duced which-as usual-reaffirmed past resolutions and the UN's desire for peaceful reunification, called on the Communists to acccept the "Geneva principles" of 1954, asked that the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) continue its work, and requested the SecretaryGeneral to place the Korean question on the agenda of the next Assembly session. On the matter of which Korea-or Koreas-should be invited to participate without a vote, however, the Korean question did receive different treatment. USSR ASKS DOUBLE INVITATION Mr. Valerian A. Zorin of the USSR introduced a resolution in the First (Political and Security) Committee April 10, inviting both north and south Korean participation, although he insisted that "The unification of Korea is . . . a matter for the Koreans themselves." Since the United Nations has "intervened," however, it is "time . . . to take a realistic look at the substance of the Korean matter and what should be done with regard to it. . . . Whether we like it or not, the fact remains that at the present time there are two states on the Korean peninsula, one being the Democratic People's Republic in the north, the other being the Republic of Korea in the south. . . "The fifteen-year record of the consideration of this problem at sessions of the General Assembly has shown with abundant clarity that the question simply cannot be solved in the absence of the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. If we do not want the consideration of the Korean question this year to be fruitless and useless, then we ought certainly to invite the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of southern Korea to take part in the debate. A decision along these lines would be fair and just and would be in keeping with generally recognized norms and principles of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations." U.S. URGES ROK PARTICIPATION Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson of the United States proposed April 10 that only the Republic of Korea be invited to participate in the debate. He noted that "the Republic of Korea is now, and has been since its birth, in close association with the United Nations," having been "established in 1948, under United Nations auspices," having "stated its support for the United Nations and for the United Nations principles on unification of the country," and having been "repeatedly recognized in the General Assembly as fully qualified for membership in the United Nations. In short, the Republic of Korea is now, and has been since its birth, in close association with the United Nations." On the other hand north Korea "has consistently rejected the United Nations," charged Mr. Stevenson. "It was set up after United Nations representatives had been refused admission to the area under its control. It has been recognized by only a few governments. Its unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea in 1950 was the occasion of the first collective action by the United Nations to repel aggression. The north Koreans have repeatedly denied the competence of the United Nations to deal with the Korean problem. The authorities in the northern part of Korea cannot claim to represent their people on the basis of free elections. The seating of a North Korean representative at a United Nations deliberation would not, therefore, be consistent with the attitude of that regime itself towards the United Nations." INDONESIA OFFERS AMENDMENT ... Dr. Sukardjo Wirjopranoto of Indonesia observed April 10 that this country "is a neighbor of Korea" and "friendly to the people of Korea," particularly since "both peoples in the past have shared the same fate" of colonialism-mentioning Indonesia's 350 years as a Dutch colony and 31⁄2 years under Japanese rule during World War II, and Korea's long occupation by the Japanese. But though there is "only one Republic of Indonesia. Korea . . . is at the present time divided. . . . To divide a people into two parts is always painful, as painful as attempting to divide a human body into two parts. For this reason, we are in sympathy with any efforts, any measures, which will serve to reunite the Korean people. . . . If we are to take any constructive steps towards the reunification of Korea between the north and the south, then according to all indications it is fair play, it is reasonable and it is even practical to have both governments, from the north and from the south, represented here in the United Nations to discuss together with us the steps to be taken in their own interests." He then submitted an amendment to the U.S. resolution, adding the words "as well as a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" to the words "Republic of Korea." There was much debate April 10 and 11 over whether to invite just south Korea or both south and north Korea. BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, EUROPEAN COMMENT Non-Asian British Commonwealth representatives agreed with the U.S. position. Mr. C. T. Crowe of the United Kingdom said that to invite both north and south Korea would be "surely to distort the meaning of the word 'equity.'" Mr. H. M. Loveday of Australia wondered whether "the aim" of those who want both north and south Korean attendance "is not in fact disruption"-since north Korean authorities "have consistently and without exception frustrated both the United Nations Commission in Korea and the United Nations itself." Mr. Louis Dauge of France considered it "utterly unjustifiable” and Mr. Marco Pisa of Italy deemed it "illogical" to hear the viewpoint of north Korea. Mr. Carl A. W. Schurmann of the Netherlands said his views "coincide fully" with those of the United States. MIDDLE EASTERN, AFRICAN VIEWPOINTS Mr. Dimitri Bitsios of Greece said "we cannot agree" to have north Korean representatives seated "until we know clearly" that they concur with UN objectives, while Mr. Nurettin Karakoylu of Turkey felt an invitation to north Korea "would be of no utility and might even be prejudicial to the prestige of the United Nations." Mr. Abdallah Chorfi of Morocco-which "in the recent past has also suffered from division . . . the scourge of the twentieth century"-was "convinced of the need to invite and hear" north Korean representatives, while Mr. Adnan Pachachi of Iraq felt it "only just and proper" to invite them. Mr. Abdul Rahman Pazhwak of Afghanistan deplored the "same rigid posi tions" which had ruled out a solution in the past, and said the UN "should neither discourage nor reject" a north Korean invitation. Mr. Zenon Rossides of Cyprus said that "the principle of equality of hearing is a fundamental juridical principal that cannot be disregarded. The Roman maxim is audiatur et altera pars." But there must also be "equality in the attitude of both parties toward the court which will examine the issue in dispute." Mr. GALLAGHER. For the record, whatever became of the Pueblo? Ambassador PORTER. The Pueblo is tied up somewhere in North Korea, as far as I know. I don't know exactly where, but she is said to be up there. Mr. GALLAGHER. Has anybody asked to have it returned? Ambassador PORTER. I think we have asked to have it returned. It is our property. We were interested primarily in concentrating on the men. Mr. GALLAGHER. Now that we have the men, do we continue our requests that the ship be returned? Ambassador PORTER. We do not continue requesting that it be returned. We have made it known that we expect our property to be returned to us. As a matter of fact, they don't return anything except the men. We recovered all the men who have been in there. We have managed to extricate everybody who has been in there and who lived, but the material doesn't come out at all. Mr. GALLAGHER. What has been the impact in Korea of our troop withdrawal from Vietnam, the program of Vietnamization itself? Ambassador PORTER. In Korea, among the public? Mr. GALLAGHER. Among the government officials and the public. Ambassador PORTER. Well, of course, here, again, we get back to their initial feelings about how far the United States was prepared to go in the redeployments or withdrawals. It became pretty obvious that a large-scale movement of American troops out of Vietnam was underway and that there was a program to bring the Vietnamese up to strength to cope with the enemy. This was treated, I think, factually, more or less, by the press after initial fears as to how far we were going. It became, I would say, a topic of continuing interest, but not of overwhelming interest. They looked upon it as something like their own modernization program, but, of course, it was somebody else's problem and they are not half as interested in those as they are in their own. Mr. GALLAGHER. Did they look upon it as a lessening of our will to meet our commitments as it might affect them? Ambassador PORTER. They always worry about the lessening of our will, yes, but they are pretty keenly aware of problems here is the United States on that kind of thing. Overall, they are worried. They would like to see clearly the United States' position in the Far East in its eventual form, whatever that may be, they would like to know. But I would not say that they are in any state of alarm about any of these matters, and I think they have complete confidence in the United States-ROK mutual security treaty. Mr. GALLAGHER. What is the long-range prognosis for U.S. presence in the Far East? Ambassador PORTER. I don't know. I know we plan to maintain a United States presence in Korea, [security deletion]. I just cannot estimate how that will end up. Mr. GALLAGHER. What is the long-range role of Japan in our plans? Are we encouraging them to take up a greater burden of defense? Ambassador PORTER. We are certainly hoping that Japan will be able to do more for the developing countries along the Asian perimeter, more in terms of economic help in particular. We recognize the limitations on the Japanese both from their side and from the side of the others, getting into anything in the sense of active defense measures. Mr. KAZEN. Why is that, Mr. Porter? Ambassador PORTER. [Security deletion.] There is a recognition that the Japanese could bring great benefits. to many countries now in their present affluence, and there is a hope that they will do just that. Mr. KAZEN. They are sure bringing them to us. Ambassador PORTER. [Security deletion.] Mr. KAZEN. No; but they are having their effects. Mr. WOLFF. There is still a statement that Korea is the dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. Ambassador PORTER. That may be, but it is a shield for Korea at the moment. Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Ambassador, will we receive an intelligence briefing tomorrow from General Michaelis? Ambassador PORTER. Yes. Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, I have one more question. I take it, in the testimony that you give in answer to the chairman's question as to whether or not we have any ships like the Pueblo, and your answer was that we do not any longer maintain that sort of surveillance, does that mean that we do not have that type of information available to us any more? Ambassador PORTER. Well, whatever the Pueblo was doing, it certainly is not being done today. Mr. WOLFF. Is there a lack of intelligence that we now have? Ambassador PORTER. I would not say that there is a lack of intelligence. I would have to ask details about the type of intelligence that is available to us. [Security deletion.] Mr. KAZEN. This is a closed session. Ambassador PORTER. Yes. [Security deletion.] Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Ambassador, in connection with the articles of agreement on modernization and troop reduction, has our commitment to Korea been decreased? Has it been enlarged or remained the same, and are there any secret agreements that have been entered into other than those which we now know about? Ambassador PORTER. The commitment has not been changed. It has not been decreased. It has taken a somewhat different form in terms of the type of equipment going in now, and the assistance accorded by the Congress. Certainly there are no secret agreements entered into which would have any bearing on our basic commitment to Korea. Mr. GALLAGHER. What other nations have a presence in Korea? Ambassador PORTER. Well, there are various nations that have a presence, a small presence. In military terms, do you mean? Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes. Ambassador PORTER. The British have a contingent there. The Thais have a larger one. There are representatives of one or two other countries. Have the Turks withdrawn their officer? General MICHAELIS. The Turk and Thai representative, and then a liaison from Australia, Ethiopia, New Zealand. Mr. GALLAGHER. Perhaps we could have a statement on the extent of foreign military presence in Korea. General MICHAELIS. We will give that to you tomorrow. (The following information was submitted:) Countries with military presence in Korea as of May 31, 1971 Mr. GALLAGHER. Assuming under the present arrangement that there would be an attack on Korea from the North, what would our obligations be? Ambassador PORTER. Our obligations would be to consult with them to determine the nature of the attack, its origin, and, of course, to follow through with our processes here in Washington to determine the best nature of response. Whether that response would be some kind of intervention or some request for restraint by the allies of North Korea, or whether it would be restraint on our part to urge restraint on our allies, the Koreans, we can't say. We would have to wait and see what the nature was. Mr. GALLAGHER. Any action on the part of the United States would first depend on consultation with the Government of the United States before our troops were committed? Ambassador PORTER. That is correct. Mr. GALLAGHER. And that would depend on the normal processes that the President would follow, as outlined in the Constitution? Ambassador PORTER. Yes, sir. Mr. GALLAGHER. There would be no automatic reaction? Mr. GALLAGHER. This is a similar arrangement that we have had prior to troop reduction and prior to the new articles of agreement? Ambassador PORTER. Yes, sir. Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman Mr. GALLAGHER. Go ahead, Mr. Wolff. Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Ambassador, as you know, we are having lots of problems with our POW's in Vietnam. Was there ever a resolution of any sort of information about the MIA that we had in Korea? Were all of the missing in action accounted for and were all of our prisoners accounted for? Ambassador PORTER. As I recall, Mr. Wolff, there was at one time some argument as to whether they gave us complete lists. Now, I would have to check back on this. There was some feeling that certain names were missing. They insisted that they had provided complete lists and had turned over people in accordance with the armistice. There was a feeling that others might have been involved, and what happened to them we have never been able to determine. The subject has not been raised for many years. Mr. WOLFF. As a result of the question of our POW's now in North Vietnam, the question has come up again relative to some that they say are still in North Korea. Mr. RANARD. If I recall correctly, sir, I think at the end of the war it finally came down to a list of some 300-odd names or so that were unresolved. The question comes up annually, and we submit a letter to the North, to the Military Armistice Committee, and if I recall, they take no reaction to that letter at all. Their position is that they returned everybody, as we have heard from other sources, and the subject is closed, period. Mr. WOLFF. We have no input at all? Mr. RANARD. No. Mr. GALLAGHER. For the record, Mr. Ambassador, we could have a statement on the present status of ROK troops in Vietnam and the cost of maintaining those troops. Is there presently a plan for ROK troop reduction? What has been the impact of the ROK troops in Vietnam, and could we have a list of casualties and general performance? (A classified document was subsequently furnished.) Ambassador PORTER. You have mentioned impact of ROK troops in Vietnam. In what sense? Mr. GALLAGHER. In the sense of participation, accomplishment, performance vis-a-vis-our own; casualties vis-a-vis-our own. Ambassador PORTER, Yes, sir. Mr. WOLFF. If the chairman would yield on that point 65-445-71-6 |