1915-46. Administrator Div. II, N.R.A., Jan.-Mar., 1934; Special Assistant to the Administrator, N.R.A., Mar.-May, 1934; administrative officer, 1934-35; member business advisory council for Dept. of Commerce, 1933; chairman 1937-39; chief materials branch, production division, O.P.M., Jan.-Mar., 1941; special representative of the President in Great Britain, rank of minister, Mar. 1941, to U.S.S.R. (chairman mission), rank of ambassador, Aug. 1941; appointed representative in London of Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, Feb. 1942; appointed member London Combined Production and Resources Board, July 1942; U.S. ambassador to Russia 1943-46, to Great Britain, Apr.-Oct. 1946 ; Secretary of Commerce, Oct. 1946-Apr. 1948; U.S. rep. in Europe under Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, rank of A.E. and P., 1948-50; special assistant to the President, 1950–51; Am. rep. on North Atlantic Treaty Organization Commission to study Western Defense plans, 1951; dir. Mutual Security Agency, 1951-53; Governor of New York, 1955-58; Ambassador at large, 1961, 1965-68; assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1961-63; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1963-65 ; personal representative of the President to Vietnam Peace Talks in Paris, 1968-69. Mr. HARRIMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I take a moment to express my congratulations to you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues, for undertaking these hearings. The subject which you are dealing with is of vital importance for an understanding of what has happened in the past in order to lay plans for the future. It gives me great heart to think that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House is taking leadership in this field. On the subject before you, I would like first to say a word or two, if I may, about the history of the war and to put into perspective some of the things which occurred during the war which have been rather confused by rather poorly informed people who have been writing about it. Very few people seem to understand that when the attack by Hitler on the Soviet Union occurred at the end of June 1941 the principal objective that Churchill and Roosevelt had was to help keep the Soviet Union in the war in order to defeat Hitler. From that time on, the principal subject of consideration in all of our dealings with Stalin and the Soviet Union was winning the war. Some people seem to forget the fact that there was a war going on. Because we won the war and were able to land on Normandy and Hitler was eventually defeated, Japan was eventually defeated, they seemed to think that it was easy and we ought to have assumed victory and other matters should have been given first consideration. Winning the war in Europe was the first consideration that Churchill and Roosevelt had. People seem to forget the role that the Russians played in the defeat of Hitler. When we landed on Normandy, it was agreed we could not land if there were more than 30 mobile German divisions in Western Europe. At that time, there were 199 German divisions on the eastern front and some 40 satellite divisions. Stalin agreed to attack shortly after we landed in order to hold down those divisions, which he did, and broke through, as a result of which we were able to successfully land and later on to carry on a successful operation, even though, as you remember, the Battle of the Bulge indicated the vulnerable position our forces might have been in if there had been a major German force available for the western front. In other words, the Soviet Union played a very major role in the defeat of Hitler although, of course, it had nothing to do with the defeat of Japan. There is another aspect that I would like to comment on and that is that when Hitler attacked Russia it was a godsend to the British. They had been standing the full force of the Nazi military might alone; the danger of invasion of Britain had been one that had given them concern and, as you know, Churchill indicated, although he was in no sense in support of communism as such, that he accepted any enemy of Hitler as an ally of the British. President Roosevelt was prepared to support the Soviet Union at that time even before we were in the war. I was sent, perhaps you remember, with Lord Beaverbrook, in a joint mission to Moscow in September 1941 to find out what the Russian needs were, to see what we could do to supply them. I am satisfied that President Roosevelt had hopes that if we became involved in the |