between technical and non-technical institutions, on which the opponents of the inclusion of the Imperial College of Science in the University insisted, are cleverly met by providing a special form of government for the Faculty of Technology by placing it in the hands of a special Committee.

It is, however, necessary to provide not only for the general supervision and control of the University as a whole, but also for the management of the separate institutions connected with the University. These are classified as follows. Institutions which are now or are to be put under the complete financial and educational control of the University will be called Constituent Colleges. Their principal teachers will be University Professors or Readers. A single department similarly controlled and staffed will be called a University Department. Public Educational Institutions or groups of departments in larger educational institutions, which are not under the educational and financial control of the University, will be called Schools of the University, provided they comply with the conditions laid down in the existing statutes and with certain others recommended by the Commissioners.

In the next place we may show how the various bodies are co-ordinated, and what are the special functions of each; and we will begin with the Professoriate, which is the foundation of the whole system.

University Professors and Readers will be teachers in Constituent Colleges or University Departments, to whose posts those titles and the status and salary attaching to them have been assigned by the University. The minimum salary of a Professor varies from 600l. a year in the Faculties of Arts and Economics to 1000l. a year in the Faculty of Technology. The head of each department and, under his directions, the other teachers in his department will be the examiners of the students in the department; but in the Public Examinations one or two assessors appointed by the Faculty will be conjoined with them. The several heads of departments and other teachers in a Faculty attached to a Constituent College, together with the assessors, will form the Examining Board for the public University examinations for the degrees of candidates in that college, and at a meeting in

common session will decide upon the Pass and Honours List to be submitted to the Faculty. It follows from these regulations that, subject to the co-operation of assessors or external examiners, the Professors will have the control of the examination of their own students.

Each Faculty of the University will consist either wholly or in the main of the University Professors and Readers of subjects comprised within the Faculty, and of such other teachers appointed by the University as the Faculty may co-opt. The Vice-Chancellor will, ex officio, be a member of every Faculty. Put very briefly, it may be stated that the Faculty will exercise control over the conditions under which degrees are obtained and over the machinery for granting them. Thus it may prescribe in general terms the standard of knowledge required, but this it will do by indicating the range of study. It is not to indicate the range of any subject by means of a detailed syllabus, for this (the Commissioners hold) is a matter for the Professor in consultation with his colleagues in the same branch of learning. It has the deciding voice in case of a difference of opinion between the head of a department and the assessor or assessors appointed to co-operate with him.

By these regulations a vast amount of business which is now transacted by the supreme body of the University as at present constituted will be transferred from it to bodies composed principally of the teachers. Matters affecting the University as a whole are to be dealt with in the following manner.

The Academic Council will be a body of University teachers, consisting of the Vice-Chancellor, who will preside, the Deans of Faculties, one teacher appointed by the Senate to represent each group of studies in respect of which Schools of the University have been recognised, but for which no Faculty has yet been constituted, and eight members of the Faculties elected by the Faculties in common session. To this body the Senate will delegate such executive functions as it may be unwilling to delegate to the Faculties separately. Its main duties, however, will be advisory; and it should be so constituted as to ensure that the Senate should have before it the opinion of the University professoriate as a whole, expressed through its appointed representatives.

The Senate will receive a report from the Academic Council before coming to a decision upon any educational question affecting the University as a whole which may arise through an appeal by a Faculty, or from a delegacy entrusted with the management of a Constituent College or a University Department, or otherwise.

The two supreme executive and legislative bodies are the Senate and the Court respectively. The Senate will be a body of fifteen persons, consisting of the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, the Chairman of Convocation, five persons appointed by the Crown and two by the Court for terms of six years, two members of the Academic Council appointed triennially by that Council, two appointed by the London County Council, and one by the Corporation of the City of London. This Senate will be the Executive Body of the University and will have the management and administration of the whole revenue and property of the University, and, except as otherwise provided (see above), the conduct of all the affairs of the University. To go beyond this short and comprehensive statement would make it necessary to enter into detail at greater length than is here possible.

In constituting the Court or supreme legislative body the Commissioners have followed the advice of the present Academic Council, and the example which has been set in the relatively new Universities in the north of England. They propose to create a very large body, composed chiefly of laymen, on which ample room can be found for all those who are or ought to be interested in the University. Taking what appears to be the maximum number of representatives in each case, the constitution of the Court will be somewhat as follows:

Senate, Deans of Faculties, and representatives of Constituent Colleges
and Departments and of Schools of the University, about .
Elected or nominated by Heads of Government Departments

Convocation

Members of Parliament for London constituencies

Corporation of City and City Companies

London County Council.

Co-opted from members of London Borough Councils

Head Masters and Mistresses of London Schools

Co-opted by Court (not more than)

Representatives of various County Councils and Institutions (chiefly

Total (about)

It is evident that a Court thus constituted, though efficiently representing public opinion, would not be competent to undertake the control of the University in detail; nor do the Commissioners intend that it should do so. 'The Senate' (they say), with its Committees and Delegacies, will be concerned with administration and finance; the Faculties with education.' The Court, subject to the approval of the Privy Council, will be the only body that can make new statutes, confer Honorary Degrees, approve the admission of Constituent Colleges or University Departments, and recognise Schools of the University. It alone can institute any new degree, diploma or certificate, and receive and decide appeals from the decisions of the Senate in cases where a decision is contrary to that of the Academic Council and a minority of not less than one-third of the Senate desire that the appeal should be made.

The constitution and powers of the Court are generally similar to those adopted by the northern Universities, which are working well. There seems to be no reason why the scheme should not work well in London, provided that the traditions of the present Senate (which is both legislative and executive) do not lead the Court to attempt encroachments on the executive powers of the new Senate and of the bodies behind it. Inasmuch as it will possess all powers except those specifically allotted to other bodies, misplaced ingenuity might find means of encroachment. Thus, though no statute will be valid unless approved by the Privy Council, it is not quite clear what will be the effect of a resolution of the Court. Of course, any such resolution must be subject to the existing statutes, and it is therefore to be presumed that the Court could not issue executive directions with regard to matters specially reserved for other bodies; but has it the power of expressing by resolution an opinion as to the way in which those powers are being exercised, if that question is not specifically raised by an appeal against a decision of the Senate ? If such a resolution can be passed, then one of two things may happen; the Executive may continue on its course irrespective of the opinion of the Court, or the formally expressed opinion of the Court may hamper the Executive in carrying out a policy over which the Court has no real control.

For example, the Senate is the body on which the duty is laid of providing 'the buildings, premises, furniture, and apparatus and other means needed for carrying on the work of the University.' (Final Report, p. 192 [g].) If a question of public interest arose as to the selection of a particular site for a particular purpose, could the Court pass a resolution expressing an opinion on this point? If this opinion were opposed to that of the Executive, it might obviously be very embarrassing. Nay, it is not quite clear that such a resolution might not contain a direction to the Senate. 'The control of the Court over the internal management of the University,' say the Commissioners, would . . . be exercised entirely by means of Statutes and Resolutions, and would take effect only by altering or by setting in motion the existing machinery for the government of the University (loc. cit. p. 158). Setting in motion' is an ambiguous phrase. If it only means requesting or desiring the Senate to consider a general question, it may be unobjectionable; but, if it includes the power to delay negotiations in progress by some such resolution as that it is not desirable that site A shall be purchased until the Senate have considered fully the advantages of site B,' the position might become intolerable. The Court would lose in dignity if the Senate completed the purchase of site A forthwith. If, however, it were held that such a resolution merely set in action the machinery of the University in a particular way, and with reference to site B, and was thus of binding force, a favourable opportunity for purchase might be lost; and such resolutions, if frequently passed, might seriously interfere with the powers and influence of the Executive.

A somewhat similar difficulty arises in regard to the very general powers given to the Court to appoint Committees. This might develope into government by Committees of the Court rather than by the Statutory Authorities. If the Court were to appoint a standing Committee to consider and report upon all business brought before the Court by the Senate before such business is considered by the Court, grave difficulties might ensue. Of course, it could be urged with some reason that a body of over two hundred persons would require the guidance of a report before they could come to a satisfactory