Mr. GALLAGHER. We are going to have a full briefing tomorrow on the military and security in Korea.

Mr. HAMILTON. All right.

Then on page 2 of your statement you talk about the burden of debt. Perhaps you could comment on that somewhat, or supply more for the record.

Ambassador PORTER. The burden is considerable, but it is in hand. The IMF/IBRD conducts an annual examination of the Korean debt service burden. The problem arises from the number of loans negotiated for payment over a period of 12 to 15 years, as well as shortterm loans. The feeling at the present time is that the loan burden is well within bounds, and the Koreans do observe carefully the agreements they reach with the IBRD as to the number and amounts of debts and new loans they incur.

We can provide you a complete burden-plus-payment document. Mr. HAMILTON. Would you do so, please?

Ambassador PORTER. Yes, sir.

(A classified memorandum was subsequently furnished.)

Mr. HAMILTON. A final question: Mr. Porter, your statement in the record is that one of two subjects in international affairs that remain preeminent is the desire for unification of the country, but I take it from your remarks thus far that really not very much is happening except lip service to unification.

So the question is: Is there any effort, private or governmental, being made toward the reconciliation of the North and the South, or is there just a complete absence of communication between these people? Ambassador PORTER. There is what amounts to a complete absence of communication. There are one or two channels-well, there is one channel at Panmunjom open as a result of the armistice arrangements, through which the South Koreans can communicate through us there with the North Korean Armistice Commission people about particular problems, say a hijacked plane, or some incident along the DMZ.

In terms of unification, there is no dialogue. [Security deletion.] Ostensibly, the North has the lead in this aspect of the matter. It is they who have openly proposed family meetings, postal exchange, trade and cultural exchanges and developments.

Mr. HAMILTON. The North has proposed this?

Ambassador PORTER. The North has proposed these things, but we can't tell whether it is propaganda or what they mean by it. Mr. HAMILTON. How have they proposed it?

Ambassador PORTER. Public statements, radio announcements, speeches made up North.

Mr. HAMILTON. But no direct communication to the South Koreans? Ambassador PORTER. No direct communication to the South Koreans. [Security deletion.]

Mr. HAMILTON. Did the opposition candidate in the election take a harder or softer line from President Park in relation to North Korea? Ambassador PORTER. He took a definitely softer line.

Mr. HAMILTON. Was that a fact in his hefty vote?

Ambassador PORTER. I can't tell. We know that is a feeling among the families in the South, and Korean family ties are very strong, but it could have helped him in some ways; yes.

65-445-71-3

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. You said he let up, or did not go out for the parliamentary election.

Ambassador PORTER. You mean the President, sir?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes. How would that be for his programs?
Ambassador PORTER. [Security deletion.]

It was a very interesting election. The southern part of Park's province was split even, 9 to 9, and that is an unheard of development. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GALLAGHER. What was President Park's reaction to this? Ambassador PORTER. He didn't do or say much during the Assembly campaign. He was generally quiet.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I mean as to the results.
Ambassador PORTER. [Security deletion.]
Mr. GALLAGHER. He didn't plan to lose like that.
Ambassador PORTER. [Security deletion.]
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Wolff?

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador, it is good to see you. I want to echo the sentiment that was made by my colleague on the other side, Mr. Broomfield, that a large amount of the success we have had in Korea is due to your efforts, and the team you have out in the area.

As you may or may not know, I am one of the people who have opposed the reversion of Okinawa. Before, in answering questions the chairman posed relative to our position as to what we propose to do when we lose Okinawa-and I am of the opinion that we are going to lose Okinawa, contrary to some of the opinions that have been advanced here; that we are going to maintain our bases, however the fact is that I wonder if we are taking steps to beef up our position in Korea in the event that we lose Okinawa.

Ambassador PORTER. We are not taking deliberate steps to do that, sir. The Koreans have made it quite clear that if the Americans find it difficult to continue on in Okinawa, that they would be entirely welcome in Korea. This is what you might call the natural Korean reaction. [Security deletion.]

But we have not gone into any deliberate or precise program with that in mind.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Excuse me; is this the Cheju Island proposal?

Ambassador PORTER. Yes; Cheju at the southern end of the peninsula, or other places. They are not proposing to confine us to Cheju, Mr. Chairman. They would be glad to have us, and then straighten out where we go. But we are not planning to do that.

Mr. WOLFF. I would like to get to the chart that was provided for us. I find this is some 2 years old, Mr. Ambassador. Could we get an update on the figures involved?

I just happened to notice on the top here it says "Through 6-30–69.” That is the last chart on your statement.

Ambassador PORTER. Yes, sir; we can update to the year through 1970, and we have figures up through 1970 which are not attached here for reasons not clear to me.

Mr. WOLFF. I think it would be important to do it.

(The information requested follows:)

U.S. overseas loans and grants-Net obligations and loan authorizations

ASSISTANCE

Ambassador PORTER. If you see the preceding statement in terms of aid it runs up through 1971 as we expect it, and 1970 as it occurred. Do you have that attached to your copy?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes, sir; but it does not have the military assistance figures.

Ambassador PORTER. The military assistance figures will be on a different sheet, but you will have it, sir.

Mr. WOLFF. On the figures that we do have before us, however, does this include the assistance that we have rendered to the Korean Forces in Vietnam or not, the figures we have here, $2.9 billion military assistance?

Ambassador PORTER. Not unless they are listed, and it does not list them. The Vietnamese figures are available otherwise, and they are a different tabulation.

Mr. WOLFF. One of the problems is the fact that we have not been able to obtain the information. I have tried to obtain the information on the assistance that we had rendered to Vietnam, and I have not been able to obtain that.

Ambassador PORTER. TO Korean forces in Vietnam?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes; in other words, as I understand it, that was the Symington report.

Ambassador PORTER. Yes.

Mr. WOLFF. And that has not been available to us.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The Symington report?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I have it here.

Mr. WOLFF. I couldn't get it.

Ambassador PORTER. We have a complete tabulation of the figures involving the support of the ROK forces in Vietnam.

Mr. GALLAGHER. If we could, update that to the present and include that in the record.

(A classified document was subsequently furnished.)

Mr. GALLAGHER. I might say, could we have the economic benefits Korea may have gained through procurement services, the economic fallout from the war in Vietnam vis-a-vis Japan and vis-a-vis Taiwan?

Ambassador PORTER. Yes: Mr. Chairman, it does require that kind of elaboration to put it in focus vis-a-vis Japan and Taiwan, because the Koreans feel they should share the benefits the way the others do. (The following information was submitted for the record:)

U.S. balance of payments in Japan, Korea and Taiwan were approximately $325 million, $85 million and $20 million respectively in fiscal year 1965, and increased to approximately $675 million. $360 million and $85 million respectively in fiscal year 1970. Accounting records are not maintained to determine the amounts of expenditures that are Southeast Asia related. However, as in order of magnitude it is estimated that of the fiscal year 1970 expenditures noted above, the following were Southeast Asia related: Japan $165 million, Korea $200 million, Taiwan $50 million.

Mr. WOLFF. Under the MAP program you have listed additional grants from excess stocks. Does that mean surplus that has been given over to them?

Ambassador PORTER. That is what that would mean; excess material. Mr. WOLFF. I believe we have a differential between excess and surplus in some cases.