Mr. WOLFF. When I was out speaking to some of our people in both Vietnam and Korea, I made note of the fact that some of our people were complaining about the attitude of the ROK troops in Vietnam in the PX's and exchanges and parts of the black market that they were contributing to.

I was wondering whether or not there had been any representations made to the Republic of Korea about those practices. Perhaps I had better repeat that question tomorrow.

Ambassador PORTER. I do not recall making any representations on that score. If those things were occurring, Mr. Wolff, they would automatically be taken up with the ROK commander in Vietnam itself.

Mr. WOLFF. I think they have been, but I don't think they have had much success. What happens is the fact that there are Koreans and third-country nationals employed in the various exchanges, and they notify the troops that the Filipinos and ROK's have large shipments of equipment that come into those exchanges and they are notified first. and by the time our people get to the exchange to pick up the equipment, like refrigerators and air conditioners, and things of that sort, they are just not there, and then they are found on the black market. This is a pretty difficult problem. I spoke about that when I was out in Korea last, and I spoke about it in Vietnam. I think it should be a matter to be taken up with the ROK military because of the fact that it does hurt the morale of our people, and also is contributing to the black market, which is a pretty virulent situation.

General MICHAELIS. We had this under control in Korea, and unfortunately I don't know what they do in Vietnam, and I don't think the Ambassador does.

Ambassador PORTER. What we would need in Vietnam is a bill of particulars as precise as possible-dates and places, and so on. We would feel no hesitation whatsoever in going in on a matter of that kind if our colleagues would supply us with the data to back us up. Mr. WOLFF. That is all. Thank you.

Mr. GALLAGHER. In Admiral McCain's statement, he cited the establishment of a research agency for defense sciences. What is that, exactly?

Ambassador PORTER. This is an agency which the Korean Government would like to establish for defense science and research, and which we have generally under examination at the present time to see whether it fits into the general structure of ROK governmental or military activity in a way that would make it useful.

Some of the outlines of the matter are not clear to us-financial dimensions and what is involved in terms of assistance if we are to give it. I imagine that there will be a statement in the military side of the paper tomorrow on that subject.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you.

The hour draws late, and we appreciate very much your being with us today, and certainly on behalf of the entire subcommittee and the full committee, I want to extend our congratulations for a job well done. It is a pleasure to see you again, Mr. Ambassador. The committee stands adjourned until tomorrow..

Ambassador PORTER. Thank you for all your kindnesses.

(Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Wednesday, June 9, 1971.)

AMERICAN-KOREAN RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRENSENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:10 p.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman) presiding.

Present: Representatives Gallagher, Fountain, Broomfield, Whalley, Thomson and Halpern.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will come to order.

We are meeting today in continuation of the hearings on AmericanKorean relations. Our principal witness today is Gen. John H. Michaelis. General Michaelis is Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea; and Commanding General, 8th U.S. Army.

General Michaelis is accompanied by Gen. John S. Lekson, Chief, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea, and other members of his staff. He will discuss the various aspects of the military assistance programs and security problems in Korea.

General Michaelis has a prepared statement and other visual briefing materials.

The subcommittee is indeed honored to have you with us today, General. We have great admiration for you personally and your outstanding military career and sincere appreciation for the service that you have rendered to our country.

We welcome you here today. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN H. MICHAELIS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND; COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES, KOREA; COMMANDING GENERAL, 8TH U.S. ARMY

General MICHAELIS. Thank you very much. It is my privilege to appear before this distinguished subcommittee.

I have with me today a rather lengthy classified statement covering the areas you requested.

Rather than reading this, with your permission I would like to give you a brief summary of the more salient points and submit my prepared statement in the record.

(The statement referred to follows:)

STATEMENT OF GEN. J. H. MICHAELIS, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND; COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES, KOREA; COMMANDING GENERAL, 8TH U.S. ARMY

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, it is a privilege to appear before this distinguished committee. In presenting this statement my purpose is to inform you of my role in the Republic of Korea and the facts that give substance and dimension to the military forces under my command. Since the forces are shaped to respond to the mission, I want to make it unequivocally clear that I consider my mission is to maintain the armistice and keep the peace on the peninsula.

In the meantime, a democratic Republic of Korea with a virile and growing economy is the best guarantee for a peaceful solution. Without the armistice, the economic miracle that we have witnessed in Korea could not have taken place. The job is not yet done. A few more years are needed to build a more nearly selfsufficient economy. This, of course, will only be possible under the umbrella of the military armistice that has prevailed since the tragic days of the Korean War. How to create a credible deterrence against North Korean aggression while the Republic of Korea builds a sound economy is the challenge.

In juxtaposition, North Korea's Dictator, Kim Il Sung, possessing the fourth largest Communist army in the world and a large modern jet air force has repeatedly stated his objectives as:

The removal of all U.S. troops in South Korea and disruption of the U.S.Republic of Korea relations.

Reverse Republic of Korea economic devlopment and foster political instability. At the appropriate time complement subversive warfare activity with conventional operations to unify Korea.

To keep peace and to deter aggression from the north, I command three separate commands.

As Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINC-UNC), under agreement of May 26, 1961. I have operational control of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces, a force of approximately 600,000. This authority is granted to-and I quote "only to defend the Republic of Korea from Communist aggression." I exercise this control through the United Nations Command component commanders, and, as CINC-UNC, I report to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the executive agent for the United Nations, which stems from a resolution of the United Nations Security Council of July 7, 1950.

My second command is that of the Commander, United States Forces, Korea (COMUSK)—a planning and coordination staff in peacetime that becomes an operational staff in wartime, whose members also fulfill the UNC staff functions. In this role, I report to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). Thirdly, as the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, I report to the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific (CINCUSARPAC), and have command of U.S. Army forces of approximately 34,000.

THE THREAT

North Korea, with a population of 14 million, has developed the fourth larg est arm in the Communist world. Highly trained and rigidly disciplined, this force maintains the capability to conduct both limited conventional and unconventional warfare against the Republic of Korea. Each of these aspects of the threat which have been present since the end of the Korean War, is felt in a very real way in the Republic of Korea today.

Premier Kim Il Sung, the Marxist leader, continues improving North Korea's military posture and converting the country into a military fortress. He has ongoing programs of dispersing population and selected industries and building underground factories, as well as improving the surviveability of the armed forces with underground hangars, command and control posts, and weapon positions.

The major force of the North Korean military is the Army-consisting of approximately 400,000 effective, well-trained personnel. Its combat effectiveness is considered good.

In general, the Army is equipped with conventional weapons and modern equipment supplied by communist China and the Soviet Union. These include AK-47 rifles, T-54 medium tanks, 100-mm assault guns, and truck-mounted rocket launchers.

In addition to the regular forces, KIM also has a paramilitary organization of approximately 1.3 million personnel-called "Laborer/Farmer/Red Guard", who

undergo reserve training and are armed with basic infantry and crew served weapons.

Contributing to the overall effectiveness of the Army is the increased level of training and the conduct of larger field and command post type exercises. This training, along with other improvements, is indicative of North Korea's ongoing programs to strengthen its military capability. However North Korea is still dependent on the Soviet Union for sophisticated military equipment.

The capabilities of the North Korean Army are formidable. The most immediate threat, however, is the North Korean Air Force, because of its capability to launch a surprise, low-level attack.

This force, virtually non-existent in 1953, is now equipped with over 400 jet fighters and in excess of 60 light-jet bombers. Most of these aircraft are housed in underground shelters on the numerous jet-capable airfields. Additionally, a modern surface-to-air missile system provides defense of the major population and industrial centers and major military installations.

The combat radii of NK fighters extend far into the ROK. Strike aircraft operating from their two southernmost bases, can reach the Seoul area in three minutes after crossing the DMZ and our southernmost installations in less than 25 minutes.

The North Korean Navy is configured primarily for the defense of its ports and shorelines-as well as for the protection of fishing operations and the surveillance of North Korean-claimed territorial waters. Although not as modern as the other services, the navy provides a limited offensive threat to the ROK. Of primary concern are the agent boats used to land agents/infiltrators along the ROK coasts and the submarines and guided missile boats.

Despite efforts to become more self-sufficient militarily, North Korea does not posses the resources to sustain a prolonged conventional war. North Korea would be heavily dependent on Soviet and/or CHICOM aid. At the present time it is not expected that this aid will be provided. Lacking such assurance, Kim Il Sung will probably continue unconventional warfare operations.

The unconventional warfare capability of North Korea is considerable with all elements highly trained in infiltration, sabotage, and subversive tactics. These forces are encountered in the ROK today and present a considerable threat now and in the future.

The North Korean agent boats are the primary means used by Kim Il Sung in sea infiltration operations against the ROK. Their low wood hull construction profile and resemblance to fishing boats make them difficult to classify even when detected. These boats, equipped with high powered diesel engines, provide speeds up to 40 knots.

The total number of incidents along the DMZ and in the ROK rear areas has decreased from approximately 76 in 1968 to 110 in 1970. This reduction is even more apparent this year with only 9 incidents thus far in the first 5 months. Primarily, I believe this reduction is due to several factors; (1) the construction of a barrier fence across the entire length of the 151 mile DMZ; (2) increased effectiveness in detection and elimination; and (3) world reaction.

Summarizing the threat, North Korea has the fourth largest Army in the communist world, with the capability to conduct limited conventional warfare against the Republic of Korea. Regular military forces total approximately 400,000 backed by a 1.3 million-man paramilitary force.

North Korea will probably strive to develop an economic and industrial base to relieve its dependency on others and to improve its international standing. To gain control over all Korea remains Kim Il Sung's ultimate goal. For the present he appears to be emphasizing political rather than direct military means to achieve it.

As long as armed aggression remains a means for accomplishing Kim Il Sung's objective to unify on his terms a divided nation, the Republic of Korea cannot meet its national objective without an effective deterrent force. While the primary purpose of maintaining such a force is to deter aggression, it must be able to defend itself if deterrence fails.

ROK MILITARY CAPABILITY, NEEDS AND PROBLEMS

The ROK Army, consisting of about 500,000 personnel, is presently capable of maintaining internal security and defending against a North Korean attack. As a result of the withdrawal of one U.S. division, the ROK Army is now re

sponsible for the defense of the entire DMZ, with the exception of a small sector on the road to Panmunjom.

The ROK Navy, consisting of about 100 ships and small craft has the mission to defend the extensive-about 1600 miles of coastal perimeter-of the Republic from seaborne attack and infiltration.

The ROK Air Force is a small, highly trained competent force. The Air Force has the all-weather, high-performance tactical fighter F4D and the F-5A freedom fighter. The remainder of the tactical fighters consists of F-86 aircraft. The ROKAF transport aircraft are mainly the WW II type C-46s and C-54s.

The Marine Corps is a well-trained and capable force.

MAP OBJECTIVES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

As is well known, the purpose of United States assistance has been to assist independent nations to preserve their independence by fostering their defense capabilities as well as their economic stability and growth. Korea is truly a showpiece of what assistance programs can accomplish.

In consonance with the Nixon Doctrine, the objectives of the MAP in Korea

are:

To continue development of modernized forces capable of detering North Korean aggression and lessen dependence on U.S. military presence. To assist economic and social growth.

The ROK Armed Forces are fully capable of using and maintaining properly and effectively MAP equipment provided.

In recent years, military assistance for Korea has had only limited amounts of grant aid for modernization. Military assistance has been sufficient to support the operating costs of the armed forces which of necessity are being maintained to counter possible invasion and actual infiltration. There is a need to: Replace obsolete equipment in all services, improve mobility, upgrade command and control facilities, and expand logistic capabilities.

PROGRESS AND CONTENT OF MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

The modernization of the ROK Armed Forces is a major consideration in preserving the Armistice and providing the stability so necessary for the continued economic development of Korea. Recognizing the need to modernize ROK forces, a modernization plan was developed, representing the minimum modernization necessary to maintain an adequate deterrent posture.

A rapid and constructive pace has been set toward the goal of modernization. Foreign Aid Legislation passed by the Congress last year has made it possible to fund procurement of new equipment and provide equipment of redeploying U.S. forces to the ROK Armed Forces.

The Modernization Plans provides a higher degree of mobility, increased firepower, and modernized tactical communications, all of which will improve the Army's capability to deter attack.

For ROKAF, the Modernization Plan provides for acquisition of the new International Fighter, the F-5E, establishment of a Tactical Air Control System, and improved radar equipment.

The ROK Navy counterinfiltration capability will be improved and the ROK Marine Corps amphibious capability will be upgraded.

ROK EFFORTS IN IMPROVING SELF-SUFFICIENCY

The Republic of Korea has recently moved ahead in developing military selfsufficiency. In October, 1968, a U.S. Department of Army Weapons Survey Team concluded that it was feasible to establish a Rifle Plant in the Republic and consequently the ROKS have entered into a co-production arrangement with an American manufacturer.

An excellent example of technological development in Korea is a fast boat which has been designed by the Korean Institute of Science and Technology and is now under construction.

Another significant step in the ROKG's march toward self-sufficiency was the establishment, by ROK Presidential Decree, in January 1971, of the Research Agency for Defense Science, called RADS. The primary mission for 1971 of this organization is to evaluate the domestic industrial capability with a view toward rapid development of Korea's defense industries.