in the UN Participation Act of 1945, empowered the President to take actions such as that implementing Rhodesian sanctions. Section 5(a) of the Act, as amended (59 Stat. 619), authorizes the President "to regulate or prohibit economic relations" when the U.S. is called upon to apply mandatory sanctions under Article 41 of the UN Charter. This authority was cited in the Executive Orders which implemented Rhodesian Sanctions.

If sanctions are imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter, all Members of the United Nations are obligated by Article 25 of the Charter to comply with the Security Council decision imposing the sanctions. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the United Nations Participation Act, the Committee said: "The committee realizes that the powers proposed to be granted to the President under [section 5] . are very great. However, the basic decision in this regard was made when the Charter was ratified and this provision is simply a necessary corollary to our membership in this Organization. The Committee also believes that the Security Council must be placed in the most effective position possible to act under Article 41 since the prompt and effective application of economic and diplomatic sanctions by all the United Nations (or even the threat or possibility thereof) may avoid the necessity for the use of the armed forces available to the Security Council.

"The better prepared this country is to participate promptly in action of this kind, the more effective will be the Security Council and the more hope there will be that the United Nations may serve its major purpose, namely, the prevention of armed conflict."

The Department of State is concerned that any limitation of the authority of the President to carry out mandatory sanctions decided by the Security Council would decrease the effectiveness of the United Nations and might at some point result in the United States being unable to satisfy its treaty obligations. In this connection, it should be noted that the President is also empowered by the Export Administration Act of 1969 (and was empowered formerly by the Export Control Act of 1949) to prohibit or curtail U.S. exports "to the extent necessary . . . to fulfill [the] international obligations" of the U.S.

H. J. Res. 172 states that the United Kingdom supplies our enemy in Vietnam and "has refused our request that it cease doing business with the enemy that is killing American boys every day. . ." In fact, virtually all external assistance to North Vietnam comes from the Soviet Union and Communist China. In the past four years only one British-owned vessel has visited North Vietnam and the British Government has acted to prevent any reoccurrences. The other British flag vessels that have called at North Vietnamese ports are controlled by Chinese Communist interests and registered in Hong Kong.

The British Government is seriously concerned about the use of its flag in this traffic and has succeeded in confining it, for all practical purposes, to vessels based in Hong Kong. The UK maintains that legal and political considerations involving its position in Hong Kong restrict its ability to deal with the matter there. Even so, the effectiveness of British efforts is evident in the decline in the number of vessels operating out of Hong Kong to North Vietnam under the British flag-114 in 1968, 74 in 1969, and 40 in 1970.

In several other respects, the preambular paragraphs of these resolutions state premises which are not consistent with the official attitude of the U.S. toward the white-ruled regimes of southern Africa and with U.S. policy in the area. First of all, as the President stated in his Report to the Congress in February: "Both our statements and actions have, or should have made it patently clear to all concerned that racism is abhorrent to the American people, to my Administration, and to me personally. We cannot be indifferent to apartheid. Nor can we ignore the tensions created in Africa by the denial of political self-determination. We shall do what we can to foster equal opportunity and free political expression instead. We shall do so on both moral and practical grounds, for in our view there is no other solution."

The U.S. voted as it did in the United Nations Security Council in 1966 and 1968 in part because the regime in Rhodesia was adopting measures designed to deny an effective voice to the African majority in the determination of Rhodesia's future. These measures were expanded in 1970 with the regime's unilateral introduction of a new constitution institutionalizing white minority control and racial discrimination. Contrary to the view expressed in H.J. Res. 172, the peaceful measures taken by the UN are designed to forestall bloody struggle in southern Africa, not promote it. We are concerned that the present tensions arising from the denial of majority rule in Rhodesia could lead to serious violence there, a situation which could be exploited by communist states seeking to increase their presence and influence in the area.

Preambular paragraphs of these resolutions which refer to Rhodesia as a "sovereign" nation are inconsistent with the view of the international community, which we share, that the UK is the sovereign power in Southern Rhodesia. Of the 21 countries which maintained some form of consular representation in Rhodesia at the time of the unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965, only South Africa and Portugal continue to do so. No country in the world-not even South Africa or Portugal-has formally recognized the Smith regime or Rhodesian independence.

Accordingly, the Security Council's actions with regard to Rhodesia were not an intervention in the internal affairs of a state, as stated in H. Con. Res. 12. They were rather a response to a request for assistance by a member nation, the United Kingdom, recognized by all as having sovereignty over, and responsibility for the territory, and to the threat to international peace and security which the Council concluded existed as the result of the situation in Rhodesia.

Finally, the statements in H. Con. Res. 5 about chromite and our national security must be judged against the following background:

The matter of chrome ore supply in this country is kept under constant review within the Executive Branch. Our studies indicate that adequate supplies of chrome ore are available to American industry at the present time. While the supply situation might be described as tight, it is premature to suggest that there is a shortage. In fact, inventories of American industry increased last year, while imports and domestic consumption were virtually in balance. Moreover, although some chrome ore is needed for national defense purposes, I should put this in perspective by noting that direct military consumption presently requires about 10% of our consumption.

With respect to U.S. imports of Soviet chrome ore, I would note that American purchases of chrome ore from the USSR did not result solely from the imposition of Rhodesian sanctions nor is the Soviet Union the sole supplier in this area. In the years immediately prior to sanctions, Rhodesia and the USSR each accounted for about one-third of U.S. imports of metallurgical grade chromite. In the period 1967-70 since sanctions, the U.S. has imported approximately 51% of its supplies from the USSR while also increasing purchases from other producers such as Turkey and South Africa.

Some months prior to the adoption of Rhodesian sanctions, the U.S. Government commenced the disposal of chrome ore and its equivalents from the stockpiles which had been found in excess of U.S. needs. Disposals of 885,000 short dry tons were authorized by the Congress in Public Law 89-415 of May 11, 1966, and are continuing.

Soviet and Rhodesian chrome ore prices are not susceptible to comparion as suggested by H. Con. Res. 5. No current Rhodesian price is ascertainable, since Rhodesian chromite is not traded freely, and it would be misleading to compare 1971 Soviet ore prices with 1966 Rhodesian ore prices. Prices for Soviet chromite have doubled since 1966. Lower-quality chromite from other sources has increased in price more or less proportionately to that for Soviet ore. The over-all rise in market prices does reflect the impact of sanctions, but it also reflects factors such as inflation and over-ail demand, which have caused significant price increases in many raw materials over the same period.

I hope that the foregoing is helpful in explaining the Department's position with respect to these resolutions.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the submission of this report. Sincerely,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

[Text of report from Department of State on H. R. 5445 and other, similar legislation]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, D.C., May 14, 1971.

Hon. THOMAS E. MORGAN,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing in response to your letter of March 12, 1971, for the comments of the Department of State on H.R. 4712, H.R. 4947, H.R. 5445, H.R. 5489, and H.R. 5817, five similar bills "To amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to prevent the imposition thereunder of any

prohibition on the importation into the United States of any metal-bearing ore from any free world country for so long as the importation of like ore from any Communist country is not prohibited by law."

The Department of State opposes these bills.

Section 5(a) of the United Nations Participation Act, which the proposed legislation would amend, enables the President to carry out the international obligations of the United States under the United Nations Charter. If sanctions are imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter, all Members of the United Nations are obligated by Article 25 of the Charter to comply with the Security Council decision imposing the sanctions. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the United Nations Participation Act, the Committee said:

"The committee realizes that the powers proposed to be granted to the President under [section 5] .. are very great: However, the basic decision in this regard was made when the Charter was ratified and this provision is simply a necessary corollary to our membership in this Organization. The committee also believes that the Security Council must be placed in the most effective position possible to act under article 41 since the prompt and effective application of economic and diplomatic sanctions by all the United Nations (or even the threat or possibility thereof) may avoid the necessity for the use of the armed forces available to the Security Council.

The better prepared this country is to participate promptly in action of this kind, the more effective will be the Security Council and the more hope there will be that the United Nations may serve its major purpose, namely, the prevention of armed conflict."

The Department of State is concerned that any limitation of the authority of the President to carry out mandatory sanctions decided by the Security Council would decrease the effectiveness of the United Nations and might at some point result in the United States being unable to satisfy its treaty obligations.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report. Sincerely yours,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE,

Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Our witnesses for today's hearing include, from the Department of State, John A. Armitage, Director of the Office of U.N. Political Affairs in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, and Joseph B. Kyle, Director of the Office of International Commodities. From the Office of Emergency Preparedness we have William N. Lawrence, Chief of the Stockpile Policy Division. Mr. Lawrence is accompanied by his assistant, Louis Need.

We will begin with Mr. Armitage who is accompanied by Oliver Crosby, Country Director for Rhodesia and South Africa.

STATEMENT OF JOHN A. ARMITAGE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF U.N. POLITICAL AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. ARMITAGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a pleasure for me to appear before you today on behalf of the Department of State to testify on the several resolutions now before this committee dealing directly or indirectly with our general policy toward Southern Rhodesia and, in particular, the question of United Nations economic sanctions.

I am joined by two colleagues from the Department of State. Mr. Joseph Kyle, the Director of the Office of International Commodities in the Bureau of Economic Affairs, will speak to the question of chrome supply and its relationship to the sanctions program.

Also prepared to assist in responding to the subcommittee inquiries is Mr. Oliver Crosby, the Director of the Office in the Bureau of African Affairs dealing with Southern Rhodesia and the remainder of Southern Africa.

Before presenting the Department's position on the resolutions before you, I would like to discuss briefly the administration's position. on Southern Rhodesia.

United States policy toward Southern Rhodesia is based on the principles of self-determination, eventual majority rule and the granting of basic rights to the 5 million citizens of Rhodesia who are black.

As President Nixon stated in his Report on U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's of February 25, 1971:

Both our statements and our actions have, or should have, made it patently clear to all concerned that racism is abhorrent to the American people, to my administration and to me personally. We cannot be indifferent to apartheid. Nor can we ignore the tensions created in Africa by the denial of political self-determination. We shall do what we can to foster equal opportunity and free political expression instead. We shall do so on both moral and practical grounds, for in our view there is no other solution.

The United States and an overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations favor eventual independence for Southern Rhodesia.

The British Government, which is the sovereign power responsible for the inhabitants of this territory, likewise wants independence for Southern Rhodesia. However, that Government has refrained from granting independence to Southern Rhodesia now because the Rhodesian regime has rejected movement toward eventual majority rule.

The Smith regime in 1965 not only refused to commit itself to such a course of action but attempted in November of that year unilaterally to declare itself independent on a basis that would indefinitely perpetuate minority rule.

The British Government declared illegal that declaration of independence and sought the assistance of the United Nations in bringing an end to the rebellion of that regime.

Since that time we have joined with the British and other United Nations member states in support of a number of peaceful measures designed to bring an end to the rebellion and to influence the regime to change its policies and move toward majority rule.

Specifically, we supported the Security Council's resolution of November 12, 1965, which condemned the illegal Smith regime. We also supported the Council's resolutions of December 16, 1966; May 29, 1968; and March 18, 1970 which called on all member nations to impose economic sanctions-first selective and subsequently comprehensive against Rhodesia.

In accordance with the authority embodied in the United Nations Participation Act, executive orders were subsequently issued to carry out the mandatory provisions of those resolutions with respect to the United States.

We have on the other hand consistently opposed the use of force to bring a settlement to the Rhodesian problem. On May 17, 1970, the same day we closed our Consulate General in Salisbury, the

United States vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution which advocated the use of force against Southern Rhodesia and contained other provisions with which we could not agree.

We continue to oppose the use of force against Southern Rhodesia. It is apparent that the U.N. sanctions program has not yet achieved its goal. The British efforts to date, first in 1966 and again in 1968, to reach an acceptable agreement with the Smith regime on the basis of eventual majority rule were unsuccessful.

The sanctions program, however, has not been without effect. It has resulted in a reduced rate of growth of the Rhodesian economy and most recently in a serious shortage of foreign exchange.

As the President said, again in his February 25 report:

We have reaffirmed and continue to enforce the economic sanctions against Rhodesia, and we have sought ways to ensure a more universal compliance with those sanctions.

We have followed this policy not to punish or visit retribution on the Smith regime, but in an effort to persuade the regime to change its policies and to pave the way for a settlement with Britain. We are still hopeful that this effort will be successful.

At the moment the British Government is again exploring the possibility of reaching an agreement with the Smith regime. We fully support their efforts in this regard and hope that they will lead to an agreement whereby all the people of Southern Rhodesia can exercise their right of self-determination and be welcomed into the community of nations. Sanctions could then be brought to an end.

With this general overview of our policy with regard to Southern Rhodesia, I would now like to turn to the specific proposals before this committee.

Since the Department has been requested to submit written reports on a representative sampling of the resolutions before you and has done so in its letters to Chairman Morgan dated May 14, 1971, and June 17, 1971, I will not attempt to provide a detailed comment on all these proposals.

The Department is opposed to all but one of the resolutions before. this subcommittee. The exception is House Resolution 45, a resolution supporting both U.S. participation in the United Nations mandatory sanctions program on Rhodesia and the principle of majority rule by all the people of that territory. This resolution reaffirms present U.S. policy as recently stated by the President and the Secretary of State. We urge its enactment.

The remaining resolutions before the subcommittee all contain proposals which in one manner or another are contrary to U.S. policy. Some are limited to provisions that it be declared the sense of the Congress that the United States either terminate its participation in the United Nations sanctions program, or beyond that, resume "normal trade" with Southern Rhodesia and accord its Government full recognition and diplomatic and consular rights.

Others resolve that the President be authorized and directed to declare that the United States will no longer abide by the sanctions. program. Still others propose an amendment to the United Nations Participation Act which would have the effect of invalidating the existing embargo on chrome imports from Southern Rhodesia so long as such imports are not prohibited from the Soviet Union or other Communist countries.