drawal so that the enemy would not attack our troops as they left South Vietnam.

The next thing I understood from the President was that we were really in South Vietnam to insure the return of our prisoners. The last I heard was that we were in South Vietnam to insure the release of our prisoners and to insure the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves.

With that statement we come a full circle to permitting the right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people. I don't know what the President's purpose is to stay in South Vietnam. I suspect it is to save face.

It is an oriental characteristic we have always maintained was a weakness of the orientals. The face the Americans have presented in Indochina is the ugliest face this Nation has ever presented to the world and the way to change that face is not to remain in Vietnam. You will save the ugly face if you remain there. The way to change that ugly face is to get out of Vietnam and not quibble over the ways you get out. Just leave Vietnam. It was not hard to get in there. Mr. GALLAGHER. Do you feel we are doing that now?

Mr. WALDIE. I suppose we are doing it to the extent that I am living out the rest of my life, if that is an analogy. As I presently stand before you, I am presently living out the rest of my life. I suspect in that regard, we are getting out of Vietnam.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I hope both policies continue.

Mr. WALDIE. The thing I disagree with-the constant assurance that the President is trying to end the war. Of course, he is. President Johnson tried to end the war. President Kennedy tried to end the war. President Eisenhower tried to end the war. All Presidents have tried to end the war. I used to criticize Presidents and vehemently ever since I have been in Congress. I criticized President Johnson and I continued criticizing President Nixon.

I am no longer going to criticize Presidents. The Congress of the United States has it within its power to end this war next week. We could end it if we had the courage to do it. It is very easy to criticize Presidents for their failures and policies if you are not willing to assume the risks that formulating policy entails. We have not been willing to do that.

Mr. GALLAGHER. With regard to the resolutions, Mr. Waldie, some are entailed by a prisoner-of-war return. Do you advocate that? Mr. WALDIE. I would advocate the resolution that calls for withdrawal from Vietnam tomorrow.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Without conditions?

Mr. WALDIE. Without any conditions. Failing to have that resolution, I would argue for each resolution calling for 24 hours beyond that.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Primarily you give testimony here to a resolution that fixes the earliest possible date to end the war without any conditions: is that correct?

Mr. WALDIE. I am not interested in conditions. I am interested in the men in Vietnam being brought home and the conditions by which they are brought home as long as they are safe. Those are the only conditions that concern me.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. du Pont.

Mr. DU PONT. Mr. Waldie, do you feel, then, that getting our troops out of South Vietnam is more important than any consequence that might attach to their removal?

Mr. WALDIE. I can think of no consequence that can attach to getting our troops out of Vietnam that are as damaging as the consequences of staying in Vietnam.

Mr. DU PONT. So you would be willing to have the troops come out and essentially leave the prisoners there. You would also be willing to have the troops come out and let an armed force from North Vietnam, uniformed, come across the DMZ and invade the South?

Mr. WALDIE. I would be willing to have the troops come out and I would be willing to have South Vietnam defend itself and I would be willing to have our prisoners released at the conclusion of the war. Your restatement of my position is not one I accept.

I tell you that the consequences of staying in there are these: The military reputation in America is probably as low as it has ever been. That may be one of the greatest if not the greatest loss the country has incurred. The people of America no longer have confidence in their military and it is a tragedy because the military is an essential part of America and that military is going to have to be called upon.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I might interject at this point that the Pentagon papers clearly indicate that a great part of the Military Establishment was against the very position we find ourselves in. These were political judgments.

Mr. WALDIE. I suspect that is quite correct, but most of the blame, it seems to me, in the mind of the American public is being shared equally, if not more than equally, by the military. I think that loss of confidence of America in the military is a devastating blow to our national interests.

I think the divisions in this country that are brought about by the Vietnam war are devastating to the fabric of the country. I think the concentration of the Congress on Vietnam to the exclusion of all of the other problems of this country are damaging to this country beyond comparison.

When you suggest an immediate withdrawal may cause the South Vietnamese to fall to the North, I suggest to you that that is a minimal consequence compared to what will happen and is happening to our country by staying there. I don't want to see the prisoners remain in captivity a day longer, but neither do I want to see this country continue to undergo the travail resulting from our remaining in Vietnam. Mr. DU PONT. Are there any conditions under which you would favor the sending of American troops to defend or to assist in the defense of a nation invaded by a third nation?

Mr. WALDIE. Surely; if Israel, for example, were under threat of invasion, I think our national interest is intimately involved in its preservation. If a NATO country were invaded, I think we would have to honor our commitment to NATO.

If certain armed forces were sent into South America, I think our national interest is intimately involved. I do not think our national interest is involved in Indochina.

Mr. DU PONT. Africa?

Mr. WALDIE. It would depend upon the nation in Africa involved and from whence the foreign troops came.

Mr. DU PONT. I am not talking about Russian or Chinese Armed Forces. I am talking about the neighboring nations.

Mr. WALDIE. I would not worry about neighboring African states. I would not commit any American forces to aid one state being invaded by another neighboring state.

Mr. DU PONT. But if the Egyptian Army

Mr. WALDIE. I clearly would.

Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much for being so patient and we apologize. We are delighted to have your contribution.

The Chair would now like to recognize Congressman William F. Ryan, Democrat of New York, who has sponsored several bills and resolutions directed at ending Ú.S. involvement in the Indochina conflict.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be able to offer testimony before this distinguished subcommittee. I believe that the very fact that hearings are being held concerning the Vietnam war, and termination of the U.S. involvement in that misguided tragedy, demonstrate that the House of Representatives, has, indeed, reached a point where there is a real chance that the responsibility of the Congress will finally be asserted.

I do not think it will come as any surprise to this subcommittee that I am appearing as a proponent of U.S. withrawal from Indochina. I think it safe to say that I have already made clear my views on the war. I have voted against every appropriation for money to sustain that nightmare, and I shall continue to do so. It is my urgent hope that the actions of this subcommittee, and of the full House Foreign Affairs Committee, and then finally of the full House, will very soon bring to an end the need to even consider legislation providing such moneys.

As you know, I am a sponsor of several bills and resolution, all directed at ending U.S. involvement in the Indochina conflict. These include:

House Concurrent Resolution 50, calling for an immediate cease-fire and complete withdrawal by June 30, 1971;

House Resolution 48, barring U.S. troops in or over Laos;

House Resolution 55, calling for the President to set a date for withdrawal;

House Concurrent Resolution 246, urging the United Nations to take over responsibility for ending the war;

H.R. 1738, barring the use of funds or personnel for Cambodia; H.R. 4102, the Vietnam Disengagement Act, calling for withdrawal by December 31, 1971;

H.R. 4126, barring U.S. involvement in Laos.

H.R. 5229, barring support for any invasion of North Vietnam; and H.R. 8955, establishing a cease-fire and withdrawal.

I am, it is clear, prepared to sponsor, support, testify for, and vote for every piece of legislation which will end this war. It should have never begun. Once begun, it should have been ended long ago. Still continuing, it should be ended today, at this instant. If today is not

feasible, I will settle for tomorrow. If tomorrow is not practicable, I will reluctantly settle for next week. But I will not settle for the unending drain of American and Asia lives, waiting and waiting for this administration to end it.

Why? Why must we withdraw? We must because we have paid an incalculably high price for an incredibly wrong venture, and in doing so, we have made the devastated lands of Indochina and their hapless peoples pay an equal incalculable price.

Since January 1, 1961, more than 53,000 American lives have been lost; more than 750,000 Vietnamese. South Vietnam is ravaged, the victim of bombs, herbicides, depopulation, forced evacuation, and constant warfare. Laos and Cambodia share that fate.

The tale of this dreary debacle is a long one. Longer even than the 47 volumes of the Pentagon study authorized by then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. It is a tale, we now know even more fully than we did just a few weeks ago because of the Pentagon Papers, of deception and obfuscation. It is a tale of bloodshed, stupidity, and even atrocity.

Why are we fighting?

We have been told that we were fighting to contain China. Today, Chinese influence is certainly no less in Southeast Asia. In fact, the North Vietnamese, historically the antagonists of China, now look to that nation as a source of materiel.

We have been told about the domino theory: if South Vietnam went Communist, the rest of Southeast Asia would topple. This theory declined in political currency for a while, but now it has been resurrected. As the President told us on July 2, 1970, in a televised interview:

Now I know there are those that say, well, the domino theory is obsolete. They haven't talked to the dominoes. They should talk to the Thais, Malaysians, to Singapore, to Indonesia, to the Philippines, to the Japanese, and the rest. And if the United States leaves Vietnam in a way that we are humiliated or defeated, not simply in what are jingoistic terms but in very practical terms, this will be immensely discouraging to the 300 million people from Japan, clear around to Thailand in free Asia. And even more important, it will be ominously encouraging to the leaders of Communist China and the Soviet Union who are supporting the North Vietnamese. It will encourage them in their expansionist policies in other areas. The world will be much safer in which to live.

Strangely, in light of this resurrected rationalization for U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, the "dominoes," to use the President's felicitous terminology, do not seem to hear the same bells tolling. No Malaysian troops fight in South Vietnam. Nor do Japanese soldiers or troops from Singapore. The few troops obtained from the Philippines and South Korea are paid for with American money. If the "dominoes" are running scared, their tread is a very soft one, and it is greased with American dollars, not our view of national interest.

Moreover, the Pentagon papers have revealed that the CIA long ago discredited the domino theory, yet that was ignored.

We have been told that the U.S. presence is necessary to insure freedom and self-determination for the South Vietnamese. Yet the regimes we have supported in that country have evidenced the same repressions we see in the very totalitarian states we condemn. Between 40,000 and 200,000 South Vietnamese are held as prisoners for their political beliefs. As I said on July 13, 1970, when the disclosures regarding Con Son Island prison were very much in the public eye:

Were Con Son Island Prison an isolated aspect of South Vietnam's governmental apparatus, some might be able to dismiss it after the ritualized rhetoric of condemnation. However, the prison is, in fact, not unique. The Thieu-Ky regime is an oppressive government, countenancing no dissent. It represses those South Vietnamese who seek a negotiated settlement to the conflict which has beset their land.

Even Vice President Ky, so deeply involved in this repression, faces being barred from running for the Presidency because of restrictive election laws. What is more, the full weight of American power is at least implicitly backing Thieu.

We have been told that our continued presence is necessary to prevent a bloodbath. The President himself said on May 14, 1970, in an address to the Nation:

When we assumed the burden of helping defend South Vietnam, millions of South Vietnamese men, women and children placed their trust in us. To abandon them now would risk a massacre that would shock and dismay everyone in the world who values human life.

How have we saved the helpless people of Southeast Asia from a bloodbath?

Let us look at Laos. Seven hundred thousand refugees have been produced as a result of war-related activities-one-fourth of the population. Of an estimated Meo population 400,000 in 1960, at least 40 to 50 percent of the men and 25 percent of the women and children have fallen as war casualties. Between 1966 and 1969 Laos suffered the highest per capita casualty rate in the world, and it experienced the heaviest per square mile bombing in history. The bombing last year alone on the Plaine des Jarres has, in the words of one U.S. AID official, left "most villages and fields now almost completely ruined."

Let us look at Cambodia. It, too, has been dragged into the war. Since May 1970, the U.S. invasion has produced approximately 1 million refugees. Famine threatens because agricultural production has fallen so severely.

And let us look at South Vietnam. Some one-third of her people have become refugees since 1964. Civilian war casualties since 1965 are estimated to exceed 1 million. Dissenters are imprisoned. Inflation is rampant-30 to 50 percent per year. The culture of the Vietnamese is being destroyed in a glut of American goods and money. Herbicides have destroyed a substantial portion of her forests.

In brief, the bloodbath of Southeast Asia has been going on for years. U.S. withdrawal would not be its creator, but rather the occasion for its surcease, with asylum being offered to those who might be endangered.

We have been told that we are protecting South Vietnam from aggression from the North. There is no question that the North Vietnamese have entered South Vietnam. But "aggression" is an ambiguous term at times. In fact, there is one Vietnam. The two Vietnams are the creation of international diplomacy, not a reflection of the aspirations of the Vietnamese people themselves. Ho Chi Minh, whatever our perceptions of his leadership and the methods he employed domestically and externally, was the national leader of virtually all the Vietnamese people. Thus, President Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs, "Mandate for a Change, 1953-56," at page 372: