I asked them what they meant by that question, and they said, "Well, you cannot find peace for us, you cannot negotiate, in a lasting fashion at least, the differences between those of us from the South and those from the North in Vietnam, and we will have to settle these differences among ourselves."

So, I think a cease-fire is important as an element in our policy to produce an atmosphere and a climate within which all this might have a chance of working out.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman

Congressman Robison, I, too, want to congratulate you on your statement. Although I was not here for all of it I, too, share your frustration in trying to come up with a solution to this war. I recently returned from Vietnam where I wrote a report on the aspects of this war and America's experience with something similar to it, drug addiction. All I can say is that the time is now and we should get out. I, too, talked to leaders of the South Vietnamese Government, and to the present government's opponents. The consensus is that we should have been out 2 or 3 years ago. We fulfilled our role and we built our forces to 1,100,000. We have given them supplies, we have given them breathing spells. I think our obligations under any treaty have been fulfilled. I think our moral obligations have been fulfilled.

I can only think back when John Kennedy was President. I was not even thinking about running for Congress at the time. He mentioned this fact, "What it boils down to is that these people at some point in time take their obligations themselves and fight their own war." I think that time has come. It has, in fact, gone by.

Again I compliment you on your statement here today. The young people in this country have looked to us in Congress. As you say, the reason for their political apathy today is the fact that they are not experiencing or seeing any leadership emanate from the Congress, and I agree with you.

Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. ROBISON. Thank you very much. I would like to congratulate you and Mr. Steele in return for the work you have done on this aspect of this conflict, and it does give me at least an added reason for feeling that it is time to bring this war to a conclusion.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Halpern.

Mr. HALPERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

At the outset I certainly want to compliment our very able and distinguished colleague from New York. I am greatly impressed, as I have been since I first came to this House, with his sincerity and his capability and awareness. I am particularly cognizant of his complete dedication to the cause of peace. I want to compliment him on his very enlightening testimony and the initiative he has shown and for joining in the dialogue of this subcommittee during these very, very important hearings.

I, too, have recently returned from Vietnam where I met with the representatives of our Government and the leaders of the Vietnamese Government. I, too, engaged in a very extensive fact finding probe of the narcotic situation there. Certainly it is horrendous to me that that

problem is probably as far reaching and as dangerous and as much a threat to this country as any of the other implications of this war.

I believe there are men who are over there who are under a much greater danger of becoming addicts and ruining their lives and imposing threats to every community in this Nation than they are of being shot. This is a horrible conclusion but it is a realistic one that we have to face and is a blatant example of why we should get out of Vietnam over and above the multitude of reasons which have been pointed out by witness after witness before this subcommittee and by countless others throughout this Nation.

Now I missed some of your testimony. I did have a chance while here to go through it and I do have some questions relative to its

content.

Now you stated that should we be unable here in Congress to reach a consensus on whether or not the United States should provide air support for the South Vietnamese forces after our withdrawal we could leave this consideration for another day, but isn't this one of those final, tough decisions that you said must be hammered out before 1972? If so, why should we wait for another date to resolve this dispute?

Mr. ROBISON. Well, I would say to my good friend and colleague from New York, that I have been here long enough to believe, as I am sure he believes, that legislation is still the art of the possible. I notice the Mansfield amendment does not attempt to address itself to those kinds of questions. I have stated as my own attitude here that I would be willing, in line with the principles of the Nixon doctrine, to see some continuing air support given by our Nation to South Vietnam if Congress wants to in the future. If we have the kind of a regime still going on in Saigon that we wish to support, then we should support it at least indirectly. But to try now, Brother Halpern, to see if we can crank that sort of a question in on the House side in hope that it might be compatible with what the Senate has now done, to my mind complicates the matter so much that we will never be able to do it.

Mr. HALPERN. You appear to be in support of the administration's objective about the continuance of support, yet you also appear to be rather disenchanted, to say the least, with the Thieu-Ky regime. You do not seem to feel that the upcoming elections will be what they should be. Now how do you reconcile your lack of enthusiasm with the present government with the administration policy that does not, by setting a definite date for withdrawal, force the Vietnamese Government to take steps to aid the South Vietnamese citizens?

Mr. ROBISON. Either my colleague misunderstood my statement or I did not write it as clearly as I should have. My reference to the administration's ambition, or that of the President, is my own understanding of what the President has said: That we must stay there, first, until there is some resolution of the prisoner of war issue, and secondly, until there is some sound chance, or safe chance, or whatever the proper words are, that the Government in South Vietnam can continue on its own and withstand whatever aggression still is thrust against it from the North.

I would agree with my friend here, Mr. Murphy, that if the South Vietnamese cannot now stand against continued aggression from the North, with some logistical help from us, and possibly some supple

mentary close-air support if that is necessary, they never will be able to. I think the President on this matter has indicated, now and then, that these two issues relative to the prisoners of war and the ability of the South Vietnamese Government to stand on its own, are separable items. The first is a matter of fact; we either get our prisoners or we do not. The second is a matter of judgment, and it is my judgment that the time to leave South Vietnam is now.

Mr. HALPERN. The points you mention for inclusion in your resolution are, I think, goals that few could disagree with that total withdrawal should be our goal, that withdrawal should be irreversible, et cetera. Would not the passage of this resolution express sentiment of which the President is well aware while papering over the very real differences that do exist in Congress over the means to achieve the ultimate goal of the withdrawal?

Mr. ROBISON. Of course, but I am trying to be a realist. What can we actually accomplish? What are we trying to get Congress to say on this is the most we can get Congress to say. Again, as Senator Mansfield said, the Senate, at least, has on a number of occasions indicated its unwillingness to force a withdrawal date on the President by a cutoff of funds or whatever. Absent that willingness then, what do we do? Do we remain silent, or do we attempt, as the Senate has attempted, to hammer out at least the framework for a national policy statement relative to our withdrawal from this war?

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to state because mention has been made here about a withdrawal date. A very, very revealing fact that I think is very pertinent to these hearings is that in my recent interview with Vice President Ky he stated, incidentally, that he favors a withdrawal date for U.S. withdrawal of U.S. troops, a fixed date.

Mr. GALLAGHER. That is what, a change of heart?

Mr. HALPERN. I have not heard about the change of heart.

He has said more recently that he would suggest some time in 1972. He didn't indicate how late in 1972, but he did favor when I spoke to him and that was not much more than 2 months ago that he favors a disengagement date and he gave two reasons, Mr. Chairman, and he said this without qualification: that it will finally bring the South Vietnamese people to the realization that the United States is not going to be there indefinitely and that they must buckle down immediately to sustain their own national security and that they must develop a determined will for their own survival.

The other reason he gave was that it will help to bring the American people together once again.

Now, Mr. Robison, my distinguished colleague-I should say Brother Robison in acknowledgment of his reference to me because I have such deep affinity and love for our witness, Mr. Chairman.

You say that a withdrawal date will not bring about the release of American prisoners. You were quite explicit in a general surmise. Now what would be wrong if the withdrawal date that is recommended by the President was contingent upon an agreement to release the prisoners of war?

Mr. ROBISON. Absolutely nothing, although you might find a bit of a distinction and an argument between some of us as to whether there should be merely such an agreement, or an agreement then followed by

an actual release of prisoners, before we then make the withdrawal date terminal.

Mr. HALPERN. Well, you would not object then.

Mr. ROBISON. Not at all.

Mr. HALPERN. Well, isn't it similar to some of the proposals pending either on this committee or the other body?

Mr. ROBISON. Yes; it is.

Mr. HALPERN. Then you would favor that?

Mr. ROBISON. Yes; it is quite like the amendment I offered to NedziWhalen which didn't get much attention, but at least I tried.

Mr. HALPERN. I may add, Mr. Chairman, as you may be aware, that I conferred with both representatives of the South Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese in Paris recently, the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the DRV, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. I conferred with them for a total of 8 hours, 4 hours with the DRV and 4 hours 15 minutes with the Vietnamese. I saw this readiness to meet with me a part of their calculated policy, knowing that I would obviously be in contact with our Government's negotiating team, our State Department, and our President. I saw this move as a signal of their willingness to talk, to clarify doubts as to the prisoner of war issue. I saw this as a sign of flexibility, as a means of communicating with us out of the context of the diplomatic strategy of official table talks. It certainly opens the door and is worth probing.

I am not naive and I certainly did not accept all the party line rhetoric that they expressed during our lengthy talks. As a matter of fact, the meetings were anything but love feasts. I played the role of the devil's advocate and even called them stupid; that if they released the prisoners of war it would be the smartest thing they could do, and it would show real evidence of good faith.

We can only accept their assurances of good faith at face value, and these are the same assurances that have been expressed to some of the other members of this committee. Their statements to us have been widely publicized and I cannot conceive of them risking world opinion by going back on their word, particularly after they went so much out of their way to emphasize their position.

Now I took complete notes at these meetings and I read back every word to them. It was not a question of interpreting what they said after the fact, the statements were literally dictated by the Communist side. I turned over the full transcript to our representatives at the Paris talks and to the State Department and to the White House

I would like, Mr. Chairman, if I may, to include in the record transcripts of these interviews that I had with both the DRV and with the North Vietnamese.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Without objection, so ordered. (The transcripts follow):

STATEMENT BY MEMBER OF DRV DELEGATION AND DRV PRESS SPOKESMAN NGUYEN THANH LE TO CONGRESSMAN SEYMOUR HALPERN

Now I'll be brief, simple, and realistic in my responses to your questions. So far we have heard from various people who have raised the same opinions and questions you expressed. This includes President Nixon who went so far as to label the Vietnamese as barbaric as far as the prisoners of war are concerned.

It isn't difficult to give answers to the questions you raised. However, we find it necessary to look into the background of the problem. Any impartial person

would say the United States has interfered in Viet-Nam affairs since 1948-1949. You probably will remember since October 4, 1950, a military mission of advisors were set up in Saigon. And some 80% of war expenditures of the French were financed by the United States.

It is not true that when Mr. Nixon says the presence of American troops in Viet-Nam was in response to an appeal of the Saigon government. This is definitely not true for it dates back to the French occupation. Even at that time the late President Kennedy, then Senator Kennedy, said we share the same bed as the French colonialists in Viet-Nam.

If the question is raised why is an American serviceman captured in Viet-Nam, that doesn't mean we have gone to the United States to get him, it is the reverse. That's why we say when Mr. Nixon says that the Vietnamese are the most barbaric nation in the world today that such statements by Mr. Nixon are stupid. Not only do the Vietnamese say that but many Americans say the same thing. The crimes committed by Americans are among the most barbaric in history. I don't know if you read the article in the Herald Tribune today but it describes an American officer's statement. He stated that an order was given by an American general to massacre a hospital in South Viet-Nam by shelling it. And when a wounded combatant in South Viet-Nam was in the hands of American troops the American general asked to withhold treatment in order to explore his mind and then leave him to his death. These are only a few and tiny examples. We have a long history of being a cultured people, a civilized people. All the Vietnamese people follow the guiding principles of humanitarianism, fidelity, faithfulness, courtesy, intelligence, and confidence. The first guiding principle for the Vietnamese is humanitarianism. You know that during thousands of years we have been victims of aggression and each time we were victims of foreign aggressors. We also captured servicemen during these periods of resistance and always treated them well. During the 13th century, the 14th century, and the 18th century when our country was invaded by the Mongolians and Chinese feudalists we captured hundreds of thousands of their men. But every time we have had a specific policy as far as the treatment of the prisoners of war were concerned and as soon as war would be over we would release them. We even provided the transportation.

Now, from 1945-1954 we resisted French aggression and there were great numbers of prisoners of war. You may remember that during Dien Bien Phu we captured tens of thousands of men but we released them right after signing the Geneva Agreements. There never was the slightest problem. General De Castries has declared he received very good treatment. The same thing was said by a great number of French officers and French soldiers. Anyone who puts himself in our place-victims of bombings and strafings by those who came over to North Viet-Nam to destroy schools, hospitals and dykes-in spite of these crimes the pilots we captured receive only good treatment, fair treatment once they were captured. Let us say as another example, our food ration. Any food ration of a captured pilot would be much better than that of the Vietnamese people. You may remember an American colonel who was released. He said he received good treatment and he corroborated that his food was better than the Vietnamese. I can cite many other examples. For instance, in Viet-Nam we have no heating systems, but in wintertime every Vietnamese gets one blanket, but every captured pilot gets two. One of the captured pilots is a Commander McCain, the son of Admiral McCain. His father is the one who ordered the bombing of North Viet-Nam yet when his son was captured inside Hanoi he was treated very well. His arm was broken and despite his contention that it would be no use to try to save him. that he was going to die. yet he got the very best of medical care and our doctors saved his life.

We think that there are many foreign visitors and journalists who came to see these captured pilots with their own eyes who would attest to their good treatment. This has been reported in the Herald Tribune. The same thing has been reported in the Baltimore Sun and the Los Angeles Times.

As for the name lists of the pilots, we have no interest in holding out any other names than those we released. We released the entire list based on the humanitarian and the guiding spirits of the Vietnamese people which I mentioned to you. Now as everyone knows, as soon as the war is over, as soon as an agreement is signed, this question of release of the prisoners is automatically solved. It was the same as with the French at Geneva. What is different from the general understanding about the war in the past, in order to show the good will of the Vietnamese people, the PRG in Paris has put forth their ten point

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